Regan v. Palmetto Prince George Operating LLC et al
Filing
77
ORDER denying 51 Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 53 Defendant Palmetto Prince's Motion for Summary Judgment; adopting 69 Report and Recommendations of Magistrate Judge Marchant. Signed by Honorable Richard M Gergel on 1/25/2012.(sshe, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
Catherine Powell Regan,
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Plaintiff,
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vs.
Civil Action No. 2:10-cv-181O-RMG
ORDER
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Palmetto Prince George Operating, LLC
d/b/a Prince George Healthcare Center, and
Millennium Management, LLC,
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Defendants.
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This matter comes before the Court on PlaintiW s and Defendant Palmetto Prince George
Operating, LLC d/b/a Prince George Healthcare Center's (hereafter "Palmetto Prince") motions
for summary judgment. Plaintiff brought this case alleging retaliation pursuant to Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et seq. Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28,
United States Code § 636(b)(l)(A), and the Local Rules, all pretrial matters in employment
discrimination cases are referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for consideration. Plaintiff
and Defendant Palmetto Prince have each filed motions for summary judgment. (Dkt. Nos. 51
and 53). The parties have filed responses and replies. (Dkt. Nos. 61, 63, 64, and 65). The
Magistrate Judge has issued a Report and Recommendation recommending that both motions for
summary judgment be denied. (Dkt. No. 69). The Magistrate Judge advised the parties of the
procedures and requirements for filing objections to the Report and Recommendation and the
consequences if they failed to do so.
The parties have not filed objections to the Report and
Recommendation. The Court agrees with the conclusion of the Report and Recommendation of
the Magistrate Judge for the reasons discussed herein and denies both motions for summary
judgment, as further explained below.
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Background
This is a Title VII action arising out of the employment relationship of Plaintiff, formerly
the Director of Human Resources at a nursing home facility operated by Palmetto Prince.
Plaintiff was supervised in some capacity by Mohamed Othman, the Administrator of the
facility, and Ronda Schmidt, who was Regional Human Resources Director, but employed by
another entity, Palmetto opeo, LLC. (Dkt. No. 63-4 at 6). Plaintiff alleges that after she learned
from employee Rosalyn Burgess that Othman was possibly having an affair with a receptionist
Danielle Guay, Plaintiff reported this to Schmidt, who advised her that "there is nothing we can
do unless Danielle reports it." (Dkt. No. 63-4 at 14, 17, 21). Plaintiff also alleges that Othman
called Burgess and "told her to keep her mouth shut" because "these rumors could cost him his
job." (Dkt. No. 63-4 at 16). Plaintiff thereafter learned that Kathleen Gilbride, a part-time
receptionist, had her hours reduced by Othman and was collecting unemployment benefits,
allegedly because Guay, the full-time receptionist, was returning from school.
Lisa Lopez, who was Human Resources Manager for Defendant Millennium
Management, a related company that contracted with Palmetto Prince to provide services,
contacted Plaintiff to discuss an unrelated matter. (Dkt. No. 63-4 at 26). According to evidence
presented by Plaintiff, Lopez would call Plaintiff with employee relations issues, payroll and
general human resources concerns from time to time. (Dkt. No. 63-4 at 10). Plaintiff reported
her concerns of a possible sexual harassment issue between Othman and Guay to Lopez and the
reduction of Gilbride's hours in favor of Guay. (Dkt. No. 53-4 at 1). Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff
was informed by Othman that she was suspended without a reason other than it was
"embarrassing". (Dkt. No. 63-4 at 31). The following day Plaintiff was terminated for "not
following chain of command" and "leaving property/assigned work area earlier than time
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allotted" on one occasion. (Dkt. No. 61-6 at 1).
Discussion
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation
has no presumptive weight, and responsibility for making a final determination remains with this
Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). This Court is charged with making a
de novo determination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific
objection is made, and this Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings
or recommendations made by the magistrate." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This Court may also
"receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate with instructions." Id. In the
absence of specific objections to the Report and Recommendation, this Court is not required to
give any explanation for adopting the recommendation. Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198 (4th Cir.
