Wilson v. Eagelton et al

Filing 40

ORDER AND OPINION adopting the 28 Report and Recommendation as the Order of the Court, denying Defendants' 15 motion for summary judgment, and referring this matter back to the Magistrate Judge for pre-trial proceedings. Signed by Honorable Richard M. Gergel on 10/10/2018. (bgoo)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
AIKEN DIVISION
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Garcia Wilson,
Plaintiff,
V.

Warden Willie Eagleton, Officer
Lucas, Officer Cotton, Officer Sims,
and Officer Williamson,
Defendants.
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Civil Action No. 1: 18-0050-RMG

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ORDER AND OPINION

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Before the Court is the report and recommendation ("R & R") of the Magistrate Judge
(Dkt. No. 28) recommending that the Court deny Defendants' motion for summary judgment
(Dkt. No. 15). For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the R & Ras the Order of the
Court and denies Defendants ' motion for summary judgment.

I.

Background
Plaintiff Garcia Wilson brought this suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that

Defendants violated his constitutional rights by failing to protect him from inmate violence, by
using excessive force and by denying him medical care while incarcerated at the Evans
Correctional Institution ("ECI") of the South Carolina Department of Corrections. Specifically,
Plaintiff alleges that on September 5, 2017 he was struck and stabbed by a fellow inmate and that
Defendants Cotton and Lucas saw Plaintiff injured, but did not help him. Plaintiff also alleges
that on September 7, 2017, after he was transported to the hospital for treatment, Defendant Sims
repeatedly kneed Plaintiff in his torso while Defendant Williamson observed, but did not
intervene. (Dkt. No . 1-2 at 7-9.)

Defendants moved for summary judgment (Dkt. No . 15),

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Plaintiff filed a response in opposition (Dkt. No. 20) and Defendants replied (Dkt. No. 21 ).
Defendants objected to the R & R. (Dkt. No. 39.)

II.

Legal Standard

A.

Review of the R & R
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation

has no presumptive weight and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the
Court. See, e.g., Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976).

The Court may "accept,

reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate
judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l)(C). Where there are specific objections to the R & R, the Court
"makes a de nova determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or
recommendations to which objection is made." Id.

In the absence of objections, the Court

reviews the R & R to "only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in
order to accept the recommendation." Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee's note. Where
there are no objections, the Court need not give any explanation for adopting the Magistrate
Judge' s analysis and recommendation. See, e.g., Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199 (4th Cir.
1983) ("In the absence of objection ... we do not believe that it requires any explanation.").

B.

Motion for Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant "shows that there is no genuine dispute

as to any material fact" and it is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). In other words, summary judgment should be granted "only when it is clear that there is
no dispute concerning either the facts of the controversy or the inferences to be drawn from those
facts." Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Props., 810 F .2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987). "In determining
whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities

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in favor of the nonrnoving party." HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. v. Am. Nat'! Red Cross, 101 F.3d
1005, 1008 (4th Cir. 1996).
The party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of demonstrating to the court
that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1986). Once the moving party has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to
survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his
pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate that specific, material
facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, "[ c]onclusory or speculative
allegations do not suffice, nor does a 'mere scintilla of evidence"' in support of the non-moving
party's case. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Phillips v. CSXTransp. , Inc., 190 F.3d 285 , 287 (4th Cir. 1999)).
III.

Discussion
The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") mandates that an inmate exhaust "such

administrative remedies as are available" before bringing suit under § 1983. 42 U.S .C. §
1997(e)(a) ("No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of
this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional
facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted."); see also Anderson v.

XYZ Corr. Health Servs., 407 F.3d 674, 677 (4th Cir. 2005). The administrative remedies are
dictated by the prison. See Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) .

A prison grievance

procedure is "available" if it is "capable of use to obtain some relief for the action complained
of." Ross v. Blake, 136 S.Ct. 1850, 1855 (2016). The PLRA, therefore, has a "built-in exception
to the exhaustion requirement: A prisoner need not exhaust remedies if they are not 'available."'

Ross, 136 S.Ct. at 1855. The prisoner bears the burden of demonstrating that an administrative
remedy is unavailable. See Graham v. Gentry, 413 Fed. Appx. 660, 663 (4th Cir. 2011) (" [I]n

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order to show that a grievance procedure was not 'available,' a prisoner must adduce facts
showing that he was prevented, through no fault of his own, from availing himself of that
procedure.") (internal citation omitted).
Specifically, an administrative remedy is not "available"-meaning, the remedy,
"although officially on the books, is not capable of use to obtain relief'-in at least three
circumstances. Ross, 136 S.Ct. at 1859. First, "an administrative procedure is unavailable when
(despite what regulations or guidance materials may promise) it operates as a simple dead endwith officers unable or consistently unwilling to provide any relief to aggrieved inmates." Id.
Meaning, the "administrative officials have apparent authority, but decline ever to exercise it."

