Lydia v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration
Filing
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ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION adopting 18 Report and Recommendation, reversing the decision of the Commissioner pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g) and remanding the action for further proceedings. Signed by Honorable Margaret B. Seymour on 09/28/2016. (bshr, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
AIKEN DIVISION
Freda Lydia,
Plaintiff,
v.
Carolyn W. Colvin, Acting Commissioner of
Social Security Administration,
Defendant.
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Civil Action No.: 1:15-795-MBS-SVH
ORDER AND OPINION
This is an action brought pursuant to Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act (the
“Act”), codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), to obtain judicial review of the final
decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“the Commissioner”).
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff Freda Lydia protectively filed applications for Disability Insurance Benefits
(“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”) on September 20, 2005, alleging disability
since May 1, 2005. R. 69, 70, 94–99, 100–06. Plaintiff’s applications were denied initially and
upon reconsideration. R. 73–77, 81–82, 84–85. Plaintiff requested a hearing before an
administrative law judge (“ALJ”), which was initially held on January 22, 2009, before ALJ
Gregory Wilson. R. 30–68. The ALJ issued an unfavorable decision dated March 12, 2009, in
which he concluded that the Plaintiff was not “disabled” as defined in the Social Security Act. R.
6–22. Accordingly, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not entitled to DIB or SSI under
Sections 216(i), 223(d), or 1614(a)(3)(A) of the Social Security Act. Plaintiff filed a request for
review of the ALJ’s decision, which was denied by the Appeals Council on April 15, 2011,
making the ALJ’s decision the “final decision” for the purposes of judicial review. R. 1–5.
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Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint in this court on June 14, 2011, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). R. 590–91. On July 25, 2012, the Honorable Bruce H. Hendricks, United States
Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that the ALJ be reversed
and remanded. Lydia v. Astrue, No. 11-1453, 2012 WL 3304107 (D.S.C. July 25, 2012). On
August 13, 2012, the Honorable David C. Norton, United States District Judge, issued an order
adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, reversing and remanding the case
to the agency. Lydia v. Astrue, No. 11-1453, 2012 WL 3308108 (D.S.C. Aug. 13, 2012). Judge
Norton, through adopting the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, found that the
ALJ failed to explain his reasons for concluding that Dr. Ruffing’s opinion was inconsistent with
his examination. Id. at *1 (adopting 2012 WL 3304107 at *8–9). The Appeals Council remanded
the case to the ALJ on May 21, 2013. The ALJ held a second hearing on November 21, 2013,
and a third hearing on July 10, 2014. R. 457–514, 515–65. ALJ again issued an unfavorable
decision on December 5, 2014, which became the final decision of the Commissioner for the
purposes of judicial review. R. 391–456. Plaintiff thereafter brought this action pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 405(g). ECF No. 1.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Rule 73.02, D.S.C., this matter was
referred to United States Magistrate Judge Shiva V. Hodges, for a Report and Recommendation.
On January 25, 2016, the Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendation in which she
recommended the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits be reversed. ECF No. 18. The
Commissioner filed objections to the Report and Recommendation on February 4, 2016. ECF
No. 20. Plaintiff filed a response to the Commissioner’s Objections on February 22, 2016. ECF
No. 22.
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The matter is now before the court for review of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation. The court is charged with making a de novo determination of any portions of
the Report and Recommendation to which a specific objection is made. The court may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation by the Magistrate Judge or may
recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). After a
careful review of the record in this matter, the Report and Recommendation, and the applicable
legal standards, the court finds that the Report and Recommendation provides an accurate
summary of the instant case. The court adopts all portions of the Report and Recommendation,
reverses the decision of the Commissioner, and remands the matter to the agency, as further
explained below.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The court is authorized to review the Commissioner’s denial of benefits under 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g); however, the court’s role is a limited one. Section 405(g) provides that “[t]he findings
of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall
be conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). “Substantial evidence has been defined innumerable
times as more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.” Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d
541, 543 (4th Cir. 1964). The court must not “try the case de novo” and it is “immaterial that the
evidence before [the court] will permit a conclusion inconsistent with [the ALJ].” Id.; Vitek v.
