Rodden v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 34

ORDER granting 31 Motion for Attorney Fees Under EAJA, awarding $3,236.57 in attorney's fees. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 05/21/2013.(bshr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
AIKEN DIVISION
Theron Andrew Rodden,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,1
Defendant.

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C/A No.: 1:12-503-SVH

ORDER

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to

the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Plaintiff requests
$3,236.57 in attorney’s fees on the ground that he is a prevailing party under the EAJA.
[Entry #31]. The Commissioner does not dispute that Plaintiff is entitled to EAJA fees,
but argues that the fees should be reduced by 50% because Plaintiff’s counsel recycled
facts and argument from prior briefs in preparing the briefs in this case. [Entry #32]. For
the reasons set forth below, the Commissioner’s objections are overruled and Plaintiff’s
motion is granted.
I.

Factual Background
On December 6, 2001, Plaintiff filed applications for DIB and SSI under the

Social Security Act (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401–433, 1381–1383c. Tr. at 15. In his
applications, he alleged his disability began on November 27, 2001. Id. His applications

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Carolyn W. Colvin became the Acting Commissioner of Social Security on February
14, 2013. Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d), Carolyn W. Colvin is substituted for
Commissioner Michael J. Astrue as the defendant in this lawsuit.

were denied initially and not pursued. Id. On November 8, 2005, Plaintiff filed a second
round of applications for DIB and SSI in which he alleged his disability began on April 1,
2003. Tr. at 110–12, 115–18. His second applications were denied initially and upon
reconsideration, Tr. at 67–68, 75–78, and an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) issued
an unfavorable decision on September 17, 2008, finding that Plaintiff was not disabled
within the meaning of the Act. Tr. at 15–26. Subsequently, the Appeals Council denied
Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision of the
Commissioner for purposes of judicial review. Tr. at 1–3. Thereafter, Plaintiff brought a
civil action in this court challenging the Commissioner’s decision. Tr. at 452–53. On
August 9, 2011, the court remanded the case to the Commissioner for further
proceedings. Tr. at 406–07.
On remand, the Appeals Council vacated the ALJ’s original decision and
remanded the case to ALJ Richard Vogel for another hearing and a new decision. Tr. at
447–49. The ALJ held a new hearing on December 9, 2011 (Tr. at 377–401), and, on
February 2, 2012, issued a partially-favorable decision finding Plaintiff disabled as of
February 2010. Tr. at 361–72. Plaintiff subsequently filed this action seeking judicial
review of the unfavorable portion of the Commissioner’s decision in a complaint filed on
February 23, 2012. [Entry #1.] On March 1, 2013, the undersigned reversed and
remanded the case, finding that the ALJ had not complied with the court’s order of
August 9, 2011, because he failed to address Plaintiff’s bipolar disorder in his listing
analysis and failed to sufficiently specify the Listing under which he analyzed Plaintiff’s
impairments. [Entry #29 at 33].

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II.

Discussion
Under the EAJA, a court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing

party in certain civil actions against the United States unless the court finds that the
government’s position was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an
award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). The eligibility requirements for an award of
fees under the EAJA are: (1) that the claimant is a prevailing party; (2) that the
government’s position was not substantially justified; (3) that no special circumstances
make an award unjust; and (4) that the fee application be submitted to the court within 30
days of final judgment and be supported by an itemized statement. See Crawford v.
Sullivan, 935 F.2d 655, 656 (4th Cir. 1991).
Because this court remanded to the ALJ pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff
is considered the “prevailing party” under the EAJA. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S.
292, 302 (1993). The Commissioner does not make a substantial justification argument.
Rather, the Commissioner seems to argue that special circumstances exist because
Plaintiff’s counsel relied on recycled facts and argument in drafting Plaintiff’s briefs.
[Entry #31]. The Commissioner contends Plaintiff’s fee award should be reduced by
50%, but presents no justification for that calculation. Plaintiff timely submitted his fee
application and his counsel provided an itemized statement documenting the 17.60 hours
she spent on the case. [Entry #31-4]. In doing so, Plaintiff’s counsel certified to the court,
under penalty of perjury, that she actually worked the stated hours on Plaintiff’s case.
The court has no reason to question the billing records of Plaintiff’s counsel.

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Consequently, the court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the eligibility requirements for
EAJA fees.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court does not find any special circumstances that

make an award of attorney’s fees unjust. Accordingly, the court grants Plaintiff’s motion
and directs the Commissioner to pay Plaintiff $3,236.57. Such payment shall constitute a
complete release from and bar to any and all further claims that Plaintiff may have under
the EAJA to fees, costs, and expenses incurred in connection with disputing the
Commissioner’s decision. This award is without prejudice to the rights of Plaintiff=s
counsel to seek attorney fees under section 406(b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §
406(b), subject to the offset provisions of the EAJA.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

May 21, 2013
Columbia, South Carolina

Shiva V. Hodges
United States Magistrate Judge 

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