Id. Second, a remedy is unavailable where the "administrative scheme might be so opaque that it
becomes, practically speaking, incapable of use." Id. In other words, "some mechanisms exists
to provide relief, but no ordinary prisoner can discern or navigate it." Id. Last, an administrative
remedy is not available "when prison administrators thwart inmates form taking advantage of a
grievance process through machination, misrepresentation, or intimidation." Id. at 1860. In this
situation, "officials might devise procedural systems (including the blind alleys and quagmires
just discussed) in order to trip up all but the most skillful prisoners" or threaten the inmate. Id.
(internal q·uotation marks and citation omitted).
After a careful review of the record, including Defendants' objections to the R & R, the
Court finds that the Magistrate Judge correctly identified that Defendants failed to demonstrate
there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether ECI remedies were unavailable to
Plaintiff such that his suit is barred by the PLRA exhaustion requirement. Here, for example,
Plaintiff submitted paper grievances following the September 5, 2017 attack, but the grievances
were returned to Plaintiff unprocessed. (Dkt. No. 20-1

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36-42.) See, e.g., Mann v. Scott, No.

0:14-3474-RMG, 2015 WL 5165198, at *5 (D .S.C. Sept. 1, 2015) ("The Court finds that the
prison's failure to respond to Plaintiff's RTS ' s made an administrative remedy unavailable in
this case, excusing his resulting failure to exhaust prior to filing suit. The Motion for Summary
Judgment is denied as to its administrative exhaustion grounds."); Martin v. McFadden, 2016
WL 3727493, at *2 (D.S.C. June 17, 2016) (denying defendants' motion for summary judgment
where prisoner received a response to his grievance "long after the time period established by
SCDC policy"). Similarly, Plaintiff was generally discouraged from filing grievances when
prison staff made his complaints public among inmates or when he did not have access to kiosks
and prison officials would not accept his paper complaints. (Dkt. No . 20-1

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44-46, 87-92.) See,

e.g., Moore v. Bennet, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that "an administrative remedy
is not considered to have been available if a prisoner, through no fault of his own, was prevented
from availing himself of it"). Construed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, including that
Plaintiff submitted a grievance on April 27, 2018 (Dkt. No. 20-1 at 29), this evidence supports
finding that the informal resolution step in the ECI grievance procedure was a "dead end" for
Plaintiff.
Defendants object to the Magistrate Judge's conclusion that administrative remedies were
unavailable to Plaintiff, arguing that, for example, (1) the Court should give deference to
Defendants' treatment of Plaintiff's grievances because the ECI's administrative process is
susceptible to multiple interpretations; (2) the R & R improperly takes as true that Plaintiff
submitted a grievance for the prison and hospital incidents; and (3) Plaintiff failed to demonstrate
he was "reasonably subjectively afraid to file complaints against officers." (Dkt. No. 39 at 4, 5,
12.) The Court has carefully reviewed Defendants' objections, but when appropriately construed

in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the record supports finding that Defendants were

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"consistently unwilling" to engage with Plaintiffs grievances, which Defendants were
empowered to consider, but nonetheless "declined []to exercise" their authority to review. Ross,
136 S.Ct. at 1853, 1859. 1

In fact, courts have rejected a defendants' PLRA exhaustion

requirement argument on a thinner record than this. See, e.g. , Lyles v. Sterling, No. 9:17-149CMC, 2018 WL 1737091, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 11, 2018) (denying defendants' motion for
summary judgment where facts alleged were insufficient to show remedies were unavailable).
As a result, Plaintiff sufficiently demonstrated that administrative remedies were unavailable and
Defendants failed to meet their burden on summary judgment of demonstrating that there is no
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff failed to satisfy the PLRA exhaustion
requirement.

IV.

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, the Court ADOPTS the R & R (Dkt. No. 28) as the Order of
the Court and DENIES Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 15). This matter is
REFERRED BACK to the Magistrate Judge for pre-trial proceedings.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

October / l) , 2018
Charleston, South Carolina

1

Plaintiff and Defendants offer voluminous discussion of Plaintiffs various history of incidents
and complaints while incarcerated, but the issues to be determined here relate only to whether
Plaintiff was required, but failed, to satisfy the PLRA exhaustion requirement in regards to the
September 5, 2017 and September 7, 2017 incidents. See Dkt. No. 20-1 at 5 ("The case at bar
only relates to the stabbing which occurred on September 5, 2017 and the later attack from the
guard at the hospital on September 7, 2017.").

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