Louis v. Stirling

Filing 67

ORDER adopting the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation (ECF No. 53 ); overruling Defendant's objections (ECF No. 57 ); granting Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction (ECF No. 42 ), enjoining Defendant and any other SCDC personnel from enforcing the grooming policy against Plaintiff; granting in part and denying in part Defendant's motion for summary judgment, dismissing Plaintiff's First Amendment claim and allowing Plaintiff&# 039;s RLUIPA claim to proceed. The Court finds this case appropriate for mediation and hereby refers this matter to a United States Magistrate Judge for mediation. If mediation is unsuccessful, the parties can proceed to trial on Plaintiff's RLUIPA claim. IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Honorable Bruce Howe Hendricks on 03/11/2025. (cpri ) Modified on 3/11/2025 to edit docket text. (cpri)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
AIKEN DIVISION
Darryl Keith Louis, Jr., also known as )
Saddiq,
)
)
Plaintiff, )
)
v.
)
)
Brian P. Stirling, Director,
)
)
Defendant. )
________________________________ )

Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-00759-BHH
ORDER

Plaintiff Darryl Keith Louis, Jr., also known as Saddiq (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro
se and in forma pauperis, sued South Carolina Department of Corrections’ (“SCDC”)
Director Bryan Stirling, in his official capacity, alleging that SCDC’s grooming policy
violates the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000cc, et seq. 1 (ECF No. 1.)2
Defendant moved for summary judgment on Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim, and the
parties fully briefed that motion. (ECF Nos. 44, 49, 52.)
Plaintiff filed a motion for preliminary injunction, and the parties fully briefed that
motion. (ECF Nos. 42, 48, 51.)

1 RLUIPA forbids any “person acting under color of State law” from “impos[ing] a substantial burden on” an

incarcerated person's “religious exercise” “unless the [defendant] demonstrates that the imposition of the
burden” “is in furtherance of a compelling government interest; and is the least restrictive means of
furthering that” interest. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a), 2000cc-5(4)(A)(iii).
2 Plaintiff also asserts in his complaint that the grooming policy violates his First Amendment rights, but
Plaintiff informed the Magistrate Judge in briefing that he is abandoning this claim. (ECF No. 53 at 11 n.9.)
Thus, the Magistrate Judge recommends granting Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to this
claim. (Id.) Given Plaintiff’s abandonment and finding no clear error, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s
recommendation and grants Defendant’s motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff’s First Amendment
claim.

Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule
73.02(B)(2)(d) (D.S.C.), these pending motions were referred to a United States
Magistrate Judge for consideration.
This matter is now before the Court for review of Magistrate Judge Shiva V.
Hodges’ Report and Recommendation (“Report”). (ECF No. 53.) The Magistrate Judge
recommends granting in part 3 and denying in part Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, allowing Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim to proceed to trial, and granting Plaintiff’s
motion for preliminary injunction. (Id. at 44.) Defendant filed objections to the Report.
(ECF No. 57.) This matter is ripe for review.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The Report contains a detailed summary of this case and sets forth the correct
legal standard. Because no party objects to these portions of the Report, the Court
incorporates the facts, procedural history, and legal standard from the Report without a
recitation.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The magistrate makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation
has no presumptive weight, and responsibility for making a final determination remains
with this Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). This Court is charged
with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which a
specific objection is made, and this Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
This Court may also “receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate

3 See supra note 1.

2

with instructions.” Id. If a litigant objects only generally, the court need not explain
adopting the Report and must “only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of
the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins.
Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s
note).
DISCUSSION
I.

RLUIPA Claim
a. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

As an initial matter, the Magistrate Judge recommends that the Court deny
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on a failure to exhaust administrative
remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a). 4 (ECF No. 53 at 20.) Defendant objects to this recommendation, arguing that
the step 2 grievance Plaintiff filed in May 2015 should not be considered as a step 2 for
Plaintiff’s 2023 grievance. (ECF No. 57 at 2-3.) “Defendant believes Plaintiff has failed to
offer a [sic] proof that he has filed a step two in 2023 or 2024 for the present matter.” (Id.)
The parties do not dispute the following facts relevant to this issue: Plaintiff filed a
grievance on May 4, 2015, asking for the grooming policy to be changed so he could grow
a beard to 1/4 inch due to his religious practice (“2015 grievance”); the 2015 grievance
was received by the Inmate Grievance Coordinator (“IGC”) on May 7, 2015; the 2015
grievance was returned to Plaintiff, and Plaintiff refiled it on May 9, 2015; the refiled 2015

4 The PLRA amended section 1997e so that it now provides, “No action shall be brought with respect to
prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any
jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.”
Id. § 1997e(a). Accordingly, before Plaintiff may proceed with his claims in this Court, he must first exhaust
his administrative remedies.

