Mayhew et al v. South Carolina Stevedores Association et al

Filing 29

ORDER denying 26 Motion for Reconsideration Signed by Honorable Patrick Michael Duffy on July 23, 2012.(prei, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
John R. Mayhew,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
ILA Local 1771 (Clerks & Checkers),
)
South Carolina Stevedores Association,
)
Ceres Marine Terminals, APM Terminals, )
Ports America Stevedoring Contract Co.,
)
SSA/Cooper Stevedoring Co., and
)
Charleston Gate, LLC,
)
)
Defendants.
)
____________________________________)

Civil Action No.: 2:11-03226-PMD

ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider this Court’s Order

denying Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to Amend its complaint. For the reasons that follow, the
Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Reconsider.
In an Order dated June 25, 2012, this Court held that Plaintiff’s union did not act
irrationally or in reckless disregard of the rights of its members when it entered into the
Agreement in light of the transitions facing the Port and its workers. Because of the long term
changes that were going to be made, the union decided to enter into the Agreement to not only
address and re-establish the employment rights of its members performing the TIR function for
the common user facilities, but to set parameters for the protection of all of its members’ rights in
the face of future changes.1 A union has vast discretion to negotiate new contracts, and the Court

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For example, the Agreement states: “All future modification in ILA hiring practices or work
responsibility must be mutually agreed upon by the direct employers and the ILA. The building
of a new container terminal in Charleston with the addition of significant volumes will produce a
need to negotiate manning requirements . . . the ILA, reserves the right to renegotiate a new TOS
[Terminal Operating System] manning agreement.” June Agreement ¶ 9.
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is not to substitute its own view of the proper bargain for that reached by the union. The Court
found that the failure by the union to specifically provide for location/yardwork jobs in the
Agreement did not rise to the level of irrational behavior in light of the entire factual landscape at
the time the union entered the Agreement. Furthermore, Plaintiff did not dispute that the June
Agreement was ratified by a unanimous vote of the union membership at the June 15, 2010
membership meeting nor did he dispute that he failed to attend that meeting. Accordingly, the
Court concluded that the union’s decision to enter into the Agreement was not arbitrary.
The Court also held that the union did not act discriminatorily or in bad faith. The facts
indicated that because of the plans to implement a new operating system, along with technology
updates, to make the Port more competitive, the SCSPA and the ILA decided to enter into the
Agreement to establish and clarify each party’s rights in the long run. Plaintiff failed to provide
facts indicating deception, specifically that the jobs at issue were now being performed by nonunion members, or that the union had an improper motive or intent upon entering the Agreement.
See Spellacy, 156 F.3d at 126 (“Judicial review of union action [] ‘must be highly deferential,
recognizing the wide latitude that [unions] need for the effective performance of their bargaining
responsibilities.’” (citing Gvozdenovic v. United Air Lines, Inc., 933 F.2d 1100, 1106 (2d Cir.
1991))). Therefore, because Plaintiff’s Second Amended Complaint failed to allege sufficient
facts to plausibly support a hybrid claim, the Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to
Amend since such an amendment would have been futile.
Plaintiff now argues that this Court’s Order was in error and moves for the
reconsideration of its judgment. Reconsideration of a judgment is an extraordinary remedy
which should be used sparingly. Pacific Ins. Co. v. American Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396,
403 (4th Cir. 1998).

A motion to reconsider may be granted for three reasons: (1) to

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accommodate an intervening change in controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not
available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear error of law or a manifest injustice. Id. Motions to
reconsider may not be used to initiate arguments or legal theories that the proponent had the
ability to address prior to the judgment. Id. Plaintiff claims that reconsideration of the Court’s
Order is necessary based upon newly-discovered evidence that was not available to Plaintiff until
after the close of briefing on Defendants’ motions. The evidence consists of: (1) Exh. A - an
affidavit of the Plaintiff (John Robert Mayhew); (2) Exh. B - Molly Parker, “Maersk signs deal
to stay in Charleston until 2014,” Charleston Regional Business Journal, October 22, 2009; and
(3) Exh. C - Molly Parker, “Maersk Line pulling out of Port of Charleston,” Charleston Regional
Business Journal, December 18, 2008. Plaintiff brings Exhibits A, B, and C to the attention of
the Court in order to demonstration that Maersk and the SCSPA reached an agreement on or
before October 22, 2009, which compelled Maersk to remain in the Port of Charleston until
2012. Plaintiff argues that this new evidence warrants reconsideration of the Court’s decision
because the Court based its decision upon Defendant Local 1771’s argument that “Local 1771
entered into [the Agreement] in order to keep Maersk, the Port of Charleston’s largest customer,
from leaving the Port of Charleston and taking with it a substantial amount of business from the
area.” Pl.’s Mot. Reconsider at 3.
It is first worth noting that Defendant Local 1771 does not put forth this argument in any
of its motions or briefs. But, more importantly, Plaintiff incorrectly concludes that this argument
was relied upon by the Court in making its ruling. The Court did take into consideration the
factual landscape leading up to the union’s decision to enter into the Agreement, such as the
transitions facing the Port and its workers as discussed and referenced in the Agreement. “[A]
union’s actions are arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the

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union’s actions, the union’s behavior is so far outside a ‘wide range of reasonableness,’ as to be
irrational.” Air Line Pilots v. O’Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991). The Court found that based upon
the entire factual landscape, it was reasonable for the union to enter into an Agreement with the
SCSPA to address and re-establish the employment rights of its members performing the TIR
function for the common user facilities and to set the parameters for the protection of all of its
members’ rights in the face of new changes. The Court also acknowledged that the Agreement
did not specifically provide for location/yardwork jobs, however, it held that this fact alone does
not create the inference that the union’s decision to enter into the Agreement was wholly
unreasonable, discriminatory, or deceitful. Its decision, however, was not based on Defendant
Local 1771’s argument or inference (according to Plaintiff) that the Agreement was necessary to
keep Maersk’s business at the Charleston Port. Because Plaintiff’s newly discovered evidence
disputes an argument not relied upon by the Court, the evidence does not alter the contours of the
case or compel reconsideration of the Court’s prior decision. Therefore, Plaintiff’s Motion to
Reconsider is denied.
CONCLUSION
It is hereby ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

July 23, 2012
Charleston, SC

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