Lydia v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration

Filing 28

ORDER denying 24 Motion for Attorney's Fees. Signed by Honorable David C Norton on 6/24/13. (juwo)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
FREIDA LYDIA,
Plaintiff,
vs.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant.

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No. 2:11-cv-01453-DCN

ORDER

This matter is before the court on plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees pursuant to
the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Plaintiff requests $4,992.19 in attorney’s fees
on the ground that she is a prevailing party under the EAJA. Defendant contests the
awarding of such fees, asserting the government’s position was substantially justified.
The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) issued a decision on March 19, 2009
denying plaintiff’s application for disability benefits. The Appeals Council denied
review, rendering the ALJ’s decision that of the Commissioner of Social Security.
Plaintiff filed a complaint before this court on June 14, 2011, seeking review of the
Commissioner’s decision.
The matter was referred to the magistrate judge, who found in a Report &
Recommendation (R&R) that the Commissioner’s decision should be reversed and
remanded for further proceedings. Neither party filed objections to the R&R.1 On

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In this District, the government’s decision not to object to the magistrate judge’s
R&R does not serve as an admission that its position was not substantially justified.
Cruell v. Colvin, No. 11-2847, 2013 WL 2423127, at *2 (D.S.C. June 4, 2013).
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August 13, 2012, this court issued an order affirming the R&R, reversing the
Commissioner’s decision, and remanding for further proceedings.
Under the EAJA, a court shall award reasonable fees and expenses to a prevailing
party in certain civil actions against the United States unless the government’s position
was substantially justified or special circumstances render an award unjust. 28 U.S.C. §
2412(d)(1)(A). Because this court remanded to the ALJ pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),
Lydia is considered the “prevailing party.” See Shalala v. Schaefer, 509 U.S. 292, 302
(1993). The government has the burden of proving that its position was substantially
justified. Crawford v. Sullivan, 935 F.2d 655, 658 (4th Cir. 1991). Evaluating whether
the government’s position was substantially justified is not an “issue-by-issue analysis”
but an examination of the “totality of circumstances.” Roanoke River Basin Ass’n v.
Hudson, 991 F.2d 132, 139 (4th Cir. 1993); see also Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
437 (1983) (“A request for attorney’s fees should not result in a second major
litigation.”).
“The government’s position must be substantially justified in both fact and law.”
Thompson v. Sullivan, 980 F.2d 280, 281 (4th Cir. 1992). Substantially justified does not
mean “justified to a high degree, but rather justified in substance or in the main—that is,
justified to a degree that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Pierce v. Underwood, 487
U.S. 552, 565 (1988) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“The government’s non-acquiescence in the law of the circuit entitles the claimant
to recover attorney’s fees.” Crawford, 935 F.2d at 658. “Where the government’s
position was a result of its failure to perform a certain analysis required by the law and its

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regulations, the government’s position was not substantially justified.” Adams v.
Barnhart, 445 F. Supp. 2d 593, 595 (D.S.C. 2006).
Here, the ALJ decided to give “little weight” to the opinions of an examining
physician, Dr. Ruffing. Tr. 20. The ALJ found Dr. Ruffing’s opinions were inconsistent
with the substantive evidence of record, which in the ALJ’s view showed that Lydia
improved with treatment and was not fully compliant with treatment. Id. In the end, the
ALJ agreed that Lydia “is certainly limited by her depression and anxiety, but she is not
as limited as Dr. Ruffing describes.” Id.
Upon review, the magistrate judge found that the ALJ failed to offer a
“reviewable explanation” because he “did not explain his rationale” and the explanation
he did provide was “too general on its face.” R&R 14. For this reason, the magistrate
judge, and this court, could not conclude whether the ALJ’s decision was supported by
substantial evidence.2
Although the court ultimately held that the ALJ did not sufficiently articulate her
reasoning, the government’s position in support of the ALJ’s decision had a “basis both
in law and fact that could satisfy a reasonable person.” Hurell v. Barnhart, 444 F. Supp.
2d 574, 577 (D.S.C. 2006). On the whole, the court finds that the government has met its
burden of showing that its position was substantially justified. See Hudson, 991 F.2d at
139 (determination of whether government’s position was substantially jusitified is not an
“issue-by-issue analysis” but an examination of the “totality of the circumstances”);
Hurrell, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 577 (finding government’s position was substantially justified
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This was the sole basis for recommending remand of the ALJ’s decision. This
court affirmed the ALJ’s decision with respect to plaintiff’s three other assignments of
error, finding that the ALJ’s decision on each issue was supported by substantial
evidence.
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even though ALJ’s reasoning was incomplete and failed to adequately explain his
rationale).
Therefore, the court DENIES plaintiff’s motion for attorney’s fees and expenses
under the EAJA.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

_________________________________
DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
June 24, 2013
Charleston, South Carolina

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