Finch, 438 F.2d 1157, 1157 (4th Cir. 1971). However, this does not require the “the findings of
the administrative agency [be] mechanically accepted. The statutorily granted right of review
contemplates more than an uncritical rubber stamping of the administrative action.” Flack v.
Cohen, 413 F.2d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 1969). “[T]he courts must not abdicate their responsibility to
give careful scrutiny to the whole record to assure that there is a sound foundation for the
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[Commissioner’s] findings, and that his conclusion is rational.” Vitek, 438 F.2d at 1157–58. In
reviewing the decision of the Commissioner, the court must “closely scrutinize the
administrative proceedings to insure a result consistent with congressional intent and elemental
fairness.” Flack, 413 F.2d at 280.
The Commissioner’s findings of fact are not binding if they were based upon the
application of an improper legal standard. Coffman v. Bowen, 829 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987).
However, the Commissioner’s denial of benefits shall be reversed only if no reasonable mind
could accept the record as adequate to support that determination. Richardson v. Perales, 402
U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
To facilitate a uniform and efficient processing of disability claims, the Social Security
Act has by regulation reduced the statutory definition of “disability” to a series of five sequential
questions. See e.g., Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 460 (1983). An examiner must consider
whether the claimant (1) is engaged in substantial gainful activity; (2) has a severe impairment;
(3) has an impairment that equals an illness contained in the Social Security Administration’s
Official Listings of Impairments found at 20 C.F.R. Part 4, Subpart P, App. 1, (4) has an
impairment that prevents past relevant work; and (5) has an impairment that prevents her from
doing substantial gainful employment. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. If an individual is found not
disabled at any step, further inquiry is unnecessary. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1503(a); Hall v. Harris, 658
F.2d 260 (4th Cir. 1981).
III. DISCUSSION
Plaintiff was thirty-seven years old on her alleged disability onset date and was fortyseven years old at the time of the ALJ’s most recent unfavorable decision regarding her
applications for DIB and SSI. R. 448. She has a high school diploma, a cosmetology license, and
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has worked in the past as a winder, spinner, creeler, cashier, and stock clerk. R. 35, 59, 136.
Plaintiff alleges disability beginning May 1, 2005. R. 94. Plaintiff alleges both physical and
mental disabilities. Plaintiff alleges physical problems with her hands, back, and knees. 1 R. 397.
Further, Plaintiff asserts that she suffers from depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, and
generalized anxiety disorders. R. 208–09, 233–49, 268, 278–79, 309–11, 315, 318, 340–46, 398,
698–700, 722–25. Plaintiff’s medical history has been discussed at length in the Report and
Recommendation; therefore, the court incorporates the Report and Recommendation’s factual
summary. ECF No. 18 at 2–18. 2 Plaintiff’s history of alleged mental disability may be
summarized as follows. Beginning with her physical injury in late 2004, Plaintiff alleges she has
become more withdrawn, anxious, and depressed because she cannot work. R. 43–45; 471.
Plaintiff further alleges that past trauma, including her father committing suicide in front of her
and an abusive marriage, have contributed to her depression and anxiety. R. 43–45, 49. Plaintiff
has been inconsistent in her treatment of her mental health issues but alleges that she has been
unable to afford treatments as she no longer has insurance coverage. R. 46, 478, 480–83.
The Commissioner asserts specific objections to the Report and Recommendation. The
court will review each of these objections in turn.
A. The Commissioner’s Objections
1. Objection One: Medical Opinion of Dr. Klickman, Treating Examiner
The Commissioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the ALJ failed to
adequately consider the consistency of Dr. Klickman’s observations with the other evidence in
1
As Plaintiff has not challenged the ALJ’s findings regarding her physical functional capabilities, the court will
limit its discussion to the opinions regarding alleged mental disabilities. ECF No. 18 at 37.
2
As always, the Court says only what is necessary to address such objections against the already meaningful
backdrop of a thorough Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge, incorporated entirely by specific
reference herein, to the degree not inconsistent.
