McGaffin et al v. MI Windows and Doors, Inc.
Filing
22
ORDER granting in part and denying in part 9 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim. Signed by Honorable David C Norton on 12/27/12. (juwo)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
IN RE: MI WINDOWS AND DOORS,
INC. PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LITIGATION
)
)
)
)
JENNIFER AND SCOTT MCGAFFIN,
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiffs,
vs.
MI WINDOWS AND DOORS, INC.
Defendant.
MDL No. 2333
No. 2:12-mn-00001-DCN
No. 2:12-cv-02860-DCN
ORDER
This matter comes before the court on defendant MI Windows and Doors, Inc.’s
(MIWD) motion to dismiss the complaint filed by Jennifer and Scott McGaffin (the
McGaffins) and to strike the McGaffins’ request to estop MIWD from relying on a statute
of limitations defense. The court grants in part and denies in part the motion to dismiss
and motion to strike.
I. BACKGROUND
The McGaffins filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the
District of Kansas on July 23, 2012. The case was transferred to this court by order of the
Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation on October 3, 2012. On October 24, 2012,
MIWD filed a motion to dismiss.
In their complaint, the McGaffins allege that their residence, built in 2008, has
windows that “were installed prior to the purchase of their residence” and were
manufactured and supplied by MIWD. Compl. ¶¶ 3-4, 38. The McGaffins further claim
1
that MIWD warranted, marketed, and advertised that its windows were fit for their
ordinary purposes and free from defects, but that the windows were in fact defective in
design. Id. ¶ 5-6. The windows allegedly permit “leakage resulting in the formation of
mineral deposits, algae, and microbial growth at the location of the leaks, and
consequential damages to other property, the adjoining finishes and walls of the
residences.” Id. ¶¶ 7, 48; see also id. ¶¶ 10, 36, 38, 51.
The McGaffins assert claims for unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation
of the Kansas Consumer Protection Act, negligence, breach of implied warranty of
merchantability, breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, fraudulent
misrepresentation, fraudulent concealment, unjust enrichment, and declaratory relief, and
additionally plead that MIWD should be estopped from relying on any statute of
limitations defense because it has “known of the defect in the Windows for years and has
concealed [it] from owners.” Id. ¶ 57.
II. STANDARDS
A. Applicable Law
This case is predicated on diversity jurisdiction and was filed in federal court, so
it is governed by state substantive law and federal procedural law. See Jones v. United
Parcel Serv., 674 F.3d 1187, 1195 (10th Cir. 2012). For diversity cases that are
transferred in a MDL, “the law of the transferor district follows the case to the transferee
district.” Manual for Complex Litigation Fourth § 20.132. Therefore, this court must
apply Kansas substantive law and federal procedural law.
2
B. Motion to Dismiss
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When considering a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true
and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. Kolon Indus., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011). But “the tenet that a court
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
On a motion to dismiss, the court’s task is limited to determining whether the
complaint states a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 679. A complaint must contain
sufficient factual allegations in addition to legal conclusions. Although Rule 8(a)(2)
requires only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The “complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Facts pled that are
‘merely consistent with’ liability are not sufficient.” A Soc’y Without a Name v.
Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
III. DISCUSSION
MIWD seeks to dismiss all counts of the complaint and moves to strike the
McGaffins’ request that MIWD be estopped from relying on any statute of limitations
defense.
3
A. Motion to Strike
In their complaint, the McGaffins plead that MIWD is “estopped from relying on
any statutes of limitation or repose by virtue of its acts of fraudulent concealment.”
Compl. ¶ 57. MIWD moves to strike this pleading from the complaint to the extent it
applies to the McGaffins’ non-fraud claims.
Kansas’s approach to equitable tolling based on fraudulent concealment has been,
at times, inconsistent. In Pike v. City of Mission, 731 F.2d 655, 658 (10th Cir. 1984), the
Tenth Circuit stated, “Under Kansas law, fraudulent concealment does not toll the statute
of limitations unless the plaintiff’s claim for relief is grounded on fraud.” In 1993, the
Tenth Circuit found, “that statement of the law no longer appears to be true.” Baker v.
