Evans v. York County Inc et al

Filing 82

ORDER adopting 78 Report and Recommendation and the Plaintiff's case is summarily dismissed with prejudice and without issuance and service of process. Signed by Honorable Joseph F Anderson, Jr on 11/15/17.(mflo, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ROCK HILL DIVISION

Reginald Evans,

C/A No. 0:15-cv-04954-JFA
Plaintiff,

v.
ORDER
York County, Inc. and B.H. Management,
Pace River Apartment,
Defendants.

I.

INTRODUCTION
Reginald Evans (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action

against York County, Inc. and B.H. Management, Pace River Apartment, (collectively
“Defendants”), claiming Defendants violated his constitutional rights. (ECF No. 73).
After reviewing the pleadings, the Magistrate Judge assigned to this action1 prepared a
thorough Report and Recommendation (“Report”) and opined that this Court should dismiss this
case with prejudice and without issuance and service of process. (ECF No. 78 p. 7). The Report
sets forth, in detail, the relevant facts and standards of law on this matter, and this Court
incorporates those facts and standards without a recitation. On October 30, 2017, the Court
received Plaintiff’s objection to the Report. (ECF No. 81). Thus, this matter is ripe for review.
The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report
to which specific objections are made, and the Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in

The Magistrate Judge’s review was made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)
(D.S.C.).
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part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge
with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). However, a district court is only required to conduct
a de novo review of the specific portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Report to which an objection
is made. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b); Carniewski v. W. Virginia Bd. of Prob. &
Parole, 974 F.2d 1330 (4th Cir. 1992). In the absence of specific objections to portions of the
Magistrate’s Report, this Court is not required to give an explanation for adopting the
recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir. 1983).
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On December 15, 2015, Plaintiff filed his initial complaint against York County; City of

Rick Hill; B.H. Management; Paces River Apartment; Magistrate Judge Clifford Berinsky;
Thomas I. Howard; Brownlee Law Firm, PLLC; Dina D. Biggs; Alyssa Pruitt; and Land Star
Transportation Logistic, Inc., alleging a violation of his constitutional rights. (ECF No. 1). This
Court dismissed the Complaint on March 29, 2016. (ECF No. 15). Thereafter, Plaintiff appealed,
and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Plaintiff could remedy the deficiencies in his
original complaint by filing an amended complaint. (ECF Nos. 18, 23).
On November 30, 2016, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against the City of Rock Hill,
Inc., and York County, Inc. (ECF No. 35). Thereafter, the Magistrate issued a report and
recommendation. (ECF No. 43). This Court subsequently adopted the Magistrate’s
recommendation and ordered that the amended complaint be summarily dismissed. (ECF No. 46).
Plaintiff again appealed to the Fourth Circuit, and the Fourth Circuit remanded the case, giving
Plaintiff the option to file another amended complaint. (ECF Nos. 49, 54). Plaintiff filed a second
amended complaint on August 28, 2017 (ECF No. 66), and he subsequently filed a third amended
complaint on September 25, 2017 (ECF No. 73). Plaintiff filed his third amended complaint
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pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which exempts him from the administrative costs of proceeding with
the lawsuit.
III.

DISCUSSION
In Plaintiff’s third amended complaint, he challenges the rulings made by the Magistrate

Court, which ultimately resulted in his eviction. (ECF No. 73 p. 6). In his Objection to the
Magistrate’s Report, Plaintiff asserts that “[t]he Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude the
federal court from proceeding in this case.” (ECF No. 81 p. 2). Specifically, Plaintiff claims that
he is not challenging the state court’s decision. (ECF No. 81 p. 3). Instead, he asserts that the
“defendant violated his due process constitutional rights for a fair hearing and processing
eviction,” and thus “the Rooker-Felman doctrine does not apply.” (ECF No. 81 p. 3).
Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, however, a federal district court may not review the
final determinations of state or local courts. Dist. of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462, 463 (1983); see Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 416 (1923) (“The jurisdiction
possessed by the District Courts is strictly original.”). Moreover, this Court does not have
jurisdiction “over challenges to state court decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial
proceedings even if those challenges allege that the state court’s action was unconstitutional.”
Feldman, 460 U.S. at 476; see Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Virginia, 122 F.3d 192, 199 (4th
Cir. 1997) (citing Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486-87; Leonard v. Suthard, 927 F.2d 168, 169-70 (4th
Cir. 1991)) (“The [Rooker-Feldman] doctrine extends not only to constitutional claims presented
or adjudicated by the state courts but also to claims that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state
court judgment.”). Therefore, Plaintiff’s argument is unfounded, and this Court must adopt the
Magistrate’s recommendation.

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IV.

CONCLUSION
After carefully reviewing the applicable laws, the record in this case, as well as the Report,

this Court finds the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation fairly and accurately summarizes the facts
and applies the correct principles of law as modified. Accordingly, the Court adopts the Report
(ECF No. 78), and the Plaintiff’s case is summarily dismissed with prejudice and without issuance
and service of process.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

November 15, 2017
Columbia, South Carolina

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
United States District Judge

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