Alexander v. Barnwell County Hospital

Filing 13

ORDER AND OPINION granting 5 Motion to Dismiss and dismissing as moot Appellant's appeal of the Bankruptcy Court's Order Denying DonAlexander's Motion to Dismiss and/or Stay. (ECF Nos. 1, 5.) Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 2/18/2014.(asni, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
AIKEN DIVISION
Don Alexander,

)
)
Appellant,
)
v.
)
)
Barnwell County Hospital,
)
)
Appellee.
)
___________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 1:13-02164-JMC

ORDER AND OPINION

This matter is before the court by way of an appeal by Appellant Don Alexander
(“Appellant” or “Alexander”) from an order filed by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the
District of South Carolina (the “Bankruptcy Court”) on June 11, 2013, and a motion to dismiss
the appeal by Appellee Barnwell County Hospital (the “Hospital” or “Debtor”). (See ECF Nos.
1, 5.) Specifically, Appellant appeals the Bankruptcy Court’s Order Denying Don Alexander’s
Motion to Dismiss and/or Stay (the “Order”).1 (See ECF No. 1 at 2-10.) Appellant asserts that
the Bankruptcy Court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the Hospital’s Chapter 9 2
bankruptcy petition and/or stay the sale of the Hospital’s assets pursuant to its plan for
adjustment of debts. (Id. at 1 (referencing ECF No. 3-3).) The Hospital responded to the appeal
by moving to dismiss it for lack of jurisdiction and on the ground of mootness. (ECF No. 5.)
For the reasons set forth below, the court GRANTS the Hospital’s motion to dismiss and
DISMISSES the appeal as moot.
1

This matter is one (1) of four (4) appeals challenging orders entered by the Bankruptcy Court.
The other three appeals are identified as follows: In re: Barnwell Cnty. Hosp., C/A No. 1:1202265-JMC (D.S.C. Aug. 9, 2012); In re: Barnwell Cnty. Hosp., C/A No. 1:13-01678-JMC
(D.S.C. June 19, 2013); and In re: Barnwell Cnty. Hosp., C/A No. 1:13-02032-JMC (D.S.C. July
24, 2013).
2
Chapter 9 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 901-946, governs the adjustment of debts of
municipalities. Section 901 sets out which provisions of Title 11 apply to filings of
municipalities. See 11 U.S.C. § 901.
1

I.

RELEVANT BACKGROUND

To support its findings, the Bankruptcy Court set forth the following detailed findings of
fact, which this court will not set aside unless clearly erroneous:
Prior to the filing of its bankruptcy petition, Debtor had been unable to pay its
debts as they became due. For years, Barnwell County provided funding to keep
Debtor operating, but Debtor was informed that Barnwell County would no longer
provide funding. Furthermore, as a rural hospital, Debtor does not have the
customer volume to pay for new technology and facilities that larger hospitals in
neighboring areas can provide. Consequently Debtor, along with Bamberg
County and Bamberg County Memorial Hospital (“Bamberg Hospital”), sought a
third party purchaser to provide healthcare for the residents of Bamberg County
and Barnwell County.
On September 29, 2011, Debtor, along with Bamberg Hospital, Barnwell County,
and Bamberg County, executed an Asset Purchase Agreement (“Original APA”)
with SC Regional Health System, LLC (“RHS”) for the purchase of substantially
all of the assets of Debtor and the Bamberg Hospital.
On October 5, 2011, Debtor filed a petition seeking relief under chapter 9 of the
United States Bankruptcy Code (“Bankruptcy Code”).
A group of citizens, including Alexander, filed an action in the Court of Common
Pleas for Barnwell County, South Carolina against members of Barnwell County
Council, Alexander et al. v. Houston et al., Case No. 2011-CP-06-476 (“State
Court Action”). The plaintiffs in the State Court Action challenged the ability of
members of Barnwell County Council to also serve on the Hospital Board of
Debtor based on the provision against dual office holding in the South Carolina
Constitution. The members of Barnwell County Council named in the State Court
Action filed a motion to dismiss the complaint in the State Court Action, which
the trial court granted by an order entered May 2, 2012. The plaintiffs in the State
Court Action appealed.
Debtor’s Amended Plan for Adjustment of Debts, as modified by the Debtor’s
Modification to First Amended Plan for Adjustment of Debts (collectively, the
“Plan”) was based on the transaction contemplated by the Original APA. On May
23, 2012, the Bankruptcy Court entered its Order confirming Debtor’s Plan (the
“Confirmation Order”).3

