Youmans v. North Charleston, City of et al
Filing
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ORDER granting in part and denying in part 86 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings; adopting in part 116 Report and Recommendation. Plaintiff's alternative motion for leave to file a second amended complaint 93 is denied. Signed by Honorable David C. Norton on 03/06/2014. (gcle, 3/6/14)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
MILTON L. YOUMANS,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CITY OF NORTH CHARLESTON,
Defendant.
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No. 2:11-cv-3227-DCN
ORDER
This matter is before the court on a report and recommendation (“R&R”) issued
by United States Magistrate Judge Bruce Howe Hendricks. The magistrate judge
recommends that the court deny defendant’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. For
the reasons that follow, the court adopts in part the R&R, and grants in part and denies in
part the motion for judgment on the pleadings. The court also denies plaintiff’s motion to
file an amended complaint.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual History
As is required on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the court construes the
facts of this case in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. As a result, the
following facts are drawn from plaintiff Milton L. Youmans’s (“Youmans”) amended
complaint unless otherwise noted.
Youmans was an employed by defendant, the City of North Charleston (“the
City”), in the City’s Code Enforcement Division. See Answer ¶ II.A.1. On August 5,
2009, Youmans’s supervisors required him to complete a personal improvement plan.
From September 2009 through December 2009, Youmans’s supervisors repeatedly made
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negative comments about his performance, despite the fact that he met his performance
goals.
In May 2010, Youmans’s supervisors told him that he had failed to close out the
proper number of cases. Youmans’s supervisors later admitted that this was an error, as
Youmans had actually exceeded his targets for closed cases. Youmans’s supervisors
continued to improperly report his performance on his monthly reports.
In October 2010, Youmans was assigned to weekend work duty. This assignment
was Youmans’s fifth weekend of work duty for the year; other officers in his position
were only assigned four weekends of work duty per year. On Saturday, October 23,
2010, Youmans tasked with supervising five community service workers as they cleaned
up roadside areas in North Charleston. After dropping the volunteers in two separate
locations on Rivers Avenue, Youmans left the area to deliver a ticket for a coworker.
Youmans returned to the area after 2:00 p.m., at which point several of the community
service workers had already left for the day.
On November 2, 2010, the City discharged Youmans. The City stated that
Youmans was discharged for his failure to properly supervise the community service
workers on October 23, 2010.
B. Procedural History
Youmans, appearing pro se, filed his complaint in this court on November 28,
2011. On June 18, 2012, Youmans amended his complaint at the direction of the
magistrate judge.
On May 16, 2013, the City filed the instant motion for judgment on the pleadings,
arguing that the amended complaint failed to state either a hostile work environment
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claim or a discriminatory discharge claim under Title VII. On June 25, 2013, Youmans
opposed the City’s motion and, in the alternative, sought leave to file a second amended
complaint.
On December 31, 2013, the magistrate judge issued the R&R, in which she
recommended denying the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The City
objected to the R&R on January 16, 2014. Youmans has not responded to the R&R or to
the City’s objections. This matter is now ripe for the court’s review.
II. STANDARDS
The court is charged with conducting a de novo review of any portion of the R&R
to which specific, written objections are made, and may accept, reject, or modify, in
whole or in part, the recommendations contained in that report. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The magistrate judge’s recommendation does not carry presumptive weight, and it is the
responsibility of the court to make a final determination. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S.
261, 270-71 (1976). A party’s failure to object may be treated as agreement with the
conclusions of the magistrate judge. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) provides that “[a]fter the pleadings are
closed--but early enough not to delay trial--a party may move for judgment on the
pleadings.” Courts follow “a fairly restrictive standard” in ruling on 12(c) motions, as
“hasty or imprudent use of this summary procedure by the courts violates the policy in
favor of ensuring to each litigant a full and fair hearing on the merits of his or her claim
or defense.” 5C Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1368 (3d ed. 2011). Ultimately, “a defendant may not prevail on a motion for judgment
on the pleadings if there are pleadings that, if proved, would permit recovery for the
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plaintiff.” BET Plant Servs., Inc. v. W.D. Robinson Elec. Co., 941 F. Supp. 54, 55
(D.S.C. 1996).
“[A] Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings is decided under the same
standard as a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).” Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v.
IRS, 361 F. App’x 527, 529 (4th Cir. 2010); see Burbach Broad. Co. v. Elkins Radio, 278
F.3d 401, 405 (4th Cir. 2002). Thus, in order to survive a motion for judgment on the
pleadings, the complaint must contain sufficient facts “to raise a right to relief above the
speculative level” and “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp.
v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 570 (2007). In reviewing the complaint, the court
accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true and construes the facts and reasonable
inferences derived therefrom in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Venkatraman v.
REI Sys., Inc., 417 F.3d 418, 420 (4th Cir. 2005). “When there are well-pleaded factual
allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they
plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950
(2009).
