Morell v. Cunningham et al

Filing 45

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation [ECF No. 33 ]; granting Centerra Group, LLC, Centerra SRS, Constellis Holding Group, LLC and Jason Cunningham's Mot ion for Summary Judgment regarding ECF No. 28 ; and denying as moot Barnwell County, Barnwell County Sheriff's Office and Steven W. Griffith's Motion for Summary Judgment regarding ECF No. 24 . Signed by Honorable Sherri A. Lydon on 01/28/2025. (cpri )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
AIKEN DIVISION
Isaac Morell,

Case No.: 1:23-cv-05528-SAL
Plaintiff,

v.
ORDER
Jason Cunningham, Individually, and in his
Official Capacity as a Law Enforcement
Officer of Centerra Group, LLC; Steven W.
Griffith, in his Official Capacity as Sheriff of
Barnwell County; Barnwell County Sheriff’s
Office; Barnwell County; Centerra Group,
LLC; Centerra SRS; and Constellis Holding
Group, LLC,
Defendants.
This matter is before the court on the report and recommendation of the magistrate judge,
ECF No. 33, which recommends granting Defendants’ motions for summary judgment. See ECF
Nos. 24, 28.1 Plaintiff Isaac Morell filed objections to the report on September 26, 2024, ECF No.
34, and Defendants filed timely replies. ECF No. 35, 38. This matter is accordingly ripe for
consideration.
BACKGROUND
Morell originally filed this action in the Barnwell County Court of Common Pleas alleging
seven common law causes of action arising out of his arrest on March 11, 2021. See ECF No. 1-1

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After the magistrate judge’s report, the parties stipulated to dismissal with prejudice of all claims
against Steven W. Griffith in his official capacity as Sheriff, Barnwell County Sheriff’s Office,
and Barnwell County (“Barnwell County Defendants”). Their motion for summary judgment, ECF
No. 24, is accordingly moot.
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at 2–8. Upon amending his complaint to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Defendants removed
the matter under this court’s federal question jurisdiction. See ECF No. 1 at 1–2.
The essential facts from which Morell’s claims arose are not, despite summary protests to
the contrary, genuinely disputed. The magistrate judge’s recitation of those facts is incorporated.
In sum, at approximately 7:00 A.M. on March 11, 2021, Defendant Jason Cunningham observed
Morell standing next to his apparently disabled truck on the side the road. See ECF No. 28-2 at 2.
No one else was present, and Morell informed Cunningham that someone had tried to run him off
the road. ECF No. 28-1 at 68:16–70:16. Cunningham noted several signs of intoxication, including
bloodshot eyes, confused and slurred speech, and a strong odor of alcohol. He attempted to
administer field sobriety tests. But Morell, after denying any medical conditions, could not
complete them. See ECF No. 28-2 at 2. Cunningham arrested Morell, read him Miranda warnings,
and transported him to the Barnwell County Detention Center for a breathalyzer test. Id. at 3. The
test revealed Morell’s blood alcohol concentration of 0.23 percent. Id. at 6. Cunningham then
issued Morell a uniform traffic ticket, charging him with driving with an unlawful alcohol
concentration (“DUAC”) in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2933.
The DUAC charge was subsequently dismissed by the state magistrate judge. See ECF No.
32-1. Although the reasons for the magistrate judge’s dismissal are not in the record, the State
appealed the dismissal to the circuit court. Id. at 1. In its opinion, the circuit court stated that the
magistrate judge exceeded his authority in dismissing the charge, but because the State had not
properly preserved this issue, the court affirmed the dismissal. Id. at 2. The circuit court also
remarked,“[a]s an aside,” that dismissal was the correct outcome under State v. Graves, 237 S.E.2d
584, 588 (S.C. 1977). It reasoned that dismissal was proper under Graves because Cunningham
had not personally seen Morell driving his truck. ECF No. 32-1 at 2.

