Abdullah-Malik v. Reynolds et al

Filing 26

ORDER adopting 14 Report and Recommendation; denying Plaintiff's 7 Motion to Remand to State Court and 12 Motion for Default Judgment; and referring this matter back to the Magistrate Judge for further pretrial handling. Signed by Honorable R Bryan Harwell on 8/2/2016. (mwal)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
AIKEN DIVISION
Akeem Alim-Nafir Abdullah-Malik,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Cecila Reynolds, Warden; Jessica Edmunds; )
Beth Tidwell; and Catherine Amason,
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Defendants.
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____________________________________)

Civil Action No.: 1:16-cv-00053-RBH-SVH

ORDER

Plaintiff Akeem Alim-Nafir Abdullah-Malik, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, commenced
this action by filing a document entitled “Rule to Show Cause” in the Court of Common Pleas for
Lancaster County, South Carolina, asserting claims under federal and state law against the four abovenamed Defendants. See ECF No. 1-1. Defendants, construing Plaintiff’s filing as a civil complaint,
removed the action to this Court on January 7, 2016, and filed an answer the same day.1 See ECF Nos.
1 & 4. Plaintiff filed a motion to remand on January 25, 2016, and a motion for default judgment on
February 22, 2016. See ECF Nos. 7 & 12. Defendants filed timely responses in opposition to both
motions. See ECF Nos. 11 & 13. Plaintiff did not file a reply to either response.
The case is now before the Court for review of the Report and Recommendation (R & R) of
United States Magistrate Judge Shiva V. Hodges, who recommends denying Plaintiff’s motion to
remand and motion for default judgment.2 See R & R, ECF No. 11. Plaintiff has filed timely objections

1

Defendants state in their notice of removal that they “were served on or about December 8, 2015.” ECF
No. 1 at 2.

2

In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 (D.S.C.), this matter was referred
to the Magistrate Judge for pretrial handling. The Magistrate Judge reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to the
screening provisions of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A. The Court is mindful of its duty to liberally construe
the pleadings of pro se litigants. See Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). But see Beaudett v. City
of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985) (“Principles requiring generous construction of pro se complaints

to the R & R. See Pl.’s Objs., ECF No. 24. Defendants have filed a timely reply to Plaintiff’s
objections. See ECF No. 25.
Standard of Review
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to the Court. The Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination
remains with the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court must conduct a
de novo review of those portions of the R & R to which specific objections are made, and it may accept,
reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge or recommit the
matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The Court must engage in a de novo review of every portion of the Magistrate Judge’s report
to which objections have been filed. Id. However, the Court need not conduct a de novo review when
a party makes only “general and conclusory objections that do not direct the [C]ourt to a specific error
in the [M]agistrate [Judge]’s proposed findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d
44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982). In the absence of specific objections to the R & R, the Court reviews only for
clear error, Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005), and the Court
need not give any explanation for adopting the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. Camby v. Davis,
718 F.2d 198, 199-200 (4th Cir. 1983).
Discussion
I.

Motion to Remand
The Magistrate Judge recommends the Court deny Plaintiff’s motion to remand. R & R at 2-4.

are not, however, without limits. Gordon directs district courts to construe pro se complaints liberally. It does not
require those courts to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them.”).

2

Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation, arguing this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over this action.3 Pl.’s Objs. at 3-13.
Having conducted a de novo review of the motion to remand and the R & R, the Court agrees
with the Magistrate Judge’s analysis and recommendation. Federal district courts have original
jurisdiction over claims arising under federal law, including “all civil actions arising under the
Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. “The presence or absence of federal-question jurisdiction is governed
by the ‘well-pleaded complaint rule,’ which provides that federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal
question is presented on the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.” Caterpillar Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987). State court defendants may remove a civil action to federal district
court if the district court has original subject matter jurisdiction over the action. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
On the face of his complaint (which is styled as a “Rule to Show Cause”), Plaintiff alleges
Defendants “seized religious property of his person,” and he “invokes his constitutional right(s) of the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment(s).” See ECF No. 1-1 at 6-7. Although
Plaintiff asserts additional state law claims,4 the Court has original subject matter jurisdiction over his
federal constitutional claims; thus, removal was proper in this case.5 The Court overrules Plaintiff’s

3

Plaintiff devotes the majority of this objection to setting forth the general law relating to subject matter
jurisdiction. See Pl.’s Objs. at 2-13. Additionally, Plaintiff quotes a lengthy passage from Farmer v. Florence
County Sheriff’s Office, 401 S.C. 606, 738 S.E.2d 473 (2013), a South Carolina Supreme Court case addressing civil
forfeiture proceedings. See Pl.’s Objs. at 7-9.

4

To the extent Plaintiff claims the Court should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law claims,
see Pl.’s Objs. at 2-3, 6, 12, that is a matter the Court will decide at a later date. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 1367
(addressing federal district courts’ supplemental jurisdiction).

5

The Court finds no merit in Plaintiff’s contention that Defendants have removed the case to federal court
as “a delay tactic to further impede due process & escape responsibility” for their alleged unlawful acts. See Pl.’s
Objs. at 10; see also id. at 13. Section 1441(a) of Title 28 of the United States Code expressly permits defendants
to remove “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).

3

objection and denies his motion to remand at this time. However, should Plaintiff advise the Court that
he is withdrawing all federal claims, then the Court may revisit a motion to remand.
II.

Motion for Default Judgment
The Magistrate Judge recommends the Court deny Plaintiff’s motion for default judgment. R

& R at 4. Plaintiff objects to the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation. Pl.’s Objs. at 12-13. Liberally
construing his objection, he appears to argue Defendants failed to file a timely responsive pleading to
his complaint and instead opted to file a notice of removal in this Court as a “deliberate delay tactic.”
Id.
The Court finds no merit in Plaintiff’s objection. As the Magistrate Judge thoroughly explains
in the R & R, Defendants filed a proper and timely notice of removal as well as a timely answer to
Plaintiff’s complaint. See R & R at 4. Accordingly, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objection and denies
his motion for default judgment.
Conclusion
The Court has conducted a thorough review of the entire record, including Plaintiff’s motions,
the Magistrate Judge’s R & R, Plaintiff’s objections, and Defendants’ reply. Based on the foregoing
reasons, the Court overrules Plaintiff’s objections and adopts and incorporates by reference the
Magistrate Judge’s R & R [ECF No. 14]. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s motion
to remand [ECF No. 7] and motion for default judgment [ECF No. 12] are DENIED. The Court
REFERS this matter back to the Magistrate Judge for further pretrial handling.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Florence, South Carolina
August 2, 2016

s/ R. Bryan Harwell
R. Bryan Harwell
United States District Judge
4