3

grievance was received by the IGC on May 19, 2015; the Warden rendered a decision on
May 21, 2015; Plaintiff filed a step 2 grievance on May 25, 2015; the SCDC replied on
December 10, 2015, finding Plaintiff’s 2015 grievance moot based upon revisions made
to the grooming policy, effective November 30, 2015, in accordance with the ruling in
United States Supreme Court decision Holt v. Hobbs5; Plaintiff filed another grievance on
October 9, 2023, requesting to grow a four-inch or “fist-full length” beard for religious
reasons (“2023 grievance”); the 2023 grievance was received by the IGC on October 11,
2023; and the 2023 grievance was returned to Plaintiff as duplicative, noting that Plaintiff
had already filed on this issue and the grooming policy states the maximum beard length
is 1/2 inch. Plaintiff then sent a request to staff member (“RTSM”) form directly to Felecia
McKie, the Inmate Grievance Chief Branch Coordinator. The parties, however, dispute
what happened next.
As to the RTSM, Plaintiff states that he “request[ed] [McKie] to review the
grievance in an effort to exhaust all available remedies” and that “Ms. McKie has yet to
respond.” (ECF No. 20-2 at 4.) He also states in his complaint filed on February 8, 2024,
that he sent the RTSM with a grievance attached so McKie could review and determine
if the grievance may be processed and forwarded to the “next/final step” and that over 45
days have passed without a response from McKie. (ECF No. 1 at 8.) 6 McKie states in
her affidavit that she believes she did respond via a mailed written response on April 18,
2024, after this case was filed, and that she informed Plaintiff that his grievance would

5 574 U.S. 352 (2015).

6 SCDC policy provides that all RTSM should be responded to within 45 calendar days from date of entry.
(ECF No. 53 at 18 (quoting SCDC Policy GA-06.04 at 3.6).) As noted by the Magistrate Judge, while
Defendant argues that this Policy does not apply to Plaintiff, Defendant does not identify what policy it
believes was applicable and/or how long McKie had to timely respond to Plaintiff’s RTSM. (Id. at 19 n.13.)

4

not be re-opened because it is duplicative. (ECF No. 21-2 ¶ 12.) Defendant did not provide
the Court with a copy of the April 18, 2024, written response McKie believes she mailed
directly to Plaintiff. (Id.)
As noted in the Report, the only argument Defendant raises concerning Plaintiff’s
failure to exhaust is that Plaintiff failed to file an appeal with the Administrative Law Court
concerning the relevant issue. (ECF No. 53 at 19.) Plaintiff admittedly did not appeal.
Rather, Plaintiff argues that an appeal is not necessary, relying on Wolfe v. Shepard 7
wherein the district court stated that an inmate satisfies the PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement by completing SCDC’s grievance procedure through the Step 2 grievance.
(Id.) The Magistrate Judge notes that Defendant does not address the court’s holding in
Wolfe, and then she recommends denying Defendant’s motion on exhaustion grounds
without further explanation. (Id.)
In his objections, Defendant states that he “does not dispute Wolfe,” and he
concedes that Plaintiff filed a step-2 on May 25, 2015. However, he “asserts [that]
Plaintiff’s having filed a step-2 grievance nine (9) years ago when the Holt decision came
out, should not be considered as a step-2 for his 2023 claim.” (ECF No. 57 at 2.)
Upon review, the Court agrees with Defendant’s assertion and to the extent the
Magistrate Judge’s recommendation was based on a finding that Plaintiff had exhausted
his administrative review of his 2023 grievance because he filed a step 2 grievance with
regard to his 2015 grievance, the Court rejects this reasoning. That said, the Court adopts
the Report’s recommendation because, based on the record set forth above, Plaintiff did

7 Wolfe v. Shepard, No. 4:21-CV-0939-JD-TER, 2023 WL 2168732, at *1 (D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2023), R&R

adopted, No. 4:21-CV-0939-JD-TER, 2023 WL 2166959 (D.S.C. Feb. 22, 2023).

