Davenport v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America LTD et al
Filing
144
ORDER AND OPINION denying 72 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 1/24/2018.(asni, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
AIKEN DIVISION
Devon Davenport,
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)
Plaintiff,
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v.
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Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America, Ltd. )
and the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, )
)
Defendants.
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_____________________________________ )
Civil Action No.: 1:15-cv-3752-JMC
ORDER AND OPINION
This matter is before the court pursuant to Defendants Goodyear Dunlop Tires North
America, Ltd. and The Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company’s (collectively “Defendants”) Motion
for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 72). Plaintiffs Maria Davenport, Arnold Davenport, Demorio
Davenport, and Devon Davenport (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a response in opposition to
Defendants’ Motion (ECF No. 85).
For the reasons set forth below, the court DENIES
Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 72).
I.
RELEVANT FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On September 18, 2015, Plaintiffs Maria Davenport, Arnold Davenport, and Demorio
Davenport filed a Complaint against Defendants. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff Maria Davenport alleged
she suffered injuries while she was driving a 1996 Ford Explorer when the tread on the left rear
tire (“Subject Tire”) separated from the car, causing it to overturn. (Id.) Plaintiff Demorio
Davenport was a passenger in the car and he also alleges that he suffered injuries during the
incident. (Id.) Plaintiff Arnold Davenport alleges loss of consortium. (Id. at 2.)
Plaintiffs Maria Davenport, Arnold Davenport, and Demorio Davenport initially filed a
Complaint in the Aiken County Court of Common Pleas (“Aiken County”). (ECF Nos. 34-1, 34-
3.) Plaintiff Devon Davenport filed a separate Complaint relating to the alleged incident in Aiken
County. (Id.) These Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed the Aiken County Complaints on September
10, 2015, and re-filed their Complaints in this court on September 18, 2015, with Plaintiffs Maria
Davenport, Arnold Davenport, and Demorio Davenport joined in one Complaint. (ECF No. 344.) Plaintiff Devon Davenport individually filed a second Complaint in this court (Devon
Davenport v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America, Ltd. and The Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Company, Civil Action No.: 1:15-cv-03752-JMC). (Id.) On August 2, 2016, Defendants filed a
Motion to Consolidate both cases. (ECF No. 34.) On October 25, 2016, the court granted
Defendants’ Motion to Consolidate for all purposes, including trial. (ECF No. 46 at 5.)
In the present Motion, Defendants contend that they are entitled to summary judgment
because: (1) Plaintiffs’ claims fail because the Subject Tire was not essentially in the same
condition as when it left the manufacturer’s hands; (2) Plaintiffs’ warnings claims fail due to a lack
of supporting evidence; and (3) Plaintiffs cannot meet the requisite standard warranting punitive
damages. (ECF No. 72.) Plaintiffs negate Defendants’ argument by stating that: (1) there is
evidence the Subject Tire was, at the time of the accident, in essentially the same condition as
when it left Defendants’ hands; (2) there is sufficient evidence of Plaintiffs’ failure to warn product
liability theory; and (3) there is evidence to support an award of punitive damages. (ECF No. 85.)
Subsequently, Defendants filed a reply, essentially restating their initial position in their Motion
for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 94.)
II.
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). “[I]n ruling on a motion for summary judgment, ‘the evidence of the nonmovant[s] is to be
believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in [their] favor.’” Tolan v. Cotton, ___ U.S.
___, 134 S. Ct. 1861, 1863 (2014) (per curiam) (brackets omitted) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986)). A dispute is genuine “if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving part[ies],” and a fact is material if it
“might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
The movant bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that no genuine issues of
material fact exist. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once this threshold
showing has been made, the non-moving party cannot survive summary judgment by resting on
the allegations in the pleadings. Rather, the non-moving party must provide specific, material facts
giving rise to a genuine issue. See id. at 324. Under this standard, the mere scintilla of evidence
is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. See Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255 (1986).
III.
