Free v. Owens et al
Filing
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ORDER AND OPINION: The court grants Defendants' summary judgment motion with respect to Plaintiff's claims alleging the unconstitutional seizure of Plaintiff's identification, the punishment of free speech, the violationof due process, and the abuse of process. The court denies Defendants' motion with respect to Plaintiff's excessive force claim. granting in part and denying in part 12 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 2/6/2014.(asni, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
AIKEN DIVISION
Oneal Free,
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Officer Brian C. Owens, Chief David P.
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Smith, Burnettown,
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Defendants.
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___________________________________ )
Civil Action No. 1:12-cv-01492-JMC
ORDER AND OPINION
Plaintiff Oneal Free (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, unlawful seizure in violation of
the Fourth Amendment, punishment of free speech in violation of the First Amendment, and
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fifth Amendment. (ECF No. 1 at 3–5).
Plaintiff also alleges the state law claim of abuse of process. Id. at 4–5. This matter is before the
court on Defendants’ motion for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56. (ECF No.
12). For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff are as follows. At the time of the
incident in question, the late afternoon of January 20, 2010, Plaintiff was 63 years old. (ECF No.
1 at 2). Plaintiff was out eating at S & S Cafeteria with his son Brian Oneal Free and his
granddaughter Alexis Oneal Free when Plaintiff’s neighbor called and reported to Plaintiff’s son
that Plaintiff’s dog had gotten loose from Plaintiff’s gate. (ECF No. 16-1 at 1; ECF No. 16-2 at
1). Plaintiff returned home with his son and granddaughter in order to place Plaintiff’s dog back
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inside Plaintiff’s gate. (ECF No. 16-1 at 1). While placing his dog back inside his gate, Plaintiff
had an encounter with Defendants Officer Brian C. Owens and Chief David P. Smith
(collectively referred to as “Defendant Officers”).
Defendant Officers were in the vicinity of Plaintiff’s home responding to a citizen’s
complaint about a loose dog which had allegedly attacked two smaller dogs. (ECF No. 12-2 at 2;
ECF No. 12-10 at 2). As Plaintiff was attempting to return his dog to his gate, Defendant Owens
yelled “Hey”, but Plaintiff was unable to hear him. (ECF No. 16-2 at 1). Defendant Owens
explains that he was attempting to inform Plaintiff that animal control had arrived to secure
Plaintiff’s dog. (ECF No. 12-2 at 3; ECF No. 12-10 at 3). Plaintiff was unaware of Defendant
Officers’ presence until Defendant Owens approached Plaintiff from behind and grabbed
Plaintiff’s right arm, twisting it and causing Plaintiff’s wrist to fracture. (ECF No. 16-1 at 1). In
the midst of this physical encounter, Defendant Owens slung Plaintiff onto Plaintiff’s fence,
Plaintiff’s truck, and the ground and then placed Plaintiff in handcuffs. (ECF No. 16-1 at 1–2;
ECF No. 16-2 at 1; ECF No. 16-3). The handcuffs’ tightness caused Plaintiff’s wrists to bleed.
(ECF No. 16-1 at 1; ECF No. 16-2 at 2; ECF No. 16-3; ECF No. 12-2 at 3; ECF No. 12-10 at 4).
Plaintiff was arrested and charged with obstruction and with having an animal at large.
(ECF No. 16-1 at 2; ECF No. 12-2 at 4; ECF No. 12-10 at 4). Plaintiff concedes that he refused
to produce identification and complained to Defendants about the treatment he was receiving.
(See ECF No. 16-1 at 2). In response to Plaintiff’s bleeding, Defendant Owens removed the
handcuffs. (See ECF No. 16-2; ECF No. 16-3; ECF No. 12-2 at 3; ECF No. 12-10 at 4).
Plaintiff then provided Defendants with his identification and the shot record for Plaintiff’s dog.
(ECF No. 12-2 at 3; ECF No. 12-10 at 4). Defendants issued Plaintiff tickets for the offenses
charged. (ECF No. 16-1 at 2; ECF No. 12-2 at 4; ECF No. 12-10 at 4). Defendants offered EMS
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treatment to Plaintiff; however, Plaintiff declined their offer. (ECF No. 12-2 at 3; ECF No. 1210 at 4). Defendant Owens photographed Plaintiff’s right arm and hand for documentation.
(ECF No. 12-5). Defendants did not take Plaintiff into police custody. (ECF No. 12-2 at 4; ECF
No. 12-10 at 4).