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the record. ECF No. 20 at 4. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ properly weighed Dr.
Klickman’s opinion as having little weight due to Dr. Klickman’s short time treating Plaintiff
and because Dr. Klickman last saw Plaintiff more than two years prior to creating his second
report summarizing Plaintiff’s ailments and physical appearance. Id. Plaintiff responds that this
mischaracterizes the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the ALJ failed to consider consistency of
Dr. Klickman’s opinion with Plaintiff’s other treating physicians. ECF No. 22 at 3. According to
Plaintiff, the Magistrate Judge did not assert that Dr. Klickman’s opinion by itself needed
additional consideration. Id.
2. Objection Two: Medical Opinion of Dr. Ruffing, Consultative Examiner
The Commissioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the ALJ did not
adequately consider Dr. Ruffing’s reports. ECF No. 18 at 40–46. The Commissioner asserts that
the ALJ sufficiently considered Dr. Ruffing’s reports but did not find the reports consistent with
Plaintiff’s reported daily activities or presentation. ECF No. 20 at 7–9. Plaintiff counters that this
is an improper reading of Dr. Ruffing’s findings, who noted the same examples of activities of
daily living but found that Plaintiff would have difficulty focusing and controlling her emotions
for an eight-hour workday. ECF No. 22 at 4.
3. Objection Three: Medical Opinion of Dr. Morton, Consultative Examiner
The Commissioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the ALJ did not
adequately consider the consistency of Dr. Morton’s opinion of Plaintiff’s mental disabilities
with the record. The Commissioner argues that the ALJ provided “at least seven valid reasons”
for giving little weight to Dr. Morton’s opinion, specifically, the marked difference between Dr.
Morton’s and Dr. Tomarchio’s opinions. ECF No. 20 at 9–10. Plaintiff asserts that the Magistrate
Judge’s determination was proper as Dr. Tomarchio was conducting a physical, not mental
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examination, and the ALJ should have given less weight to his opinion. ECF No. 22 at 7.
Plaintiff also asserts that Dr. Tomarchio and Dr. Morton’s reports are not inconsistent with one
another. Id. Further, Plaintiff points to the consistency of Dr. Morton’s opinion with the rest of
the record. Id. at 8.
4. Objection Four: Improper HALLEX Compliance and Testimony of Dr. Jonas,
Non-Examining Physician
Finally, the Commissioner objects to the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the use of Dr.
Jonas prejudiced the Plaintiff. While acknowledging that Dr. Jonas was called out of order, in
violation of the SSA’s Hearing, Appeals, and Litigation Law Manual (“HALLEX”), the
Commissioner asserts that Plaintiff fails to show bias because the ALJ had “plausible, rational
reasons for soliciting Dr. Jonas’s services.” ECF No. 20 at 12. Further, the Commissioner asserts
that Dr. Jonas did no more than “note the obvious flaws in the opinions of Drs. Ruffing and
Morton.” Id. at 13. Plaintiff counters that she was prejudiced because Dr. Jonas was used to
reject all consistent opinions of disabling limitations, even those offered by the ALJ’s chosen
consultative experts. ECF No. 22 at 12. Further, Plaintiff raises prior concerns with Dr. Jonas in
cases similar to hers, i.e., calling Dr. Jonas to testify in cases on remand from a district court and
Dr. Jonas’s testimony that capacity to handle finances was inconsistent with a severe mental
disability.