Bd. of Regents, 991 F.2d 628, 633 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Ferrell v. Ferrell, 719 P.2d 1, 5
(Kan. Ct. App. 1986)). However, in 1996, the Kansas Supreme Court decided that “the
doctrine [of fraudulent concealment] only tolls the time in which a fraud action may be
filed if the plaintiff’s claim for relief is validly grounded in fraud.” Bonin v. Vannaman,
929 P.2d 754, 762 (Kan. 1996); see also Freebird, Inc. v. Merit Energy Co., --- F. Supp.
2d. ----, 2012 WL 3143870, at *9 (D. Kan. Aug. 1, 2012) (“Although the Kansas
Supreme Court has not been entirely consistent in applying the fraudulent concealment
doctrine to toll the statute of limitations, it has repeatedly and most recently held that it
only tolls the statute of limitations on fraud claims.”).
MIWD is correct in its contention that under current Kansas law, fraudulent
concealment can only toll a statute of limitations when a claim for relief is grounded on
fraud. For this reason, the McGaffins may plead that MIWD should be estopped from
relying on a statute of limitations defense to their claims for fraudulent concealment and
4
fraudulent misrepresentation. However, the McGaffins cannot seek equitable tolling of
the statute of limitations on their non-fraud based claims for unfair trade practices,
negligence, breach of implied warranties, unjust enrichment, and declaratory relief, so the
court will strike the allegation that MIWD is etopped from relying on a statute of
limitations defense as to these claims.1
B. Unfair Trade Practices
MIWD next moves to dismiss the McGaffins’ claim for unfair trade practices as
barred by the statute of limitations.
The Kansas Consumer Protection Act (KCPA) carries a three-year statute of
limitations. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-512. “A cause of action accrues under the KCPA on
the date of the alleged deceptive act or practice regardless of when the alleged deception
is discovered.” Hemmen v. Terminix Int’l Co., No. 92-1468, 1993 WL 3022255, at *3
(D. Kan. July 14, 1993); see In re Long, No. 09-12827, 2011 WL 976460, at *8 (Bankr.
D. Kan. Mar. 1, 2011) (same); Four Seasons Apts., Ltd. v. AAA Glass Serv., 152 P.3d
101, 105 (Kan. Ct. App. 2007) (same).
The McGaffins state that the windows were installed in their home in 2008,
Compl. ¶ 38, so the statute of limitations would have expired sometime in 2011. The
1
In other cases in this MDL, the court denied MIWD’s motion to strike on the basis that it was
premature and unnecessary. See, e.g., Wani v. MI Windows & Doors, Inc., No. 12-1255, 2012
WL 4482928, at *6 (D.S.C. Sept. 27, 2012) (“MIWD has not moved to dismiss the Wanis’ claims
on a statute of limitations basis. The court finds it unnecessary to strike the allegations regarding
equitable tolling from the amended complaint.”). Here, where MIWD has actually asserted a
statute of limitations defense and Kansas law prevents parties from moving for equitable tolling
on non-fraud claims, it is necessary to limit the McGaffins’ request for estoppel. As to the
McGaffins’ fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment claims, MIWD does not
move to dismiss on a statute of limitations basis. Although Ralph Waldo Emerson warned that a
foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, this court, like in the other cases, finds it
unnecessary to strike the estoppel allegations regarding these claims at the motion to dismiss
stage.
5
McGaffins did not file their complaint until 2012. They rely on the “discovery rule” to
save their claim, citing to Alexander v. Certified Master Builder Corp., 43 F. Supp. 2d
1242 (D. Kan. 1999). This reliance is misplaced. In Alexander, the district court held
that a claim brought under the KCPA accrued when the plaintiff “discovered, or
reasonably should have discovered, the alleged misrepresentations.” Id. at 1249. The
Alexander decision has been squarely rejected by subsequent courts. See Four Seasons,
152 P.3d at 104 (“[Plaintiff] relies upon Alexander . . ., in which the court read a
discoverability provision into the statute . . . . We note that this theory was rejected by
our court . . . .”).
