Bahringer v. ADT Security Services Inc

Filing 52

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 43 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable David C Norton on 04/29/2013. (gcle, 4/29/13)

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
THOMAS A. BAHRINGER,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ADT SECURITY SERVICES, INC.,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

No. 2:12-cv-1473-DCN

ORDER

This matter is before the court on a motion for summary judgment brought by
defendant ADT Security Services, Inc. (“ADT”). For the reasons that follow, the court
grants in part and denies in part ADT’s motion.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 26, 2012, plaintiff Thomas Bahringer filed a civil complaint against
ADT in the Court of Common Pleas for Charleston County. ADT removed the action to
this court on June 4, 2012, on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. ADT moved to dismiss
Bahringer’s complaint on June 11, 2012, and Bahringer amended his complaint shortly
thereafter. Bahringer’s amended complaint alleges four causes of action against ADT:
negligence, breach of contract, unfair trade practices under the South Carolina Unfair
Trade Practices Act (“SCUTPA”), and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 14-31. All of Bahringer’s claims relate to a house fire that went undetected by
ADT, his alarm services provider. Id. ¶¶ 6-8.
Bahringer is significantly handicapped and is confined to a wheelchair. Id. ¶ 4.
On or around April 2, 2010, Bahringer purchased a security system and monitoring
services from ADT. Id. At the time of purchase, Bahringer signed an alarm services
1

contract with ADT’s authorized dealer, Securewatch. Id.; Def.’s Mot. for J. on the
Pleadings Ex. A. On July 9, 2011, Bahringer’s home was partially destroyed by a fire.
Am. Compl. ¶ 6. Bahringer was rescued by neighbors, but suffered smoke inhalation
injuries that required “two weeks of hospitalization and treatment.” Id. ¶ 7. Bahringer
alleges that his ADT-monitored smoke detectors failed to alert either him or ADT to the
fire; indeed, ADT was unaware of the fire until Bahringer notified them after the fact. Id.
¶¶ 6-8. ADT did not receive any signals from the smoke detectors in Bahringer’s house
on the night of the fire. Def.’s Reply in Support of Mot. for Summ. J. Exs. B, C, D.
ADT timely answered the amended complaint. On October 26, 2012, ADT
moved for motion for judgment on the pleadings. Because the parties referenced
important documents that were not attached to the pleadings, the court converted the
motion into one for summary judgment and allowed time for additional briefing. ADT
filed the instant motion for summary judgment on February 4, 2013, and Bahringer
opposed the motion on February 18, 2013. A hearing was held on March 27, 2013, and
the matter is now ripe for the court’s review.
II. STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “[S]ummary judgment will
not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. “[A]t the summary

2

judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine
the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at
249. The court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 255.
III. DISCUSSION
ADT contends that judgment must be granted in its favor on all four causes of
action included in the amended complaint.
A. First Cause of Action – Negligence
ADT argues that Bahringer’s negligence claim must fail because ADT did not
owe Bahringer any duty independent of the duties owed under the alarm services
contract. Bahringer counters that a special relationship existed between the parties – and
therefore an extra-contractual duty was owed – because he is a wheelchair-bound double
amputee. At the very least, Bahringer argues, whether such a special relationship exists
is a factual question that must be resolved at trial.
As an initial matter, the court notes that the question of whether a special
relationship existed between Bahringer and ADT is not a factual one. The parties agree
that Bahringer is paraplegic, and that he contracted with ADT for its alarm services.
What must be determined is whether ADT’s obligations to Bahringer constitute a “special
relationship” under South Carolina law. That is a legal question reserved for the court.
Generally, under South Carolina law,
[A] negligence action will not lie when the parties are in privity of
contract. When, however, there is a special relationship between the
alleged tortfeasor and the injured party not arising in contract, the breach
of that duty of care will support a tort action.