ANALYSIS
A. Subject Tire’s Condition
Under South Carolina law, “[i]n any products liability action, a plaintiff must establish
three things: (1) he was injured by the product; (2) the product was in essentially the same
condition at the time of the accident as it was when it left the hands of the defendant; and (3) the
injury occurred because the product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user.” Graves v. CAS Med. Sys., Inc., 735 S.E.2d 650, 658 (S.C. 2012). Plaintiffs must establish
each of these three elements regardless of whether the theory under which they seek to recover is
strict liability, breach of warranty, or negligence. Sauls v. Wyeth Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 846 F.
Supp. 2d 499, 502 (D.S.C. 2012) (citing Holst v. KCI Konecranes Int’l Corp., 699 S.E.2d 715, 719
(S.C. Ct. App. 2010)).
Defendants contend that “Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden that the Subject Tire, over 11
years old at the time of the accident with an unknown service life and substantial weathering,
uneven tread wear, and cracking, was in essentially the same condition at the time of the accident
as when it left the hands of Defendants.” (ECF No. 72 at 13.) Plaintiffs disagree, asserting that
the Subject Tire failed due to the lack of a full nylon ply cap, an inadequate wedge, and an absence
of adequate aging resistance. (ECF No. 85 at 8.)
Whether the Subject Tire separated due to the wear and tear alleged by Defendants or due
to a design defect alleged by Plaintiffs is a jury determination. “Before the manufacturer or seller
may be relieved of liability for the product-caused injury, the defendant must show that any
alteration to the product was substantial.” 63 Am. Jur. 2d Products Liability § 19. “Liability may
. . . be imposed upon a manufacturer or seller notwithstanding subsequent alteration of the product
. . . when the alteration could have been anticipated by the manufacturer or seller, or did not
causally contribute to the damages or injuries complained of.” Fleming v. Borden, Inc., 316 S.C.
452, 458 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Fleming, the parties agreed the product
was altered after it left the manufacture’s hands, but the Supreme Court reversed summary
judgment for the manufacturer on this issue because “it was for the jury to decide whether [the
alteration] . . . was a foreseeable alteration” and, “if the jury believed [the plaintiff’s ] evidence, it
could legitimately conclude [the alteration was] . . . not a substantial or material one, in as much
as it was foreseeable.” Id. at 459.
A review of the evidence shows that there is a genuine issue of material fact. Defendants
point to evidence to be considered by a jury that is not dispositive of the issue. “The time, length,
and severity of use of the product and the product’s state of repair are all relevant, but not
controlling factors in determining whether a defect in the product existed at the time the product
left the manufacture’s hands; such factors are for the consideration of the trier of fact . . .” 63 Am.
Jur. 2d Products Liability § 18. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that when a product’s
alleged defect is one related to its age, the age may be “coincidental with its failure rather than the
cause of it” and “the mere passage of time should not excuse” the manufacturer. Mickle v.
Blackmon, 252 S.C. 202, 234-35 (1969) (involving a gearshift lever covered by a plastic knob that
Ford knew would deteriorate with exposure to the sun where a visual inspection may show cracks
but the deteriorating effect would not be known to an ordinary person).
Plaintiffs posit that Defendants knew that tires deteriorate with age, yet it failed to include
a full nylon ply cap or warn retailers and consumers about tire aging dangers. (ECF No. 85 at 14.)
The fact that the Subject Tire is over eleven years old does not preclude recovery, but may be
found by a jury to be coincidental with its failure rather than the cause of it. Consequently, because
the court finds that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to any substantial or material
modification of the Subject Tire after it left Defendants’ hands, it will not grant summary judgment
on this issue.
