Hunt v. Wilson et al

Filing 22

ORDER adopting 17 Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Bruce Howe Hendricks. This action is dismissed without prejudice and without issuance and service of process. Signed by Honorable Joseph F Anderson, Jr on 8/19/2013.(ssam, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Leslie C. Hunt,
Plaintiff,
v.
Lt. Wilson; Sumter Lee Regional Detention
Center; Major Simon; Unknown Staff;
SLRDC Headquarters, etc.,
Defendants.
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C/A No.: 2:12-3336-JFA-BHH

ORDER

The pro se plaintiff, Leslie C. Hunt, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Hunt is an inmate with the South Carolina Department of Corrections. After allowing the
plaintiff time to clarify and resubmit his pro se complaint, the Magistrate Judge assigned to
this action1 has prepared a Report and Recommendation wherein she suggests that this court
should summarily dismiss the action. The Report sets forth in detail the relevant facts and
standards of law on this matter, and the court incorporates such without a recitation and
without a hearing.
The plaintiff was advised of his right to file objections to the Report and
Recommendation and he filed timely objections thereto. Thus, this matter is ripe for review.

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The Magistrate Judge’s review is made in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule
73.02. The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has no presumptive
weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261
(1976). The court is charged with making a de novo determination of those portions of the Report to which specific
objection is made and the court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of the Magistrate
Judge, or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

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This case began as a two-page handwritten letter complaining about various criminal
charges brought against the plaintiff in Sumter County. It was not clear from plaintiff’s
initial handwritten letter whether he is complaining that he is being incarcerated after having
been found not guilty, or whether he contends that he is in fact not guilty of the charge and
was convicted based on perjured testimony. The revised complaint appears, to this reader
at least, to concede that the plaintiff has been convicted, but contends that the plaintiff was
convicted based on “false statements” in court. The plaintiff also refers to a “sex charge on
my records.”
Here, the Magistrate Judge properly determined that this action is subject to summary
dismissal because the plaintiff’s right of action has not accrued. This is because the
plaintiff’s conviction has not been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order,
declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court’s issuance of
a writ of habeas corpus. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994).
The Magistrate Judge observes that if the plaintiff were to succeed in this § 1983
action seeking damages and injunctive relief, the plaintiff’s guilty plea and conviction for
indecent exposure would necessarily be rendered illegal. Thus, a judgment in favor of the
plaintiff would imply the invalidity of his underlying conviction. Heck does not allow a
lawsuit to go forward in such circumstances.
The Magistrate Judge also opines that the plaintiff cannot maintain an action against
witnesses who allegedly made false statements in court against him because it is well settled
in this Circuit that a person who testifies in any judicial proceeding relating to a plaintiff’s

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conviction has absolute immunity in an action for damages brought under § 1983. See
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 327–46 (1983).
The Magistrate Judge further opines that to the extent plaintiff attempted to state a
malicious prosecution-type claim pursuant to § 1983, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
criminal proceeding against him terminated in his favor. This the plaintiff cannot do.
Finally, to the extent the plaintiff has made an allegation that he was “shamed in front
of millions” when he was placed on the sex offender registry or when his case was reported
in the newspaper, the Magistrate Judge cites well settled authority that such a claim is not
actionable under § 1983. The Magistrate Judge points out that defamation in this situation
is only actionable under § 1983 if it occurs in the course of or is accompanied by a change
or extinguishment of a right or status guaranteed by state law or protected by the
Constitution. Courts have labeled the showing required to meet this standard as “stigma
plus.” Plaintiff cannot make this allegation under applicable federal pleading standards.
In response to the Magistrate Judge’s Report and Recommendation, the plaintiff has
filed a one-page document suggesting that he has now filed a state post-conviction relief
action. He does not contend that this action has been concluded in his favor. The mere
pendency of a state PCR proceeding does not cure the problem cited by the Magistrate Judge
in relying on Heck v. Humphrey.
Accordingly, the objections are overruled; the Report and Recommednation is
incorporated herein by reference; and this action is dismissed without prejudice and without
issuance and service of process.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

August 19, 2013
Columbia, South Carolina

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.
United States District Judge

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