Richards v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 18

ORDER ADOPTING THE 14 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND AFFIRMING DEFENDANT'S FINAL DECISION DENYING BENEFITS. Signed by Honorable Mary Geiger Lewis on 3/27/2024. (lbak)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
AIKEN DIVISION
JAMISON RICHARDS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

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§
§
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KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of §
Social Security,
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Defendant.
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CIVIL ACTION NO. 1:23-55-MGL

ORDER ADOPTING THE REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
AND AFFIRMING DEFENDANT’S FINAL DECISION DENYING BENEFITS
This is a Social Security appeal in which Plaintiff Jamison Richards (Richards) seeks judicial
review of the final decision of Kilolo Kijakazi (Kijakazi), Acting Commissioner of Social Security
(Kijakazi), denying his claims for disability insurance benefits (DIB) and supplemental security
income (SSI). The matter is before the Court for review of the Report and Recommendation
(Report) of the United States Magistrate Judge suggesting Kijakazi’s final decision be affirmed.
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation has
no presumptive weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court.
Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo
determination of those portions of the Report to which specific objection is made, and the Court may
accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate Judge or
recommit the matter with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

The Magistrate Judge filed the Report on July 17, 2023, Richards filed his objections on July
31, 2023, and Kijakazi filed her reply on August 11, 2023. The Court has carefully reviewed
Richards’s objections, but holds them to be without merit. It will therefore enter judgment
accordingly.
On January 30, 2020, Richards filed his applications for DIB and SSI. He alleged his
disability began on May 9, 2018.
His applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. On November 10, 2021,
Richards had a hearing before the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ issued an unfavorable
decision on March 28, 2022, finding Richards was unable to show he was disabled within the
meaning of the Act.
The Appeals Council subsequently denied Richards’s request for review, making the ALJ’s
decision the final decision of Kijakazi for purposes of judicial review. Thereafter, Richards brought
this action seeking judicial review of Kijakazi’s decision in a complaint filed on January 6, 2023.
The Agency has established a five-step sequential evaluation process for determining if a
person is disabled. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a), 416.920(a). The five steps are: (1) whether the
claimant is currently engaging in substantial gainful activity; (2) whether the claimant has a
medically determinable severe impairment(s); (3) whether such impairment(s) meets or equals an
impairment set forth in the Listings; (4) whether the impairment(s) prevents the claimant from
returning to her/his past relevant work; and, if so, (5) whether the claimant is able to perform other
work as it exists in the national economy. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(I)-(v), 416.920(a)(4)(I)-(v).
Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), a district court is required to conduct a de novo review of those
portions of the Magistrate Judge’s Report to which a specific objection has been made. The Court
need not conduct a de novo review, however, “when a party makes general and conclusory
objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the [Magistrate Judge’s] proposed
findings and recommendations.” Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir. 1982).
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It is the claimant’s duty both to produce evidence and prove she is disabled under the Act.
Pass v. Chater, 65 F.3d 1200, 1203 (4th Cir. 1995). Nevertheless, the ALJ is to develop the record
and when he”fails in his duty to fully inquire into the issues necessary for adequate development of
the record, and such failure is prejudicial to the claimant, the case should be remanded.” Marsh v.
Harris, 632 F.2d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 1980).
It is also the task of the ALJ, not this Court, to make findings of fact and resolve conflicts
in the evidence. Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). “It is not within the
province of this [C]ourt to determine the weight of the evidence; nor is it [the Court’s] function to
substitute [its] judgment for that of [the defendant] if [the] decision is supported by substantial
evidence.” Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966).
In other words, the Court “must sustain the ALJ’s decision, even if [it] disagree[s] with it,
provided the determination is supported by substantial evidence.” Smith v. Chater, 99 F.3d 635, 638
(4th Cir. 1996). Under the substantial evidence standard, the Court must view the entire record as
a whole. Steurer v. Bowen, 815 F.2d , 1249, 1250 (8th Cir. 1987).
Although ALJs must sufficiently explain the reasons for their rulings to allow this Court to
provide meaningful review, Radford v. Colvin, 734 F.3d 288, 296 (4th Cir. 2013), “the ALJ is not
required to address every piece of evidence[;] [instead,] he must . . . build an accurate and logical
bridge from the evidence to his conclusion.” Clifford v. Apfel, 227 F.3d 863, 872 (7th Cir. 2000)
(citations omitted). The Court’s “general practice, which [it] see[s] no reason to depart from here,
is to take a lower tribunal at its word when it declares that it has considered a matter.” Hackett v.
Barnhart, 395 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir.2005).

