Hayes v. Knight et al

Filing 79

ORDER adopting Report and Recommendations of Magistrate Judge Bristow Marchant; DENIES the Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 66) as to Defendant Knight, and GRANTS the Motion as to Defendant Hunt. The case will therefore proceed on the four Section 1983 claims against Defendant Knight. Signed by Honorable Richard M Gergel on 1/15/2015.(cwhi, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Kelvin Hayes and Karen Skipper,
Plaintiffs,

v.
Tim Knight and Keith Hunt,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

C.A. No. 2: 13-cv-0816-RMG

ORDER

------------------------)

Plaintiffs filed this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendants,
Dorchester County sheriffs Deputies, violated their constitutional rights during a traffic stop on
March 27,2011. Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on June 30, 2014 (Dkt. No.
66), Plaintiffs filed a Response on July 21, 2014 (Dkt. No. 70), and Defendants filed a Reply on
July 31,2014 (Dkt. No. 75). The case is now before this Court on the Report and
Recommendation ("R&R") of the Magistrate Judge, submitted November 5,2014 (Dkt. No. 76),
which recommends that the Motion for Summary Judgment be denied. Defendants filed
Objections to the R&R on November 24,2014 (Dkt. No 77). For the reasons stated herein, the
Court DENIES the Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendant Knight, GRANTS the
Motion for Summary Judgment as to Defendant Hunt, and ADOPTS the R&R in whole.
Background
The R&R ably recites the relevant facts, and it is unnecessary to review the details of the
complaint, depositions, and arrest reports that constitute the factual record to this point. In brief,
Plaintiff Mr. Hayes, an African American man, was driving a vehicle at night with Plaintiff Ms.
Skipper, a white woman, as a passenger, when Defendant Deputy Knight pulled them over.
Knight explained that Hayes had failed to activate his tum signal more than 100 feet prior to

1

turning. After Knight spoke with Skipper and Hayes, and had Hayes spit out a mint in his
mouth, Knight attempted to search Hayes' mouth, asserting that he had seen something in his
mouth. When Hayes stated that he wanted to be released if he was not being ticketed and
refused to open his mouth, Knight threatened to "choke [him] out" and proceed to grab Hayes by
the lapels and throw him down onto the hood of the car. The two then struggled on the ground
out of view of the "dash cam" video recording of the events; accounts differ as to whether Hayes
resisted or not. During this altercation, Defendant Deputy Hunt arrived on the scene and
handcuffed Hayes, who was taken first to a hospital for treatment of a head injury and bleeding
and next to a detention center, while Skipper was driven home by another officer. (R&R at 1-6;

Video at 1:27:00-1 :39:00).
Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, filed September 27, 2013, alleges four causes of action
against Knight under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; first, a Fourth Amendment claim for an illegal seizure of
both Plaintiffs; second, a Fourth Amendment claim for excessive force while seizing Hayes;
third, a Fourth Amendment claim for arresting Hayes without probable cause; and fourth, a First
Amendment claim for arresting Hayes based on his speech invoking his Fourth Amendment
rights. (Dkt. No. 55 at 7-10). The Complaint also alleges one cause of action against Hunt for
excessive force during the arrest. (ld. at 8).

Analysis
A. Legal Standard
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation
has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the

1 South Carolina Code of Laws Section 56-5-2 I 50 requires that a driver activate their turn signal a minimum of 100
feet prior to a turn or lane change. Plaintiffs have offered substantial evidence that Hayes began signaling 117.8 feet
before the stop sign where he turned, and Defendants accept this estimate for purposes of summary judgment
analysis. (Dkt. No. 66-1 at 11).

2

Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). The Court is charged with making a de novo
detennination of those portions of the Report and Recommendation to which specific objection
is made. The Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the recommendation of
the Magistrate Judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). To the extent Petitioner fails to point to a specific
error in the R & R and simply makes conclusory objections, the Court need not conduct a de
novo review. Smith v. Washington Mut. Bank FA, 308 Fed.Appx. 707, 708 (4th Cir. 2009) ("The

court need not conduct de novo review ... 'when a party makes general and conclusory
objections that do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate's proposed findings and
recommendations."') (quoting Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir.l982)).
Summary judgment is appropriate if a party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact" and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(a). In other words, summary judgment should be granted "only when it is clear that there is
no dispute concerning either the facts of the controversy or the inferences to be drawn from those
facts." Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987). "In detennining
whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities
in favor of the nonmoving party." HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 101 F.3d
1005, 1008 (4th Cir. 1996). The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of
demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477U.S. 317,323 (1986).

Once the moving party has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to
survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his
pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate that specific, material
facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, "[c]onclusory or speculative

3

allegations do not suffice, nor does a 'mere scintilla of evidence'" in support of the non-moving
party's case. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 FJd 645,649 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Phillips v. CSX Transp., Inc., 190 F.3d 285,287 (4th Cir. 1999)).

