Sawyer v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration
ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION adopting 29 Report and Recommendation, affirming the decision of the Commissioner. Signed by Honorable Timothy M. Cain on 08/10/2017. (bshr, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Kim Eugenia Sawyer
Nancy A. Berryhill,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Civil Action No. 1:16-cv-327-TMC
The plaintiff, Kim Eugenia Sawyer (“Sawyer”), brought this action pursuant to the Social
Security Act (“SSA”), 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), seeking judicial review of a final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”),1 denying her claim for Disability Insurance
Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”). In accordance with 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., this matter was referred to a magistrate judge
for pretrial handling. Now before this court is the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
(“Report”), recommending the court to affirm the Commissioner’s decision. (ECF No. 29).2 In the
Report, the Magistrate Judge sets forth the relevant facts and legal standards, which are incorporated
herein by reference. Sawyer has filed objections to the Report (ECF No. 37), and the Commissioner
has responded to those objections (ECF No. 39). Accordingly, this matter is now ripe for review.
Nancy A. Berryhill became the Acting Commissioner of the Social Security Administration on
January 27, 2017. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P.25(d), Berryhill should be substituted for Carolyn W.
Colvin as the defendant in this action.
A magistrate judge's recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for
making a final determination remains with the United States District Court. Mathews v. Weber,
423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those
portions of the Report to which specific objection is made. The court may accept, reject, or
modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation made by the magistrate judge or recommit the
matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
Sawyer applied for DIB and SSI on August 7, 2012, alleging disability beginning on June
25, 2011. Sawyer’s application was denied initially and on reconsideration. On August 21, 2014,
an Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) heard testimony from Sawyer and a vocational expert (“VE”).
At the hearing, Sawyer amended her alleged onset date to January 9, 2012. On October 29, 2014,
the ALJ issued a decision denying Sawyer’s claim. (ECF No. 11-2 at 31-46).
In his decision, the ALJ found that Allen suffered from the following severe impairments:
degenerative disc disease and pelvic fracture. (ECF No. 11-2 at 33). The ALJ found that, despite
Sawyer’s limitations, she was capable of performing past relevant work as an administrative
assistant. (ECF No. 11-2 at 42). Sawyer sought review of her case by the Appeals Council. The
Appeals Council denied Sawyer’s request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision
of the Commissioner. This action followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
The federal judiciary has a limited role in the administrative scheme established by the SSA.
Section 405(g) of the Act provides, “the findings of the Commissioner of Social Security as to any
fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive . . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
“Substantial evidence has been defined . . . as more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance.”
Thomas v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 541, 543 (4th Cir. 1964). This standard precludes a de novo review
of the factual circumstances that substitutes the court’s findings for those of the Commissioner.
Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1971). Thus, in its review, the court may not “undertake to
re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility determinations, or substitute [its] own judgment for
that of the [Commissioner].” Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996).
However, “[f]rom this it does not follow . . . that the findings of the administrative agency
are to be mechanically accepted. The statutorily granted right of review contemplates more than an
uncritical rubber stamping of the administrative agency.” Flack v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 278, 279 (4th
Cir. 1969). Rather, “the courts must not abdicate their responsibility to give careful scrutiny to the
whole record to assure that there is a sound foundation for the [Commissioner’s] findings, and that
this conclusion is rational.” Vitek, 438 F.2d at 1157-58.
In her objections, Sawyer contends that the Magistrate Judge erred by concluding that 1) the
ALJ properly considered Sawyer’s ability of performing past relevant work as an administrative
assistant; and 2) the ALJ properly discounted the opinion of a treating physician, Dr. Mardikian. The
court addresses each objection below.
First, Sawyer contends that the ALJ merely referred to exhibits and did not make any
findings as to the physical and mental demands of her past relevant work as an administrative
assistant. Sawyer contends this is not harmless error. Sawyer focuses on the specific duties she was
responsible for when she worked as an administrative assistant, rather than on how the job is
generally performed in the economy. As the Magistrate Judge noted, an individual is deemed
capable of performing past relevant work if she can performed the job as actually performed in the
past OR as generally performed in the economy. Social Security Regulation (“SSR”) 82-62
specifically provides that a plaintiff is not disabled within the meaning of the SSA if she can return
to past relevant work as it is customarily performed in the economy or as the claimant actually
performed the work. See SSR 82-62. According to SS 82-62, “[t]he [Residual Functional Capacity
(RFC)] to meet the physical and mental demands of jobs a claimant has performed in the past (either
the specific job a claimant performed or the same kind of work as it is customarily performed
throughout the economy) is generally a sufficient basis for a finding of ‘not disabled.’ ” Id.
Therefore, although Sawyer argues that she was unable to perform her past relevant work as she
actually performed it, the ALJ's conclusion that she was not disabled was not based on her inability
to perform her past specific job. Rather, the ALJ determined that she was able to perform her past
relevant work as an administrative assistant as it as it is customarily performed throughout the
economy. Therefore, the court finds that the ALJ did not err.
Second, Sawyer contends that the ALJ erred in discounting the opinions of a treating
physician, Dr. Pascale Mardikian. In June 2013, Dr. Mardikian completed a mental medical source
statement in which he noted that Sawyer had responded well to her current medication, but he
opined that her stability had been maintained because of her limited interactions with others. (ECF
No. 11-7 at 73-77). Dr. Mardikian noted that Sawyer would be affected in leaving her home
environment and likely decompensate. (ECF No. 11-7 at 76). He also noted she had GAF Score
of 55. (ECF No. 11-7 at 73). In August 2014, Dr. Mardikian completed another mental medical
source statement in which he noted Sawyer suffered from severe anxiety and depression and he
opined that it is unlikely that Sawyer would be able to work. (ECF No. 11-8 at 40-42). He noted
Sawyer had a GAF score of 60. (ECF No. 11-8 at 40).
The ALJ accorded these opinions little weight as he found they were inconsistent with Dr.
Mardikian’s treatment notes - which document relatively benign clinical findings on mental status
examinations and consistently assess Sawyer with mild GAF scores of 70 on each visit. Sawyer
contends that Dr. Mardikian, a psychiatrist, has treated her for depression and anxiety on a regular
basis since 2012, and Dr. Mardikian’s records support her opinion. Where a treating physician’s
opinion is inconsistent with his own treatment notes and other evidence of record, as is the case here,
the ALJ may give the opinion limited weight. See Dunn v. Colvin, 607 Fed.Appx. 264, 269 (4th Cir.
2015) (unpublished) (citing Meyer v. Colvin, 754 F.3d 251, 256 (4th Cir. 2014)). The function of
this court is not to review Sawyer’s claims de novo or to reweigh the evidence of record. See Smith
v. Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 1986) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); and Blalock v.
Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 775 (4th Cir. 1972)). Rather, this court is to determine whether, upon
review of the whole record, the Commissioner’s decision is supported by substantial evidence and
a proper application of the law. See Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990); see also
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). As the Magistrate Judge found, the record supports the ALJ’s decision to
discount Dr. Mardikian’s opinions.
Having conducted the required de novo review of the issues to which Sawyer has objected,
the court finds no basis for disturbing the Report. The court concurs with both the reasoning and the
result reached by the Magistrate Judge in her Report, and the ALJ’s decision is supported by
substantial evidence. Therefore, the court adopts the Report (ECF No. 29), and the Commissioner’s
decision is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Timothy M. Cain
United States District Judge
Anderson, South Carolina
August 10, 2017
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