B. Analysis of Objections
1. The ALJ Failed to Follow the Treating Physician Rule
When viewed as a whole, the ALJ failed to properly weigh the opinions of the
treating, consultative, and testifying mental health experts. Under the Treating Physician
Rule, the ALJ is to accord weight based upon the (1) examining relationship; (2)
treatment relationship; (3) support of diagnoses by medical signs and laboratory tests; (4)
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consistency with the overall record; (5) physician or expert specialization; and (6) other
factors. 20 C.F.R. §404.1527(c). Relating to “treatment relationship,” the ALJ is to
consider the length of the treatment relationship and frequency of the examination. Id. at
§ 404.1527(c)(2)(i). Further, the ALJ is to consider the type of examination the treating
physician was providing. Id. at § 404.1527(c)(2)(ii). The Code of Federal Regulations
provides the following example: [I]f your ophthalmologist notices that you have
complained of neck pain during your eye examinations, we will consider his or her
opinion with respect to your neck pain, but we will give it less weight than that of another
physician who has treated you for neck pain.” Id. The Code of Federal Regulations
further states that “[o]ther factors” to consider include “the amount of understanding of
our disability programs” and “the extent to which an acceptable medical source is
familiar with the other information in your case record.” Id. at § 404.1527(c)(6).
a. Physician-Patient Relationship
Dr. Klickman primarily treated Plaintiff for physical ailments but prescribed
Cymbalta for her depression and referred her to mental health counseling in June 2006
when the “severity of her illness [exceeded his] ability to take care of her.” R. 268. Dr.
Ruffing examined Plaintiff on two separate occasions, before both of her Social Security
headings in March 2006 and January 2009, and noted that Plaintiff’s “condition has been
refractory to psychiatric and psychological treatment efforts.” R. 346. Dr. Morton
examined Plaintiff in February 2013 to determine whether she was mentally disabled. 3 R.
719–25. Dr. Morton’s findings are summarized as follows: Plaintiff has an extreme
3
While the ALJ notes that a portion of the weight assigned to the doctors was due to Dr. Jonas looking at the entire
record while Dr. Morton did not (Tr. 439, 722), the ALJ’s assumption is unsupported by the record. ECF No. 18 at
50 n.8. As noted in the Report and Recommendation, Dr. Morton’s comment regarding Dr. Esquivel’s note was
likely because it was the most recent, not because it was the only evidence Dr. Morton reviewed. Id.
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limitation in her ability to interact appropriately with the public and with supervisors (R.
720); Plaintiff has a marked limitation in her ability to make judgments in complex
situations, relate to coworkers, and respond to work-routine changes; (R. 719–20);
Plaintiff has a moderate limitation in her ability to make simple judgments, understand
and carry out complex instructions (R. 719).
Drs. Ruffing and Morton were appointed by the Commissioner to determine
whether Plaintiff’s disability was sufficiently severe as to prohibit her from engaging in
substantial gainful employment. See R. 338–39 (analyzing Plaintiff’s disability in terms
of ability to accomplish work-related tasks as a percentage of the day); R. 719–21 (rating
Plaintiff’s ability to accomplish work-related tasks as a result of her mental disability).
Dr. Jonas is a non-treating, non-examining physician, and his opinion is entitled to the
lowest level of weight and consideration. Drs. Ruffing and Morton were not treating
physicians but they were examining physicians and their opinions were consistent with
the overall record; however, the ALJ accorded more weight to Dr. Jonas, the nontreating, non-examining physician. Compare Creekmore v. Colvin, No. 14-3019, 2015
WL 4771947 (D.S.C. Aug. 12, 2015), at *5–7, with R.R. 441–43. The ALJ’s assertion
that Dr. Jonas’s specialty is psychiatry is insufficient to accord him more weight than
Drs. Ruffing and Morton, who are both psychologists.
Further, the court notes that Dr. Jonas’s credibility has been called into question
by numerous courts, and was called into question at the hearing. See, e.g., Creekmore,
2015 WL 4771947, at *7, *7 n.1 (noting numerous cases where Dr. Jonas has been used
to discredit treating physicians and was accorded improper weight), Smith v. Astrue, No.
09-0471, 2011 WL 5326844, at *9 (W.D.N.C. Nov. 4, 2011) (noting improper weight
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accorded to Dr. Jonas); Roman v. Astrue, No. 10-3085, 2012 WL 4566128 at *10
(E.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2012) (noting improper application of “Treating Physician Rule” as
applied to Dr. Jonas); Tobler v. Colvin, No. 13-1095, 2014 WL 4187372 (N.D. Ala. Aug.
