English v. Andrews et al

Filing 121

ORDER granting 40 Motion to Dismiss. Signed by Honorable Joseph F Anderson, Jr on 9/8/2014.(abuc)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Roderick English,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Ms. Andrews, RN; Jane Wrecsis, Health
Manager; Mr. Parker, Warden; John B.
Mcree; Vera Courson, RN; William R.
Byars Jr.; and Nurse Cebags,
Defendants.

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C/A No.: 1:13-2793-JFA-SVH

ORDER

Plaintiff Roderick English, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this civil
rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his constitutional rights
while incarcerated at McCormick Correctional Institution (MCI) in the custody of the
South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC). Plaintiff sues the following
defendants: Nurse Andrews, Health Manager Wrecsis, Warden Parker, Mr. Mcree, Nurse
Courson, Mr. Byars, and Nurse Sebag.1
This matter comes before the court on Sebag’s motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s
complaint against her. (ECF No. 40). Pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309
(4th Cir. 1975), the court advised Plaintiff of the dismissal procedures and the possible
consequences if he failed to respond adequately to Sebag’s motion. (ECF No. 48). This
motion having been fully briefed, it is ripe for disposition. (ECF Nos. 58, 67).

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The court filings indicate that Sebag is the correct spelling of her name. (ECF No. 40).

I.

Factual Background
Plaintiff’s complaint concerns the medical attention he received at MCI related to

an injury to his left thigh. Sebag is not referenced in the complaint except that she is
named in a list of defendants on the nearly identical first and second pages of the
complaint. (ECF No. 1 at 1–2). Otherwise, the complaint is devoid of any reference to
Sebag. Sebag argues the complaint fails to state a claim against her upon which relief can
be granted.
II.

Discussion
A.

Standard on Motion to Dismiss

To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), “a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The court is “not required to accept as true the legal
conclusions set forth in a plaintiff’s complaint.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d
231, 244 (4th Cir. 1999). Indeed, “[t]he presence of a few conclusory legal terms does not
insulate a complaint from dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) when the facts alleged in the
complaint cannot support” the legal conclusion. Young v. City of Mount Ranier, 238 F.3d
567, 577 (4th Cir. 2001).
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by
attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is
charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the
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development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94
(2007). When a federal court is evaluating a pro se complaint, the plaintiff’s allegations
are assumed to be true. Fine v. City of N.Y., 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2d Cir. 1975). The
mandated liberal construction afforded to pro se pleadings means that if the court can
reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it
should do so. Nevertheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the
court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts that set forth a claim
currently cognizable in a federal district court. Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d
387, 390–91 (4th Cir. 1990).
B.

Analysis

A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that
the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although the court must liberally
construe a pro se complaint, the United States Supreme Court has made clear that a
plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements to state a claim. See Iqbal, 556
U.S. at 677S78; Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). Rather, the
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim that is
plausible on its face, and the reviewing court need only accept as true the complaint’s
factual allegations, not its legal conclusions. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678S79. Here, Plaintiff
provides no factual allegations in the complaint that demonstrate a violation of his
constitutional rights by Sebag. Plaintiff’s response to Sebag’s motion to dismiss fails to
set forth any allegations indicating that Plaintiff could cure the deficiencies in his
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complaint with an amendment. (ECF No. 58). Therefore, because Plaintiff fails to set
forth a claim against Sebag upon which relief can be granted, the court grants Sebag’s
motion to dismiss.
III.

Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants Sebag’s motion to dismiss. (ECF No.

40).
IT IS SO ORDERED.

September 8, 2014
Columbia, South Carolina

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
United States District Judge

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