Chestnut v. Singleton

Filing 94

ORDER denying 64 MOTION to Compel; denying 65 MOTION to Compel; denying 66 MOTION for Physical Examination; denying 67 MOTION for Writ of Habeas Corpus ad prosequendum; denying 74 MOTION for Sanctions; den ying 78 MOTION for Entry of Default; denying 79 MOTION for Default Judgment as to Raymond Chestnut; denying 83 MOTION for Sanctions; denying 88 MOTION for Spoilation Sanctions; and denying 90 MOTION for Hearing. Signed by Magistrate Judge Shiva V Hodges on 4/13/2015. (mwal)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Raymond Edward Chestnut,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Officer K. Singleton,
Defendant.

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C/A No.: 1:13-2250-RBH-SVH

ORDER

Plaintiff Raymond Edward Chestnut, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis,
brings this civil action pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).1 Plaintiff alleges that Officer Singleton
(“Defendant”) used excessive force against him during Plaintiff’s incarceration at the
Federal Correctional Institution in Bennettsville, South Carolina (“FCI-Bennettsville”), a
facility of the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”). [ECF No. 1]. Plaintiff is now housed at the
United States Prison in Lewisburg, Pennsylvania. [ECF No. 1 at 2].
This matter comes before the court on the following motions of Plaintiff: (1)
motions to compel [ECF Nos. 64, 65]; (2) motion for a physical examination [ECF No.
66]; (3) motion for a transfer [ECF No. 67]; (4) motion for sanctions [ECF No. 74]; (5)
motions related to Defendant’s failure to file video evidence [ECF Nos. 78, 79, 83, 88];
and (6) motion for a hearing [ECF No. 90]. Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(B), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), this matter has been referred to the
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Bivens established that victims of a constitutional violation perpetuated by a federal
actor may sue the offender for damages in federal court despite the absence of explicit
statutory authorization for such suits.

undersigned for all pretrial proceedings.
I.

Motions to Compel
In his motions to compel filed November 14, 2014 [ECF Nos. 64, 65], Plaintiff

alleges he served Defendants with interrogatories and requests for production on
September 27, 2014, but did not receive answers or responses. Defendant filed responses
to the motions indicating that neither Defendant nor counsel received the discovery
requests. [ECF No. 71, 72]. Plaintiff argues that he needs this discovery to resolve
“genuine issues of material fact.” [ECF No. 65 at 2]. Without making a substantive
determination as to whether Plaintiff is entitled to the discovery, the undersigned denies
Plaintiff’s motions to compel. The undersigned will resolve in Plaintiff’s favor all factual
issues that could reasonably be disputed. The undersigned also notes that Defendant’s
motion for summary judgment contains copies of many of the requested documents, such
as Plaintiff’s BOP medical records from August 7, 2010, until November 7, 2012, and the
BOP’s Office of Internal Affairs Incident Report (“Report”). [ECF No. 68-2]. Although
Defendant has not submitted the video of the incident, a summary of the video is included
in the Report and the undersigned has resolved all reasonable disputes of fact in
Plaintiff’s favor for summary judgment purposes. [ECF No. 68-2 at 39]. Therefore,
Plaintiff has not shown why he needs the discovery he alleges that he timely served, and
his motions to compel are denied.
II.

Motion for a Physical Examination
Plaintiff requests that the court order he be physically examined because he has

experienced “a lack of clear vision and dizziness” since the incident on August 10, 2012.
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[ECF No. 66 at 1]. Plaintiff’s complaint states only that his eye was swollen and blurry
for about 14 days. [ECF No. 1 at 3]. Plaintiff’s medical records indicate that he refused
an injury assessment on August 10, 2012. [ECF No. 68-2 at 3]. His next medical
encounter was August 24, 2012, at which time his eyes were examined and found to be
normal. Id. at 4. Although Plaintiff was seen by medical several other times between the
incident and November 7, 2012, there is no record of Plaintiff complaining of injury to
his eye or other pain originating from the incident. Id. at 4–27. Because it appears that
Plaintiff was regularly examined by medical in the weeks and months following the
incident, the undersigned denies his request for a physical examination.
III.

