Traylor v. Knight et al

Filing 23

ORDER adopting and specifically incorporating the 16 Report and Recommendation, overruling 18 Petitioner's objections, granting Respondents' 10 Motion to Dismiss and dismissing this action without prejudice. Signed by Honorable Bruce Howe Hendricks on 11/17/2021. (dist)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Jessie Traylor,

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Petitioner,
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v.
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Stevie Knight, Warden; Melissa
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Forsyth, Camp Administrator,
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Respondents.
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________________________________)

Civil Action No. 0:21-cv-150-BHH
ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Jessie Traylor’s pro se petition for a writ
of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. On April 15, 2021, Respondents filed a
motion to dismiss, to which Petitioner filed a response in opposition. In accordance with
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), the matter was
referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for initial review.
On May 7, 2021, Magistrate Judge Paige J. Gossett filed a Report and
Recommendation (“Report”) outlining the issues and recommending that the Court grant
Respondents’ motion to dismiss in large part based on the Fourth Circuit’s decision in
United States v. Surratt, 855 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2017), where the court held that the
President’s commutation of a federal prisoner’s mandatory life sentence to a term of 200
months’ imprisonment rendered moot the prisoner’s appeal in an action challenging the
original mandatory life sentence.
Petitioner filed objections to the Magistrate Judge’s Report, arguing that the cases
relied upon by the Magistrate Judge do not involve alleged intervening changes in
controlling law and that Surratt does not control the outcome of his case. Petitioner asserts

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that he is seeking relief based on new statutory authority and he objects to the Magistrate
Judge’s conclusion that the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider his claim.
After review, the Court is not persuaded by Petitioner’s objections, and the Court
agrees with the Magistrate Judge that, pursuant to Surratt, the Court is without jurisdiction
to address Petitioner’s habeas corpus application. In Surratt, Surratt received a mandatory
life sentence for his drug-trafficking conspiracy conviction based on four prior drug
convictions, which, at the time, qualified as enhancing predicates. After Surratt’s conviction
became final and after his first § 2255 motion was rejected, the Fourth Circuit overruled the
precedent under which Surratt’s prior convictions qualified as enhancing predicates
triggering a mandatory life sentence. See United States v. Simmons, 649 F.3d 237 (4 th
Cir. 2011) (en banc). Surratt then filed a habeas corpus petitioner pursuant to § 2241, and
while that petition was pending the President of the United States commuted his life
sentence to a term of 200 months’ imprisonment. Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit held that
the Presidential commutation of Surratt’s sentence rendered his petition moot, with the
majority concluding that the court could not disturb Surratt’s presidentially commuted
sentence based on a claim that Surratt was improperly subjected to a mandatory minimum
life sentence at his original sentencing. Surratt, 855 F.3d at 219. As Judge Wilkinson
explained in his concurring opinion, “[a]bsent some constitutional infirmity in the
commutation order, which is not present here, we may not readjust or rescind what the
President, in the exercise of his pardon power, has done.” Id.
Here, similar to Surratt, Petitioner challenges his original sentence because one of
the prior convictions used to enhance his sentence under former 21 U.S.C. § 841 no longer
qualifies as a predicate offense. As the Magistrate Judge explained, however, on January
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17, 2017, the President of the United States commuted Petitioner’s total sentence to a term
of 240 months’ imprisonment. Traylor, 2:08-cr-20036 (C.D. Ill. Dkt. No. 147). Thus,
Petitioner is “no longer serving a judicially imposed sentence, but a presidentially
commuted one.” Surratt, 855 F.3d at 220 (Wilkinson, J., concurring). Ultimately, therefore,
as in Surratt, the President’s commutation renders moot Petitioner’s claim that his original
sentence is unlawful, and this Court lacks jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s claim. See
also Blount v. Clarke, 890 F.3d 456, 462-63 (4th Cir. 2018) (finding that the district court
erred as a matter of law in failing to apply Surratt and by failing to conclude that it lacked
jurisdiction to consider Blount’s habeas corpus application); and Holmes v. United States,
No. 9:04-cr-429, 2019 WL 4689237, *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 26, 2019) (finding a § 2255 motion
moot due to a presidential commutation and explaining that the court “was not free to
decline to follow Surratt”). Accordingly, it is hereby
ORDERED that the Magistrate Judge’s Report (ECF No. 16) is adopted and
specifically incorporated; Petitioner’s objections (ECF No. 18) are overruled; Respondents’
motion to dismiss (ECF No. 10) is granted; and this action is dismissed without prejudice.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/Bruce H. Hendricks
The Honorable Bruce Howe Hendricks
November 17, 2021
Charleston, South Carolina

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