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In the operative complaint, Morell alleges he is innocent of the DUAC charge. ECF No. 11 at 51. He states claims for (1) wrongful failure to train and supervise; (2) false imprisonment
and/or false arrest; (3) gross negligence; (4) malicious prosecution; (5) abuse of process; (6)
outrage; (7) assault and battery; and (8) violation of constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See generally id.
The magistrate judge recommends granting summary judgment for Defendants on Morell’s
§ 1983 claims, concluding that Cunningham had probable cause to arrest Morell for DUAC
notwithstanding the ultimate dismissal of the charge. Additionally, the magistrate judge found that
Cunningham independently had probable cause to arrest Morell for gross intoxication on a
highway in violation of S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-530. As a result, the magistrate judge determined
that any claims for unlawful arrest or malicious prosecution necessarily fail.2 The magistrate judge
further found no evidence to support Morell’s excessive force claim, where the video evidence
revealed no force beyond what was necessary to carry out the arrest. Finally, as to supervisory
liability under Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), the
magistrate judge concluded that Morell’s claim fails because he did not establish an underlying §
1983 violation by Cunningham.
For Morell’s state-law claims, the magistrate judge recommended granting summary
judgment for Defendants, reasoning that Cunningham’s probable cause similarly defeats Morell’s
claims for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution. The magistrate judge further concluded

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The court notes that Morell’s malicious prosecution claim would survive summary judgment if
there was no probable cause to prosecute him for DUAC. See Chiaverini v. City of Napoleon,
Ohio, 602 U.S. 556, 563 (2024) (“[T]he bringing of one valid charge in a criminal proceeding
should not categorically preclude a [malicious prosecution] claim based on the Fourth
Amendment.”). Rather, for purposes of malicious prosecution, each charge must be supported by
probable cause. Id.
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there was no evidence in support of Morell’s claims for abuse of process or assault and battery. As
to Morell’s claim for outrage or intentional infliction of emotional distress, the magistrate judge
noted it is barred by the South Carolina Tort Claims Act. Finally, the report observed that Morell
failed to submit evidence or even address his negligence claim.
In objecting to the report, Morell’s arguments primarily challenge the finding of probable
cause. He relies on the “aside” in the circuit court’s reasoning, arguing that Cunningham could not
charge or arrest him under State v. Graves, 237 S.E.2d 584 (S.C. 1977), because Cunningham did
not personally witness him driving. Morell further argues that (1) the post-arrest breathalyzer
results should not affect the court’s probable cause analysis; (2) the determination of probable
cause is a “jury question”; and (3) his hearing impairment could lead a jury to conclude that his
intoxication-like behavior was solely attributable to his hearing condition.3
LEGAL STANDARD
I.

Summary Judgment

Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that “[t]he court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material”
if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine”
if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id.

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Morell makes a few other passing arguments. He submits that Cunningham acted outside the
scope of his employment for purposes of the South Carolina Tort Claims Act because he
subjectively believed he had probable cause to arrest Cunningham, and that Morell in fact has
“scars” and continuing pain from being placed in handcuffs. The former argument borders on
frivolous, and the latter remains unsupported by any evidence in the record. These objections are
overruled.
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at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all
inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States
v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of proving to the court
that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986).
Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the
motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations asserted in his pleadings. Id. at 324.
Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts give rise to a genuine issue.
Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant’s
position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the
summary judgment motion. Ross v. Commc’ns Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985),
overruled on other grounds, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the
outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.
Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at
248.
II.

Report and Recommendation

The magistrate judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation
has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with this
court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). The court is charged with making a
de novo determination of only those portions of the report that have been specifically objected to,
and the court may accept, reject, or modify the report, in whole or in part. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
An objection is sufficiently specific if it reasonably alerts the district court of the true ground for

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the objection. United States v. Midgette, 478 F.3d 616, 622 (4th Cir. 2007). Without specific
objections, the court need not provide an explanation for adopting the report and must “only satisfy
itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.”
Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72
advisory committee’s note).
DISCUSSION
The court first addresses Morell’s objections regarding probable cause. Notwithstanding
the favorable dicta from the circuit court in resolving Morell’s criminal appeal,4 this court finds
ample, undisputed facts in the record to support Cunningham’s warrantless arrest and Morell’s
subsequent prosecution for DUAC.
“To determine whether an officer had probable cause to arrest an individual, we examine
the events leading up to the arrest, and then decide ‘whether these historical facts, viewed from the
standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to’ probable cause.” Maryland v.
Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371 (2003) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)).
Probable cause exists when the facts and circumstances known to a police officer “would warrant
the belief of a prudent person that the arrestee had committed or was committing an offense.” See
United States v. Garcia, 848 F.2d 58, 59–60 (4th Cir. 1988). Probable cause “is an objective
standard of probability that reasonable and prudent persons apply in everyday life,” which requires