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The Bankruptcy Court also found in the Confirmation Order that the dual office holding
prohibition of the South Carolina Constitution had not been violated and that the Hospital met
Chapter 9 eligibility requirements.
2

In confirming Debtor’s Plan, this Court considered objections to the Plan from
Alexander and others raising the issue of the eligibility of Debtor for chapter 9
relief on, among other grounds, the same dual office holding proscription. The
precise issue, parties and arguments were different in the State Court Action and
in this Court. This Court determined Debtor was eligible and determined that the
dual office holding provisions of the South Carolina Constitution were not
violated albeit on different grounds than the state trial court.
Alexander filed a notice of appeal of the Confirmation Order. He did not move for
a stay pending the outcome of the appeal.
The transaction contemplated under the Original APA did not close, the reasons
for which were vigorously contested by Debtor and RHS. As a result of the
transaction not closing, RHS filed an application seeking payment of an
administrative expense claim (“RHS Application”) in the amount of
approximately $1,819,000.00 for liquidated damages under the Original APA and
for compensation and reimbursement of fees and expenses under a separate
Consulting Agreement between Debtor and RHS. Debtor objected to the RHS
Application and disputed that RHS was entitled to a claim against Debtor.
Additionally, Debtor asserted that it was entitled to damages against RHS, which
RHS disputed.
When the transaction did not close under the Original APA, Debtor sought a new
purchaser to be substituted for RHS and close the transaction in accordance with
the terms approved in the Plan. Debtor located a new purchaser and executed a
new Asset Purchase Agreement with BCH dated November 26, 2012 (the
“Substitute APA”). Thereafter, on December 7, 2012, Debtor filed a Motion for
an Order Authorizing a Substitute Asset Purchase Agreement in Aid of
Implementation of the Plan (“Substitution Motion”) seeking an Order from this
Court authorizing Debtor to substitute the New APA in place of the Original APA
and allowing Debtor to sell its assets to BCH instead of RHS as contemplated in
the Plan.
A Notice and Application for Settlement and Compromise (“Settlement
Application”) seeking approval of a Settlement Agreement and Release
(“Settlement Agreement”) between Debtor and RHS was entered on February 27,
2013.
On April 18, 2013, the Court entered an Order granting the Substitution Motion
and approving the Settlement Agreement (“Substitution Order”).
On May 2, 2013, Alexander moved to amend the Substitution Order.
On May 2, 2013, the Estate of Robert M. Peeples and Six Participants of the
Barnwell County Pension Plan filed a notice of appeal of the Substitution Order.
On May 7, 2013, the Court entered an Order denying Alexander’s motion to
amend.
3

On May 21, 2013, Alexander filed a notice of appeal of the Substitution Order.
On May 29, 2013, the South Carolina Supreme Court filed an opinion reversing
the trial court’s order dismissing the State Court Action, finding that the service of
members of Barnwell County Council on both County Council and Hospital
Board constitutes improper dual office holding in violation of the South Carolina
Constitution, and remanding the case to the trial court.
On June 6, 2013, Alexander filed a motion to dismiss and/or stay and requested an
expedited hearing on the motion.
The Court granted the request for an expedited hearing, which was held on June
11, 2013. [After the hearing, the Court entered an order denying Alexander’s
motion to dismiss and/or stay.]
The closing of the sale pursuant to the Substitute APA [][occurred on] June 12,
2013.
(ECF No. 1 at 2-5.)
On August 9, 2013, Appellant filed a notice to appeal the Order to this court pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 158(a) or (b). (ECF No. 1.) On August 12, 2013, the Clerk of Court entered a
document that notified the parties of the filing of the bankruptcy appeal and set up a briefing
schedule for their submissions.4 (ECF No. 2.) On August 14, 2013, the Hospital filed a motion
to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction and mootness. (ECF No. 5.) Appellant filed
opposition to the Hospital’s motion to dismiss on September 3, 2013, to which the Hospital filed
a reply in support of its motion on September 12, 2013. (ECF Nos. 10, 11.)
II.
A.