Plaintiff was ultimately charged with violations of the city ordinances for permitting
domestic animals to run at large and for resisting arrest. (ECF No. 12-7). Although Plaintiff
requested a jury trial for his citations, Plaintiff failed to appear for his trial. (ECF No. 12-2 at 4).
After being found guilty in his absence, Plaintiff voluntarily paid his fines and was never taken
to jail. Id.
Plaintiff filed the instant action on June 5, 2012, alleging several constitutional violations
pursuant to § 1983 as well as abuse of process under South Carolina law. (ECF No. 1).
Following the completion of discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment under FED. R.
CIV. P. 56. (ECF No. 12). Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to Defendants’ motion (ECF
No. 16), to which Defendants filed a reply (ECF No. 19). The court held a hearing on this matter
on February 3, 2014. (ECF No. 39).
LEGAL STANDARDS
A.
Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would
affect the disposition of the case under the applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477
U.S. 242, 248–49 (1986). A genuine question of material fact exists where, after reviewing the
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record as a whole, the court finds that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party. Newport News Holdings Corp. v. Virtual City Vision, 650 F.3d 423, 434 (4th Cir. 2011).
In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must construe all inferences and
ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. See United States v.
Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the
district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving
party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his
pleadings. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist
which give rise to a genuine issue. See id. at 324. Under this standard, the existence of a mere
scintilla of evidence in support of the petitioner’s position is insufficient to withstand the
summary judgment motion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or
denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion.
See Ross v. Commc’ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985).
B.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction in Congruence with Heck v. Humphrey
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), instructs that a § 1983 claimant cannot recover
damages from a harm that if found unlawful would render a conviction unlawful. Id. at 486–87.
Thus, the court must conduct a fact-intensive inquiry into the details of the plaintiff’s underlying
conviction to determine whether the plaintiff’s § 1983 success would necessarily imply that the
plaintiff’s conviction was wrongful. Riddick v. Lott, 202 F. App’x 615, 616 (4th Cir. 2006)
(reversing the district court after it presumed a § 1983 excessive force claim automatically
implied the invalidity of a resisting arrest conviction).
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ANALYSIS
A.
Section 1983 Claim: Excessive Force in Violation of the Fourth Amendment
Plaintiff claims that Defendants violated the Fourth Amendment by restraining Plaintiff
with unreasonable and excessive force. (ECF No. 1 at 3). As an initial matter, the court finds
that the record is inconclusive with regard to whether a finding of excessive force would
necessarily imply the invalidity of Plaintiff’s resisting arrest conviction. The record contains no
evidence from which the court can determine the factual basis for the jury verdict finding
Plaintiff guilty of resisting arrest. If the jury found that the actions constituting resistance
occurred independently of or prior to Defendant Owens’s use of force, the success of Plaintiff’s
excessive force claim would not call Plaintiff’s resisting arrest conviction into question. See
Riddick, 202 F. App’x at 616 (“If, however…the [officer’s] alleged punch occurred,
independently…or after his resistance had clearly ceased, then a successful § 1983 suit for
excessive force would not imply invalidity of the conviction.”) Therefore, the court finds that
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, does not bar Plaintiff’s excessive force claim. Accordingly,
the court proceeds to an analysis on the merits.
A claim of excessive force in the context of an arrest or investigatory stop is analyzed
under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394
(1989). The court must determine “whether the officers’ actions are objectively reasonable in
light of the facts and circumstances confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation.” Henry v. Purnell, 652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at
397) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In considering whether an officer used reasonable
force, a court must focus on the moment that the force is employed.” Id. Upon viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the court is charged with determining the issue
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of officer reasonableness at summary judgment as it is a question of law. Id.
The Supreme Court has advised that the following factors assist the court in determining
whether the totality of the circumstances justifies a particular seizure: the severity of the crime at
issue, whether the detainee posed an immediate threat to the officers’ safety, and whether the
detainee was actively resisting arrest or attempting to flee. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The court
finds the central offense of an animal at large to be a moderately serious situation over which a
reasonable officer would want to exert control. However, the court cannot conclude that a
reasonable officer would twist a detainee’s arm and sling him around in effort to gain
compliance with the officer’s investigation after only a minimal attempt to verbally direct the
detainee. The facts viewed in favor of Plaintiff do not indicate that Plaintiff posed a safety threat
to Defendant at the time the force was applied or that Plaintiff was actively resisting an arrest.
