Leger v Cruz

Filing 32

ORDER denied as moot 29 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 31 Motion for New Trial; denying 31 Motion to Alter Judgment. Signed by Chief Judge Terry L Wooten on 7/31/2014.(abuc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
AIKEN DIVISION
Paul Gerald Leger,
Petitioner,
vs.
Maureen Cruz, Warden,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Civil Action No.: 1:13-cv-00372-TLW

ORDER
This matter comes before this Court on Petitioner’s pro se motion for summary judgment
(Doc. #29) filed on February 19, 2014 and motion for new trial and motion to alter or amend the
judgment (Doc. #31) filed on March 10, 2014.
Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. #29) is untimely as this case is closed.
On February 10, 2014, this Court accepted the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
dismissed the above-captioned case without prejudice and without issuance and service of
process.

(See Docs. #26, 27).

Moreover, after careful review, the Court concludes that

Petitioner’s motion for new trial and motion to alter or amend the judgment is without merit.
According to the motion, Petitioner files his motion for a new trial and to alter or amend
the judgment pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59 and 52. Although Rule 59(e) does
not itself provide a standard under which a District Court may grant a motion to alter or amend a
judgment, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized three grounds for a court to alter
or amend an earlier judgment: (1) to accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2)
to account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or prevent
manifest injustice. Robinson v. Wix Filtration Corp., 599 F.3d 403, 407 (4th Cir. 2010); Pacific

Ins. Co. v. American National Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998) cert. denied, 525 U.S.
1104 (1999). Thus, Rule 59(e) permits a District Court to correct its own errors, “sparing the
parties and the appellate courts the burden of unnecessary appellate proceedings.” Pacific Ins.
Co., 148 F.3d at 403 (citing Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 749
(7th Cir. 1995)).
However, Rule 59(e) motions may not be used to raise arguments which could have been
raised prior to the issuance of the judgment, nor may they be used to argue a case under a novel
legal theory that the party had the ability to address in the first instance. Id. Similarly, if a party
relies on newly discovered evidence in its Rule 59(e) motion, the party must produce a legitimate
justification for not presenting the evidence during the earlier proceeding. Id. (citing Small v.
Hunt, 98 F.3d 789, 798 (4th Cir. 1996)). In general, reconsideration of a judgment after its entry
is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly. Id.
In light of the foregoing standards, the Court has carefully reviewed the Petitioner’s
motion. After careful consideration of the relevant filings, this Court concludes there is no basis
under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) or 52 for this Court to modify its Order (Doc. #26)
and Judgment (Doc. #27) entered on February 7, 2014 and February 10, 2014, respectively.
More specifically, the Court notes that the Petitioner asserts in his motion for summary
judgment (Doc. #29), Objections (Doc. #30) to this Court’s February 7, 2014 Order (Doc. #26)
dismissing the instant action, motion for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment (Doc.
#31), and original Objections (Doc. #18) filed to the Report and Recommendation that was
ultimately accepted by this Court, that the Report and Recommendation (Doc. #16) “was based
upon the erroneous presumption that this instant § 2241 Petition for writ of habeas corpus,
challenges the same projected release date as was challenged in the first § 2241 petition, in Leger

2

v. Owen, Case No. 1:11-2464.” (Doc. #31 at 1). After careful consideration, the Court finds
there is no basis to conclude that the instant § 2241 petition challenges a different calculation
than was raised and addressed on the merits in the Petitioner’s previous § 2241 petition, Leger v.
Owen, Case No. 1:11-2464.
Additionally, there has been no showing by the Petitioner that the Court’s previous
analysis warrants reconsideration or that the conclusions previously reached by this Court and
discussed in the Order dismissing this case (Doc. #26) regarding the challenged release date are
erroneous. The Report and Recommendation (Doc. #16) recommending dismissal of the instant
action and accepted by this Court specifically states, “As in the present petition, BOP records in
Leger I reflect Petitioner’s federal sentence as beginning on July 2, 2002, with eighty days of
prior custody credit and 705 days Good Conduct Time credit, resulting in a projected release date
of May 8, 2015. The BOP records in Leger I list April 23, 2002, as the completion date for
Petitioner’s first state sentence. This is the same date that he challenges in the instant petition.
The Report and Recommendation issued in Leger I, which was adopted by the district court,
found the BOP’s sentence calculation to be correct.” (Doc. #16 at 4 (emphasis added); see also
Leger I, Case No. 1:11-2464 Doc. #36 at 3–4).
Moreover, the Report and Recommendation in Leger I specifically states that the “BOP’s
projected release date of Petitioner from the federal sentence [is] May 8, 2015.” (Leger I, Case
No. 1:11-2464 Doc. #36 at 4 (emphasis added)). That is the same projected release date the
Petitioner indicates he challenges in the instant petition. Thus, there is no basis to amend the
Court’s conclusion stated in the Order dismissing this case that “the instant § 2241 petition
challenges the same projected release date as was challenged in the first petition. . . . [and]
accordingly, the instant case is dismissed with prejudice for the reasons articulated in this

3

Court’s previous Order dismissing Petitioner’s first habeas petition.” (Doc. #26 at 2 n.1 (citing
Leger I, Case No. 1:11-2464, Doc. #40).
In addition, after review of the record in this matter and the filings of the Petitioner, the
Court concludes that the Petitioner has not shown there was an improper calculation of
Petitioner’s federal sentence. In light of the fact that the Petitioner has made no such showing,
he is not entitled to relief on the merits.
Accordingly, after careful consideration, IT IS ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for
new trial and motion to alter or amend the judgment (Doc. #31) is DENIED. IT IS FURTHER
ORDERED that Petitioner’s motion for summary judgment (Doc. #29) is denied as MOOT.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Terry L. Wooten____
TERRY L. WOOTEN
Chief United States District Judge
July 31, 2014
Columbia, South Carolina

4