5

not get a timely response to his RTSM, which, in turn prevented him from pursuing a
proper Step 1 Grievance. Plaintiff waited 45 days for a response before filing the instant
suit and, thus, has shown that he exhausted all levels of administrative review available
to him. See Moore v. Bennette, 517 F.3d 717, 725 (4th Cir. 2008) (“[A]n administrative
remedy is not considered to have been available if a prisoner, through no fault of his own,
was prevented from availing himself of it.”); Zander v. Lappin, 415 F. App’x 491, 492 (4th
Cir. Mar. 10, 2011) (“[W]hen prison officials prevent inmates from using the administrative
process . . . , the process that exists on paper becomes unavailable in reality.”); see also
Hinojos v. Bowers, No. 2:14-CV-01800-DCN, 2015 WL 4878812, at *9 (D.S.C. Aug. 14,
2015) (finding that plaintiff made sufficient attempts to exhaust the administrative
remedies available to him where he was unable to file a proper grievance because he
could not get a response to his RTSM form).
While McKie attests that she did respond to Plaintiff’s RTSM, no dated response
evidencing that she in fact timely did so was provided to the Court. Thus, on this record
and viewing the facts in Plaintiff’s favor, the Court finds that Defendant has failed to carry
his burden of establishing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.
Anderson v. XYZ Corr. Health Servs., 407 F.3d 674 (4th Cir.2005). Therefore, the Court
adopts the Report’s recommendation based on the reasoning set forth herein and denies
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on a failure to exhaust administrative
remedies.
b. Merit-based Objections
Defendant objects to the Report’s statement that Plaintiff has submitted
“undisputed evidence that SCDC has substantially pressured him to modify his behavior

6

and violate his beliefs.” (ECF No. 53 at 26.) According to Defendant, Plaintiff cannot show
that SCDC’s grooming policy “burdens [his] religious belief or caused [him] irreparable
harm.” (ECF No. 57 at 4.) Defendant relies on Plaintiff’s disciplinary sanctions, which
Defendant contends “had nothing to do with [Plaintiff] refusing to cut his beard or shave.”
(Id.) Defendant also states there is no evidence that Plaintiff was subjected to “loss of
meals” due to the length of his facial hair and that, other than Plaintiff’s own affidavit, there
is no evidence that Plaintiff was subjected to “various punishments” for refusing to abide
by the grooming policy.
Under RLUIPA, the inmate bears the initial burden of establishing that a prison
policy substantially burdens his or her ability to practice in accordance with a sincerely
held religious belief. See Incumaa v. Stirling, 791 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2015). While
RLUIPA does not define “substantial burden,” the Fourth Circuit has held that the term
has the same meaning as it does in the First Amendment context. See Lovelace v. Lee,
472 F.3d 174, 187 (4th Cir. 2006). And in that context, “a substantial burden is one that
puts substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs
or one that forces a person to choose between following the precepts of her religion and
forfeiting governmental benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning the precepts of her
religion on the other hand.” Id. (cleaned up).
Here, upon review, it is evident that SCDC’s grooming policy provides clear
consequences, including the removal of privileges as well as the forced shaving of
inmates, where inmates do not comply with the policy. (See ECF No. 21-4 at 4.) And the
Fourth Circuit has found that “removing privileges in [an] effort to compel compliance,
despite not physically forcing [an] inmate to cut his hair, qualifies as [a] substantial

7

burden.” Couch v. Jabe, 679 F.3d 197, 200-01 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing Warsoldier v.
Woodford, 418 F.3d 989, 995-96 (9th Cir. 2005)); see also Greenhill v. Clarke, 944 F.3d
243, 252 (4th Cir. 2019) (finding plaintiff “met his initial showing under RLUIPA that the
VDOC grooming policies he challenged substantially burdened his religious practice of
maintaining a four-inch beard” where his non-compliance forecloses the privilege of
returning to a general population environment). Accordingly, the Court overrules this
objection and finds that Plaintiff has met his initial showing under RLUIPA that SCDC’s
grooming policy substantially burdens his religious practice of maintaining a four-inch
beard. 8
c. New Evidence
Defendant also objects to the Report’s finding that he has failed to show that
SCDC’s grooming policy is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling
governmental interest and to address Plaintiff’s alternative suggestion to the grooming
policy. In support of his belief that this conclusion was in error, Defendant repeats
arguments previously made and provides new evidence to show that the grooming policy
is the least restrictive means of furthering the compelling government interests he
identified 9 and to address Plaintiff’s alternative suggestion. Indeed, Defendant submits a
supplemental affidavit of Colie Rushton, the Director of Security Emergency Operations.