Because the statute of limitations has run on the McGaffins’ KCPA claim, it is
dismissed.
C. Negligence
MIWD next moves to dismiss the McGaffins’ claim for negligence as barred by
the economic loss doctrine.
The economic loss doctrine is a “judicially created doctrine that sets forth the
circumstances under which a tort action is prohibited if the only damages suffered are
economic losses.” David v. Hett, 270 P.3d 1102, 1105 (Kan. 2011) (internal quotation
marks omitted). “Simply stated, a buyer of defective goods cannot sue under a tort
theory when the injury merely consists of damage to the goods themselves.” Bldg.
Erections Servs. v. Walton Const. Co., 219 P.3d 1243 (Kan. Ct. App. 2009) (table). “On
the other hand, recovery for physical damage a product caused to ‘other property’ is not
precluded by the economic loss doctrine.” N.W. Ark. Masonry, Inc. v. Summit Specialty
Prods., Inc., 31 P.3d 982, 987 (Kan. Ct. App. 2001).
6
While courts in Kansas take a “relatively broad view of what constitutes the
relevant product for purposes of the economic loss doctrine,” Lexington Ins. Co. v. W.
Roofing Co., 316 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1148 (D. Kan. 2004), the threshold issue is whether
the doctrine even applies. The Kansas Court of Appeals has stated that while “consumers
are not typically in privity of contract with the manufacturer when they purchase products
from retailers or wholesalers, . . . the economic loss rule applies equally to consumer
purchasers.” N.W. Ark. Masonry, 31 P.3d at 988-89. The court in Northwest Arkansas
Masonry relied on Jordan v. Case Corp., 993 P.2d 650, 652 (Kan. Ct. App. 1999), in
which the court ruled that the economic loss doctrine applies “equally to a consumer of
defective goods as well as to commercial buyers of defective goods.” The court reasoned
in part that in consumer transactions, the economic loss doctrine “protects a party’s
freedom to allocate economic risks by contract,” and in that case, the consumer-purchaser
of a combine had “bargained for the combine at a certain price and with certain warranty
provisions.” Id.; see also Hett, 270 P.3d at 1110 (noting that the Jordan court “expanded
the economic loss doctrine to include defective products purchased in consumer
transactions” in part because “the plaintiff in the case had engaged in his own contract
negotiations in purchasing the combine and had insurance”); Louisburg Bldg. & Dev. Co.
v. Albright, 252 P.3d 597, 622 (Kan. Ct. App. 2011) (stating that one policy “driving the
expansion of the doctrine” is “protecting parties’ expectations with respect to their
bargained-for limited liability”); Prendiville v. Contemporary Homes, Inc., 83 P.3d 1257,
1260 (Kan. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that the economic loss doctrine is “designed to
prevent a party from asserting a tort remedy in circumstances governed by the law of
contracts”).
7
In this case, the McGaffins do not allege that they contracted with MIWD;
instead, they claim that the windows manufactured by MIWD “were installed prior to
their purchase of their residence.” Compl. ¶ 4; see also id. ¶ 38. As a result, it does not
appear that courts in Kansas would apply the economic loss doctrine to bar the
McGaffins’ negligence claim. See Rinehart v. Morton Bldgs, Inc., 240 P.3d 626, at *4
(Kan. Ct. App. 2010) (table) (“[Plaintiff] fails to cite any case law to support its position
that the economic loss doctrine can be applied to bar an entity that is not a party to the
contract from recovering damages in tort. We decline Morton's invitation to so extend
the application of the economic loss doctrine in Kansas.”). At a minimum, the
McGaffins have asserted a plausible negligence claim that will be permitted to survive a
motion to dismiss.
