Reid v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 26

ORDER granting 22 Motion for Attorney Fees Under EAJA, directing the Commissioner to pay Plaintiff $3,379.06 in fees. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 08/07/2013.(bshr, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
AIKEN DIVISION
Malcom Jamal Reid,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting
Commissioner of Social Security
Administration,
Defendant.

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C/A No.: 1:12-1084-SVH

ORDER

This matter is before the court on Plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to

the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d). Plaintiff requests
$3,379.06 in attorney’s fees on the ground that he is a prevailing party under the EAJA.
[Entry #22]. Defendant contests the awarding of such fees, asserting the government’s
position was substantially justified. [Entry #24 at 1]. For the reasons set forth below, the
court grants Plaintiff’s motion.
I.

Procedural Background
Plaintiff, then a minor child, was awarded Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”)

benefits on November 22, 2000. Tr. at 44–52. On April 27, 2007, the Social Security
Administration informed Plaintiff that he was no longer eligible for SSI and notified him
that he had 60 days to appeal the decision. Tr. at 60–62. Plaintiff retained an attorney
and sought an untimely request for reconsideration of the denial of benefits in August
2007. Tr. at 64, 161. Plaintiff’s request was dismissed in August 2007. Tr. at 161. The
request was later reinstated and sent to the Office of Disability Adjudication and Review.

Tr. at 180. The ultimate disposition of the request for reconsideration is not clear from
the record.
On April 11, 2008, Plaintiff filed an application for SSI in which he alleged his
disability began on July 21, 1998. Tr. at 10. His application was denied initially and
upon reconsideration. Tr. at 58–59. Following a hearing before an Administrative Law
Judge (“ALJ”), the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision. Tr. at 10–18. In his decision,
the ALJ found Plaintiff had not been under a disability since the date the application was
filed. Id. Applying the five-step sequential process, the ALJ found that Plaintiff had the
severe impairment of mild mental retardation. Id. The ALJ determined that Plaintiff did
not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one
of the impairments listed at 20 C.F.R. part 404, subpart P, appendix 1. Id. Further, the
ALJ found that Plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of
work at all exertional levels, but with the following nonexertional limitations: no
exposure to hazards; simple, routine repetitive tasks, involving low stress, defined as no
more than occasional decision making or changes in the work setting; and no exposure to
the general public or requirements for complex reading, writing, or math. Id. Finally, the
ALJ determined that Plaintiff had no past relevant work, but that jobs existed in
significant numbers in the national economy that he could perform. Id.
The Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, rendering the ALJ’s
decision the final decision of the Commissioner. Tr. at 1–3. Plaintiff then filed suit in
federal court asserting that the ALJ’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.
[Entry #1]. Plaintiff alleged several errors committed by the ALJ, including that the ALJ

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erred in finding that Plaintiff’s Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”) was
not a severe impairment and that he did not meeting Listing 12.05(C) (mental
retardation). [Entry #16]. The undersigned reversed and remanded the case, finding that
the ALJ did not sufficiently consider Plaintiff’s school records or the records of Dr.
Joseph West in accordance with 20 C.F.R. § 416.912, and that the failure to consider
those records impacted the ALJ’s analysis of Plaintiff’s severe impairments and the
Listing analysis. [Entry #20 at 15–17].
II.

Discussion
Under the EAJA, a court shall award reasonable attorney’s fees to a prevailing

party in certain civil actions against the United States unless the court finds that the
government’s position was substantially justified or that special circumstances make an
award unjust. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Because this court remanded to the ALJ
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), Plaintiff is considered the “prevailing party” under the
EAJA. See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302 (1993). Therefore, as the nonprevailing party, the government has the burden of proving that its position was
substantially justified. Crawford v. Sullivan, 935 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1991). “The
government’s position must be substantially justified in both fact and law.” Thompson v.
Sullivan, 980 F.2d 280, 281 (4th Cir. 1992). Substantially justified does not mean
“justified to a high degree, but rather justified in substance or in the main—that is,
justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted). There is no presumption that

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the government’s position was not substantially justified simply because it lost the case.
Crawford, 935 F.2d at 656.
“The government’s non-acquiescence in the law of the circuit entitles the claimant
to recover attorney’s fees.” Id. at 658; see also Adams v. Barnhart, 445 F. Supp. 2d 593,
595 (D.S.C. 2006) (“Where the government’s position was a result of its failure to
perform a certain analysis required by the law and its regulations, the government’s
position was not substantially justified.”).
Here, the Commissioner argues that her position was substantially justified, but
does not attempt to justify the ALJ’s failure to consider Plaintiff’s school records and
those of Dr. West. Instead, the Commissioner offers post-hoc rationalizations supporting
the ALJ’s decision.

In essence, the Commissioner is arguing that the decision is

supported by substantial evidence. For the reasons stated in its order dated April 22,
2013, the court found that the ALJ’s decision is not supported by substantial evidence,
and the Commissioner’s attempts to argue to the contrary here are unavailing. Thus, the
Commissioner has failed to demonstrate that the ALJ’s failure to comply with 20 C.F.R.
§ 416.912 was substantially justified.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court finds that the government has not met its

burden of showing that its position was substantially justified. The court does not find
any special circumstances that make an award of attorney’s fees unjust. Accordingly, the
court grants Plaintiff’s motion and directs the Commissioner to pay Plaintiff $3,379.061

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Defendant did not object to Plaintiff’s calculation of the fee.
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forthwith. Such payment shall constitute a complete release from and bar to any and all
further claims that Plaintiff may have under the EAJA to fees, costs, and expenses
incurred in connection with disputing the Commissioner’s decision.

This award is

without prejudice to the rights of Plaintiff=s counsel to seek attorney fees under section
406(b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), subject to the offset provisions of
the EAJA. Pursuant to Stephens v. Astrue, 565 F.3d 131, 137 (4th Cir. 2009), payment
should be made directly to Plaintiff as the prevailing party rather than to his attorney.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

August 7, 2013
August 8, 2013
Columbia, South Carolina

Shiva V. Hodges
United States Magistrate Judge 

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