8 Defendant also states that he is reiterating his argument that Plaintiff’s religion does not require him to

have a fist-length beard. (ECF No. 57 at 9 (stating that he is maintaining the same argument that Plaintiff
has failed to show that modifying his behavior will infringe his free exercise of religion because “[n]ot every
Muslim grows their beard to fist-length”).) However, it is well established that rehashing an argument
previously made does not constitute a specific objection to the Report. Baccus v. Stirling, No. 8:18-CV1880-JFA-JDA, 2019 WL 978866, at *2-3 (D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2019), aff'd, 776 F. App’x 142 (4th Cir. 2019).
Thus, even construing this as an objection, the Court finds no clear error in the Magistrate Judge’s finding
that this argument is without merit.
9 The parties do not dispute that security, safety, order, hygiene, identifying inmates and escaped inmates,
and limiting contraband are compelling governmental interests.

8

(ECF No. 57-1.) Therein, Director Rushton states that the time required to conduct the
search suggested by Plaintiff would be disruptive to inmate daily movement and “does
not seem practical”. (Id.) He further states that Plaintiff’s alternative suggestion “does not
seem reasonable” because “beard texture varies from person to person.” (Id.) Lastly, he
states that “it appears Plaintiff further suggested the Correctional Officers to search
beards from behind the inmate,” which he believes puts officers in a “precarious position”
as an “inmate could easily bite the Officer’s hand.”10 (Id.).
Even considering this new evidence and upon a de novo review, 11 the Court finds
that Defendant has failed to show that the grooming policy is the least restrictive means
of furthering the interests of security, safety, order, hygiene, 12 identifying inmates and
escaped inmates, and limiting contraband 13 and to address Plaintiff’s alterative
suggestion. (ECF No. 53 at 27.) The Court notes that Defendant has not put forth any
evidence that Plaintiff’s proposed search would require an extensive period of time,
thereby making it not “practical.” Indeed, at least one court has stated that such a search

10 Upon review, the Court finds that Plaintiff did not make this suggestion and, thus, this suggestion was not
discussed or addressed by the Magistrate Judge in her Report. Rather, the Report only mentions an officer
being behind an inmate in the context of an officer conducting a pat-down search of an inmate. (ECF No.
53 at 28-29.)
11 “The district court's decision whether to consider additional evidence is committed to its discretion, and
any refusal will be reviewed for abuse.” Doe v. Chao, 306 F.3d 170, 183 & n.9 (4th Cir. 2002). “[A]ttempts
to introduce new evidence after the magistrate judge has acted are disfavored,” though the district court
may allow it “when a party offers sufficient reasons for so doing.” Caldwell v. Jackson, 831 F. Supp. 2d 911,
914 (M.D.N.C. 2010) (listing cases). Here, Defendant does not provide any reason(s) for introducing new
evidence. But given that it appears the supplemental affidavit was provided in an effort to expand on and
support assertions previously made and considered by the Magistrate Judge, the Court will consider this
evidence.
12 As to this interest, Plaintiff provided evidence, including SCDC’s hygiene and cleanliness policies, that in
keeping with his religion he spends approximately 100 minutes cleansing his beard per day to prepare for
prayer. (ECF No. 53 at 31 n.20.) Defendant does not address this evidence.
13 As to this interest, Defendant provided no evidence that Plaintiff, or any other inmate, has ever concealed
anything in their beards. (Id. at 28.) See also Sims, 400 F. Supp. 3d at 1277 (noting that the likelihood of an
inmate hiding valuable or dangerous contraband in a beard is low). Further, as noted in the Report, Plaintiff
provided undisputed evidence, including pictures, that at certain periods of time during his incarceration,
the grooming policy was not enforced, and he was allowed to have a full beard. (Id. at 28 n.17.) Defendant
does not address this evidence.

