Souffrant v. Iseman

Filing 141

ORDER denying 134 MOTION for Reconsideration. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V. Hodges on 2/28/2020. (lbak)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Thomas Souffrant,
Plaintiff,
vs.
C.J. Iseman, Deputy Sheriff of
Clarendon County, Brandon T.
Braxton, and Ernie Grice,
Defendants.

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C/A No.: 0:18-388-SVH

ORDER

Thomas Souffrant (“Plaintiff”) brought this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. This matter
comes before the court on Iseman’s motion to reconsider the court’s order
granting Plaintiff’s motion to amend. [ECF No. 134]. This motion having been
fully briefed, it is ripe for disposition. [ECF Nos. 139, 140].
I.

Factual and Procedural History
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this lawsuit on February 9, 2018.

[ECF No. 1]. In his original Complaint, Plaintiff alleged that on July 12,
2016, he was stopped by deputies of the Clarendon County Sheriff’s office,
including deputy C.J. Iseman and “two other sheriff’s deputies of the
Clarendon County Sheriff’s Office.” Id. at 3. Plaintiff alleged that the officers
asked to search his vehicle and he refused. Thereafter, Plaintiff was told to
exit the vehicle, and “[w]ithout any warning or instructions from Iseman or

other deputies, one deputy withdrew his revolver pointing it at me and
deputy Iseman and the other deputy both grabbed me and lifting me off the
ground and raising me several feet in the air and then slammed me on the
ground.” Id. In the section of the Complaint identifying the parties, Plaintiff
identified Deputy Iseman and also identified “Deputy Sheriff #2, name
currently unknown” and “Deputy Sheriff #3, name currently unknown.” Id. at
2.
Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on May 24, 2018, in which he
specified the nature of his claims—claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for
violation of his constitutional rights, specifically for an illegal traffic stop and
search and for excessive force. [ECF No. 39]. The case proceeded through
discovery. During discovery, Plaintiff, still acting pro se, made multiple
attempts to obtain the video footage of the police stop. First, on April 16,
2018, he filed a motion for discovery, “requesting the surveillance from the
Clarendon County Sheriff[’s] Office” from “July 12, 2016.” [ECF No. 25]. On
June 11, 2018, Plaintiff filed a “motion to receive full discovery from
Clarendon County Sheriff Office” in which he specifically requested the
“audio and video from the night of July 12, 2016.” [ECF No. 45]. Plaintiff
argued that he needed his video for evidence and “because it shows the
excessive force used by Defendants.” Id. On July 24, 2018, the undersigned
issued an order stating in relevant part:
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Plaintiff filed three separate motions requesting various forms of
discovery. [ECF Nos. 45, 52, 53]. Plaintiff has previously been
advised that discovery requests need not be filed with the court,
but should be served on Defendants. [ECF No. 26]. Therefore,
Plaintiff’s motions are denied, as they prematurely seek to
compel discovery responses from Defendants before the requests
were served on Defendants. However, in this limited instance
only, the court construes discovery requests as served on
Defendants through CM/ECF on July 24, 2018, and they are
directed to respond within the time limits prescribed by the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
[ECF No. 61 at 1–2 (“July 24, 2018 Order”].
On July 26, 2018, Plaintiff filed his “Second Motion for Production of
Documents” in which he asked the Sheriff’s Office to release the video footage
of the traffic stop to the court. [ECF No. 63]. The undersigned denied without
prejudice Plaintiff’s motion to produce the video to the court, but stated
Plaintiff could renew the motion upon the undersigned’s consideration of
dispositive motions, as typically defendants include any video available with
their dispositive motions. [ECF No. 65].
In August 2019, the court granted summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
search and seizure claim, but denied summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
excessive force claim. [ECF No. 111]. On September 16, 2019, the court
appointed counsel to represent Plaintiff. [ECF No. 121]. Thereafter, Plaintiff
obtained a copy of the video footage he had been seeking since the beginning
of this case. According to Plaintiff’s motion to amend, after reviewing the
video and asking defendant’s counsel to confirm the identities of the
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individuals in the video, it became clear to Plaintiff that Officers Grice and
Braxton were the two officers who threw him to the ground. [ECF No. 128].
On December 10, 2019, Plaintiff sought leave to amend the complaint
to add Officers Ernie Grice and Brandon Braxton as defendants to this
action. Iseman’s response did not contain any arguments or allegations
indicating he had previously served Plaintiff with the video. In the order
granting Plaintiff leave to amend, the court quoted its July 24, 2018 Order,
and noted that “Defendant had apparently failed to comply with the court’s
order.” [ECF No. 132 at 5].
Iseman filed the instant motion to reconsider on January 24, 2020.
[ECF No. 134].
II.