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In his objections, Morell claims that the circuit court made a ruling on probable cause. See ECF
No. 34 at 14 (characterizing the circuit court’s opinion as “arguably” ruling that “the arresting
officer’s arrest of the Plaintiff did not comply with State v. Graves”). He fails to relay the circuit
court’s finding that dismissal of the DUAC charge occurred outside the magistrate judge’s
authority and that the dismissal was affirmed solely because the State failed to preserve that issue.
The circuit court’s reference to Graves was expressly dicta that did not analyze probable cause to
make an arrest at all. See ECF No. 24-5 at 2.
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more than a “bare suspicion” but less than the evidence necessary to convict. See United States v.
Gray, 137 F.3d 765, 769 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc).
Against this backdrop, Morell argues that the holding in State v. Graves precluded
Cunningham from establishing probable cause because Cunningham did not personally observe
Morell driving. This argument fails. In Graves, the trial court denied the defendant’s motion for a
directed verdict of acquittal on a DUI charge. See 237 S.E.2d at 585–86. Although the defendant
was convicted, the circuit court reversed the conviction, reasoning that the arresting officer did not
personally witness the defendant “driving” his vehicle. Id. at 586. The South Carolina Supreme
Court, however, explicitly rejected this reasoning on appeal. The issue was whether the term
“drive” as used in S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2930 and § 56-5-2933 required any evidence that the
vehicle was in motion. The court held that it did but clarified that this requirement could be
satisfied by either direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. at 588 (emphasis added). Thus, Graves
establishes that the State need not provide direct evidence—such as an eyewitness, which the
circuit court erroneously found essential in Graves and here—to survive a motion for a directed
verdict.5
Subsequent case law reinforces that direct evidence of “driving” is unnecessary for a case
to reach the jury or for an officer to develop probable cause for arrest. See ECF No. 33 at 12–13
(citing Anderson v. State, 898 S.E.2d 218, 222 (S.C. Ct. App. 2024); State v. Russell, 546 S.E.2d

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Of course, the quantum of evidence necessary to establish probable cause to make an arrest lies
somewhere below that needed to survive a motion for a directed verdict at trial: “[I]n ruling on a
directed verdict motion where the State relies on circumstantial evidence, the court must determine
whether the evidence presented is sufficient to allow a reasonable juror to find the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Pearson, 783 S.E.2d 802, 807 (S.C. 2016) (emphasis added)
(quoting State v. Bennett, 781 S.E.2d 352, 354 (S.C. 2016)). Probable cause, alternatively, is more
than bare suspicion but less than the evidence necessary to obtain a conviction. Gray, 137 F.3d at
769.
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202, 205 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001)); see also State v. Osborne, 516 S.E.2d 201, 205 (S.C. 1999); State
v. Abraham, 759 S.E.2d 440, 443 (S.C. Ct. App. 2014). In each case, the appellate courts upheld
convictions where circumstantial evidence, corroborated by the defendant’s statements, was
sufficient for a jury to determine whether the defendant had been driving.
For example, in Osborne, an officer discovered a single-vehicle wreck with no one at the
scene. 516 S.E.2d at 202. About two hours later, the defendant was located at a gas station, initially
claiming his vehicle had been stolen. Id. Upon being advised of the penalties for making a false
report, the defendant “admitted he wrecked the car . . . .” Id. The defendant’s admission, together
with the officer’s observations of intoxication and failed field sobriety tests, “allowed a reasonable
inference that the crime of driving under the influence was committed.” Id. at 202, 205. The South
Carolina Supreme Court accordingly reinstated the DUI conviction based on these facts. Morell’s
reliance on Graves, and by extension the circuit court’s citation to it, is therefore misplaced.. As
established in Anderson, Russell, Osborne, and Abraham, direct evidence of driving is not required
for probable cause or a jury determination of guilt. Circumstantial evidence and corroborative
statements, as present here, are sufficient to meet either standard.
Here, the magistrate judge noted the following facts known to Cunningham which
supported his determination of probable cause:
Plaintiff was found standing on the side of a state highway next to a vehicle that
was stuck in a ditch; was visibly intoxicated; admitted to driving the vehicle,
informing Cunningham repeatedly “he ran me off the road” and “I can’t find my
keys”; was soaked from having been in the ditch water and had a twig on him,
indicating he had fallen out of the passenger side door; failed the standard field
sobriety tests; and could not articulate where he had been, where he was going,
when he had been drinking, or when he had run his vehicle off the road.