20, 2014) (noting ALJ accorded improper weight to Dr. Jonas’s testimony); R. 529
(objecting to use of Dr. Jonas in violation of HALLEX and stating “I can tell you what
Dr. Jonas is going to say almost verbatim as he’s testified in every other case.”).
Accordingly, the court finds that the Commissioner improperly applied the
Treating Physician Rule.
2.
Consistency of Opinions with the Overall Record
While Plaintiff’s various doctors treated her for short periods of time, the opinions of
each of the treating and consultative doctors were consistent with one another. The Magistrate
Judge correctly summarized as follows:
Dr. Klickman stated Plaintiff “always presented” as “sad, tearful, overly anxious,
and worried.” R. at 337. While Dr. Klickman’s statement that it was possible
Plaintiff’s pain may distract her from work tasks was speculative and failed to
reflect concrete vocational terms, his observation as to how Plaintiff “always
presented” was relevant to consideration of other records that showed the same
presentation. See R. at 210 (clinician noted Plaintiff to be tearful during session),
217 (Dr. Mourtada noted Plaintiff was crying during the exam), 234 (Dr. Ruffing
indicated Plaintiff’s presentation was marked by tension, sadness, and tearfulness
and that she had significant difficulty regulating and controlling her emotions),
316 (Dr. Edwards described Plaintiff as depressed and tearful), 327–28 (Dr.
Wasson noted that Plaintiff was anxious and depressed and assessed acute anxiety
and acute depression), 344 (Dr. Ruffing indicated Plaintiff generally demonstrated
poor emotional regulation and control during the exam), 722 (Dr. Morton
observed that Plaintiff had an unstable affect and a depressed mood and that she
cried throughout the evaluation).
ECF No. 18 at 41. Plaintiff routinely presented as tearful and depressed for over nine
years. The only exceptions were Dr. Tomarchio’s physical examination in January 2014
(R. 707–718) and Dr. Jonas’s non-examining testimony in July 2014 (R. 549–50). The
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ALJ’s reliance on Plaintiff’s appearance during her physical examination with Dr.
Tomarchio is insufficient to support his assertion that Plaintiff is emotionally stable. As
noted in “nature [] of treatment relationship,” an examination within the doctor’s
specialty is to be accorded more weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2)(ii). Here, the
ALJ should consider whether to accord more weight to Dr. Morton’s analysis of mental
health as he is a psychologist, than to Dr. Tomarchio’s opinion as an orthopedic
examiner.
Furthermore, the ALJ’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s activities of daily living
demonstrated an ability to consistently work is not supported by substantial evidence.
The ability to accomplish various activities of daily living does not necessarily equate to
an ability to engage in substantial gainful activity. See Higginbotham v. Califano, 617
F.2d 1058, 1060 (4th Cir. 1980) (noting that the plaintiff’s capacity to “at her own pace
and in her own manner, [do] her housework and shopping” did not constitute evidence
that she could concentrate at work); Rogers v. Colvin, No. 13-2327, 2014 WL 5474627,
at *24 (D.S.C. Oct. 28, 2014) (stating that the plaintiff’s testimony that she could engage
in limited daily activities is not contradicted by the record; therefore, should not weigh
against Plaintiff’s credibility). Plaintiff presented as adequately groomed and discussed
her activities of daily living with each of her doctors; however, each still found that
Plaintiff was emotionally unstable, suffering from depression, and having a difficult time
controlling her emotions. ECF No. 18 at 42 (Dr. Ruffing noted that Plaintiff was capable
of performing tasks but unreliable in her performance because of “emotional instability”);
id. at 44 (“Dr. Ruffing’s observation of normal orientation, thought process, thought
content, grooming . . . do[es] not disprove his observations that Plaintiff would have
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significant difficulty [in] . . . maintaining attention and concentration, behaving in an
emotionally stable manner, relating predictable in social situations . . . .”); id. at 47–48
(Dr. Morton noted Plaintiff’s appropriate appearance and ability to communicate but
found that Plaintiff would have “marked restriction” in her abilities to interact
appropriately and response appropriate to typical work stresses). Accordingly, on
remand, the ALJ should make specific findings regarding whether Plaintiff’s ability to
engage in activities of daily living is inconsistent with her inability to reliably perform
work-related tasks.