3

Tommy L. Griffin Plumbing & Heating Co. v. Jordan, Jones & Goulding, Inc., 463
S.E.2d 85, 88 (S.C. 1995). Examples of such special relationships include those between
design professionals and general contractors who work under their supervision, id. at 89
(contractors could maintain negligence action against engineer who supervised them),
between lawyers and their clients, Lloyd v. Walters, 277 S.E.2d 888, 889 (S.C. 1981)
(corporation could maintain negligence action against lawyer who had a professional
duty to protect its interests), and between corporate consultants and a state agency that is
the subject of a report prepared by those consultants. S.C. State Ports Auth. v. BoozAllen & Hamilton, Inc., 346 S.E.2d 324, 326 (S.C. 1986) (state agency could maintain
negligence action against corporate consultant when the consultant “undertakes to
objectively analyze and compare the attributes of commercial competitors for the purpose
of giving one a market advantage over the other”). “A buyer-seller relationship does not
constitute a ‘special relationship . . . .’” Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. v. Honeywell, Inc., 966 F.
Supp. 1401, 1414 (D.S.C. 1996), aff'd,113 F.3d 1232 (4th Cir. 1997).
In the examples above, the South Carolina Supreme Court has found a special
relationship where the parties’ relationship was one marked by professional duty, as in
Lloyd or Booz-Allen & Hamilton, or by supervisor-supervisee relations, as in Tommy L.
Griffin Plumbing. Bahringer’s relationship with ADT does not fit into either of these
categories. Moreover, other courts that have considered the issue have determined that a
tort claim does not lie where an alarm services provider owes a contractual duty to
monitor a plaintiff’s premises. See, e.g., Spengler v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., 505 F.3d
456, 458 (6th Cir. 2007) (negligence claim for failure to properly dispatch an ambulance
failed where the parties’ relationship was governed by contract); Vigilant Ins. Co. v. ADT

4

Sec. Servs., Inc., No. 10-cv-3066, 2011 WL 855874, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2011)
(negligence claim for alarm system’s failure to detect a fire failed because parties’
relationship was governed by a contract).
The amended complaint alleges that ADT acted negligently by installing an alarm
system that did not function properly, improperly installing and monitoring the alarm
system, and failing to take proper action at the first sign that a fire had started in Mr.
Bahringer’s home. These allegations are all thinly veiled breach of contract claims which
cannot stand as a separate negligence claim. See Seebaldt v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan
Ass’n, 239 S.E.2d 726, 727 (S.C. 1977) (“Bare allegations of negligence cannot convert a
breach of contract action into an action in tort.”); Koontz v. Thomas, 511 S.E.2d 407, 412
(S.C. Ct. App. 1999) (“[Plaintiff’s] tort allegations are merely veiled breach of contract
claims and . . . cannot be maintained as a separate cause of action.”).
Bahringer has not explained how or why ADT’s duties to him may be any
different than they would be to an able-bodied customer. Because the court finds that no
special relationship existed between the parties, Bahringer’s negligence claim fails.
B. Second Cause of Action – Breach of Contract
ADT contends that it did not breach its alarm services contract with Bahringer
and that any relief offered to Bahringer must be capped by the liability limitations
included in the contract.
The parties have not offered explanations as to how and why Bahringer’s alarm
system malfunctioned. As a result, questions of material fact persist as to whether ADT
breached the alarm services contract with Bahringer and summary judgment is
inappropriate. However, the contract clearly limits ADT’s liability for any breach that it