D. Breach of Implied Warranty
MIWD next moves to dismiss the McGaffins’ claims for breach of implied
warranty.
First, MIWD argues that no implied warranties were created because there was no
sale of “goods,” but only a sale of “real estate,” because the McGaffins admit that the
windows were installed prior to their purchase of the residence. Implied warranties are
created by UCC Article 2, as adopted in Kansas. The implied warranties of
merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose specifically apply to “transactions in
goods.” Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 84-2-313, 84-2-314. Goods are defined as “all things
(including specially manufactured goods) which are movable at the time of identification
to the contract for sale.” Kan. Stat. Ann. § 84-2-105(1). At this stage, MIWD’s
argument fails because there is a question of fact whether the windows were readily
8
moveable at the time of the purchase of the home. See Johnson v. MI Windows & Doors,
Inc., No. 11-167, 2012 WL 5408563, at *5 (D.S.C. Nov. 6, 2012).
Next, MIWD argues the implied warranty claims fail because the McGaffins do
not allege they suffered “personal injuries” and thus lack privity. Under Kan. Stat. Ann.
§ 84-2-318, implied warranties extend to “natural persons who may reasonably be
expected to use the goods and who suffer personal, as opposed to economic, injury.”
Privity requirements for implied warranty claims have been abolished when the claims
involve consumer transactions. See Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-639(b) (“Notwithstanding any
provision of law, no action for breach of warranty with respect to property subject to a
consumer transaction shall fail because of a lack of privity between the claimant and the
party against whom the claim is made.”); Gonzalez v. Pepsico, Inc., 489 F. Supp. 2d
1233, 1246 (D. Kan. 2007) (“Section 50-639(b) of the KCPA has abolished any privity
requirement in an action for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability involving
a consumer transaction under Kansas law.”). As such, MIWD’s argument fails.
Finally, MIWD contends that any implied warranties have been disclaimed. But
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 50-639(c) states, “A supplier may limit the supplier's implied warranty
of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose with respect to a defect or defects
in the property only if the supplier establishes that the consumer had knowledge of the
defect or defects, which became the basis of the bargain between the parties.” MIWD
has not established that the defects formed the basis of a bargain with the McGaffins; to
the contrary, the McGaffins claim that they lacked knowledge of the defects in the
windows when they purchased their home. See Golden v. Den-Mat Corp., 276 P.3d 773,
800 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012). This argument fails.
9
For these reasons, the court denies the motion to dismiss the claims for breach of
implied warranty.
E. Fraudulent Misrepresentation
MIWD next moves to dismiss the McGaffins’ claim for fraudulent
misrepresentation, arguing that it is not pled with particularity under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 9(b).
In Kansas, the elements of a claim for fraudulent misrepresentation “include an
untrue statement of fact known to be untrue by the party making it made with the intent
to deceive or with reckless disregard for the truth upon which another party justifiably
relies and acts to his or her detriment.” Alires v. McGehee, 85 P.3d 1191, 1195 (Kan.
2004). Under Rule 9(b), to survive a motion to dismiss, an allegation of fraud must “set
forth the time, place, and contents of the false representation, the identity of the party
making the false statements and the consequences thereof.” Schwartz v. Celestial
Seasonings, Inc., 124 F.3d 1246, 1252 (10th Cir. 1997). “In other words, the plaintiff
must set out the ‘who, what, where, and when’ of the alleged fraud.” Plastic Packaging
Corp. v. Sun Chemical Corp., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1201, 1203 (D. Kan. 2001).
