Anderson v. Warden

Filing 33

ORDER accepting 23 Report and Recommendation; granting Respondent's 15 Motion for Summary Judgment; and denying Petitioner's Petition with prejudice. A certificate of appealability is denied. Signed by Honorable J Michelle Childs on 6/20/2018. (mwal)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
COLUMBIA DIVISION
Chadwick Deon Anderson,

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Petitioner,
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v.
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Warden, Perry Corr. Inst.,
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Respondent.
)
____________________________________)

Civil Action No.: 1:17-02233-JMC

ORDER AND OPINION

This matter is before the court upon review of the Magistrate Judge’s Report and
Recommendation (“Report”) (ECF No. 23), recommending that the court grant Respondent’s
Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 15). For the reasons stated herein, the court ACCEPTS
the Magistrate Judge’s Report (ECF No. 23).
I.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The court concludes upon its own careful review of the record that the factual and
procedural summation in the Report (ECF No. 23) is accurate, and the court adopts this summary
as its own. The court will only cite herein procedures pertinent to the court’s review of the Report
(ECF No. 23). On February 14, 2018, Magistrate Judge Shiva V. Hodges filed the Report (ECF
No. 23). Petitioner timely filed an Objection (ECF No. 30) after receiving an Extension of Time
to File (ECF No. 28). Respondent then filed a Response to Petitioner’s Objections to Magistrate
Judge’s Report. (ECF No. 31.)
II.

LEGAL STANDARD

A. Report and Recommendation Legal Standard
The Magistrate Judge’s Report was made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and
Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a) for the District of South Carolina. The Magistrate Judge only
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makes a recommendation to this court, and the recommendation has no presumptive weight—the
responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423
U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those
portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objections are made, and the court
may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the Magistrate Judge’s recommendation or
recommit the matter with instruction. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
B. Habeas Corpus Standard of Review
Because Petitioner filed his petition after the effective date of the AEDPA, review of his
claim is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended. See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 619
(4th Cir. 1998). Under the AEDPA, federal courts may not grant habeas corpus relief unless the
underlying state adjudication: (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an
unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination
of the facts in light of the evidence presented at the State court proceeding. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1)(2); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 398 (2000). “[A] federal habeas court may not issue the
writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state court
decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application
must also be unreasonable.” Id. at 410. Moreover, state court factual determinations are presumed
to be correct and the petitioner has the burden of rebutting this presumption by clear and
convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
III.

ANALYSIS

Petitioner alleges he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his attorney
deliberately entertaining a conflict of interest. When evaluating ineffective assistance of counsel

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claims, a court must recognize a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption
that, under the circumstances, the challenged action “might be considered sound trial strategy.”
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984). This high standard requires a habeas
petitioner to show that counsel’s errors deprived him “of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.”
Id. at 687.
A. Application of Strickland
In his objections, Petitioner generally restates the argument from his Petition that his plea
counsel was ineffective due to a conflict of interest, and that the state court and the Magistrate
Judge erred in failing to find Petitioner was entitled to relief under Strickland. (ECF No. 30 at 3.)
As stated above, a federal habeas court can only issue a writ when a state court has
unreasonably applied federal law. See Williams, 529 U.S. at 410. In evaluating an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim with a habeas petition, the petitioner must satisfy the highly deferential
standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and Strickland “in tandem,” making the standard “doubly” more
difficult. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 105. “Section 2254(d) codifies the view that habeas corpus is a
“guard against extreme malfunctions in the state criminal justice system, not a substitute for
ordinary error correction through appeal.” Id. at 102 (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307,
332 n.5 (1979)). Additionally, the United States Supreme Court has cautioned that “[s]urmounting
Strickland’s high bar is never an easy task.” Harrington, 562 U.S. at 88 (quoting Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 371 (2010)). The unreasonableness of the state court determination must
be “beyond any possibility of fair-minded disagreement.” Id. at 103. Lastly, a defendant who raised
no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his
lawyer’s performance. Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980).

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The Post Conviction Relief (“PCR”) court found that there was no conflict of interest,
therefore, the court’s only duty is to determine the reasonableness of the PCR court’s decision.
(ECF No. 23 at 20.) Petitioner’s evidence in regard to his lawyer’s performance being adversely
affected is that Petitioner and his co-defendant received identical sentences despite having
different charges. 1 However, Petitioner has not provided any evidence that the PCR court’s
decision was unreasonable or that the PCR court’s determination of the facts in light of the
evidence was unreasonable. Therefore, Petitioner has not carried his burden of establishing the
PCR.
B. Presumption of Prejudice Standard under Holloway
Petitioner asserts the Magistrate Judge failed to apply the presumption of prejudice
standard established in Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978). (ECF No. 30 at 2.)
Petitioner misunderstands Holloway’s holding and enlarges the holding outside of its
applicable scope. Holloway dealt with a specific circumstance, not present here, in which a trial
court failed to inquire into a potential conflict of interest despite defense counsel’s notice to the
court regarding the potential conflict. See id. In Holloway, the trial court required one defense
attorney to represent three co-defendants in a joint trial despite repeated objections by defense
counsel that the joint representation hampered his ability to represent any of the defendants
adequately. See id. at 477-78. Notably, counsel could not cross-examine any of the defendants
from whom he had confidential information. See id. at 478-80. The Holloway trial court declined
to inquire into prejudice arising from the conflicted representation and all three defendants were
convicted as a result of counsel not being about to represent them effectively. Id.