5

may have committed, and the court holds that ADT’s liability is limited to $500, the
amount identified in the alarm services contract.
South Carolina courts have generally upheld exculpatory contracts. However,
contracts that seek to exculpate a party from liability for its own negligence are strictly
construed against the party relying thereon. McCune v. Myrtle Beach Indoor Shooting
Range, Inc., 612 S.E.2d 462, 465 (S.C. Ct. App. 2005) (citing Pride v. S. Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 138 S.E.2d 155, 157 (S.C. 1964)). “An exculpatory clause will never be construed
to exempt a party from liability for his own negligence ‘in the absence of explicit
language clearly indicating that such was the intent of the parties.’” McCune, 612 S.E.2d
at 465 (quoting S.C. Elec. & Gas Co. v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 322 S.E.2d 453, 458
(S.C. Ct. App. 1984)). While exculpatory clauses are strictly construed against the party
relying thereon, courts around the country have nevertheless upheld provisions of
contracts that limit the liability of alarm services providers. See, e.g., Jeannie’s Jewelers,
Inc. v. ADT Sec. Servs., Inc., No. 12-cv-0265, 2012 WL 1860319, at *5 (E.D. Va. May
22, 2012) (citing Gill v. Rollins Protective Servs. Co., 722 F.2d 55, 58-59 (4th Cir.
1983)); Leon’s Bakery, Inc. v. Grinnell Corp., 990 F.2d 44, 48 (2d Cir. 1993) (collecting
cases).
The ADT alarm services contract that Bahringer signed includes an exculpatory
clause that states:
6. . . . YOU AGREE THAT WE . . . ARE EXEMPT FROM LIABILITY
FOR ANY LOSS, DAMAGE, INJURY OR OTHER CONSEQUENCE
ARISING DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY FROM THE SERVICES
(INCLUDING INTERNET/WEBSITE SERVICES) WE PERFORM OR
THE SYSTEMS WE PROVIDE UNDER THIS CONTRACT. IF IT IS
DETERMINED THAT WE . . . ARE DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY
RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY SUCH LOSS, DAMAGE, INJURY OR
OTHER CONSEQUENCE, YOU AGREE THAT DAMAGES SHALL
6

BE LIMITED TO THE GREATER OF $500 OR 10% OF THE ANNUAL
SERVICE CHARGE YOU PAY UNDER THIS CONTRACT. THESE
AGREED UPON DAMAGES . . . ARE YOUR SOLE REMEDY NO
MATTER HOW THE LOSS, DAMAGE, INJURY OR OTHER
CONSEQUENCE IS CAUSED, EVEN IF CAUSED BY OUR
NEGLIGENCE, GROSS NEGLIGENCE, FAILURE TO PERFORM
DUTIES UNDER THIS CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, FAILURE
TO COMPLY WITH ANY APPLICABLE LAW, OR OTHER FAULT.
AT YOUR REQUEST, WE MAY ASSUME ADDITIONAL LIABILITY
BY ATTACHING AN AMENDMENT TO THIS CONTRACT
STATING THE EXTENT OF OUR ADDITIONAL LIABILITY AND
THE ADDITIONAL COST TO YOU. YOU AGREE THAT WE ARE
NOT AN INSURER EVEN IF WE ENTER INTO ANY SUCH
AMENDMENT.
Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. Ex. A, ¶ 6 (capitalization in original, font size not to scale). A
paragraph entitled EXCLUSIVE DAMAGES REMEDY immediately follows. It states:
“YOUR EXCLUSIVE DAMAGE AND LIABILITY REMEDIES ARE SET FORTH IN
PARAGRAPH 6 ABOVE. WE ARE NOT LIABLE TO YOU OR ANY OTHER
PERSON FOR ANY INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES.” Id. ¶ 7
(capitalization in original, font size not to scale).
The exculpatory clause is clearly worded and appears in all capital letters. The
court finds that the exculpatory clause clearly limits ADT’s liability and demonstrates
that such limitation was the intent of the parties. To hold otherwise would be to ignore
the teachings of South Carolina courts. See, e.g., Gladden v. Boykin, --- S.E.2d ---, 2013
WL 1223848, at *3 (S.C. Mar. 27, 2013) (noting that “the proper test is whether an
important clause was particularly inconspicuous, as if the drafter intended to obscure the
term,” and determining that a clause whose heading was printed in capital letters was not
inconspicuous); Wachovia Bank v. Blackburn, 716 S.E.2d 454, 458 (S.C. Ct. App. 2011)
(finding that waivers printed in stand-alone paragraphs with all capital letters and bold