Standard on a Motion for Reconsideration
Motions for reconsideration of interlocutory orders are appropriately

granted only in narrow circumstances: (1) the discovery of new evidence, (2)
an intervening development or change in the controlling law, or (3) the need
to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice. American Canoe Ass’n v.

Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505 (4th Cir. 2003). Petitioner has not
identified any of the narrow circumstances appropriate for granting a motion
to reconsider.

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III.

Analysis
In his motion, Iseman requests the court reconsider its prior order and

find Plaintiff did not show good cause to amend his complaint because he was
not diligent in attempting to discover the identities of the two officers. [ECF
No. 134 at 4]. In support, Iseman argues for the first time he complied with
the July 24, 2018 Order by mailing a flash drive with the video to Plaintiff
while incarcerated. [ECF No. 134 at 4; 134-1]. As explanation as to why he
failed to provide such relevant information to the court in response to the
motion to amend, Iseman argues “his alleged failure to provide the video to
Plaintiff was not an issue” until the court’s ruling granting the motion to
amend, as “Plaintiff did not argue Defendant never provided him the video.”
[ECF No. 140 at 1].
Defendant’s argument is inaccurate. In Plaintiff’s motion to amend, he
stated “Plaintiff was never provided with the video or the opportunity to view
it while he remained unrepresented.” [ECF No. 128 at 2–6]. Iseman’s
response did not dispute Plaintiff’s statement. [See generally ECF No. 130].
Additionally, Plaintiff’s reply stated “Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff
with the video footage notwithstanding this Court’s instructions to the
contrary” and “In their Response, Defendants fail to provide any reason why
Plaintiff did not receive the discovery he requested, but, for purposes of the
instant Motion, it is undisputed that Plaintiff never received the video
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footage of the traffic stop until his appointed counsel requested it.” [ECF No.
131 at 3]. Iseman did not seek leave to file a sur reply to dispute Plaintiff’s
argument.
Iseman had adequate opportunity to argue he provided the video in
response to the July 24, 2018 Order, and he failed to do so. A review of
Iseman’s response to the motion to amend reveals multiple references to
Plaintiff’s alleged failure to properly request the video,1 which would be
irrelevant if the video had been properly produced in compliance with the
court’s order. To the extent Iseman realized he had provided the video after
the court granted leave to amend, failure to properly check his own records
during the court’s consideration of the motion to amend is not a sufficient
basis to grant reconsideration. See Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S.
471, 485 n. 5 (2008) (finding such motions may not be used to raise new
arguments or introduce evidence that could have been addressed or presented
previously).
Further, to the extent Iseman argues the amendment is futile because
it is barred by the statute of limitations, the court is unable to find at this

For instance, rather than advising the court the video had been served,
Iseman argued “Plaintiff’s attempts to seek the discovery of videos in the
possession of Defendant were not directed to Defendant throughout the
course of this case” and “Plaintiff failed to submit his discovery requests to
Defendant despite multiple instructions by the court on the proper process to
do so.” [ECF No. 130 at 3].
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time that the amendment is futile. Plaintiff argues that the statute of
limitation may be equitably tolled and also that the amendment may relate
back to the filing of the original complaint. [ECF No. 131 at 5–8]. The Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals has considered items outside of the pleadings to
determine whether an amendment adding a new defendant relates back to
the original complaint. Wilkins v. Montgomery, 751 F.3d 214, 225 (4th Cir.
2014 (considering affidavit evidence related to relation back of an
amendment). Therefore, the court need not make a determination before the
parties have had an opportunity to develop the record.
In addition, the undersigned does not find that Iseman will be
prejudiced by Plaintiff’s amendment. Iseman argues “The addition of new
Defendants will prejudice Defendant Iseman as he will be forced to
participate in further discovery and associated actions outside of the simple
Order for Summary Judgment that he is entitled to.” [ECF No. 130 at 5–6].
Iseman fails to acknowledge he has previously filed a motion for summary
judgment that was denied in part. To the extent he now has exculpatory
evidence, it is a direct result of Plaintiff’s request for additional discovery—
specifically the video. Given this history, the undersigned is not convinced
that brief further discovery will prejudice Iseman. His attempts to argue
prejudice on behalf of the new defendants is also unavailing, as it is the same

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argument upon which he bases his futility argument, which is addressed
above.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court denies Iseman’s motion for

reconsideration.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
February 28, 2020
Columbia, South Carolina

Shiva V. Hodges
United States Magistrate Judge

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