Bryant v. Reynolds

Filing 37

ORDER adopting 26 Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Bruce Howe Hendricks; granting 16 Motion for Summary Judgment. Petitioner's Petition is dismissed with prejudice. The Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability in this matter. Signed by Honorable G Ross Anderson, Jr on 8/23/2013.(ssam, )

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
Corey Londre Bryant, #334193,

)
)
Petitioner, )
)
v.
)
)
Cecilia R. Reynolds, Warden,
)
)
Respondent. )
____________________________________ )

C/A No.: 2:12-cv- 01731-GRA

ORDER
(Written Opinion)

This matter comes before the court for a review of United States
Magistrate Judge Bruce H. Hendricks’ Report and Recommendation made in
accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c)
DSC, and filed on July 9, 2013. Petitioner Corey Londre Bryant (“Petitioner”), an
inmate currently in state custody at Kershaw Correctional Institution and
proceeding pro se, brought this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on June
20, 2012.1 ECF No. 1. Respondent filed a Return and Memorandum, ECF No.
17, and moved for summary judgment on October 23, 2012, ECF No. 16, and
the Court sent Petitioner an order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d
309 (4th Cir. 1975), explaining the summary judgment process and instructing
Petitioner that he had thirty-four days to respond to the motion. ECF No. 18.
Petitioner filed a response in opposition on November 27, 2012. ECF No. 20.

1

Prisoner petitions are deemed filed at the time that they are delivered to prison authorities for
mailing to the court clerk. Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 276 (1988). The envelope Petitioner
used to file his § 2254 Petition is stamped “received” by Kershaw Correctional Institution Mail
Room on June 20, 2012, therefore the Court will treat his petition as filed on June 20, 2012.

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Respondent filed a Supplement to Respondent’s Return and Memorandum on
February 25, 2013. ECF No. 22. In a text order entered the same day, Petitioner
was informed that any response to the Supplement would be due on March 18,
2013. ECF No. 23. No response was received from the Petitioner. Magistrate
Judge Hendricks now recommends that this Court grant Respondent’s motion for
summary judgment and that Petitioner’s § 2254 Petition be dismissed with
prejudice. Report & Recommendation, ECF No. 26. For the reasons discussed
herein, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation in
its entirety.
Standard of Review
A. Pro Se Petitions
Petitioner brings this claim pro se. This Court is required to construe pro
se pleadings liberally. Such pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than
those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir.
1978). This Court is charged with liberally construing a pleading filed by a pro
se litigant to allow for the development of a potentially meritorious claim. Boag
v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982).

A court may not construct the

petitioner’s legal arguments for him, Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411 (7th Cir.
1993), nor is a district court required to recognize “obscure or extravagant
claims defying the most concerted efforts to unravel them,” Beaudett v. City of
Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985).

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B. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment
The issue in determining a motion for summary judgment is whether there
exists a genuine dispute of material fact. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Of course, a
party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of
informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those
portions of the “pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,” which it believes
demonstrate the absence of genuine issues of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Though this initial responsibility rests with
the moving party, when a motion for summary judgment is made and supported
as provided in Rule 56, the non-moving party must produce specific facts
showing there is a genuine dispute for trial, rather than resting upon bald
assertions contained in the pleadings. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); see Matsushita Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
C. Section 2254 Petitions
Petitioner’s Petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). The AEDPA provides that a federal court cannot
grant habeas relief to a person in state custody, unless the petitioner “has
exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State”; or “there is an
absence of available State corrective process”; or “circumstances exist that
render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(1).

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Under the AEDPA, a state court’s decision must be sustained unless it
was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established
Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States”; or “was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Furthermore, “a
determination of a factual issue made by a State Court shall be presumed to be
correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of
correctness by clear and convincing evidence.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
The Supreme Court has held that the “contrary to” and “unreasonable
application” clauses contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) have independent
meaning. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405 (2000). Moreover, a state
court’s decision may be “contrary to” Supreme Court precedent in two ways: (1)
“if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the
Supreme Court] on a question of law”; or (2) “if the state court confronts facts
that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent
and arrives at a result opposite to [the Supreme Court’s].” Id. at 405.
The “unreasonable application” clause is implicated when a “state court
identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme Court’s]
decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s
case.” Id. at 413. “The federal habeas scheme leaves primary responsibility with
the state courts for these judgments, and authorizes federal-court intervention
only when a state-court decision is objectively unreasonable.” Woodford v.

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Visciotti, 537 U.S. 19, 27 (2002) (per curiam). The federal habeas court should
not grant relief to a petitioner “so long as ‘fairminded jurists could disagree’ on
the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S.
___, ___, 131 S. Ct. 770, 786 (2011) (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S.
652, 664 (2004)). Relief cannot be granted if the state court’s decision is only
incorrect or erroneous; rather, the state court’s application of Supreme Court
precedent must be “objectively unreasonable.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,
520–21 (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted).
D. The Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The
recommendation has no presumptive weight, and responsibility for making a final
determination remains with this Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–
71 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those
portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objection is made,
and this Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate.” 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This Court
may also “receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate with
instructions.”

Id.