1983).
The Court shall grant summary judgment "if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to a judgment as a matter oflaw."
Fed.R.Civ.P.56(a). Accordingly, to prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant
must demonstrate that: (1) there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; and (2) that she is
entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. As to the first of these determinations, a fact is deemed
"material" if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under
applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986), All evidence is
viewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Perini Corp. v. Perini Construction,
Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 123 (4th Cir.1990).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the
district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
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317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party,
to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in her
pleadings. Rather, the nonmoving party must demonstrate that specific, material facts exist
which give rise to a genuine issue. Id. at 324. Conclusory allegations or denials, without more,
are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary judgment motion. Ross v.
Communications Satellite Corp., 759 F.2d 355, 365 (4th Cir. 1985).
Defendant Palmetto Prince argues that Plaintiff has failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies because her Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (hereafter "EEOC") charge
of discrimination only named Defendant Millennium and not Palmetto Prince. (Dkt. No. 53-1 at
5-6). As the Magistrate Judge points out, Plaintiff provided the contact information of both
Palmetto Prince and Millennium Management to the EEOC. (Dkt. No. 63-9). Further, on the
EEOC charge, Plaintiff listed her employer as "Millennium Management d/b/a Prince George
Healthcare Center." (Dkt. No. 63-10). While naming a party as a defendant in an EEOC charge
is generally a jurisdictional requirement to bringing suit, two exceptions are recognized,
including "where the party named in the complaint is for all practical purposes the same as the
party named in the EEOC charge" or "where the defendants were given some notice ofthe
EEOC violation, and thus, should have anticipated being named in the Title VII suit." Londeree
v. Crutchfield Corp., 68 F.Supp.2d 718, 724-25 (W.D.Va. 1999). In the instant case, there is
evidence that officials with Palmetto Prince had notice of the EEOC filings. (Dkt. No. 63-5 at
16-18). Thus, Palmetto Prince is not entitled to dismissal of Plaintiffs claims on this procedural
ground.
As to the merits of Plaintiffs claim, this Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge
correctly determined that various questions of fact remain and thus a denial of summary
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judgment is appropriate. Defendant alleges that Plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case
of retaliation because she was not engaged in protected activity. To establish a prima facie case
of retaliation, Plaintiff must show that "( 1) that she engaged in protected activity, (2) that an
adverse employment action was taken against her, and (3) that there was a causal link between
the protected activity and the adverse employment action." Laughlin v. Metropolitan
Washington Airports Authority, 149 F.3d 253, 258 (4th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff need only
"demonstrate a good faith, reasonable belief that the underlying challenged action violated the
law." Wentz v. Maryland Cas. Co., 869 F.2d 1153, 1155 (8th Cir. 1989).
Plaintifftestified that "I consider Rosalyn coming to me and telling me the information
that she knew or what she knew that the receptionist's schedule was rearranged and that she
thought that Mohamed and Danielle were having an affair, I consider her telling me that
specifically, calling me after work hours, a complaint." (Dkt. No. 63-4 at 38). Othman admitted
that Plaintiff had a duty to report all complaints of harassment and that Plaintiff would be
responsible for conducting a sexual harassment investigation. (Dkt. No. 52-4 at 26, 28). Othman
testified that he had no reason to believe that Plaintiff was not making this report in good faith.
(Dkt. No. 63-5 at 15). Schmidt also testified that Lopez was a resource that Plaintiff could use
when she had EEOC questions. (Dkt. No. 52-6 at 5-6). Viewing the evidence in a light most
favorable to Plaintiff, this Court concludes that Plaintiff could have had a good faith, reasonable
beliefthat sexual harassment was taking place and that another employee was adversely affected
because of it. See Richey v. City ofIndependence, 540 F.3d 779, 785 (8th Cir. 2008)("The jury
must decide whether the employer took the adverse action because of a good faith belief that the
employee made false accusations (in which case there is no liability ...or because the employee
opposed unlawful activity (in which case the employer's conduct would violate Title VII ....)").