LEGAL STANDARD

Bankruptcy Appeals
This court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from final orders of the bankruptcy court. 28

U.S.C. § 158; see, e.g., In re Kirkland, 600 F.3d 310, 314 (4th Cir. 2010) (noting district court’s
“capacity as a bankruptcy appellate court”). The standard for finality of bankruptcy court orders
4

The briefing schedule for a bankruptcy appeal to a federal district court is established by law.
See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8009. According to Rule 8009, an appellant has fourteen days after filing
a notice of appeal within which to file a supporting brief. Id. at 8009(a)(1).
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is relaxed from that of non-bankruptcy district court orders under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. In re
Looney, 823 F.2d 788, 790 (4th Cir. 1987) (citing A.H. Robins Co. v. Piccinin, 788 F.2d 994,
1009 (4th Cir. 1986)). A court may consider an order a final order for appeal purposes if it
resolves the litigation, decides the merits, settles liability, establishes damages, or determines the
rights of even one of the parties to the bankruptcy case. Id.
The standard of review of a bankruptcy appeal by a district court is the same as when a
court of appeals reviews a district court proceeding. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(2). Accordingly,
the bankruptcy court’s findings of fact are reviewed under a “clearly erroneous” standard. Fed.
R. Bankr. P. 8013. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous when the entire record demonstrates
convincingly to the reviewing court that “a mistake has been committed.” United States v. U.S.
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948); United States v. Hall, 664 F.3d 456, 462 (4th Cir. 2012).
A bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law are subject to de novo review. In re Biondo, 180 F.3d
126, 130 (4th Cir. 1999); In re K & L Lakeland, Inc., 128 F.3d 203, 206 (4th Cir. 1997).
B.

The Doctrine of Mootness
“Article III of the Constitution limits federal courts to the adjudication of actual, ongoing

controversies between litigants.” Deakins v. Monaghan, 484 U.S. 193, 199 (1988) (citations
omitted). “‘[T]he doctrine of mootness constitutes a part of the constitutional limits of federal
court jurisdiction . . . .’” Townes v. Jarvis, 577 F.3d 543, 546 (4th Cir. 2009) (quoting United
States v. Hardy, 545 F.3d 280, 283 (4th Cir. 2008)). “Federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide
moot cases because their constitutional authority extends only to actual cases or controversies”
under Article III of the Constitution. Iron Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70
(1983). “A case becomes moot when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack
a legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Warren v. Sessoms & Rogers, P.A., 676 F.3d 365,

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370 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mootness in bankruptcy appeals arises in two forms: constitutional mootness and
equitable mootness. Carr v. King, 321 B.R. 702, 705 (E.D. Va. 2005). Constitutional mootness
refers to the well-settled notion that “[w]hen there is no longer a case or controversy in the
constitutional sense, an Article III court is without jurisdiction to adjudicate.” Cent. States, Se.
& Sw. Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 841 F.2d 92, 95 (4th Cir. 1988). A federal
court lacks authority “to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to
declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.”
Church of Scientology v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S.
651, 653 (1895)). Therefore, “if an event occurs while a case is pending on appeal that makes it
impossible for the court to grant ‘any effectual relief whatever’ to a prevailing party, the appeal
must be dismissed.” Id. (quoting Mills, 159 U.S. at 653).
In contrast, “the doctrine of equitable mootness is a pragmatic principle, grounded in the
notion that, with the passage of time after a judgment in equity and implementation of that
judgment, effective relief on appeal becomes impractical, imprudent, and therefore inequitable.”
Mac Panel Co. v. Va. Panel Corp., 283 F.3d 622, 625 (4th Cir. 2002). Equitable mootness is
“[a]pplied principally in bankruptcy proceedings because of the equitable nature of bankruptcy
judgments” and “is often invoked when it becomes impractical and imprudent ‘to upset the plan
of reorganization at this late date.’” Id. at 625 (quoting In re UNR Indus., Inc., 20 F.3d 766, 769
(7th Cir. 1994)). Moreover, in applying equitable mootness, a court “does not employ rigid
rules,” but must “determine whether judicial relief on appeal can, as a pragmatic matter, be
granted.” Id. Specific “[f]actors in making this determination include (1) whether the appellant
sought and obtained a stay; (2) whether the reorganization plan or other equitable relief ordered

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has been substantially consummated; (3) the extent to which the relief requested on appeal
would affect the success of the reorganization plan or other equitable relief granted; and (4) the
extent to which the relief requested on appeal would affect the interests of third parties.” Id.
C.