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ECF No. 33 (citing Cunningham’s body-worn camera video, ECF No. 28-3).6 Nor was there
anyone else in the vicinity. Only the most fantastical interpretation of these facts could reconcile
them with the idea that Morell was not “driving” the truck as that term is defined by Graves. Where
Graves and subsequent appellate opinions permit circumstantial evidence to prove that a defendant
was “driving” at trial, it is indisputable that circumstantial evidence known to Cunningham
provided probable cause to make the arrest. Morell, however, seeks to turn this into a temporal
question. How could Cunningham reasonably believe that Morell was driving while unlawfully
intoxicated? After all, Morell stated he spent the whole night in his truck on the side of the road.
He therefore argues that the only reasonable conclusion Cunningham could draw was that, after
being run off the road, he chose to drink inside his disabled vehicle. While this is a theoretically
possible scenario, the court must note that no alcoholic beverages or containers were found at the
scene—a fact acknowledged by Morell. His theory of innocence, within the context of a probable
cause analysis, strains even the most generous bounds of plausibility.
Finally, Morell’s assertion that he is hard of hearing is unsupported by the record and does
not create a genuine dispute. He appears to argue that his inability to complete field sobriety tests
could be attributed, by a jury, to a hearing problem. While he claims his hearing problem is

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These facts exclude later-obtained breathalyzer results, and Morell’s complaint that the
magistrate judge improperly considered the breathalyzer to support the initial probable cause
determination is unfounded. Morell goes even further, arguing that the post-arrest, pre-charging
breathalyzer results should be “excluded” because (1) the DUAC charge was dismissed, and (2)
he could not challenge the credibility of the breathalyzer result of 0.23 percent in the criminal case.
Dismissal of the criminal charge has nothing to do with whether the breathalyzer results are
relevant or admissible in this case, and, as Defendants note, Morell had every opportunity to
challenge the credibility of the test during the discovery period. It appears that those discovery
efforts were not successful. See ECF Nos. 29-1, 29-2 (deposing witnesses on this topic). Morell’s
point that the breathalyzer result cannot justify the initial arrest is well-taken, but the result is
inherently relevant to Morell’s malicious prosecution claims. Morell does not, however, develop
a specific objection in this regard.

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documented, the record contains no evidence to substantiate this claim, rendering his objection
conclusory. Moreover, the video evidence demonstrates that Morell’s alleged factual dispute
regarding his hearing is not genuine. See ECF Nos. 28-3, 28-4.
The “historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police
officer,” Pringle, 540 U.S. at 371, fully support Cunningham’s determination of probable cause to
believe that Morell was driving his truck with an unlawful alcohol concentration.7 And for
purposes of Morell’s malicious prosecution claims, the court further considers Morell’s blood
alcohol concentration of 0.23 percent, as measured by Cunningham before filing the charge.
Morell’s objections on probable cause are accordingly overruled. Any remaining objections raised
by Morell are undeveloped and lack the specificity to warrant or enable de novo review.

7

Morell contends that the existence or non-existence of probable cause must be decided by a jury.
See ECF No. 34 at 12–13 (citing Jones v. City of Columbia, 389 S.E.2d 662, 663 (S.C. 1990)
(“South Carolina follows the minority rule that the issue of probable cause is a question of fact and
ordinarily one for the jury.”)). But “[a] district court’s determination of probable cause under the
Fourth Amendment is an issue of law . . . .” United States v. Wilhelm, 80 F.3d 116, 118 (4th Cir.
1996) (citing United States v. Miller, 925 F.2d 695, 698 (4th Cir. 1991)). This is a procedural
distinction, and this court’s determination of probable cause—based on undisputed facts—is a
question of law. For purposes of the present motion, however, it is a distinction without a
difference because there is only one reasonable conclusion. See Sedar v. Reston Town Ctr. Prop.,
LLC, 988 F.3d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 2021) (“The court may grant summary judgment . . . if it
concludes that the evidence could not permit a reasonable jury to return a favorable verdict.”).

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CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s objections to the magistrate judge’s report, ECF No. 34, are OVERRULED,
and the report is ADOPTED and incorporated. Accordingly, the motion for summary judgment
filed by the remaining Defendants here, ECF No. 28, is GRANTED. The Barnwell County
Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 24, is DENIED as moot.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

January 28, 2025
Columbia, South Carolina

Sherri A. Lydon
United States District Judge

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