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The Magistrate Judge also correctly concluded that there is a question of fact as to
whether Plaintiff's actions were reasonable and thus Plaintiff is not entitled to summary
judgment. The Supreme Court has held that the "gravamen of any sexual harassment claim is
that the alleged sexual advances are 'unwelcome'" and reasoned that "[w]hether particular
conduct was indeed unwelcome presents difficult problems of proof and turns largely on
credibility determinations committed to the trier of fact." Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477
U.S. 57,68 (1986). Schmidt testified that Plaintiff did not have any reason to believe the rumor.
(Dkt. No. 61-2 at 11). Burgess testified that she and Guay were joking with each other about
Othman and that may have been how the rumor got started. (Dkt. No. 61-1 at 2-5). Guay never
indicated to Plaintiff that she was being sexually harassed and there is no evidence that Plaintiff
spoke to Guay about it. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the Defendant,
Plaintiff is also not entitled to summary judgment.
Defendant Palmetto Prince asserts as part of its argument for summary judgment that it
has put forth a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Plaintiffs termination. The Fourth
Circuit has made clear that a plaintiff can survive a motion for summary judgment in one of two
ways. First, the plaintiff can offer "direct or circumstantial evidence that raises a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether an impermissible factor ...motivated the employer's adverse
decision." Diamond v. Colonial Life and Accident Insurance Company, 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th
Cir. 2005). Second, the plaintiff can use the pretext framework set forth in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), which includes the establishment of a prima Jacie case.
Diamond, 416 F.3d at 318. As the Fourth Circuit has noted, "[i]n the event that a plaintiff has
direct evidence of discrimination or simply prefers to proceed without the benefit of the burden
shifting framework, she is under no obligation to make out a prima facie case." Id at 318, n. 4.
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In her Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff argues that she
does not need to resort to the burden-shifting scheme embodied in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green because "where a plaintiff in a disparate treatment case has direct evidence of an illicit
motive by the employer...[the McDonnell Douglas scheme] is not applicable." (Dkt. No. 63 at
20). The Fourth Circuit has noted that such direct evidence requires "evidence of conduct or
statements that both reflect directly the allegedly discriminatory attitude and that bear directly on
the contested employment decision." Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Services, 181 F.3d 544, 553
(4th Cir. 1999). Specifically Plaintiff argues that this direct evidence is embodied in "the
discharge decision itself, the timing of the decision, and Defendant's explanation." (Dkt. No. 63
at 20). Plaintiff argues that she was fired the day after telling Lopez about her concerns and
asking for advice. (Dkt. No. 63 at 21). Schmidt, who directed Othman to suspend Plaintiff,
testified that it was for an "embarrassing" reason and that she "would discuss it with him in the
morning face-to-face." (Dkt. No. 63-3 at 3). Plaintiff also testified that Othman told her that the
reason for her suspension was "embarrassing" and would not tell her why she was being
suspended. (Dkt. No. 63-4 at 31). There is testimony that Othman called Burgess on her cell
phone and told her to keep her mouth shut because those rumors could cost him his job. (Dkt.
No. 63-4 at 16). Othman testified that he terminated Plaintiff "[b]ecause she went outside our
company to report the sexual harassment." (Dkt. No. 63-5 at 12). Because Plaintiff has offered
sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment with direct or circumstantial evidence of
retaliation, Plaintiff need not demonstrate the presence of a prima facie case under the
McDonnell Douglas burden shifting standard and this Court need not engage in the burden
shifting analysis.
Conclusion
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Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt.
No. 51) and DENIES Defendant Palmetto Prince's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No.
53).
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
Richard Mark Gergel
United States District Court Judge
January 2S:-: 2012
Charleston, South Carolina
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