Motions to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction or Mootness
The appropriate means for challenging either the court’s jurisdiction or the mootness of a

matter is a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). See, e.g., Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219
(4th Cir. 1982); Friends of Animals v. Salazar, 670 F. Supp. 2d 7, 11 (D.D.C. 2009) (holding that
“[a] motion to dismiss for mootness is properly brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1)”). The burden of showing subject matter jurisdiction on a Rule 12(b)(1) motion rests
with the party invoking it. Adams, 697 F.2d at 1219.
III.

ANALYSIS

In this appeal, Appellant argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred in denying his motion to
dismiss the Hospital’s Chapter 9 bankruptcy petition and/or stay the sale of assets pursuant to its
plan for adjustment of debts. (See ECF No. 1 (referencing ECF No. 3-3).) Before considering
the merits of the appeal, the court must address first the issue of its jurisdiction, which includes
the Hospital’s assertion that the appeal is barred by mootness, because mootness is a
jurisdictional issue. See, e.g., Church of Scientology of Cal., 506 U.S. at 12 (“[I]f an event
occurs while a case is pending on appeal that makes it impossible for the court to grant any
effectual relief whatever to a prevailing party, the appeal must be dismissed,” for federal courts
have “no authority to give opinions upon moot questions or abstract propositions, or to
declare principles or rules of law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.”);
Constantine v. Rectors & Visitors of George Mason Univ., 411 F.3d 474, 480 (4th Cir. 2005)
(“A federal court has an independent obligation to assess its subject-matter jurisdiction, and it

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will ‘raise a lack of subject­matter jurisdiction on its own motion.’”) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir.,
Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982)).
A.

The Hospital’s Motion to Dismiss
1.

The Parties’ Arguments

The Hospital moves for dismissal of the appeal, arguing that (1) the court lacks
jurisdiction over the matter because the order being appealed is not a final order and (2) the
appeal is both constitutionally moot and equitably moot. (ECF No. 5.) In support of these
arguments, the Hospital asserts that the court lacks jurisdiction because the Order is not a final
order and Appellant has failed to request or be granted leave to appeal the Order. (Id. at 2.)
Alternatively, the Hospital asserts that dismissal for mootness is appropriate because the Plan has
been substantially consummated; Appellant failed to obtain a stay of the Confirmation Order
pending the appeal; the court cannot grant effective relief on appeal even if Appellant’s
arguments have merit; and even if the court could grant effective relief, implementation of that
relief would be inequitable. (Id.)
To show that the Plan has been substantially consummated, the Hospital submitted
evidence via affidavit that on June 12, 2013, in accordance with the Plan: (1) all of the Hospital’s
assets were transferred to BCH Acquisitions Group, which took control of the hospital facility
and hired workers that had been previously employed by the Hospital 5; (2) BCH Acquisitions

5

In addition, BCH received the following from the Hospital: (1) all schedules and due diligence
items incident to the New APA; (2) a deed of the real property comprising the Hospital’s facility;
(3) the right, title and obligations of certain of the Hospital’s operating contracts; (4) Bills of Sale
for the Hospital’s personal property; (5) transfers and powers of attorneys for certain licenses for
the operation of the hospital, its rural facilities and its pharmacies; (6) proof of settlements of
certain indebtedness; and (7) certificates of Barnwell County and the Hospital regarding the
completion of certain conditions precedent to the sale. (ECF No. 5-2 at 5 ¶ 23.)
8