7

headings are conspicuous and unambiguous).1 Bahringer’s argument that the exculpatory
clause is unenforceable because it was printed in small font is unavailing. Furthermore,
Bahringer’s decision not to read the contract, Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 8,
does not invalidate it. See Sims v. Tyler, 281 S.E.2d 229, 230 (S.C. 1981) (“One who is
capable of reading and understanding but fails to read a contract before signing is bound
by the terms thereof.”); Blackburn, 716 S.E.2d at 458 (“A person signing a document is
responsible for reading the document and making sure of its contents. Every contracting
party owes a duty to the other party to the contract and to the public to learn the contents
of a document before he signs it.”) (quoting Regions Bank v. Schmauch, 582 S.E.2d 432,
440 (S.C. Ct. App. 2003)).
The alarm services contract plainly limits ADT’s liability to the greater of $500 or
10% of its annual service charges,2 even if the damages were caused ADT’s negligence,
failure to perform contractual duties, or other fault. Even if, as Bahringer alleges, ADT’s
monitoring system or personnel failed in some way, such a failure falls within the scope
of the contract’s exculpatory clause.3

1

Bahringer invites the court to find that a limitation of liability provision is unenforceable when it
is written in 4-point font, or to certify the following question to the South Carolina Supreme
Court: “Whether, where the text of a contract is of a consistent size, there is a minimum size the
text must be for limitation-of-liability clauses in consumer contracts peddled door-to-door in
residential neighborhoods to be enforceable?” Letter from B. Fudenberg, Apr. 23, 2013, ECF No.
51. Because the law is clear, the court declines to so find or to so certify a question.
2

Bahringer paid $41.99/month to ADT under the alarm services contract, or $503.88 annually.
Def.’s Mot. Ex. A. Because 10% of his annual service payments would be $50.39, the largest
sum that Bahringer can recover under the contract is $500.
In several paragraphs, the contract describes in detail the limitation of ADT’s liability, as well as
the possible flaws in ADT’s monitoring systems.
3

YOU ARE AWARE OF THE FOLLOWING: NO ALARM SYSTEM CAN
GUARANTEE PREVENTION OF LOSS; HUMAN ERROR IS ALWAYS
POSSIBLE; WE MAY NOT RECEIVE ALARM SIGNALS IF THE

8

While he appears to concede that the public interest is not implicated in this case,
Bahringer suggests that ADT cannot limit its liability for negligence via the alarm
services contract because the parties were not on roughly equal bargaining terms. Pl.’s
Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for J. on the Pleadings 2; Pl.’s Opp’n to Def.’s Mot. for Summ. J. 3.
He notes that:
[C]onsiderations of public policy prohibit a party from protecting himself
by contract against liability for negligence in the performance of a duty of
public service, or where a public duty is owed, or public interest is
involved, or where public interest requires the performance of a private
duty, or when the parties are not on roughly equal bargaining terms.

TELEPHONE LINE OR OTHER ALARM TRANSMISSION SYSTEM IS
CUT, INTERFERED WITH, OR OTHERWISE DAMAGED OR IF
TELEPHONE OR ELECTRICAL SERVICE IS UNAVAILABLE FOR ANY
REASON.
....
5. . . . WE ARE NOT AN INSURER AND YOU WILL OBTAIN FROM AN
INSURER ANY INSURANCE YOU DESIRE. THE AMOUNT YOU PAY US
IS BASED UPON THE SERVICES WE PERFORM AND THE LIMITED
LIABILITY WE ASSUME UNDER THIS CONTRACT AND IS UNRELATED
TO THE VALUE OF YOUR PROPERTY OR THE PROPERTY OF OTHERS
LOCATED IN YOUR PREMISES. IN THE EVENT OF ANY LOSS OR
INJURY TO ANY PERSON OR PROPERTY, YOU AGREE TO LOOK
EXCLUSIVELY TO YOUR INSURER TO RECOVER DAMAGES. . . .
....
20. SMOKE DETECTOR AND OTHER WARNINGS. Our . . . SMOKE
DETECTORS WILL NOT OPERATE, THE ALARM WILL NOT SOUND,
AND THE ALARM SIGNAL WILL NOT BE TRANSMITTED, IF THE
ELECTRICITY IS CUT OFF AND THE BACKUP BATTERY, IF PART OF
THE SYSTEM, IS LOW OR DEAD. If there is any fire, the electricity may cut
off before the alarm can function and the alarm will not sound, and the alarm
signal will not be transmitted. . . . WE RECOMMEND THAT YOU INSTALL A
BATTERY POWERED SMOKE DETECTOR AS A BACKUP SYSTEM.
YOU SHOULD REGULARLY INSPECT YOUR SMOKE DETECTORS . . . .
WE WARN YOU THAT A SMOKE DETECTOR WILL NOT ENSURE THAT
YOU WILL NEVER SUFFER DAMAGE OR INJURY.
Def.’s Mot. Ex. A (capitalization in original, font size not to scale).