Motion to Transfer
Although Plaintiff’s motion is entitled “Motion for Writ of Habeas Corpus Ad

Prosequendum,” he seeks a transfer from Pennsylvania to a prison in South Carolina in
order to prepare his case. [ECF No. 67]. There is no constitutional right for a state or
federal prisoner to be housed in a particular institution, at a particular custody level, or in
a particular portion or unit of a correctional institution. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S.
238 (1983); Ange v. Paderick, 521 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1975). The placement and
assignment of inmates into particular institutions or units by state or federal corrections
departments are discretionary functions and are not subject to review unless state or
federal law places limitations on official discretion. Hayes v. Thompson, 726 F.2d 1015,
1016–17 & n.1 (4th Cir. 1984). In addition, no trial date has been set in this case, and
Plaintiff has ably prosecuted his case while incarcerated outside of South Carolina.
Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion for a transfer is denied.
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IV.

Motion for Sanctions
In his first motion for sanctions, Plaintiff argues that Assistant United States

Attorney Marshall Prince (“AUSA Prince”) does not have standing to represent
Defendant because she is sued in her individual capacity. [ECF No. 74 at 2]. Defendant’s
response states that 28 U.S.C. § 517 governs representation of federal employees by the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and 28 C.F.R. § 50.15 provides guidance to the DOJ as to
whether representation may be provided to an employee. [ECF No. 76 at 1–2]. AUSA
Prince represents that on September 26, 2013, Defendant requested representation by a
DOJ attorney in this case. Id. He further represents that DOJ granted Singleton’s request
on October 17, 2013. Id. at 2. To the extent Plaintiff believes he is entitled to
documentation of the same [ECF No. 84 at 2], he has provided no authority. Plaintiff’s
motion for sanctions dated December 12, 2014 [ECF No. 74], is denied.
V.

Motions Related to the Video
In Plaintiff’s motion for sanctions dated January 20, 2015 [ECF No. 83], Plaintiff

argues Defendant should be sanctioned for failure to file the video of the incident
pursuant to the court’s order. Plaintiff also filed a motion for an entry of default [ECF No.
78] and for a default judgment [ECF No. 79] related to Defendant’s failure to provide the
video. Finally, Plaintiff also filed a motion for spoliation sanctions related to the video.
[ECF No. 88].
A review of the docket reveals that on April 8, 2014, the undersigned issued a text
order stating “In accordance with Judge Harwell’s order of April 8, 2014, if video
evidence referred to in Plaintiff’s Documentation of Informal Resolution Attempt exists
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and if Defendant wishes to make it a part of the record, Defendant should file it with the
court by May 8, 2014.” [ECF No. 33]. Therefore, the court directed Defendant to file the
video evidence with the court only if: (1) it existed and (2) Defendant wished to make it
part of the evidence. In response to prior motions by Plaintiff requesting a copy of the
video, Defendant indicated that “no video evidence of this alleged incident is available.”
[ECF Nos. 38, 40]. As previously discussed, the undersigned has resolved all reasonable
factual disputes in Plaintiff’s favor, and the absence of video evidence has not prejudiced
his case. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motions requesting sanctions related to Defendant’s failure
to file the video evidence [ECF Nos. 78, 79, 83, 88] are denied.
VI.

Motion for Hearing
In Plaintiff’s motion for a hearing, he demands a jury trial be set in this case

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 38. [ECF No. 90]. Rule 38 preserves the Seventh
Amendment’s right to a jury trial if there are facts in dispute. However, to the extent a
case contains only issues of law, a court may decide the matter on summary judgment.
Barber v. Kimbrell’s, Inc.,577 F.2d 216, 221 n.12 (4th Cir. 1978) (“where summary
judgment is properly granted, no Seventh Amendment issue arises”) (citing Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. U.S. ex rel. Smoot, 187 U.S. 315, 319–21 (1902). Plaintiff also cites to the
Sixth Amendment, but it only applies to criminal prosecutions. Therefore, Plaintiff’s
motion for a hearing is denied at this time.
VII.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the following motions by Plaintiff are denied: (1)

motions to compel [ECF Nos. 64, 65]; (2) motion for a physical examination [ECF No.
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66]; (3) motion for a transfer [ECF No. 67]; (4) motion for sanctions [ECF No. 74]; (5)
motions related to Defendant’s failure to file video evidence [ECF Nos. 78, 79, 83, and
88]; and (6) motion for a hearing [ECF No. 90].
IT IS SO ORDERED.

April 13, 2015
Columbia, South Carolina

Shiva V. Hodges
United States Magistrate Judge

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