Boykin v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration
Filing
18
ORDER awarding Plaintiff $5,000.00 in attorney's fees. Signed by Honorable Timothy M. Cain on 3/15/2019. (bgoo)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
ROCK HILL DIVISION
Dorine Boykin,
Plaintiff,
v.
Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
C/A No. 0:18-1288-TMC
ORDER
Plaintiff Dorine Boykin filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to
Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412, on the basis that she was the prevailing party and the
position taken by the Commissioner in this action was not substantially justified. (ECF No. 14).
Specifically, Plaintiff moves for an award of attorney’s fees in the amount of $5,705.28 for 28.3
hours of attorney’s time. (ECF Nos. 14 at 1; 14-2 at 2).1 The Commissioner has filed a response
in which she stipulates to a $5,000.00 award of attorney’s fees. (ECF No. 16).
Under the EAJA, a court shall award attorney’s fees to a prevailing party in certain civil
actions against the United States, unless it finds that the government's position was substantially
justified or that special circumstances make an award unjust. See 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).2
The district courts have discretion to determine a reasonable fee award and whether that award
should be made in excess of the statutory cap. Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988); May
v. Sullivan, 936 F.2d 176, 177 (4th Cir. 1991).
The requested rate is $210.60 per hour for attorney time. (ECF No. 14-2 at 2).
1
A party who is granteda remand pursuant to sentence four of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
405(g), is a prevailing party for EAJA purposes. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 300-302
(1993). The remand in this case was made pursuant to sentence four. (ECF No. 12).
2
1
The district courts also have broad discretion to set the attorney fee amount. In
determining the fee award, “[e]xorbitant, unfounded, or procedurally defective fee applications .
. . are matters that the district court can recognize and discount.” Hyatt v. North Carolina Dep’t
of Human Res., 315 F.3d 239, 254 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Comm’r v. Jean, 496 U.S. 154, 163
(1990)). Additionally, the court should not only consider the “position taken by the United
States in the civil action,” but also the “action or failure to act by the agency upon which the
civil action is based.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(2)(D), as amended by P.L. 99-80, § 2(c)(2)(B).
Despite there being no opposition to the motion, the court is obligated under the EAJA to
determine if the fee is proper. See Design & Prod., Inc. v. United States, 21 Cl.Ct. 145, 152
(1990) (holding that under the EAJA, “it is the court’s responsibility to independently assess the
appropriateness and measure of attorney’s fees to be awarded in a particular case, whether or not
an amount is offered as representing the agreement of the parties in the form of a proposed
stipulation.”). Applying the above standard to the facts of this case, the court concludes that the
Commissioner’s position was not substantially justified. Furthermore, after a thorough review of
the record, the court finds a fee award of $5,000.00 is appropriate. Accordingly, the court orders
that Plaintiff be awarded $5,000.00 in attorney’s fees.3
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Timothy M. Cain
United States District Judge
March 15, 2019
Anderson, South Carolina
The court notes that the fees must be paid to Plaintiff. See Astrue v. Ratliff, 560 U.S. 586 (2010)
(June 14, 2010) (holding that the plain text of the EAJA requires that attorney’s fees be awarded
to the litigant, thus subjecting EAJA fees to offset of any pre-existing federal debts); see also
Stephens v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131, 139 (4th Cir. 2009) (same).
3
2
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?