Group paid the Hospital closing and cure costs in the amount of $1,400,000.006; (3) a Creditor’s
Distribution Trust was created, which entity was the recipient of any remaining non-purchased
assets of the Hospital for collection and distribution to its unsecured creditors 7 ; and (4) the
Hospital ceased operations. (ECF No. 5-2 at 5-6.) Based on the foregoing, the Hospital argues
that the appeal is constitutionally moot because Appellant seeks to accomplish the impractical
and impossible by unwinding the Hospital’s bankruptcy. (ECF No. 5-1 at 11-12.)
The Hospital also argues that the appeal is equitably moot because it would be “both
impractical and imprudent to upset the Hospital’s bankruptcy” and “[t]he four factors considered
. . . in determining whether to dismiss an appeal as equitably moot weigh heavily in favor of
dismissal in this case.” (Id. at 12-17.) In support of this argument, the Hospital asserts that (1)
Appellant failed to obtain a stay of either the Confirmation Order or the Substitution Order on
appeal; (2) the Plan has been substantially consummated; (3) the relief requested by Appellant
would substantially affect the success of the Plan; and (4) the Hospital’s creditors, BCH
Acquisitions Group, and other third parties would be significantly harmed if the court granted the
relief requested in the appeal. (Id.) Accordingly, the Hospital contends that the appeal should be
dismissed for mootness.
Appellant opposes the motion to dismiss, arguing that the Order meets the more flexible
standards of a final, appealable order in a bankruptcy matter, which standards only require that
the order “finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger case.” (ECF No. 10 at 2 (citing,

6

Upon receipt of the $1,400,000.00, the Plan required the Hospital to disburse $701,382.24 to
the United States for Medicare overpayments, $47,500.00 to First Citizens Bank and Trust
Company, Inc., and $17,000.00 to South Carolina Rural Health. (ECF No. 5-2 at 6 ¶ 26.) In
total, the Hospital has paid allowed administrative expenses in the amount of $900,000.00, in
addition to final operating costs through June 12, 2013. (Id. at ¶ 27.)
7
The Plan required that the Hospital’s right to recover preferential and fraudulent transfers be
transferred and vested in a Creditors Distribution Trust. (ECF No. 5-2 at 5 ¶ 21.)
9

e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 880 F.2d 1509, 1511 (2d Cir. 1989); In re Saco Local Dev. Corp.,
711 F.2d 441, 444 (1st Cir. 1983)).) Appellant next argues that the appeal is not constitutionally
moot because the court has the power to unwind the Hospital’s sale no matter the complexity or
difficulty. (Id. at 3 (citing In re Lomagno, 320 B.R. 473, 480 (1st Cir. BAP 2005) (Bankruptcy
court had equitable power to find a foreclosure sale, which occurred in violation of automatic
stay, void and without effect); In re Wright, 329 Fed. Appx. 137 (9th Cir. 2009) (“unscrambling
the eggs” is theoretically possible through disgorgement of unsecured creditors)).) Appellant
further argues that dismissal of the appeal for equitable mootness is unwarranted because (1)
Appellant sought a stay as soon as he had grounds to support a stay; (2) the Hospital
substantially consummated the Plan by transferring assets and paying creditors after it had been
warned about the consequences of proceeding with the assets sale and/or transfer of assets while
an appeal was pending; (3) the Hospital should not have attempted to complete the Plan since it
was not an eligible Chapter 9 debtor; and (4) a reversal of the Plan would have a limited effect
on third parties since the purchaser of the Hospital had notice of Appellant’s objection to the
sale, and the Hospital’s other assets have not been distributed to unsecured creditors. (Id. at 4-6
(citing ECF Nos. 10-1, 10-2, 10-3, 10-4).) Therefore, Appellant requests that the court deny the
motion to dismiss and consider the appeal on the merits.
2.