The court finds that the Commissioner’s denial of DIB and SSI benefits on the
basis that Plaintiff’s ability to handle finances contradicts her inability to work is without
substantial evidence. See Creekmore, 2015 WL 4771947 at *6 (reversing determination
of no disability as the ALJ accorded too much weight to Dr. Jonas’s statement that it was
“internally inconsistent” that plaintiff could suffer from bipolar disorder and manage her
own finances). Accordingly, on remand, the ALJ should consider whether Plaintiff’s
ability to manage, or manage with assistance, her DIB or SSI benefits is sufficient to
deny her DIB and SSI benefits.
3. It is Unclear Whether ALJ Sufficiently Considered Plaintiff’s Inability
to Afford Medical Care
It is unclear whether the ALJ considered whether Plaintiff’s lack of medical care
and treatment was based on her inability to afford such treatment, thereby leading to the
lack of long-term care. The Fourth Circuit has found that “a claimant may not be
penalized for failing to seek treatment he cannot afford; [i]t flies in the face of the patent
purpose of the Social Security Act to deny benefits to someone because [she] is too poor
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to obtain medical treatment that may help [her].” Lovejoy v. Heckler, 790 F.2d 1114,
1117 (4th Cir. 1986) (quoting Gordon v. Schweiker, 725 F.2d 231, 237 (4th Cir. 1984)). It
is up to the ALJ to provide “specific factual findings regarding the resources available to
[the plaintiff] and whether her failure to seek additional medical treatment was based on
her alleged inability to pay.” See Dozier v. Colvin, No. 14-0029, 2015 WL 4726949 at *4
(D.S.C. Aug. 10, 2015) (remanding for ALJ to make specific findings on resources
available to claimant and whether her failure to seek treatment was based on inability to
pay); Hagerman v. Colvin, No. 13-1709, 2015 WL 300265 at *5 (D.S.C. Jan. 22, 2015)
(remanding where ALJ failed to determine whether inability to pay was the cause of the
plaintiff’s lack of medical treatment). The ALJ repeatedly noted that Plaintiff’s
depression was under control when she was taking her medication and her limited
therapy sessions; however, the ALJ fails to acknowledge that Plaintiff’s treatment ceased
when her insurance expired. R. 42–43, 478, 481. Accordingly, upon remand, the ALJ
should consider Plaintiff’s financial situation and the impact on her ability to seek
medical treatment.
4. The ALJ’s Failure to Follow HALLEX May Have Prejudiced Plaintiff
As discussed at length in the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, the
ALJ did not follow the proper HALLEX procedures. ECF No. 18 at 52–57. While failure
to follow HALLEX does not require automatic reversal, there is reversible error when the
agency’s failure to follow procedures causes prejudice to an individual. Newton v. Apfel,
209 F.3d 448 (5th Cir. 2000); Way v. Astrue, 789 F. Supp. 2d 652, 665 (D.S.C. 2011).
Due to the ALJ’s failure to follow HALLEX, the court must determine if Plaintiff was
prejudiced by this failure.
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The court finds that Plaintiff may have been prejudiced by the ALJ’s failure to
follow HALLEX procedures. As the ALJ improperly accorded too much weight to Dr.
Jonas’s opinion, this HALLEX violation appears to have prejudiced the Plaintiff.
IV. CONCLUSION
After reviewing the entire record, the applicable law, the briefs of counsel, the findings
and recommendations of the Magistrate Judge, and Defendant’s objections, this court adopts the
Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation and incorporates it herein by reference. The
Commissioner’s objections are without merit. For the reasons setout hereinabove and in the
Report and Recommendation, the Commissioner’s final decision of no disability is reversed and
remanded under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. §405(g) for further proceedings.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Margaret B. Seymour
Margaret B. Seymour
Senior United States District Judge
Columbia, South Carolina
September 28, 2016
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