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“[T]he substantial evidence standard presupposes a zone of choice within which the
decisionmakers can go either way, without interference by the courts. An administrative decision
is not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite
decision.” Clarke v. Bowen, 843 F.2d 271, 272-73 (8th Cir. 1988) (citations omitted) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (alteration omitted). Put differently, if the ALJ’s “dispositive factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence, they must be affirmed, even in cases where contrary
findings of an ALJ might also be so supported.” Kellough v. Heckler, 785 F.2d 1147, 1149 (4th Cir.
1986).
With this law as a framework, the Court will consider Richards’s objections to the Magistrate
Judge’s Report, which primarily relate to the ALJ’s evaluation of the opinion evidence of Robert
Allman, M.D., (Dr. Allman).
Here is a summary of Allman’s opinion:
On July 21, 2020, Dr. Allman provided a medical opinion statement.
He stated he had treated [Richards] since February 12, 2018, and was
very familiar with his condition. He noted [Richards] had ongoing
neurological deficits to his right lower extremity and back,
generalized neuropathy, probable CTS, probable cubital tunnel
disease, right foot drop, right hand weakness, numbness, and tingling,
and cervical degenerative disease resulting in diffuse neural
foraminal stenosis of the cervical spine at multiple levels. He
identified signs and symptoms that included intermittent foot drop,
intermittent neurological defects, numbness, tingling, muscle
wasting, weakness, and spells of blurred vision. He stated
[Richards’s] symptoms suggested a diagnosis of multiple sclerosis,
but that he could not definitively diagnose the condition because it
was difficult to diagnose in its early stages. He further noted
[Richards] had sleep apnea and had struggled to effectively use a
continuous positive airway pressure . . . machine. He indicated
[Richards’s] impairments were confirmed by CT scan of his cervical
spine, cervical myelogram, MRI of the cervical spine, myelogram of
the lumbar spine, and NCS of the upper and lower extremities. He
further represented he had observed [Richards’s] consistent physical
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signs and symptoms during office visits. He opined that [Richards]
would not be able to sit, stand, or remain still for an extended period
of time and would need to rest for more than one hour during an
eight-hour period. He stated [Richards’s] pain made it nearly
impossible for him to focus, concentrate, and remain on task and his
psychological impairments made it difficult for him to reliably
concentrate. He indicated [Richards’s] problems made it difficult for
him to sustain attention and concentration to task. He explained that
[Richards’s] medical records included occasional normal findings
that were the result of computer-generated records that did not
accurately reflect his condition, usually by doctors who were not
treating him for the condition addressed.
Report at 33-34 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (alteration marks omitted).
But, the ALJ found Dr. Allman’s opinion unpersuasive:
The undersigned has considered the medical opinion from
[Richards’s] primary care provider, [Dr. Allman], but finds it not
persuasive. The severity of Dr. Allman’s opinions are not supported
by his own treatment reports. For example, Dr. Allman notes . . .
[Richards’s] generalized anxiety disorder is stable in August 2021
and reports normal findings on mental status examination. Dr.
Allman may note a few positive findings on physical examination
relating to the claimant’s shoulder impingement, but his treatment of
[Richards’s] impairments has remained conservative, through
physical therapy referral, medication, ice, or one injection in the
claimant’s left shoulder. Moreover, his opinion is not consistent with
the longitudinal record, in particular findings from treatment by
orthopedic specialists and mental health specialists.
A.R. at 27-28 (citations omitted).
As per the applicable regulations, the ALJ is instructed to consider the following factors in
evaluating medical opinions: (1) supportability, (2) consistency, (3) relationship with the claimant,
(4) specialization, and (5) other factors that tend to support or contradict the medical opinion. 20
C.F.R. §§ 404.1520c(b), (c), 416.920c(b), (c). The regulations, require, however, the ALJ explicitly
discuss only their evaluations of the supportability and consistency factors, as these factors are

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considered most important in assessing the persuasiveness of a medical source’s opinion. 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1520c(a), (b)(2), 416.920c(a), (b)(2).
“[A]n ALJ has the obligation to consider all relevant evidence and cannot simply cherrypick
facts that support a finding of nondisability while ignoring evidence that points to a disability
finding.” Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 869 (4th Cir. 2017) (quoting Denton v. Astrue, 596 F.3d
419, 425 (7th Cir. 2010)). The Court rejects Richards’s suggestion of cherrypicking here.
Most of the contentions Richards presents here were already considered and rejected by the
Magistrate Judge. Having made a de novo review of the record, the Court agrees with her discussion
and analysis of those arguments. Thus inasmuch as the Report will be incorporated into this Order,
the Court will refrain from repeating here what she said there.
The Court must, however, address Richards’s accusation of post hoc rationalization. As the
Court noted above, in Dr. Allman’s opinion, he stated Richards’s symptoms might be explained by
a potential diagnosis of multiple sclerosis. As per the Magistrate Judge, “this explanation appears
only in Dr. Allman’s opinion statement. Therefore, the ALJ would have found no support for it in
Dr. Allman’s treatment notes.” Report at 41.
According to Richards, the ALJ did not address this explanation by Dr. Allman, so this is
impermissible post hoc rationale offered by the Magistrate Judge.” But, the Court is unable to say
the Magistrate Judge erred here inasmuch as the weight the ALJ afforded to the opinion evidence
offered by Dr. Allman is supported by substantial evidence.
For these reasons, the Court will overrule Richards’s objections to the Report.
In sum, the Court has little trouble concluding there is substantial evidence to support the
ALJ’s conclusion Richards failed to establish she was disabled under the Act during the relevant

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time period; the ALJ’s decision is detailed enough to permit this Court’s review; the ALJ’s decision
is free from any reversible legal error; and the ALJ’s determination is reasonable.
Thus, after a thorough review of the Report and the record in this case pursuant to the
standard set forth above, the Court overrules Richards’s objections, adopts the Report, and
incorporates it herein. Therefore, it is the judgment of the Court Kijakazi’s final decision denying
Richards’s DIB and SSI claims is AFFIRMED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Signed this 27th day of March, 2024, in Columbia, South Carolina.
/s/ Mary Geiger Lewis
MARY GEIGER LEWIS
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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