9

Pride, 138 S.E.2d at 157.
Nothing in the record supports Bahringer’s contention that the parties bargained
on unequal footing. Bahringer was under no obligation to obtain fire and theft
monitoring. Once he chose to obtain alarm services, he could have done so through any
security services company that serves the Charleston area. ADT was not his only choice.
Finally, Bahringer has never suggested that his cognitive abilities are limited in any way
that would have made it difficult for him to read and understand the contract. For these
reasons, the court finds that the parties in this case were on roughly equal footing. See
Gladden, 2013 WL 1223848, at *3 (finding that a home inspector and a home buyer had
roughly equal bargaining power, where there was no allegation that the home buyer
lacked the education to understand the terms of a contract, and where the record did not
support a finding that home inspection contracts without exculpatory clauses are
unavailable in the market).
For the foregoing reasons, summary judgment is inappropriate with respect to
Bahringer’s breach of contract claim. However, the court finds that ADT’s liability is
limited by the express terms of the alarm services contract to $500.
C. Third Cause of Action – Violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade
Practices Act
ADT also contends that Bahringer’s SCUPTA claim must fail because ADT has
done nothing more than honor the terms of its agreement. Bahringer responds that ADT
employs deceptive advertising that states that the company notifies the fire department
“[a]s soon as an ADT fire or smoke detector signals an alarm.” Am. Compl. ¶ 5. He
contends that the discrepancy between ADT’s advertising and the terms of ADT’s
agreement constitutes a deceptive practice.
10

A plaintiff seeking to maintain an unfair trade practices claim under SCUTPA
must establish:
(1) the defendant engaged in an unlawful trade practice; (2) the plaintiff
suffered actual, ascertainable damages as a result of the defendant's use of
the unlawful trade practice; and (3) the unlawful trade practice engaged in
by the defendant had an adverse impact on the public interest.
Bessinger v. Food Lion, Inc., 305 F. Supp. 2d 574, 579 (D.S.C. 2003), aff'd, 115 F. App'x
636 (4th Cir. 2004). Unlawful trade practices are “[u]nfair methods of competition and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade.” S.C. Code Ann. § 39-520(a) (2012). Unfair trade practices are practices which are “offensive to public policy or
which are immoral, unethical, or oppressive . . . while a deceptive practice is one which
has a tendency to deceive.” Smith v. Chase Bank & Mortg., No. 10-cv-0882, 2011 WL
939288, at *6 (D.S.C. Jan. 13, 2011) (internal quotations omitted), report and
recommendation adopted by 2011 WL 938409 (D.S.C. Mar. 16, 2011). A plaintiff may
show that unfair or deceptive acts or practices have an impact upon the public interest by
demonstrating a potential for repetition. Haley Nursery Co. v. Forrest, 381 S.E.2d 906,
908 (S.C. 1989); Noack Enters., Inc. v. Country Corner Interiors of Hilton Head Island,
Inc., 351 S.E.2d 347, 350-51 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986). The potential for repetition is
generally demonstrated in one of two ways: “(1) by showing the same kind of actions
occurred in the past, thus making it likely they will continue to occur absent deterrence;
or (2) by showing the company's procedures create a potential for repetition of the unfair
and deceptive acts.” Wright v. Craft, 640 S.E.2d 486, 502 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006).
SCUTPA relief is “not available to redress a private wrong where the public interest is
unaffected.” Columbia E. Assoc. v. Bi-Lo, Inc., 386 S.E.2d 259, 263 (S.C. Ct. App.