Here, the McGaffins do not even allege that they saw, heard, or relied to their
detriment on the allegedly fraudulent misrepresentations disseminated by MIWD, other
than through two conclusory allegations. See Compl. ¶¶ 101-02. However, dismissal is
not necessarily warranted on this ground, as “it is clear under Kansas law a third party
may have an action for fraud without any direct contact with and without having received
any direct misrepresentations from the defrauding party.” DeBoer v. Am. Appraisal
Assocs., Inc., 502 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1168 (D. Kan. 2007) (“Kansas courts have held that
10
a plaintiff may recover for fraudulent misrepresentation where reliance occurs
indirectly.”); Citizens State Bank v. Gilmore, 603 P.2d 605, 610 (Kan. 1979) (“The fact
that the misrepresentation consisted of a concealment of material facts rather than a
material misstatement of facts does not alter the situation.”). Still, “a person seeking to
recover under an indirect reliance theory must demonstrate that his or her reliance on the
original fraudulent misrepresentation would have been justifiable.” DeBoer, 502 F.
Supp. 2d at 1168.
While the law allows for indirect reliance, the McGaffins have not made
particularized pleadings in accordance with Rule 9(b). For this reason, the court
dismisses the claim.
F. Fraudulent Concealment
MIWD next moves to dismiss the McGaffins’ cause of action for fraudulent
concealment, arguing that this claim is not pled with the requisite particularity. In
Kansas, to bring a claim for fraudulent concealment or “fraud by silence,” the plaintiff
must allege that: (1) the defendant had knowledge of material information the plaintiff
could not have discovered through reasonable diligence; (2) the defendant had a duty to
communicate the information to plaintiff; (3) the defendant deliberately failed to
communicate the information; (4) the plaintiff justifiably relied on the defendant to
communicate the information; and (5) the plaintiff was injured as a result of the failure to
communicate. See Burton v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 397 F.3d 906, 910 (10th Cir.
2005).
Under Rule 9(b), a fraud claim must be pled with particularity, but “[t]hat rule is
often applied more liberally to fraud by silence claims because it may be difficult to
11
identify when, where, and by whom a representation should have been made.” Near v.
Crivello, 673 F. Supp. 2d 1265, 1280 (D. Kan. 2009). A plaintiff must at least allege
with particularity any “facts that would have prevented it from knowing [the concealed
information] and must also allege that its ignorance was not the result of its own lack of
diligence.” Zurn Constructors, Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 746 F. Supp. 1051, 1056 (D.
Kan. 1990).
MIWD contends that the complaint “contains only the conclusory allegation that
MIWD engaged in ‘acts of fraudulent concealment.’” Def.’s Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss 6
(quoting Compl. ¶ 57)). To the contrary, the complaint contains specific allegations that
MIWD’s windows are defective in that they permit water intrusion resulting in the
formation of mineral deposits and damage to other property in the home, Compl. ¶ 7, that
MIWD knew or should of known of these defects, id. ¶¶ 6, 108, and that MIWD failed to
warn purchasers, installers, or users of the risks of failure, id. ¶ 14. Moreover, the
McGaffins complain that their lack of knowledge of the window defects did not result
from lack of diligence; instead, according to the McGaffins, MIWD “conceals its
knowledge of repeated product defects in the Windows in the Class members’
residences.” Id. ¶ 33; see id. ¶ 110 (“The defect is latent and not something that Plaintiffs
or Class members, in the exercise of reasonable diligence, could have discovered
independently prior to purchase, because it is not feasible.”).
That said, the allegations of the complaint are still lacking in that they fail to
plausibly show that MIWD had a duty to communicate information to plaintiffs, which is
the required second element of a fraudulent concealment claim. Under Kansas law,
“[n]ondisclosure becomes fraudulent only when it violates a duty to disclose.” Burton,
12
397 F.3d at 910. “A party has a duty to disclose material facts if the party knows that the
other is about to enter into the transaction under mistake as to such facts, and that the
other, because of the relationship between them . . . would reasonably expect disclosure
of such facts.” OMI Holdings, Inc. v. Howell, 918 P.2d 1274, 1300-01 (Kan. 1996). “A
duty to disclose arises in two situations: (1) a contracting party who has superior
knowledge, or knowledge that is not within the reasonable reach of the other party, has a
legal duty to disclose information material to the bargain; and (2) parties in a fiduciary
relationship must disclose material information to one another.” Plastic Packaging, 136
