Turner v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 32

ORDER granting 29 Motion for Attorney Fees per Rule 406b, awarding $30,935.50 in fees. Signed by Honorable Donald C Coggins, Jr on 09/08/2021.(bshr, )

1:19-cv-02082-DCC

Date Filed 09/08/21

Entry Number 32

Page 1 of 3

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
AIKEN DIVISION
Stephen Scott Turner,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
Commissioner of Social Security,
)
)
Defendant. )
_____________________________________ )

C/A No. 1:19-cv-02082-DCC

ORDER

On August 20, 2021, counsel for Plaintiff, filed a motion for attorney’s fees pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 406(b). ECF No. 29. In the motion, counsel requests reimbursement for
representation provided in the above-referenced case in the amount $30,935.50. Id.
Plaintiff’s counsel previously received an attorney fee award under the Equal Access to
Justice Act (“EAJA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2412, in the amount of $6,000.00. ECF No. 28.
Counsel agrees that any attorney fees awarded under § 406(b)(1) are subject to offset by
a previous EAJA attorney fee award and the lesser of the two amounts must be refunded
to the plaintiff. On September 1, 2021, Defendant filed a response in support of Plaintiff’s
motion and requested that the Court authorize a payment to Plaintiff’s counsel in the
amount of $30,935.50. ECF No. 30.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A) provides that “[w]henever a court renders a judgment
favorable to a claimant . . . who was represented before the court by an attorney, the court
may determine and allow as part of its judgment a reasonable fee for such representation,
not in excess of 25 percent of the total of the past-due benefits to which the claimant is

1:19-cv-02082-DCC

Date Filed 09/08/21

Entry Number 32

Page 2 of 3

entitled by reason of such judgment.” 42 U.S.C. § 406(b)(1)(A). The Supreme Court has
held that § 406(b) sets a statutory ceiling for attorney fees in social security cases of 25
percent of past-due benefits and calls for court review of contingency fee agreements to
assure that the agreement yields reasonable results in particular cases. Gisbrecht v.
Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 807 (2002). Contingency fee agreements are unenforceable to
the extent that they provide for fees exceeding 25 percent of the past-due benefits.
Gisbrecht, 535 U.S. at 807. When the contingency fee agreement and requested fee do
not exceed 25 percent of the past-due benefits, “the attorney for the successful claimant
must show that the fee sought is reasonable for the services rendered.” Id. Even where
the requested fee does not exceed 25 percent of past-due benefits, “a reduction in the
contingent fee may be appropriate when (1) the fee is out of line with the ‘character of the
representation and the results . . . achieved,’ (2) counsel’s delay caused past-due benefits
to accumulate ‘during the pendency of the case in court,’ or (3) past-due benefits ‘are
large in comparison to the amount of time counsel spent on the case’” (i.e., the “windfall”
factor). Mudd v. Barnhart, 418 F.3d 424, 428 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Gisbrecht, 535 U.S.
at 808).
As required by 42 U.S.C. § 406(b), the amount requested by counsel is not greater
than 25 percent of the past-due benefits recovered by Plaintiff. The Court has reviewed
the motion, counsel's fee petition, and the accompanying fee agreement and finds that
the request is reasonable.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Attorney's Fees pursuant to the Social Security
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) [20] is GRANTED in the amount of $30,935.50. Plaintiff's counsel

1:19-cv-02082-DCC

Date Filed 09/08/21

Entry Number 32

Page 3 of 3

is directed to return $6,000.00 previously awarded under the EAJA to Plaintiff after he
receives the payment of the § 406(b) fees.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Donald C. Coggins, Jr.
United States District Judge
September 8, 2021
Spartanburg, South Carolina