B. Warning Claims
Plaintiffs argue that the Subject Tire was defectively designed because, among other things,
it failed to include a tire aging warning notifying a consumer that the tire should be taken out of
service after a certain number of years, regardless of the tread depth or condition of the tire. (ECF
No. 85 at 15.) Defendants claim that Plaintiffs’ tire expert, Dennis P. Carlson, Jr., is not qualified
to provide any opinions regarding Defendants’ warning or instructions, or lack thereof on the
Subject Tire. (ECF No. 72 at 17.) Further, Defendants espouse that Plaintiffs cannot succeed on
their claim that Defendants’ warnings or instructions were inadequate because they cannot prove
any alleged warning inadequacy caused Plaintiffs’ injuries. (Id. at 19.)
Defendants, however, concomitantly with its Motion for Summary Judgment, filed a
Daubert motion directed specifically at Mr. Carlson’s warning opinions. (ECF No. 73.) In its
Order, dated December 27, 2017, the court already disposed of this issue when it denied
Defendants’ Motion to Exclude Mr. Carlson’s testimony on this matter.
(ECF No. 137.)
Specifically, the court decided to allow Mr. Carlson to testify about warning design defects in the
Subject Tire, but limited such testimony as to not bear on causation. (Id. at 12.) Accordingly,
Defendants’ summary judgment request on this issue is moot.
C. Punitive Damages
“Under South Carolina law, punitive damages may be awarded to punish tortfeasors who
have acted in a reckless, willful, or wanton manner.” Duncan v. Ford Motor Co., 385 S.C. 119,
138 (Ct. App. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). “A tort is characterized as reckless, willful
or wanton if it was committed in such a manner or under such circumstances that a person of
ordinary reason and prudence would have been conscious of it as an invasion of the plaintiff’s
rights.” Taylor v. Medenica, 324 S.C. 200, 221 (1996). “A conscious failure to exercise due care
constitutes willfulness.” Id. at 221. “In any civil action where punitive damages are claimed, the
plaintiff has the burden of proving such damages by clear and convincing evidence.” S.C. CODE
ANN. § 15-33-135 (2013). 1
Defendants maintain that Plaintiffs’ claim for punitive damages fails because there is no
evidence that Defendants engaged in intentional misconduct, malice, deceit, or conscious disregard
1
The court acknowledges that although product liability cases may be brought under theories of
negligence, strict liability and warranty in South Carolina, punitive damages are only available in
cases that are brought under the negligence theory. Barnwell v. Barber-Colman Co., 393 S.E.2d
162, 164 (S.C. 1989) (“Recovery of punitive damages is not allowed under a cause of action based
solely upon the South Carolina strict liability statute.”); Rhodes v. McDonald, 548 S.E.2d 220, 222
(S.C. Ct. App. 2001) (holding that punitive damages are not available for a breach of warranty).
of Plaintiffs’ rights. (ECF No. 72 at 20.) Defendants find it significant that Plaintiffs never took
the deposition of either Defendant’s corporate representative pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 30(b)(6), and Mr. Carlson has rendered his opinions without having received any design
or manufacturing records of the Subject Tire. (Id.) Therefore, Defendants believe “there simply
is no record testimony at all regarding Defendants’ conduct, much less evidence that rises to the
high threshold required to sustain punitive damages.” (Id.)
Plaintiffs insist that there is clear and convincing evidence from which a reasonable jury
could find Defendants acted recklessly in designing and manufacturing the Subject Tire. (ECF
No. 85 at 19.) Plaintiffs state that their position is supported by “numerous pieces of evidence,
including the absence of a full nylon cap ply in the face of known safety advantages and the absence
of a tire aging warning in the face of known dangers.” (Id.) (emphasis added).
Because a jury could find the design decisions and manufacturing conduct by Defendants
ignored known safety measures, industry standards, and foreseeable dangers, there remains a
question of material fact as to whether Defendants’ conduct could be found reckless and willful,
awarding Plaintiffs the requisite punitive damages. Thus, summary judgment on this issue is
denied.
IV.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court DENIES Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment
(ECF No. 72).
IT IS SO ORDERED.
United States District Judge
January 24, 2018
Columbia, South Carolina
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