III. DISCUSSION
The R&R recommends that the court deny the City’s motion for judgment on the
pleadings with respect to both Youmans’s hostile work environment and discriminatory
discharge claims. Neither party objects to the magistrate judge’s recommendation
regarding Youmans’s discriminatory discharge claim. The court has also reviewed the
R&R and finds no clear error on the face of the record. As a result, the court accepts the
R&R to the extent that it recommends denying judgment on the pleadings with respect to
Youmans’s discriminatory discharge claim. What remains to be considered are the City’s
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arguments regarding Youmans’s hostile work environment claim and his motion to
amend the complaint.
A. Youmans’s Hostile Work Environment Claim
The City contends that Youmans’s hostile work environment claim must fail
because he failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. “In order to pursue [any] Title
VII claim, a plaintiff must first file an administrative charge with the EEOC.” Gilliam v.
S. Carolina Dep’t Of Juvenile Justice, 474 F.3d 134, 139 (4th Cir. 2007) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(e)). “Even after a plaintiff has exhausted his administrative remedies, the
administrative framework plays a substantial role in focusing the formal litigation it
precedes.” Chacko v. Patuxent Inst., 429 F.3d 505, 509 (4th Cir. 2005). If “the claims
raised under Title VII exceed the scope of the EEOC charge and any charges that would
naturally have arisen from an investigation thereof, they are procedurally barred.”
Dennis v. Cnty. of Fairfax, 55 F.3d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 1995). As the Fourth Circuit has
explained, “the allegation of a discrete act or acts in an administrative charge is
insufficient when the plaintiff subsequently alleges a broader pattern of misconduct.”
Chacko, 429 F.3d at 509 (finding that a plaintiff’s administrative charges, which
referenced specific acts of supervisor discrimination, could not support later claims of
continuous name-calling harassment by coworkers).
In this case, Youmans filed a charge of discrimination with the South Carolina
Human Affairs Commission on March 23, 2011. Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. for J. on Pleadings
Ex. 1 at 12. In his charge, Youmans alleged that the earliest date that discrimination took
place was November 2, 2010 and that the latest date that discrimination took place was
November 2, 2010. Id. He did not check the box on the charge form that states that the
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discrimination is a continuing action. Id. In its entirety, Youmans’s administrative
charge states:
I. PERSONAL HARM: I was discharged from my employment on
November 2, 2010.
II. RESPONDENT’S REASON (S) FOR ADVERSE ACTION (S):
Deficiencies in work performance.
III. COMPLAINANT’S CONTENTION (S): I was falsely accused of an
incident which I deny. I am aware of a similarly situated white
employee that violated company policy, yet he was not discharged for
his offenses.
IV. DISCRIMINATION STATEMENT: I therefore believe that I have
been discriminated against on the basis of my race (black) in violation
of the SC Human Affairs Law, as amended, and Title VII of the US
Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended.
Id.
A plain reading of Youmans’s administrative charge shows that he alleged a
single incident of discrimination. His charge does not allege any continuing
discriminatory actions, and does not describe any discrimination that he suffered other
than his termination on November 2, 2010. As a result, a reasonable investigation of
Youmans’s charge would not have revealed the hostile work environment about which
Youmans now complains. Youmans’s hostile work environment claim is procedurally
barred. See Chacko, 429 F.3d at 511-12; Govan v. Caterpillar, Inc., 899 F. Supp. 2d 445,
457 (D.S.C. 2012) (holding that an administrative charge alleging discriminatory
discharge could not support a hostile work environment claim).
Because Youmans’s hostile work environment claim is procedurally barred, the
court need not consider whether that claim has been sufficiently pleaded. The City is
entitled to judgment on the pleadings with respect to the hostile work environment claim.
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B. Youmans’s Motion to File a Second Amended Complaint
Finally, Youmans moved for leave to file a second amended complaint “pursuant
to Rule 15(a) to conform to the discovery.” Pl.’s Opp’n at 11.
Rule 15(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that courts should
freely give plaintiffs leave to amend their complaints when justice so requires. In this
case, Youmans appears to seek leave to amend his complaint so that he may provide
more detail regarding his hostile work environment claim. Pl.’s Opp’n at 12. As the
court has already found that this claim is procedurally barred, amendment of Youmans’s
complaint would be futile. Justice does not require the court to allow Youmans to further
amend a claim that is procedurally barred.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court ADOPTS IN PART the magistrate judge’s
R&R, ECF No. 116, and GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the City’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings, ECF No. 86. The court GRANTS the City’s
motion for judgment on the pleadings as to Youmans’s Title VII hostile work
environment claim. The court DENIES judgment on the pleadings as to Youmans’s Title
VII discriminatory discharge claim. The court also DENIES Youmans’s motion to
amend his complaint, as the amendment he proposes would be futile.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
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DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
March 6, 2014
Charleston, South Carolina
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