CresCom Bank v. Terry et al

Filing 27

ORDER denying 20 Motion for Reconsideration Signed by Honorable Patrick Michael Duffy on September 26, 2012.(kspa, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION

CresCom Bank, successor by merger to
Community FirstBank

)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
Edward L. Terry, Harris Street, LLC, n/k/a )
CCT Reserve, LLC; Sugarloaf Marketplace, )
LLC; and CCT Reserve, LLC
)
)
Defendants.
)
____________________________________)

Case No.: 2:12-cv-00063-PMD
ORDER

This matter is before the Court upon Defendant Edward L. Terry’s (“Terry”) Motion to
Alter, Amend, or Reconsider (“Motion to Amend”) the Court’s Order of July 31, 2012 (“Order”).
In the Order, the Court denied Terry’s Motion to Dismiss or Transfer Venue. The Court held
that Plaintiff had established a prima facie showing of a jurisdictional basis over Terry. After
reviewing the Order, the Court denies Terry’s Motion to Amend.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Reconsideration of a judgment is an extraordinary remedy that should be used sparingly.
Pac. Ins. Co. v. Am. Nat. Fire Ins. Co., 148 F.3d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1998). A motion to alter or
amend a judgment may be granted for only three reasons: (1) to follow an intervening change in
controlling law; (2) to account for new evidence not available at trial; or (3) to correct a clear
error of law or prevent manifest injustice. Id. “Rule 59(e) permits a court to alter or amend a
judgment, but it may not be used to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present

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evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v.
Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (internal quotation omitted).
ANALYSIS
Although Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges that each contract at issue in this case was
executed in South Carolina, Terry swore in his affidavit that he executed the guaranty contracts
in Georgia. Terry argues that because he contradicted Plaintiff’s allegations in his affidavit,
Plaintiff had the burden to present an affidavit or other evidence that the guaranty agreements
were executed in South Carolina. Terry further contends that Plaintiff failed to present such
evidence, and thus “the Court clearly erred by finding that the guaranty agreements were
executed in South Carolina.” Terry’s Mot. to Am. 3. According to Terry, “the uncontroverted
evidence shows that [he] signed the guaranty agreements in Georgia, which makes a compelling
case that he purposefully availed himself of the benefits and protections of Georgia—not South
Carolina—law.” Id. at 5.
The Court disagrees with Terry’s contention that Plaintiff failed to present evidence,
beyond the pleadings, that the guaranty agreements were executed in South Carolina.

As

explained in the Order, Plaintiff filed copies of “guaranty contracts . . . captioned ‘Charleston,
SC,’ and nowhere on the contracts did anyone note that [the agreements] were being executed
anywhere other than South Carolina.”

Order 9, July 31, 2012.

Thus, Plaintiff presented

evidence—the guaranty agreements captioned “Charleston, SC”—that controverts Terry’s
affidavit swearing that he executed the agreements in Georgia.
In determining the existence of personal jurisdiction, this Court “must draw all
reasonable inferences from both parties’ pleadings, even if they conflict, in the plaintiff’s favor.”
Tetrev v. Pride Intern., Inc., 465 F. Supp. 2d 555, 558 (D.S.C. 2006) (citing Meier ex rel. Meier

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v. Sun Intern. Hote Ltd., 28 F.3d 126 1269 (1 1th Cir. 20
I
els,
88
64,
002) (“Wher the plain
re
ntiff’s
complain and supp
nt
porting evide
ence conflic with the defendant’s affidavits, the court must
ct
s
,
construe all reasonab inference in favor of the plainti
ble
es
o
iff.”)). Beca
ause the Cou properly drew
urt
all reasonable infere
ences regard
ding jurisdic
ctional facts in Plaintiff favor, the was no clear
f’s
ere
error of law.1 Accord
l
dingly, the Court denies Defendant T
C
Terry’s Mot
tion to Amen
nd.
CON
NCLUSION
For the foreg
going reason it is OR
ns,
RDERED th Defenda Terry’s M
hat
ant
Motion to A
Alter,

Amend, or Reconside is DENIE
o
er
ED.

Septemb 26, 2012
ber
2
Charlest
ton, SC 

1

The Cou similarly fin no clear err of law in th Order’s appl
urt
nds
ror
he
lication of the “
“corporate shie doctrine” o in
eld
or
the inferen
nces drawn in favor of Plaintiff regarding Te
f
erry’s meetings and conversa
s
ations with Plai
intiff.

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