9

“adds perhaps five second per search.” Sims v. Inch, 400 F. Supp. 3d 1272, 1277 (N.D.
Fl. 2019) (holding that “[p]rohibiting an inmate from growing a religiously required beard
is not the least restrictive means of furthering the Department’s compelling interest in
security”). As to identifying inmates, and escaped inmates, Defendant attempts to address
the Report’s comment that “Defendant makes no attempt to identify how [an inmate’s]
escape in Pennsylvania” is relevant to the specific issue at hand, by stating that this
example “shows how an inmate may quickly change [his] appearance by shaving his
beard upon escape and avoid law enforcement.” (ECF No. 53 at 34; ECF No. 57 at 11.)
Yet, Defendant fails again to address why the dual-photograph system already in place
at SCDC does not sufficiently address this concern. See Carter v. Myers, No. 0:15-2583HMH-PJG, 2017 WL 3498878, at * (D.S.C. August 15, 2017) (recapping Holt’s discussion
of the dual photo method, which would allow prison guards to have a bearded and cleanshaved photo). Further, as noted in the Report, Plaintiff’s proposed alternative method for
locating contraband that may be hidden in a beard has been found to be an effective
method and is being utilized by many facilities that allow beards longer than 1/2 inch.
(ECF No. 53 at 28-20.) While case law outside the Fourth Circuit and practices of other
institutions are not controlling, as noted by Defendant and acknowledged by the
Magistrate Judge, such case law is persuasive, and the practices utilized elsewhere are
relevant. See Rich v. Sec'y, Fla. Dep’t of Corr., 716 F.3d 525, 534 (11th
Cir.2013) (practices of other institutions are relevant but not controlling). Thus, the Court
may properly take notice of the fact that Plaintiff’s proposed method has been successfully
implemented in other institutions, and other courts have concluded that prohibiting an

10

inmate from growing a religiously required fist-length beard is not the least restrictive
means of furthering the compelling governmental interests identified by Defendant.
Next, in hopes of remedying the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Defendant failed
to offer evidence in support of any legitimate reasons for why SCDC treats Plaintiff
differently than women, transgendered inmates, and inmates with applicable medical
conditions, 14 Defendant provides a supplemental affidavit of Warden Tonya James. (ECF
No. 57 at 6-7; ECF No. 57-2.) Therein, Warden James addresses SCDC’s treatment
towards a transgender inmate identified by Plaintiff (Adrian Bernard Good). (ECF No. 572.) Defendant states that James’ supplemental affidavit “suggests that Inmate Good was
warned about the grooming policy and eventually allowed the barber to cut the matted
ends off of his braids.” (ECF No. 57 at 7.) Defendant then argues that Plaintiff’s
underinclusive argument “is not a relevant issue because Plaintiff is not a transgender
inmate, nor does he claim to be one.” (ECF No. 57 at 11.) Additionally, while Defendant
stated in his briefing before the Magistrate Judge that he “is informed nowhere in the
policy creates any exception to inmates with ‘certified medical condition,’” 15 he now states
that a medical condition exception is necessary “to prevent the spread of infectious
diseases . . . and protect the health of inmates with certain medical conditions.” (Id.)
Upon review, the Court first notes that Plaintiff’s “substantially underinclusive”
argument was addressed in a footnote of the Report, wherein the Magistrate Judge simply
noted that Defendant had not offered any evidence to support any legitimate reason(s)
why SCDC treats Plaintiff differently than these other groups of inmates. (ECF No. 53 at

14 See ECF No. 53 at 32-33 n.21.

15 See ECF No. 52 at 5 (“Contrary to Plaintiff’s argument, the Defendant is informed nowhere in the policy

creates any exception to inmates with ‘certified medical condition . . . .’”).

11

32-33 n.21. Now, via objections to the Report, Defendant seeks to provide new evidence
addressing, for the first time, the SCDC’s treatment of an inmate Plaintiff identified in his
briefing. Defendant does not explain why this evidence could not have been provided
earlier. That said, even considering James’ supplemental affidavit, and Defendant’s
seemingly contrary and confusing 16 statements above, the Court agrees with the
Magistrate Judge that Defendant has not offered adequate explanations for the policy’s
seemingly underinclusiveness.
II.

Preliminary Injunction

“The purpose of a preliminary injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions
of the parties until a trial on the merits can be held.” United States v. South Carolina, 840
F. Supp. 2d 898, 914 (D.S.C. 2011) (quoting Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390,
395 (1981)). “A plaintiff seeking a preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to
succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, that the balance of the equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction
is in the public interest.” Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). As
the Supreme Court has noted, a preliminary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy that
may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Id. at
22. The decision whether to grant a preliminary injunction is committed to the equitable
discretion of the district court. See Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 714 (2010);
Christopher Phelps & Assocs., LLC v. Galloway, 492 F.3d 532, 543 (4th Cir. 2007).

