Gray v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 30

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION adopting 24 Report and Recommendation, affirming the decision of the Commissioner. Signed by Honorable Bruce Howe Hendricks on 02/28/2018. (bshr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Martha Sue Gray,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting
)
Commissioner of Social Security
)
Administration,
)
)
Defendant.
)
________________________________)

Civil Action No. 0:16-3099-BHH

ORDER

This is an action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) seeking judicial review of
the Acting Commissioner of Social Security’s (“Commissioner”) final decision, which denied
Plaintiff Martha Sue Gray’s (“Plaintiff”) claim for disability insurance benefits (“DIB”) and
supplemental security income (“SSI”). The record includes the report and recommendation
(“Report”) of the United States Magistrate Judge Paige J. Gossett, which was made in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a) (D.S.C.).
In her Report, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court affirm the
Commissioner’s final decision denying benefits. Plaintiff filed objections to the Report, and
the Commissioner filed a response to those objections. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)
(providing that a party may object, in writing, to a Magistrate Judge’s Report within 14 days
after being served a copy). For the reasons stated below, the Court adopts the Magistrate
Judge’s Report and affirms the Commissioner’s final decision denying benefits.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI in April of 2012, alleging disability beginning on
June 1, 2009. Her applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration, and she

requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). A video hearing was held
on December 2, 2014, at which Plaintiff, who was represented by counsel, appeared and
testified. At the hearing, Plaintiff amended her alleged onset date to October 31, 2011.
After considering the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), the ALJ issued a decision on
February 13, 2015, concluding that Plaintiff was not disabled from October 31, 2011,
through the date of the decision.
Plaintiff was born in 1974 and was 37 years old at the time of her amended alleged
onset date. She has a high school education and past relevant work experience as a
cashier, a furniture inspector, an automotive machine operator, a production associate, and
a retail stock associate. Plaintiff alleged disabilities due to migraines, degenerative disc
disease, depression, and obsessive-compulsive disorder.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
I.

The Magistrate Judge’s Report
The Court conducts a de novo review to those portions of the Report to which a

specific objection is made, and this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,
the recommendations contained in the Report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Any written
objection must specifically identify the portion of the Report to which the objection is made
and the basis for the objection. Id.
II.

Judicial Review of a Final Decision
The federal judiciary plays a limited role in the administrative scheme as established

by the Social Security Act. Section 205(g) of the Act provides that “[t]he findings of the
Commissioner of Social Security, as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall

2

be conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Consequently, judicial review . . . of a final
decision regarding disability benefits is limited to determining whether the findings are
supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct law was applied.” Walls v.
Barnhart, 296 F.3d 287, 290 (4th Cir. 2002). “Substantial evidence” is defined as:
evidence which a reasoning mind would accept as sufficient to support a
particular conclusion. It consists of more than a mere scintilla of evidence
but may be somewhat less than a preponderance. If there is evidence to
justify a refusal to direct a verdict were the case before a jury, then there is
“substantial evidence.”
Shively v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. 1984) (quoting Laws v. Celebreeze, 368
F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966)). In assessing whether substantial evidence exists, the
reviewing court should not “undertake to re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility
determinations, or substitute [its] judgment for that of” the agency. Mastro v. Apfel, 270
F.3d 171, 176 (4th Cir. 2001) (alteration in original).
DISCUSSION
I.

The Commissioner’s Final Decision
The Commissioner is charged with determining the existence of a disability. The

Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-1399, defines “disability” as the “inability to engage
in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be
expected to result in death or which has lasted or can expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than 12 months . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). This determination
involves the following five-step inquiry:
[The first step is] whether the claimant engaged in substantial gainful
employment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(b). If not, the analysis continues to
3