The Court’s Review

Upon review, the court finds that it has jurisdiction to address mootness. Because it
denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss and/or stay, the Order allowed the sale of the Hospital’s
assets to proceed in accordance with the Plan. Based on the foregoing, the court is convinced
that the Order is the type of decree that has a final and irreparable effect on the rights of the
parties, which effect appellate courts have allowed jurisdiction for an appeal pursuant to the

10

collateral order doctrine. Looney, 823 F.2d at 791 (citing Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan
Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949) (“This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally
determine claims of right separable from, and collateral to rights asserted in the action, too
important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to require that appellate
consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated.”)).
With a finding that it has jurisdiction to address mootness, the court is authorized to
conclude that this appeal is both constitutionally moot and equitably moot. This appeal is
constitutionally moot because Appellant seeks a remedy that would require undoing the Plan in
its entirety. In this regard, the Plan has been implemented such that a greater part of the
Hospital’s assets are in the possession of a non-party to this action and any remaining assets have
either already been distributed or are about to be distributed to other non-parties. Moreover,
most of the proceeds from the transfer of the Hospital’s assets have been distributed to its
creditors, who are also non-parties to this action. Based on the foregoing, the court finds that it
would be impossible to award Appellant effective relief under these circumstances. Therefore,
the court finds that the appeal should be dismissed as constitutionally moot.
Alternatively, upon consideration of the four (4) factors used to determine whether
judicial relief on appeal can be granted, the court finds that the appeal is equitably moot as well.
First, even though Appellant sought and was denied a stay in the Bankruptcy Court, he failed to
seek a stay from this court pending the appeal.8 While a party is not required to seek a stay
pending appeal, a party who fails to do so incurs the risk that during the pendency of the appeal,
the appeal may be rendered moot. In re Shawnee Hills, Inc., 125 Fed. Appx. 466, 470 (4th Cir.
8

Bankruptcy Rule 8005 expressly provides that even in the face of a denial of a stay by the
bankruptcy court, “[a] motion for such relief, . . . may be made to the district court or the
bankruptcy appellate panel, but the motion shall show why the relief, modification, or
termination was not obtained from the bankruptcy judge.” Fed. R. Bankr. 8005.
11

2005) (citing Taylor v. Austrian, 154 F.2d 107, 108 (4th Cir. 1946)); In re Kevin Blake Carr, 321
B.R. 702, (E.D. Va. 2005). In this case, because this court was not asked to issue a stay pending
the appeal, the Hospital was authorized to carry out the Plan before this appeal could be heard.
As to the second factor, the consummation of the Plan has been more than substantial.
Substantial consummation as defined by the Bankruptcy Code requires three events: (1) transfer
of all or substantially all of the property proposed by the plan to be transferred; (2) assumption
by the debtor or by the successor to the debtor under the plan of the business or of the
management of all or substantially all of the property dealt with by the plan; and (3)
commencement of distribution under the plan. 11 U.S.C. § 1101(2); see Mac Panel, 283 F.3d at
625-26. Based on the facts made known to the court, all three of these events have occurred.
Moreover, Appellant does not dispute that the Plan was substantially consummated. Instead,
Appellant takes the position that the Plan’s consummation occurred after the Hospital had been
warned about the consequences of proceeding with an assets sale and/or transfer of assets while
an appeal was pending. Notwithstanding Appellant’s arguments, it is clear that the Plan has been
substantially consummated.
The third factor weighs against Appellant because he seeks to undo the Plan completely,
as opposed to a less extreme measure, such as undoing one component of the Plan. Finally, with
respect to the fourth factor, the court finds that the remedy Appellant seeks would unduly harm
innocent third parties, who are not before the court, including BCH Acquisitions Group and any
of the Hospital’s creditors to whom money was distributed. Therefore, using the four-factor test
set forth by the Fourth Circuit for evaluating equitable mootness, the court finds that this appeal
should be dismissed as equitably moot.

12

B.

The Appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s Order
Because the appeal is moot, the court need not consider the merits of the appeal. Mills v.

Green, 159 U.S. 651, 653 (1895) (“It necessarily follows that when, pending an appeal from the
judgment of a lower court, . . . , an event occurs which renders it impossible for this court, . . . ,
to grant him any effectual relief whatsoever, the court will not proceed to a formal judgment, but
will dismiss the appeal.”)
IV.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the court hereby GRANTS the Hospital’s motion to dismiss
and DISMISSES as moot Appellant’s appeal of the Bankruptcy Court’s Order Denying Don
Alexander’s Motion to Dismiss and/or Stay. (ECF Nos. 1, 5.)
IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge
February 18, 2014
Greenville, South Carolina

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