Moore v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 23

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION adopting 19 Report and Recommendation, affirming the decision of the Commissioner. Signed by Honorable Mary Geiger Lewis on 04/29/2016. (bshr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ROCK HILL DIVISION
WILLIE N. MOORE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CAROLYN W. COLVIN,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.

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CIVIL ACTION NO. 0:15-cv-425-MGL

ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AND AFFIRMING DEFENDANT’S FINAL DECISION DENYING BENEFITS
This is a Social Security appeal in which Plaintiff seeks judicial review of the final decision
of Defendant denying his claims for Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security
Income (SSI). The parties are represented by excellent counsel. The matter is before the Court for
review of the Report and Recommendation (Report) of the United States Magistrate Judge
suggesting to the Court that Defendant’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claims for DIB and SSI
be affirmed. The Report was made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Local Civil Rule 73.02
for the District of South Carolina.
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has
no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court.
Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo
determination of those portions of the Report to which specific objection is made, and the Court may

accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge or
recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The Magistrate Judge filed the Report on March 28, 2016, Plaintiff filed his objections on
April 14, 2016, and Defendant filed her reply to Plaintiff’s objections on April 26, 2016. The Court
has carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s objections, but finds them to be without merit. Therefore, it will
enter judgment accordingly.
Plaintiff filed his application for DIB and SSI in August 2011, asserting that his disability
commenced on August 1, 2011. His application was denied initially and upon reconsideration.
Plaintiff requested a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), which the ALJ conducted
on July 8, 2013. Then, on October 18, 2013, the ALJ issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not
disabled under the Act. Subsequently, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review of
the ALJ’s decision; accordingly, the ALJ’s decision became Defendant’s final decision for purposes
of judicial review. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed suit in this Court, seeking judicial review of
Defendant’s final decision denying his claim.
The Social Security Administration has established a five-step sequential evaluation process
for determining whether a person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The five steps
are: (1) whether the claimant is currently engaging in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the
claimant has a medically determinable severe impairment(s); (3) whether such impairment(s) meets
or equals an impairment set forth in the Listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevents the claimant
from returning to his past relevant work; and, if so, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other
work as it exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(I)-(v).

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Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), a district court is required to conduct a de novo review of those
portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Report to which a specific objection has been made. The Court
need not conduct a de novo review, however, “when a party makes general and conclusory objections
that do not direct the court to a specific error in the [Magistrate Judge’s] proposed findings and
recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).
Thus, the Court will address each specific objection to the Report in turn. As provided above,
however, the Court need not–and will not–address any of Plaintiff’s arguments that fail to point the
Court to alleged specific errors that the Magistrate Judge made in the Report.
It is Plaintiff’s duty to both produce evidence and prove that he is disabled under the Act.
See Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995). And, it is the duty of the ALJ, not this
Court, to make findings of fact and to resolve conflicts in the evidence. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d
1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). Under the substantial evidence standard, however, we must view the
entire record as a whole. See Steurer v. Bowen, 815 F.2d, 1249, 1250 (8th Cir. 1987).
“Additionally, the substantial evidence standard presupposes a zone of choice within which
the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts. An administrative decision
is not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite
decision.” Clarke v. Bowen, 843 F.2d 271, 272-73 (8th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (alteration omitted). Likewise, when considering a Social Security
disability claim, it is not the province of this Court to “reweigh conflicting evidence . . . or substitute
[its] judgment for that of the ALJ.” Johnson v. Barnhart, 434 F.3d 650, 653 (4th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (citation omitted) (alteration omitted). The Court “must sustain the ALJ’s decision, even

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if [it] disagree[s] with it, provided the determination is supported by substantial evidence.” Smith
v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638 (4th Cir. 1996).
Plaintiff raises two specific objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report. The Court will
address each one in turn.
First, Plaintiff asserts that the Magistrate Judge erred in finding that Plaintiff failed to
demonstrate any error by the ALJ or that the ALJ’s residual functional capacity (RFC) assessment
is unsupported by substantial evidence. Objections 1. Plaintiff contends that the ALJ was required
not only to discuss evidence that contradicted her conclusions, but also to give some rational reason
why the contradictory evidence should be disbelieved. Id. at 2. Further, Plaintiff avers that the ALJ
improperly provided her own medical interpretation of the objective evidence in assessing Plaintiff’s
RFC. Id. at 2-3. The Court is unpersuaded.
As already noted, “the substantial evidence standard presupposes a zone of choice within
which the decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts. An administrative
decision is not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence would have supported an
opposite decision.” Clarke, 843 F.2d at 272-73. The Court “must sustain the ALJ’s decision, even
if [it] disagree[s] with it, provided the determination is supported by substantial evidence.” Smith,
99 F.3d at 638. Moreover, the ALJ is not required to rely on medical opinions to formulate an RFC
assessment, as the “ALJ is not precluded from reaching RFC determinations without outside medical
expert review of each fact incorporated into the decision.” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667
F.3d 356, 361 (3d Cir. 2011). Where, as here, the ALJ discussed medical and nonmedical evidence
leading to her RFC assessment for Plaintiff, specifically addressing each of Plaintiff’s impairments
and giving him every benefit of the doubt by providing for any limitation in overhead reaching, the
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Court holds that the ALJ’s decision was supported by substantial evidence. Thus, the Court will
overrule Plaintiff’s first objection.
Second, Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge erred in suggesting that Plaintiff failed
to demonstrate that the ALJ’s determination that Plaintiff was only partially credible is unsupported
by substantial evidence or controlled by an error of law. Objections 4. Plaintiff requests the Court
recognize that the ALJ failed to consider and weigh the evidence fairly and failed to consider the
longitudinal treatment record supporting Plaintiff’s allegations. Id. at 6. Plaintiff also insists that
the ALJ’s finding that Plaintiff was incredible due to his testimony that he still used a cane was
unreasonable. Id. Ultimately, Plaintiff proclaims that the ALJ failed to articulate specific and
adequate reasons for discounting Plaintiff’s testimony about pain and the Magistrate Judge erred by
essentially taking the position that the ALJ’s credibility determination is beyond review. Id. at 7-8.
The Court disagrees.
The ALJ expressly considered Plaintiff’s claims of pain and explained her conclusion that
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints were only partially credible. Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the
Court’s “general practice, which [it] see[s] no reason to depart from here, is to take a lower tribunal
at its word when it declares that it has considered a matter.” Hackett v. Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168,
1173 (10th Cir. 2005). The Court finds that Plaintiff’s objection to the ALJ’s finding merely
constitutes disagreement with the ALJ’s conclusion, and the Court “generally treat[s] credibility
determinations made by an ALJ as binding upon review.” See Gossett v. Bowen, 862 F.2d 802, 807
(10th Cir. 1988); see also Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that the court
may not “undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute
[its] judgment for that of the [Commissioner]”). Therefore, discerning no legal error, and holding
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that the ALJ’s decision on this issue is supported by substantial evidence, the Court will overrule
Plaintiff’s second objection as well.
In sum, the Court holds that there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s conclusion that
Plaintiff was not disabled under the Act during the relevant time period and that the ALJ’s decision
is free from reversible legal error. Further, the determination is reasonable.
After a thorough review of the Report and the record in this case under the standard set forth
above, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objections, adopts the Report, and incorporates it herein.
Therefore, it is the judgment of the Court that Defendant’s final decision denying Plaintiff’s claims
for DIB and SSI is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 29th day of April, 2016, in Columbia, South Carolina.
s/ Mary Geiger Lewis
MARY GEIGER LEWIS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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