determine whether, based upon the medical evidence, the claimant has a
severe impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(c) If the claimed impairment is
sufficiently severe, the third step considers whether the claimant has an
impairment that equals or exceeds in severity one or more of the
impairments listed in Appendix I of the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d);
20 C.F.R. Part 404, subpart P, App. I. If so, the claimant is disabled. If not,
the next inquiry considers if the impairment prevents the claimant from
returning to past work. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(e); 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)
If the answer is in the affirmative, the final consideration looks to whether the
impairment precludes that claimant from performing other work.
Mastro, 270 F.3d at 177 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.920).
If the claimant fails to establish any of the first four steps, review does not proceed
to the next step. Hunter v. Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 35 (4th Cir. 1993). The burden of
production and proof remains with the claimant through the fourth step. However, if the
claimant successfully reaches step five, then the burden shifts to the Commissioner to
provide evidence of a significant number of jobs in the national economy that the claimant
could perform, taking into account the claimant’s medical condition, functional limitations,
education, age, and work experience. Walls, 296 F.3d at 290.
At step one, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not engage in substantial gainful activity
since October 31, 2011, her amended alleged onset date. Next, the ALJ determined that
Plaintiff’s obesity, degenerative disc disease of the cervical spine, migraine headaches,
osteoarthritis of the knees, essential tremor, tobacco abuse, mood disorder, depression,
anxiety, and status-post a left sacroiliac joint arthrodesis in December of 2013 were severe
impairments.

However, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or

combination of impairments that met or medically equaled the severity of one of the listed
impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1 (“the Listings”). With regard to
residual functional capacity (“RFC”), the ALJ found that Plaintiff could:
4

perform up to and including the light exertional level work, as defined in 20
CFR 404.1567(b) and 416.967(b) except: she can only occasionally climb
ramps and stairs; she can never climb ropes, ladders or scaffolds; she can
only occasionally balance, crawl, stoop, kneel, and crouch; she is limited to
routine tasks with no detailed instructions; she can only engage in occasional
decision-making; she can tolerate no more than occasional workplace
changes; she cannot tolerate more than superficial interaction with the
public, supervisors or co-workers, meaning that successful performance of
her job duties involves working primarily with things and not people, although
she can tolerate incidental interaction or proximity with them.
(Tr. 16.) The ALJ found that Plaintiff was unable to perform her past relevant work but that,
considering her age, education, work experience, and RFC, there were jobs that exist in
significant numbers that Plaintiff could perform. Accordingly, the ALJ found that Plaintiff
was not disabled from October 31, 2011, through the date of the decision.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review on July 14, 2016, making
the decision of the ALJ the final decision of the Commissioner. Plaintiff filed this action on
September 13, 2016, seeking judicial review.
II.

The Court’s Review
In this action, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ’s RFC finding was reached through

application of an incorrect legal standard and was unsupported by substantial evidence.
(ECF No. 17 at 11.) Specifically, Plaintiff contends that the ALJ failed to reconcile the RFC
finding with a medical opinion that included limitations in bilateral overhead reaching. (Id.)
In addition, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to weigh the opinion evidence in accordance
with the regulations, or, alternatively, that the ALJ failed to request the opinion of a treating
source or send Plaintiff for a consultative examination. (Id. at 15.)
In response, the Commissioner asserts that the ALJ’s RFC finding was based on
an appropriate evaluation of the medical evidence and was supported by substantial
5

evidence with no need for further development of the record.
In her Report, the Magistrate Judge considered the issues raised by Plaintiff and
rejected her arguments, first finding that even if the ALJ failed to reconcile his RFC finding
with opinion evidence that the ALJ credited from Dr. Robert Gardner, the state agency
medical consultant who limited Plaintiff’s bilateral overhead reaching, such an error was
harmless. As the Magistrate Judge noted, Dr. Gardner opined that Plaintiff was limited to
medium work with two limitations including a restriction to frequent, but not constant,
reaching overhead to the left and right. (Tr. 131-33.) The ALJ indicated that he afforded
Dr. Gardner’s opinion great weight “to the extent that [he] assessed that [Plaintiff’s] back
disorder does not preclude her ability to work.” (Tr. 38-39.) Importantly, however, the ALJ
did not limit Plaintiff to medium work as Dr. Gardner opined; instead, the ALJ limited her
to light work with seven additional restrictions. Ultimately, the Magistrate Judge determined
that even if the ALJ should have adopted Dr. Gardner’s limitation to frequent, but not
constant, overhead reaching, the ALJ still would have reached the same disability
determination because the three occupations identified by the VE all include a limitation
to frequent overhead reaching. Because the occupations identified by the VE do not
conflict with the additional limitation Plaintiff argues the ALJ should have included, the
Magistrate Judge determined that any error was harmless and remand is not warranted.
Next, the Magistrate Judge considered Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ failed to
weigh the medical opinion evidence in accordance with the regulations. The Magistrate
Judge noted that the ALJ used a “somewhat unusual term of phrase” when he indicated
he was giving “some and controlling weight” to the opinions of Gray’s two treating
physicians. However, the Magistrate Judge determined after a review of the ALJ’s
6