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Petitioner pleaded guilty to six counts of armed robbery and two counts of accessory after the
fact and his co-defendant pleaded guilty to eight counts of armed robbery.
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In Holloway, the United States Supreme Court stated: “[a]n attorney representing two
defendants in a criminal matter is in the best position professionally and ethically to determine
when a conflict of interest exists or will probably develop in the course of a trial.” Id. at 485
(quoting State v. Davis, 514 P.2d 1025, 1027 (Ariz. 1973)). Simply because the attorney is in the
“best” position to determine if a conflict exists does not mean that he is the only person who can
bring a conflict to the court’s attention.
Plea counsel testified that he discussed the potential conflict with Petitioner and his codefendant.2 (ECF No. 23 at 19.) Because plea counsel discussed the conflict with Petitioner,
Petitioner had knowledge of the potential conflict and the ability to bring the potential conflict to
the state court’s attention at his plea hearing. However, Petitioner chose not to do so and proceeded
to plead guilty.
Upon review of Holloway, the court determines that the phrasing Petitioner uses from
Holloway has been taken out of context and is not applicable in this case. 3 Because Holloway is
not applicable, the PCR court did not unreasonably apply federal law. This court previously stated
that Strickland is applicable to this Petition and Petitioner has failed to meet the standard required
by Strickland and 28 U.S.C. § 2254 because Petitioner has provided no evidence that the PCR
court’s decision was unreasonable.

The PCR court found credible plea counsel’s testimony that he advised Petitioner of the potential
conflict of interest. When reviewing the PCR court’s findings, this court cannot make credibility
determinations, and therefore, must take the PCR court’s determination as fact. See Marshall v.
Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983); 28 U.S.C. 2254(e)(1).
3 Petitioner claimed his case was distinguishable from Holloway “since [his] plea counsel] failed
to bring [the potential conflict] to the court’s attention and let the court take the proper steps to
ensure there was no conflict.” (ECF No. 30 at 2) (referencing Holloway, 435 U.S. at 485-86).
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C. Guilty Plea Objection
Petitioner objects that he should not have been allowed to plead guilty absent an on-therecord waiver of the conflict of interest. (ECF No. 30 at 2-3.)
When reviewing the PCR court’s findings, this court cannot make credibility
determinations, and therefore, must take the PCR court’s determination as fact. See Marshall v.
Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 434 (1983). The PCR court found plea counsel’s testimony that he
informed Petitioner of the conflict of interest to be credible. (ECF No. 23 at 20.) Still, Petitioner
chose to plead guilty despite knowing of the conflict. Finally, the case law Petitioner cites,
Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 602 (1961), concerns a defendant’s right to testify, a right
Petitioner expressly waived by pleading guilty.
Petitioner has not presented any evidence that the PCR court unreasonably applied
Strickland or other United States Supreme Court precedent in deciding Petitioner’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim. Petitioner has not provided sufficient evidence that he was prejudiced
by this alleged conflict of interest, and moreover, he did not contest his plea counsel’s
representation at the plea hearing. Accordingly, Petitioner has failed to overcome the deferential
standard of review afforded to the state PCR court’s determination that there was no conflict of
interest.
IV.

CONCLUSION

After a thorough review of the Report and the record, the court finds the Report provides
an accurate summary of the facts and law and does not contain clear error. The court ACCEPTS
the findings of the Report. (ECF No. 23.) Therefore, the court GRANTS Respondent’s Motion for
Summary Judgment (ECF No. 22) and DENIES WITH PREJUDICE Petitioner’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1).

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Certificate of Appealability
The law governing certificates of appealability provides that:
(c)(2) A certificate of appealability may issue . . . only of the applicant has made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
(c)(3) The certificate of appealability . . . shall indicate which specific issue or
issues satisfy the showing required by paragraph (2).

28. U.S.C § 2253(c). A prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that reasonable jurists
would find this court’s assessment of his constitutional claims is debatable or wring and that any
dispositive procedural ruling by the district court is likewise debatable. See Miller-El v. Cockrell,
537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003); Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); Rose v. Lee, 252 F.3d
676, 683 (4th Cir. 2001). In this case, the legal standard for the issuance of a certificate of
appealability has not been met.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

United States District Judge
June 20, 2018
Columbia, South Carolina

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