In the absence of specific objections to the Report and

Recommendation, this Court is not required to give any explanation for adopting
the recommendation. Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198 (4th Cir. 1983).
Discussion
Petitioner filed the instant Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (“Petition”)

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pursuant to 28 U.S.C § 2254 on June 20, 2012. ECF No. 1. In the Petition,
Petitioner asserted eight grounds for relief. The Magistrate Judge recommends
that the Court deny Petitioner’s claims for relief. ECF No. 26. Petitioner timely
filed an objection to the Report and Recommendation on August 5, 2013.2 ECF
No. 35. In his objection, Petitioner states “that he would like to waive[ ]
Ground[s] one, two, three, four, five, seven, and eight from his petition.” Id.
Thus, the Court will only address Petitioner’s objection to the Magistrate Judge’s
conclusion concerning Ground Six of the Petition, listed verbatim as follows:
Ground Six: Petitioner was not in residence when seized without
arrest warrant and/or probable cause.
Supporting Facts: Petitioner was away from the apartment when he
was seized, arrested and detained and transported in handcuffs to
an apartment in which police during a search of same found drugs.
This procedure was illegal under the 4th Amendment. Even if
warrant to search defendants residence implicitly granted authority
to search persons on those premises, just as that authority included
authorization to search furniture and containers in which particular
things described might be con[c]ealed, that authority could not
justify initial detention of defendant outside premises described in
warrant.
Pet. for Writ of Habeas Corpus, ECF No. 1 (internal citations omitted). In his
reply to the Report and Recommendation, Petitioner specifically objects to the
Magistrate Judge’s finding that Petitioner is precluded from receiving federal
habeas relief on his Fourth Amendment claim because he received a full and fair
opportunity to litigate this claim in state court. ECF No. 35. However, this Court
finds that his objection is without merit.

2

The Court granted Petitioner’s Motion for Extension of Time on July 30, 2013, giving Petitioner
until August 13, 2013 to respond to the Report and Recommendation. ECF No. 33.

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Petitioner’s claim under the Fourth Amendment is not cognizable on
federal habeas review. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). In Stone, the
Supreme Court held that “where the State has provided an opportunity for full
and fair litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, the Constitution does not require
that a state prisoner be granted federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that
evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search or seizure was introduced at his
trial.”

Stone, 428 U.S. at 482. The record reflects and Petitioner does not

dispute that he had a full and fair opportunity to litigate his Fourth Amendment
claim in state court. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Michigan v.
Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), the post-conviction relief (“PCR”) Court found
that Petitioner’s detention did not violate the Fourth Amendment. ECF No. 17-7.
In Summers, the Supreme Court held that “a warrant to search for contraband
founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it the limited authority to detain
the occupants of the premises while a proper search is conducted.” Summers,
452 U.S. at 705. “The reasonableness of the seizure in Summers was justified
by three law enforcement objectives: (1) ‘preventing flight in the event that
incriminating evidence is found’; (2) ‘minimizing the risk of harm to the officers’;
and (3) facilitating ‘the orderly completion of the search’ with the assistance of
the detained occupants.” U.S. v. Montieth, 662 F.3d 660, 666 (4th Cir. 2011)
(citing Summers, 452 U.S. at 702-03) (holding defendant’s detention away from
the residence to seek consensual entry was a reasonable alternative to a more
dangerous method of executing a search warrant). In its ruling, the PCR Court

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considered testimony from a law enforcement officer that a confidential
informant provided the address of the apartment building and described the
color, make, and model of Petitioner’s car; that the stop was made in the
immediate vicinity of the apartment; and that Petitioner’s apartment key was
used to prevent damage to the apartment door. ECF No. 26 at 18–19. Based on
these facts, the PCR Court concluded that the detention was unconstitutional in
light of Summers. The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the PCR
Court thoroughly addressed the Fourth Amendment challenge.
In addition, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that the PCR
Court’s adjudication of this issue did not result in a decision contrary to, or
involving an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d).

The Court further agrees that the PCR Court’s ruling on

Petitioner’s unlawful detention claim was not based upon an unreasonable
determination of facts in light of the state court record. See ECF No. 17–1 at 6–
32, 82–110.
Moreover, the Court notes that the Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Bailey v. United States, 133 S.Ct. 1031 (2013), which addressed the scope of a
proper detention pursuant to Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692 (1981), while
this case was pending. Subsequently, Respondent filed a Supplement to his
Return and Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment
arguing that Petitioner cannot rely on a new decision to show clearly established
law because a new decision would not have been available at the time of the

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state court review. ECF No. 22.

After review of the Bailey decision, the

Magistrate Judge concluded that it was not made retroactive to cases on
collateral review, thus making it inapplicable to this case. ECF No. 26 at 24. The
Court has independently reviewed Bailey and agrees with the Magistrate Judge’s
conclusion on this issue. See U.S. v. Mathur, 685 F.3d 396, 399 (4th Cir. 2012)
(stating “new rules of constitutional law are generally ‘not…applicable to those
cases which have become final before the new rules are announced’ and finding
that there is a “strong presumption against retroactive application of new rules of
constitutional law.”) (quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309–10 (1989)).
Conclusion
The

Court

has

reviewed

the

Magistrate

Judge’s

Report

and

Recommendation, Petitioner’s objections, and the record, and has conducted a
de novo review of the issues raised in this case. The Court concludes that the
Magistrate Judge correctly determined that Petitioner has no claim for relief
under 28 U.S.C. §2254. Based on the foregoing, the Court adopts the Report
and Recommendation in its entirety.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner’s Petition is DISMISSED with
prejudice, and Respondent’s Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED. The
Court declines to issue a certificate of appealability in this matter.3

3

When a district court issues a final ruling on a habeas petition, the court must issue or deny a
certificate of appealability. See Rule 11(a) of the Rules governing 28 U.S.C. § 2254 & 2255.
The Court has reviewed its order and, pursuant to Rule 11(a), declines to issue a certificate of
appealability as Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of a denial of a constitutional right.
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); see Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (holding that, to

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

August 23, 2013
Anderson, South Carolina

satisfy § 2253(c), “a petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district
court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.”).

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