thorough opinion that it appeared the ALJ had given “some” weight to portions of the
opinions and “controlling” weight to others. (ECF No. 24 at 9 (citing Tr. at 39).) Because
a review of the ALJ’s decision clearly indicated the weight given to the opinions of Plaintiff’s
treating physicians, the Magistrate Judge found no error.
In her objections to the Report, Plaintiff does not specifically dispute the Magistrate
Judge’s findings outlined above. Instead, Plaintiff contends that the Magistrate Judge
failed to address one of her arguments, namely, her argument that “the ALJ erred by
creating a residual functional capacity (“RFC”) that was not supported by the opinion
evidence.” (ECF No. 25 at 1-2 (citing ECF No. 17 at 15-16).) Specifically, Plaintiff
contends that there is no medical opinion evidence in the record to support the ALJ’s RFC
finding as to the additional limitations imposed on Plaintiff, i.e., the ALJ’s limitations to
Plaintiff’s ability to climb ramps, stairs, ladders, ropes, and scaffolds, and to make postural
movements. Plaintiff contends that “the ALJ relied on his own lay opinion of the functional
limitations caused by Plaintiff’s impairments based on the raw medical data, as the only
opinion evidence credited in this case is far less limiting tha[n] the ALJ’s actual RFC
determination.” (ECF No. 25 at 3.) According to Plaintiff, therefore, the RFC is based only
upon raw medical data with no supporting medical opinions, which requires remand.
Here, after review, the Court finds Plaintiff’s objections without merit. As the
Commissioner points out in her response to Plaintiff’s objections, the Magistrate Judge
properly recognized that Plaintiff’s issues on appeal centered on the ALJ’s RFC finding.
The Magistrate Judge remarked that “[t]he ALJ exhaustively reviewed the medical evidence
and his RFC analysis comprises approximately twenty-five single-space[d] pages of
description and analysis specific to [Plaintiff].” (ECF No. 24 at 6.) Moreover, with respect
7

to Plaintiff’s argument that the ALJ needed to request an opinion from a treating source or
send Plaintiff for a consultative examination, the Magistrate Judge specifically rejected this
argument, noting that: “The Court finds no merit in this contention, as the ALJ need only
develop the record in certain situations; where, as here, he did not give controlling weight
to all aspects of the treating physicians’ opinions, he was under no obligation to seek
favorable, additional evidence for the claimant.” (ECF No. 24 at 7, n.5 (citations omitted).)
Likewise, the Court finds no merit to Plaintiff’s argument that remand is required
because the ALJ’s RFC is not supported by medical opinions. First, as mentioned above,
it is clear from a review of the ALJ’s decision that he exhaustively considered the evidence
in determining Plaintiff’s RFC, as his decision includes approximately 25 pages of singledspaced analysis. In addition, as the Commissioner points out, the Fourth Circuit has
remarked that an ALJ “need not parrot a single medical opinion, or assign ‘great weight’
to any opinions, in determining RFC.” Felton-Miller v. Astrue, 459 F. App’x 226, 231 (4th
Cir. 2011). Rather, it is the ALJ’s responsibility to assess a claimant’s RFC, and it is “an
administrative assessment made by the Commissioner based on all the relevant evidence
of record.” Id. at 230-31; Colvard v. Chater, 59 F.3d 165, *2 (4th Cir. 1995) (“The
determination of a claimant’s residual functioning capacity lies with the ALJ, not a
physician, and is based upon all relevant evidence.”) (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a),
404.1546, 416.945(a), 416.946). Here, contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the Court finds no
legal error in the ALJ’s RFC assessment.
CONCLUSION
The Court has no difficulty in determining that the Magistrate Judge properly
summarized the facts and applied the correct principles of law when she determined that
8

Plaintiff failed to show that the Commissioner’s decision was not supported by substantial
evidence or that it was reached through application of an incorrect legal standard.
Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Report (ECF No. 24) is
adopted and incorporated herein; Plaintiff’s objections (ECF No. 25) are overruled; and the
Commissioner’s final decision denying benefits is affirmed.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Bruce H. Hendricks
The Honorable Bruce H. Hendricks
United States District Judge
February 28, 2018
Charleston, South Carolina

9