Scipio v. Fairfield County

Filing 55

ORDER denying 51 Bill of Cost in the amount of $3,045.63. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 11/4/2019. (asni, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ROCK HILL DIVISION
Shaun Scipio,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Fairfield County, South Carolina,
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Defendant.
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____________________________________)

Civil Action No. 0:17-cv-03126-JMC

ORDER

This action arises from alleged violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”)
by Defendant Fairfield County, South Carolina. The matter before the court is Defendant’s Bill of
Costs pursuant to Local Rule 54.03, Fed. R. Civ. P. 54, and 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (2008), seeking to
recover $3,045.63 in litigation costs from Plaintiff Shaun Scipio. 1 (ECF No. 51.) On September
30, 2019, the court issued an order accepting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
(ECF No. 41) and granting Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 49.) On
October 7, 2019, Defendant filed the present motion, to which Plaintiff filed objections on October

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Defendant’s claim for $3,045.63 is itemized as follows:
Copies of depositions and exhibits of Shaun Scipio: $1,238.75
Copies of deposition of Marcus Harlan: $137.20
Copies of deposition of Davis Anderson: $313.60
Copies of exhibits of Harlan and Anderson: $24.25
Copies of deposition of William C. Gray: $235.20
Copies of deposition of Teresa Lawson: $267.05
Copies of deposition of Hyatte Kelsey: $220.50
Copies of deposition of Jannie Davis: $102.90
Copies of exhibits of Gray, Lawson, Kelsey and Davis: $20.75
Cost of binding of Memo in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment: $63.67
Cost of binding of Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment: $21.76
Cost of Removal to Federal Court: $400.00

(ECF Nos. 51; 51-1; 51-2 at 1-5.)
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21, 2019 (ECF No. 52).
Rule 54(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[u]nless a federal
statute, these rules, or a court order provides otherwise, costs other than attorney's fees should be
allowed to the prevailing party.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(1). Rule 54(d) “creates the presumption that
costs are to be awarded to the prevailing party.” Cherry v. Champion Int’l Corp., 186 F.3d 442,
446 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. August, 450 U.S. 346, 352 (1981); Teague v.
Bakker, 35 F.3d 978, 995-96 (4th Cir. 1994)). “To overcome the presumption of awarding costs, a
district court ‘must justify its decision [to deny costs] by articulating some good reason for doing
so.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Teague, 35 F.3d at 996). “Costs may be denied
to the prevailing party only when there would be an element of injustice in a presumptive cost
award,” Id. (citing Delta Air Lines, 450 U.S. at 355 n.14), or when “the losing party's inability to
pay will suffice to justify denying costs.” Cherry, 186 F.3d at 446 (quoting Congregation of The
Passion, Holy Cross Province v. Touche, Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 219, 222 (7th Cir. 1988)). The
Fourth Circuit has “recognized additional factors to justify denying an award of costs, such as their
excessiveness in a particular case, the limited value of the prevailing party’s victory, or the
closeness and difficulty of the issues decided.” Id. (citing Teague, 35 F.3d at 996). “Although the
losing party’s good faith in pursuing an action is a virtual prerequisite to receiving relief from the
normal operation of Rule 54(d)(1), that party’s good faith, standing alone, is an insufficient basis
for refusing to assess costs against that party.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Plaintiff objects and contends that his claims arising under the ADA “were not
frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation . . . Plaintiff had a reasonable basis for bringing his
claims despite the [c]ourt’s grant of Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment.” (ECF No. 52 at
2.) Moreover, “ADA issues in the workplace are of paramount importance, and it cannot be

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disputed that Plaintiff is absolutely sincere in his belief that the actions and omissions [by]
Defendant . . . [gave] rise to important questions as to the legality of Defendant’s employment
practices.” (Id.) In addition, Plaintiff claims that he is unable to pay the costs and “[a]s shown by
the record . . . Plaintiff’s sole source of income is his Social Security benefits.” (Id.)
The court finds that because Plaintiff’s Social Security disbursements are his only source
of income, an injustice would occur if he was required to pay. Furthermore, this case did not
contain any unique or complex legal situations; it is a standard dispute that was resolved on a
summary judgment motion and therefore falls short of the generally recognized Rule 54(d)(1)
threshold. See, e.g., Grochowski v. Sci. Applications Int’l Corp., No. ELH-13-3771, 2017 WL
121743, at *4 (D. Md. Jan. 12, 2017) (internal and external citations omitted)) (“The closeness of
a case is judged not by whether one party clearly prevails over another, but by the refinement of
perception required to recognize, sift through and organize relevant evidence, and by the difficulty
of discerning the law of the case.”). Simply put, while Defendant Fairfield County is the prevailing
party, Plaintiff Shaun Scipio has demonstrated an inability to pay Defendant’s litigation costs.
Consequently, the court DENIES Defendant Fairfield County, South Carolina’s Bill of Costs
requesting the amount of $3,045.63 (ECF No. 51).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge
November 4, 2019
Columbia, South Carolina

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