Thus, the court finds the record does not preclude a finding that Defendant Owens’s use of force
was objectively unreasonable under the circumstances of this case.
Defendants raise the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. (ECF No. 12-1 at 17–
19). The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials performing discretionary
functions from liability for civil damages where “their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.”
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). The steps in determining whether officials are
entitled to qualified immunity are: (1) an inquiry into whether the plaintiff has alleged a
deprivation of a constitutional right and (2) whether that right was clearly established at the time
of the alleged violation. Rogers v. Pendleton, 249 F.3d 279, 286 (4th Cir. 2001). Under the facts
as established for the purposes of summary judgment, Defendant Owens’s actions are not
shielded by qualified immunity because a reasonable officer in his position would have
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understood that the degree of force exerted violated Plaintiff’s rights.
Thus, the court denies Defendants’ motion for summary judgment with respect to
Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.
B.
Section 1983 Claim: Unlawful Seizure of Identification in Violation of the Fourth
Amendment
Plaintiff states that Defendants unconstitutionally seized his identification in violation of
the Fourth Amendment. (ECF No. 1 at 4). Even viewing the facts in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, Plaintiff’s identification was seized after he was arrested. Because an officer may
conduct a search incident to a lawful arrest, the seizure of Plaintiff’s identification was
accordingly lawful. Given this justification for the seizure of Plaintiff’s identification, it appears
that the only manner in which Plaintiff can challenge the seizure of his identification is to
challenge the lawfulness of his arrest. Because challenging the legality of the arrest would
necessarily call into question the validity of Plaintiff’s convictions, this claim is barred pursuant
to Heck v. Humphrey.
Therefore, the court grants Defendants’ summary judgment motion for this claim.
C.
Section 1983 Claim: Punishment of Free Speech in Violation of the First Amendment
Plaintiff claims that Defendants selectively prosecuted Plaintiff’s case to punish his
criticism of their actions. (ECF No. 1 at 4). A court finding that Plaintiff was arrested and
prosecuted due to the exercise of his First Amendment rights would call into question the
lawfulness of Plaintiff’s convictions.
As such, Heck v. Humphrey bars this claim, and
accordingly, Defendants’ summary judgment motion is granted for this claim.
D.
Section 1983 Claim: Cruel and Unusual Punishment in Violation of the Fifth
Amendment
Plaintiff contends Defendants’ use of force violated his due process rights. (ECF No. 1 at
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5; ECF No. 16 at 10–11). It appears that Plaintiff seeks to state a substantive due process claim
under the Fourteenth Amendment, although Plaintiff does not clearly indicate the basis for this
claim. (See ECF No. 16 at 10–11). In Graham v. Connor, the Supreme Court explained that “all
claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive force…in the course of an arrest,
investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than under a ‘substantive due process’
approach.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 (1989).
Therefore, Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is granted for this cause of action
as it is duplicative of Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.
E.
Abuse of Process Under State Law
Plaintiff claims that Defendants pursued the legal process against him in retaliation for
Plaintiff’s complaints about Defendants’ alleged actions. (ECF No. 1 at 5). The elements for
abuse of process are (1) an ulterior purpose; and (2) a willful act in the use of the process that is
not proper in the regular conduct of the proceeding. Huggins v. Winn-Dixie Greenville, Inc., 153
S.E.2d 693 (S.C. 1967). A defendant will not be held liable for an abuse of process where he has
“done nothing more than carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even though bad
intentions.” Hainer v. American Medical Intern, Inc., 492 S.E.2d 103, 107 (S.C. 1997). Plaintiff
has not offered any evidence of an ulterior purpose or an intention on the part of Defendant
Owens to abuse a process, nor can any such mindset be permissibly inferred from the evidence.
To the contrary, the facts viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff establish that Defendant
Owens was attempting to effectuate a valid investigation into a citizen’s complaint about an
animal at large.
As such, Defendants were authorized to effectuate legal process against
Plaintiff.
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Thus, the court grants summary judgment for this claim.
CONCLUSION
Upon careful consideration of the entire record, the court hereby GRANTS IN PART
and DENIES IN PART Defendants’ motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 12). The court
grants Defendants’ summary judgment motion with respect to Plaintiff’s claims alleging the
unconstitutional seizure of Plaintiff’s identification, the punishment of free speech, the violation
of due process, and the abuse of process. The court denies Defendants’ motion with respect to
Plaintiff’s excessive force claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
United States District Judge
February 6, 2014
Greenville, South Carolina
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