16 It is unclear to the Court whether Defendant is contending all inmates are treated the same with regard

to the grooming policy or whether Defendant is contending SCDC treats some categories of inmates
differently for valid reasons.

12

Here, Plaintiff filed a motion for a preliminary injunction, asking the Court for an
order preventing Defendant from enforcing the grooming policy against him. (ECF No.
42.) Preliminary injunctions may be prohibitory or mandatory in nature; whereas a
prohibitory preliminary injunction seeks to enjoin a party from engaging in certain action
during the pendency of the case, mandatory preliminary injunctions “do not preserve the
status quo” and compel a party to perform an affirmative act while the action is pending.
Incumaa v. Stirling, No. 9:17-CV-1608-DCN-BM, 2021 WL 2291787, at *2 (D.S.C. June
4, 2021). Since Plaintiff’s motion seeks to enjoin Defendant and any other SCDC
personnel from enforcing the applicable SCDC grooming standards against him, the
proposed preliminary injunction is prohibitory. 17
As noted at the outset, the Magistrate Judge recommends granting Plaintiff’s
motion for preliminary injunctive relief. In response, Defendant states, generally, that he
objects to this recommendation. As to irreparable injury, Defendant does not object to or
address the reasoning set forth in the Report for finding in Plaintiff’s favor on this factor.
(ECF No. 53 at 41-42.) Rather, Defendant repeats his argument that the sanctions Plaintiff
was subjected to had nothing to do with Plaintiff refusing to cut his beard or shave. (ECF
No. 57 at 13 (referencing Plaintiff’s search detail report and arguing that Plaintiff has not
shown that he has been subjected to punishments for refusing to follow the grooming
policy).)

17 This distinction is noteworthy as “‘[m]andatory preliminary injunctive relief in any circumstance is
disfavored[] and warranted only in the most extraordinary circumstances.’ Where a plaintiff seeks injunctive
relief that would disturb the status quo of a state-run prison, principles of federalism present an additional
obstacle.” Incumaa, 2021 WL 2291787, at *2 (quoting Taylor v. Freeman, 34 F.3d 266, 270 n.2 (4th Cir.
1994)) (internal citation omitted).

13

Having reviewed this portion of the Report and finding no clear error, the Court
agrees with and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s finding that Plaintiff has established this
factor. See Miller v. Marshall, 682 F. Supp. 3d 559, 591 (S.D.W. Va. 2023) (stating that
“such a Hobson’s choice [e.g., forcing a plaintiff to violate his religious belief or forgo
certain privileges] violates the First Amendment and RLUIPA” and finding that because
plaintiff “has shown a clear likelihood of a constitutional violation, he has shown
irreparable harm,” (citing Henry v. Greenville Airport Comm’n, 284 F.2d 631, 633 (4th Cir.
1960))).
Similarly, as to the “balance of equities” and “public interest” factors, Defendant
repeats his arguments that granting Plaintiff’s requested relief would create safety and
security concerns. (ECF No. 57 at 15.) Defendant also states that granting the requested
relief will open the door to other inmates requesting to grow a fist-length beard, such that
“SCDC will likely need more manpower, time, and funds . . . .” (Id.) Defendant then relies
on Rushton’s statement in his supplemental affidavit, discussed above, that Plaintiff’s
alternative suggestion is “not practical.” (Id. at 15-16.)
In the absence of a specific objection to the Report, the Court reviews this portion
of the Report for clear error and, having found none, the Court agrees with and adopts
the Magistrate Judge’s finding that the balance of harms to the parties and the public
interest tip in Plaintiff’s favor.
CONCLUSION
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, the Court adopts and specifically
incorporates the Magistrate Judge’s Report (ECF No. 53); overrules Defendant’s
objections (ECF No. 57); grants Plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction, enjoining

14

Defendant and any other SCDC personnel from enforcing the grooming policy against
Plaintiff; and grants in part and denies in part Defendant’s motion for summary
judgment, dismissing Plaintiffs’ First Amendment claim and allowing Plaintiff’s RLUIPA
claim to proceed. After consideration, the Court finds this case appropriate for mediation.
The Court hereby refers this matter to a United States Magistrate Judge for mediation. 18
If mediation is unsuccessful, the parties can proceed to trial on Plaintiff’s RLUIPA claim.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
/s/ Bruce Howe Hendricks
United States District Judge
March 11, 2025
Charleston, South Carolina

18 Upon referral, the magistrate judge can consider whether appointment of counsel may be appropriate in

this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1).

15