B. Discussion
The Court has carefully reviewed the R&R, the full administrative record in this matter,
and the relevant authorities. The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge ably and promptly
summarized the factual and legal issues and appropriately recommended that Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment be denied as to all claims against Defendant Knight and granted
as to the excessive force claim against Defendant Hunt. Defendants have filed objections to the
R&R, arguing that the Magistrate Judge's analysis erred in three ways.
First, Defendant Knight argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity on the wrongful
arrest claim because he made a "bad guess in [a] gray area[]" with respect to the distance Hayes
traveled between activating his turn signal and making the tum, and reasonably believed that he
had probable cause to believe Hayes had violated the law. (Dkt. No. 77 at 7, citing Maciariello

v. Sumner, 973 F.2d 295,298 (4th Cir. 1992)). The Objections also argue that there is no
evidence that Deputy Knight was "measurement-challenged" enough to invoke the fourth
Circuit's decision in United States v. Sowards, 690 F.3d 583,591 (4th Cir. 2012) (reversing a
district court decision that credited an officer's visual speed estimate of seventy-five miles per
hour in a seventy mile per hour zone and his assertion that he had tracked a vehicle for one
hundred yards, despite his further testimony that there are "twelve feet in a yard" and "twelve
inches on a yardstick). Knight asserts in his pleading that he "had a reasonable belief in the
distance involved to initiate the traffic stop and the detention of Hayes, based on his background,
experience, and considered opinion." (Dkt. No. 77 at 7). But the dash cam video shows Knight

4

telling Hayes that he was only twenty feet from the turn when he activated his tum signal, which
would mean that, assuming that Plaintiffs' investigator is correct that Hayes activated his turn
signal approximately 118 feet before turning, Knight underestimated Hayes' distance from the
stop sign by approximately nighty-eight feet. See Video at 1:25:30. The Court is not prepared to
find that there is no dispute of the the material facts as to whether Defendant Knight's error in
distance estimation was reasonable enough to render the stop constitutionaL Nor is he entitled to
summary judgment based on qualified immunity. This is because "[d]isputed facts are treated no
differently in this portion of the qualified immunity analysis than in any other context." Vathekan
v. Prince George's Cnty., 154 F.3d 173, 180 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Buonocore v. Harris, 65 F.3d
347,359 (4th Cir. 1995) and Pritchett v. Alford, 973 F.2d 307,313 (4th Cir. 1992)).
Accordingly, "summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds is improper as long as there
remains any material factual dispute regarding the actual conduct of the defendants." Id
Second, both in their Motion for Summary Judgment and in the Objections to the R&R,
Defendants raise a novel legal argument as to why a passenger might not be "seized" for
purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis purposes. Defendants first acknowledge that "A
passenger in a vehicle stopped by the police is seized by the stop within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." (Dkt. No. 66-1 at 12, citing Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007)
and United States v. Soriano-Jarquin, 492 F.3d 495 (4th Cir. 2007). However, they proceed to
present the question of "When is a technical 'seizure' not a Section 1983 'seizure' or, at least,
not a seizure that constitutes a § 1983 violation?" (Dkt. No. 77 at 10-11 (emphasis in original)).
Citing to cases from other circuits and trial courts, Defendants argue that in cases where police
chases end in accidental collisions, or where shots fired by a police officer hit an uninvolved
bystander, no "seizure" has taken place because the police officer did not intend to target the

5

person inadvertently “seized.” The Objections also cite to Brower v. County of Invo, 489 U.S.
593, 597 (1989), where the Court found that a car stopped by a road block was “intentionally”
seized because the road block was designed to serve the purpose of stopping cars, even if no
individual made a decision to seize the particular car. (Dkt. No. 77 at 10).
In the Court’s view, Brower and Brendlin leave no room for dispute that when an officer
has intentionally pulled over a car, and when that car contains a passenger, the passenger may
dispute the constitutionality of the stop via a Section 1983 claim. Brower requires that to be
subjected to Fourth Amendment analysis, a seizure must involve “a governmental termination of
freedom of movement through means intentionally applied.” 489 U.S. at 597 (emphasis in
original). The record contains no evidence or argument that there was anything unintentional
about Knight’s actions in pulling over the van that Skipper was riding in; comparing the traffic
stop to a stray bullet or a car accident is inapt. Because the law is clear on this point, the Court
also rejects Defendant Knight’s related qualified immunity argument that the law was unclear on
what type of traffic stop constitutes seizure of a passenger. (Dkt. No. 13).
Third, and finally, Defendant Knight argues that he is entitled to qualified immunity as to
the use of force claim because Knight thought that he saw something in Hayes’ mouth and
believed that if Hayes ingested cocaine he could be physically harmed.2 (Dkt. No. 77 at 13-14).
As discussed in the context of the reasonableness of Knight’s belief that Hayes had violated the
turn signal law, a defendant is only entitled to summary judgment qualified immunity where the
facts are not in dispute. Here, both parties agree that the initial white object Knight saw in
Hayes’ mouth was a mint, which he spit out upon the officer’s request. Whether at that point
Knight held a genuine and reasonable belief that Hayes had something else in his mouth, and that

2

Defendants make no argument that the underlying right – to be free of excessive force during a traffic stop – was
not clearly established at the time of the arrest. E.g. Turmon v. Jordan, 405 F.3d 202, 208 (4th Cir. 2005).

6

it was necessary to threaten to "choke him out" and to use significant force to overcome Hayes
and remove the object is a determination on facts and credibility that cannot be appropriately
made by the Court on a motion for summary judgment. The Court therefore declines to grant
summary judgment to Knight based on qualified immunity for the excessive force claim.
Conclusion

The Court has reviewed the R&R, the full administrative record in this matter and the
relevant legal authorities. The Court finds that the Magistrate Judge ably and promptly
summarized the factual and legal issues and appropriately recommended that the motion be
denied. Therefore, the Court hereby ADOPTS the R&R as the order of this Court, DENIES the
Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 66) as to Defendant Knight, and GRANTS the Motion
as to Defendant Hunt. The case will therefore proceed on the four Section 1983 claims against
Defendant Knight.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

Richard Mark Gergel
United States District Court Judge
January IS"', 2015
Charleston, South Carolina

7