F. Supp. 2d at 1205.
Here, plaintiffs rely on the first situation mentioned in Plastic Packaging; that is,
they assert that MIWD had superior knowledge and thus had a duty to speak. Under this
argument, the McGaffins must claim that MIWD “kn[ew] that [plaintiffs were] about to
enter into the transaction under a mistake as to such facts, and that [plaintiffs], because of
the relationship between them, the customs in the trade, or other objective circumstances,
would reasonably expect a disclosure of such facts.” OMI Holdings, 918 P.2d 1274.
“While the Kansas Supreme Court has written about a duty arising from special
knowledge, this has been explicitly connected . . . with the relationship between the
parties, and whether there is a disparity of bargaining power or expertise reflected in the
relationship.” Meschke v. OrthAlliance, Inc., No. 01-1365, 2002 WL 1398635, at *2 (D.
Kan. June 24, 2002).
The cases referencing the duty to speak based on “special knowledge” generally
refer to a duty that arose because of a contractual relationship. See Plastic Packaging,
136 F. Supp. 2d at 1205 (“Kansas courts have indeed recognized that a party possessing
13
superior knowledge, who partakes to enter into a contract with a party who lacks such
knowledge, has a duty to disclose material facts at the time of contracting.”). Here, the
McGaffins did not enter into any contractual relationship with MIWD. Contra
Ensminger v. Terminix Int’l Co., 102 F.3d 1571, 1574 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding a
jury’s finding that a duty to speak arose from a contractual relationship because the
sellers of a home hired Terminix to check for termites, and there was an “unequal
relationship in which the claimant seeks particular information from a specialist upon
which the recipient intends to rely or act”). For these reasons, the court dismisses the
fraudulent concealment claim for failure to plead “with particularity” the circumstances
giving rise to MIWD’s duty to speak and failure to do so.
G. Unjust Enrichment
MIWD next moves to dismiss the McGaffins’ claim for unjust enrichment. “The
basic elements [of] a claim based on a theory of unjust enrichment are threefold: (1) a
benefit conferred upon the defendant by the plaintiff; (2) an appreciation or knowledge of
the benefit by the defendant; and (3) the acceptance or retention by the defendant of the
benefit under such circumstances as to make it inequitable for the defendant to retain the
benefit without payment of its value.” J.W. Thompson Co. v. Welles Prods. Corp., 758
P.2d 738, 745 (Kan. 1988).
The McGaffins claim that “even though [they] were indirect purchasers, MIWD
benefited economically from the Plaintiffs’ purchase of a residence, which incorporated
MIWD’s defective Windows.” Pls.’ Resp. 16. It is true that a “claim for unjust
enrichment under Kansas law . . . does not depend on privity.” Gonzalez, 489 F. Supp.
2d at 1249 (“Because a benefit may be conferred indirectly, the Court cannot conclude
14
that plaintiffs did not confer a benefit on defendants when they purchased defendants’
beverage products through local retailers.”). Even if the allegations regarding conferral
of a benefit were sufficient, the McGaffins have not plausibly asserted that MIWD had an
appreciation or knowledge of the benefit. Therefore, the court dismisses this claim.
H. Declaratory Judgment
Finally, MIWD seeks to dismiss the McGaffins’ claim for declaratory relief.
Such relief would be inappropriate at this stage, as the merits of the McGaffins’
substantive claims have not been adjudicated. The court dismisses the claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN
PART defendant’s motion to dismiss and DISMISSES WITHOUT PREJUDICE
plaintiffs’ claims for unfair trade practices, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraudulent
concealment, unjust enrichment, and declaratory relief. The court further GRANTS IN
PART AND DENIES IN PART defendant’s motion to strike. Plaintiffs shall have leave
to file an amended complaint within 14 days of the filing of this order.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
_________________________________
DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
December 27, 2012
Charleston, South Carolina
15
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?