Gilbert v. West et al

Filing 66

ORDER adopting 51 Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Bruce Howe Hendricks; denying 33 Motion for Summary Judgment; denying 34 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable Richard M Gergel on 3/14/2014.(ssam, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Jamie Michael Gilbert, #335126,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Sgt. Colton West,
Defendant.

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No.2: 13-cv-493-RMG

ORDER

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This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation ("R&R") of the
Magistrate Judge recommending that the Court deny both Plaintiffs and Defendant's motion for
summary judgment because an issue of fact exists for trial. (Dkt. No. 51). Plaintiff and
Defendant both filed a timely objections to the R & R. (Dkt. Nos. 59,64). For the reasons stated
below, the Court adopts the R & R. Accordingly, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment
(Dkt. No. 33) is DENIED, and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 34) is
DENIED.

I. FACTS 1
The following facts are uncontested. On February 13,2012, Defendant and Officer
Dillman escorted inmate Angelo Ham, Plaintiffs cell mate, back to his cell. (Dkt. No.1 at 3;
Dkt. No. 59-1 at ~~ 2-3). When the cell door was opened, Plaintiff struck Ham with a blunt piece
of metal. (Dkt. No.1 at 3; Dkt. No. 59-1 at ~ 8). During this altercation, Plaintiff apparently also
stuck Defendant. (Dkt. No. 59-1 at ~ 6). Plaintiff ran away from the scene and into Officer

The Court considers the evidence submitted by Defendant with his objections to the R &
R. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(I) (stating that the Court can "receive further evidence").
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Thompson at the top of a stairway. (Dkt. No.1 at 3; Dkt. No. 59-1 at ~ 9). Officer Thompson
attempted to restrain Plaintiff, was unsuccessful and was dragged to the bottom of the stairs by
Plaintiff. (Dkt. No.1 at 3; Dkt. No. 59-1 at ~ 9). Officer Thompson apparently tripped Plaintiff
at the bottom of the stairs. (Dkt. No. I at 3; Dkt. No. 59-1 at ~ 10).
Here, Plaintiffs version of events and Defendant's version of events differ. Plaintiff
states that, after tripping him, Officer Thompson restrained him. (Dkt. No.1 at 3). Plaintiff
states that, after he was restrained, Defendant ran down the stairs, ''jumped on my back &
punched me several times in my face causing my face to swell up ... West hit me so many times
that Cpl. Thompson had to push him off me 2-3 times." (Id.).
Defendant states that when he reached the bottom of the stairs, Officer Thompson was
holding Plaintiffs leg, but that Plaintiff was not restrained. (Dkt. No. 59-1 at ~ 10). Defendant
states that he could not gain control of Plaintiffs arms, so he "administered a palm heel strike to
the facial area of [Plaintiff]." (/d.). Defendant states that after this strike, Plaintiff began to
comply and Officer Thompson restrained Plaintiff in handcuffs. (/d.).
The medical report submitted by Defendant indicates that Plaintiff suffered ruptured
blood vessels in his left eye and bruising around his eyes and on the left side of his face. (Dkt.
No. 34-3).

II. LEGAL STANDARD
A. Report and Recommendation

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation
has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the
Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court may "accept, reject, or
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modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate." 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). This Court is charged with making a de novo determination of those
portions of the R & R or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is
made. Diamond v. Colonial Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(I)); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. neb).
B. Summary Judgment
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw." Fed.R.Civ.P.
56(a). Only material facts-those ''that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law"-will preclude the entry of summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242,248 (1986). A dispute about a material fact is genuine, "if the evidence is such that a
reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Id.
At the summary judgment stage, the court must "construe the evidence, and all reasonable
inferences that may be drawn from such evidence, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party." Dash v. Mayweather, 731 F.3d 303, 310 (4th Cir. 2013). However, "the nonmoving
party must rely on more than conclusory allegations, mere speculation, the building of one
inference upon another, or the mere existence of a scintilla of evidence." Id. at 311.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment
As an initial matter, the Court agrees that PlaintifPs claim is not barred by Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The Magistrate Judge correctly applied the operative facts the
applicable law in finding that Heck did not bar Plaintiffs claim (see Dkt. No. 51 at 3-6), and

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Defendant has not objected to this finding by the Magistrate Judge. (See Dkt. No. 59). It appears
that Plaintiffs disciplinary convictions are for actions that happened in Plaintiffs cell or at the
top of the stairs, namely striking Ham and Defendant. (See Dkt. No. 34~4). Plaintiffs claim
involves what happened later, at the bottom of the stairs and, in Plaintiffs version of events, after
he was restrained. It is possible for Plaintiffs disciplinary convictions to be valid, and for
Plaintiff to have a valid claim for excessive force for events that occurred after he was restrained.
Turning to Plaintiffs Eighth Amendment claim generally, the Court finds that there is a
genuine issue of material fact for trial, namely whether Plaintiff was restrained at the time that he
was struck by Defendant. This fact bears directly on the first three factors set out in Hudson: the
need for the application of force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force
used, the threat reasonably perceived by Defendant West. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1,
7 (1992). The Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that this factual dispute is for the jury.
Defendant claims that Plaintiff s "uncorroborated and

self~serving

statements" are

insufficient to defeat summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 59 at 2). Plaintiffs statements are no more
self~serving

or less corroborated than Defendant's. In the record before the Court, both

Plaintiffs and Defendant's statements are only corroborated by their own earlier statements?
Neither Plaintiffs nor Defendant's version of events is corroborated by the testimony of any
other witnesses or by physical evidence.

2 Defendant's version of events is corroborated by Defendant's statement of what
happened in an incident report written after the incident. (Dkt. No. 59-2). Plaintiffs version of
events is corroborated by Plaintiffs statement to medical personnel after the event. (See Dkt.
No. 59-3 ("punching me in the side of my face repeatedly while I was on the ground")).

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Regardless, credibility determinations are for the jury, and not for consideration of the
Court on a motion for swnmary judgment E.g. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
255 (1986); see also Gray v. Spillman, 925 F.2d 90, 95 (4th Cir.l991) ("It is not our job to weigh
the evidence ... or to disregard stories that seem hard to believe. Those tasks are for the jury.").
At the swnmary judgment stage, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to
Plaintiff, resolve any disputed factual questions in his favor, and draw all inferences in his favor.

E.g. Meyers v. Baltimore Cnty., Md., 713 F.3d 723, 730 (4th Cir. 2013); Dash v. Mayweather,
731 F.3d 303, 310 (4th Cir. 2013). Doing so, the Court finds that a jury could infer that
Defendant "wantonly administered significant force to [plaintiff] in retaliation for his conduct
rather than for the purpose of bringing him under controL" Thompson v. Shelton, 541 Fed.
App'x 247, 250 (4th Cir. 2013). Therefore, the Court adopts the R & R and denies Defendant's
motion for summary judgment.

B. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment
The Court agrees that much of Plaintiffs motion raises claims that are not cognizable
under § 1983 for the reasons stated in the R & R. To the extent that Plaintiff moves for summary
judgment on his excessive force claim, the Court also agrees that Plaintiff has not shown that he
is entitled to summary judgment. A reasonable jury could believe Defendant's version of events
and find the Defendant did not act "maliciously and sadistically." Therefore, the Court agrees
with and adopts the R & R with regard to Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment, and
Plaintiff's motion is denied.

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IV. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, the Court ADOPTS the R & R as an order of this Court.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 33) is DENIED, and
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 34) is DENIED.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

Richard Mark Gerger
United States District Judge

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2014
March
Charleston, South Carolina

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