11

1989). Even “a deliberate or intentional breach of a valid contract, without more, does
not constitute a violation of the Unfair Trade Practices Act.” Id.
The ADT marketing materials that Bahringer identifies are not, in fact,
misleading. They neither promise to insure customers against all damages nor suggest
that ADT accepts unlimited liability for customers’ losses. The guarantees listed on
ADT’s website do not relate to fire protection services, and the company’s Home
Security Systems web page does not suggest that its fire alarm systems are infallible. The
language on that page focuses on what happens once a fire or smoke alarm has been
triggered, not how reliably the alarms are triggered.
Furthermore, Bahringer’s SCUTPA claim fails because he has not demonstrated
that ADT has engaged in an unlawful trade practice. Even assuming that ADT regularly
limits its liability to $500 in its alarm services contracts, such a limitation of liability is
not an unfair or deceptive act. The alarm services contract clearly limits its liability and
states that ADT is not an insurer of its customer’s property. The contract also repeatedly
states that no fire alarm system is 100% effective and that the alarm system may fail
during a fire. Neither the alarm services contract nor ADT’s advertisements guarantee
that ADT’s fire alarm systems will always work and will always prevent loss.
For these reasons, the court grants summary judgment in favor of ADT on
Bahringer’s SCUTPA claim.
D. Fourth Cause of Action – Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
Finally, ADT seeks judgment in its favor on the intentional infliction of emotional
distress cause of action, arguing that Bahringer has failed to show that ADT acted in any
way that would support such a claim. The amended complaint alleges that Bahringer
suffered severe emotional distress during the time that he was trapped in his burning
12

home. Am. Compl. ¶ 31. Bahringer also contends that he suffered emotional distress
when ADT repeatedly attempted “to force Plaintiff to make his contracted-for payments”
after the fire occurred. Pl.’s Opp’n to Mot. for Summ. J. 8.
In order to recover for intentional infliction of emotional distress, Bahringer must
establish that:
(1) the defendant intentionally or recklessly inflicted severe emotional
distress, or was certain, or substantially certain, that such distress would
result from his conduct;
(2) the conduct was so “extreme and outrageous” so as to exceed “all
possible bounds of decency” and must be regarded as “atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community;”
(3) the actions of the defendant caused plaintiff's emotional distress; and
(4) the emotional distress suffered by the plaintiff was “severe” such that
“no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.”
Hansson v. Scalise Builders of S.C., 650 S.E.2d 68, 70-71 (S.C. 2007) (quoting Ford v.
Hutson, 276 S.E.2d 776, 778 (S.C. 1981)).
Bahringer surely suffered severe emotional distress while trapped inside his
burning home. However, even when all facts are construed in Bahringer’s favor, he has
not demonstrated the first three elements of an intentional infliction of emotional distress
claim. He has not alleged facts that demonstrate that ADT caused the fire or that ADT
intentionally and recklessly ignored distress signals from his house. Insofar as Bahringer
alleges that ADT inflicted emotional distress on him through their attempts to obtain
monthly payments after the fire, the repeated phone calls of which Bahringer complains
do not rise to the level of “extreme and outrageous conduct” contemplated by an
intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. Furthermore, the parties agree that
ADT stopped contacting Bahringer after he terminated his service agreement in writing,

13

per the terms of the contract. As a result, Bahringer has also failed to show that ADT’s
actions caused his severe emotional distress.
In short, Bahringer’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim cannot
survive summary judgment.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN
PART ADT’s motion for summary judgment, ECF No. 43. The court DENIES
summary judgment with respect to Bahringer’s second cause of action, his breach of
contract claim, and GRANTS summary judgment in favor of ADT on all other causes of
action contained in the amended complaint. Though the court denies summary judgment
as to the breach of contract claim, it HOLDS that ADT’s liability for any breach would
be limited to $500, per the terms of the alarm services agreement signed by both parties.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

__________________________________
DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
April 29, 2013
Charleston, South Carolina

14