Hewitt v. Bouch
Filing
10
ORDER - The court concludes that the claims of the two Plaintiffs in the instant action should be separated for initial review. Signed by Honorable Mary G Lewis on 3/16/2015. (gmil)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
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Plaintiffs,
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v.
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Cpl. Bouch,
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Defendant.
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Steven L. Hewitt, also known as Steven Lee
Hewitt, Sr., also known as, Steven Lee Hewitt,
also known as, Steven Hewitt;
Steven W. Mullis,
C/A No. 0:15-721-MGL-PJG
ORDER
This is a civil rights action filed by two state prisoners, proceeding pro se. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit has held that prisoners cannot bring a class action lawsuit.
See Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) (“[T]he competence of a layman
representing himself [is] clearly too limited to allow him to risk the rights of others.”); see also
Hummer v. Dalton, 657 F.2d 621, 625-26 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that a prisoner’s suit is “confined
to redress for violation of his own personal rights and not one by him as a knight-errant for all
prisoners”).
While this Circuit has not ruled on the issue of whether multiple prisoner plaintiffs are
allowed to join under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or the issue of fee payment
in a case filed by multiple prisoners, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
addressed these issues in Hubbard v. Haley, 262 F.3d 1194, 1198 (11th Cir. 2001), and found that
prisoners may not join in one action. The Hubbard court reasoned that, because the plain language
of the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), requires
each prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis to pay the full filing fee, it was appropriate to sever the
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claims and require each prisoner to file a separate lawsuit. Hubbard, 262 F.3d at 1198. Even in light
of more flexible holdings in other circuits regarding permissive joinder of multiple prisoner
plaintiffs, see Hagan v. Rogers, 570 F.3d 146, 157 (3d Cir. 2009); Boriboune v. Berge, 391 F.3d
852, 855 (7th Cir. 2004); In re Prison Litigation Reform Act, 105 F.3d 1131, 1137-38 (6th Cir.
1997), courts in this district have found the analysis in Hubbard persuasive and have declined to
permit prisoner plaintiffs to join in one civil action. See Williams v. Jones, C/A No. 9:14-787RMG-BM, 2014 WL 2155251, at *10 (D.S.C. May 22, 2014) (adopting report and recommendation
collecting cases which find Hubbard persuasive); McFadden v. Fuller, C/A No. 2:13-2290-JMC,
2013 WL 6182365, at *2 (D.S.C. Nov. 22, 2013) (agreeing with the magistrate judge’s conclusion
that multiple prisoner plaintiffs “should not be allowed to proceed under one joint action”); see also
Carroll v. United States, C/A No. 5:14-2167-JMC, 2015 WL 854927, at *9-10 (D.S.C. Feb. 27,
2015) (denying joinder of seventy pro se prisoners as co-plaintiffs and noting that the “court has
discretion to disallow joinder when it is infeasible or prejudicial”).
In addition to the requirement that “indigent prisoners filing lawsuits be held responsible for
the full amount of filing fees,” Torres v. O’Quinn, 612 F.3d 237, 241 (4th Cir. 2010), the PLRA also
requires each prisoner to exhaust his or her administrative remedies prior to filing a civil lawsuit.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 85 (2006); Porter v. Nussle, 534
U.S. 516, 524 (2002). “Just as payment of one fee does not cover multiple plaintiffs under the
PLRA, exhaustion of administrative remedies by one prisoner does not meet the exhaustion
requirement for all of the Plaintiffs.” Williams, 2014 WL 2155251 at *11. Thus, each Plaintiff’s
claim “will require individualized determinations.” Id.; see also McFadden, 2013 WL 6182365 at
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*1 (noting that “each Plaintiff would need to meet the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA and
might be entitled to differing amounts of damages”).
Accordingly, the court concludes that the claims of the two Plaintiffs in the instant
action should be separated for initial review.
TO THE CLERK OF COURT:
The above-captioned case shall pertain only to the first named Plaintiff, Steven L. Hewitt.
Therefore, the Clerk of Court is directed to terminate Steven W. Mullis as a plaintiff in the abovereferenced case. The Clerk of Court is further directed to assign a separate civil action number to
Plaintiff Mullis. The Clerk of Court shall file this order as the initial docket entry in the newly
created case, and shall re-file the instant Complaint, Plaintiff Mullis’s motion for a preliminary
injunction, and proposed service documents as subsequent docket entries in the newly created
action. The defendant in the newly created case will be the same defendant listed in the abovecaptioned case. The Clerk of Court is authorized to determine the most efficient way and time for
assigning and entering the new case number, party information, and pleading information on the
court’s electronic case management system.
After the new case is docketed, the assigned Magistrate Judge is authorized to issue orders
pursuant to the General Order issued in In Re: Procedures in Civil Actions Filed by Prisoner Pro Se
Litigants, 3:07-mc-5014-JFA (D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2007), and conduct initial reviews in compliance
with 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
March 16, 2015
Columbia, South Carolina
s/ Mary G. Lewis
Mary G. Lewis
United States District Judge
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