Wellin v. Wellin et al

Filing 962

ORDER denying (692) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in case 2:13-cv-01831-DCN; denying (726) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in case 2:13-cv-03595-DCN; denying (472) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment in case 2:14-cv-04067-DCN Signed by Honorable David C Norton on December 19, 2019.Associated Cases: 2:13-cv-01831-DCN, 2:13-cv-03595-DCN, 2:14-cv-04067-DCN(bgam, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
WENDY C.H. WELLIN, as Special
Administrator of the Estate of Keith S. Wellin
and as Trustee of the Keith S. Wellin Florida
Revocable Living Trust u/a/d
December 11, 2001,

)
)
)
)
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
PETER J. WELLIN, CYNTHIA W. PLUM
)
AND MARJORIE W. KING, individually and )
as co-Trustees and beneficiaries of the Wellin )
Family 2009 Irrevocable Trust, u/a/d
)
November 2, 2009, and FRIENDSHIP
)
MANAGEMENT, LLC,
)
)
Defendants.
)
_______________________________________)
LARRY S. MCDEVITT, as Trust Protector
)
of the Wellin Family 2009 Irrevocable Trust,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
vs.
)
)
PETER J. WELLIN, CYNTHIA W. PLUM
)
AND MARJORIE W. KING, individually and )
as co-Trustees and beneficiaries of the Wellin )
Family 2009 Irrevocable Trust, u/a/d
)
November 2, 2009, FRIENDSHIP
)
MANAGEMENT, LLC, and CYNTHIA W.
)
PLUM as manager of Friendship Management, )
LLC,
)
)
Defendants.
)
)
PETER J. WELLIN, CYNTHIA W. PLUM
)
AND MARJORIE W. KING, individually and )
as co-Trustees and beneficiaries of the Wellin )
Family 2009 Irrevocable Trust
)
)
1

No. 2:13–cv–01831–DCN
ORDER

No. 2:13–cv–03595–DCN

Counterclaim Plaintiffs,

)
)
vs.
)
)
LARRY S. MCDEVITT, as Trust Protector
)
of the Wellin Family 2009 Irrevocable Trust,
)
LESTER SCHWARTZ as Trust Protector
)
of the Wellin Family 2009 Irrevocable Trust,
)
u/a/d November 2, 2009, and WENDY C.H.
)
WELLIN, as Special Administrator of the
)
Estate of Keith S. Wellin,
)
)
Counterclaim Defendants.
)
_______________________________________)
PETER J. WELLIN, CYNTHIA W. PLUM
)
AND MARJORIE W. KING, individually and )
as co-Trustees and beneficiaries of the Wellin )
Family 2009 Irrevocable Trust, u/a/d
)
November 2, 2009, FRIENDSHIP
)
MANAGEMENT, LLC,
)
)
Plaintiffs,
)
)
vs.
)
)
WENDY WELLIN, individually and as
)
Trustee of the Keith S. Wellin
)
Florida Revocable Living Trust u/a/d
)
December 11, 2001,
)
)
Defendant,
)
and Hamilton College,
)
)
Defendant–Intervenor,
)

No. 2:14-cv-4067-DCN

This matter is before the court on a motion for summary judgment. Peter J. Wellin
(“Peter”), Cynthia Wellin Plum (“Ceth”), Marjorie Wellin King (“Marjorie”) — in their
individual capacities, their capacities as co-Trustees, and their capacities as beneficiaries
Wellin Family 2009 Irrevocable Trust (“2009 Irrevocable Trust”) (collectively, the
“Wellin children”) have filed a motion for summary judgment as to the invalidity of five
certain amendments to the Keith S. Wellin (“Keith”) Florida Revocable Living Trust
2

u/a/d December 11, 2001 (“2001 Revocable Trust”) purportedly executed between June
20, 2013 and June 27, 2014 (“2013–14 amendments”). ECF No. 472-1 at 2. 1
For the reasons stated below, the court denies the Wellin Children’s motion for
summary judgment as to the invalidity of the 2013–14 amendments.
I. BACKGROUND
Because the nature of this case, the court will dispense with a recitation of facts
and include only a procedural history of the matters at hand.
The motion for summary judgment as to the invalidity of the 2013–14
amendments was filed by the Wellin children on November 13, 2017. ECF No. 472.
Wendy C.H. Wellin, as Trustee of the 2001 Revocable Trust (“trustee Wendy”), and
individually (“Wendy”, together with trustee Wendy, the “Estate”) responded on
December 14, 2017, ECF Nos. 491, 493, and Hamilton College filed a memorandum in
opposition on December 20, 2017, ECF No. 492. The Wellin children replied to the
responses by the Estate and memorandum in opposition by Hamilton College on January
4, 2018, ECF No. 500. Hamilton College filed an additional reply to the Wellin
children’s reply on February 20, 2018, ECF No. 518, and the Estate filed an additional
reply to the Wellin children’s reply on February 28, 2018, ECF No. 524. The motion is
now ripe for the court’s review.

1

All ECF numbers will be referencing Civil Action No. 2:14-cv-4067 (“Wellin II”)
unless otherwise stated. Wellin II was consolidated for discovery purposes only with
Civil Action No. 2:13-cv-1831 (“Wellin I”) and Civil Action No. 2:13-cv-3595
(“McDevitt”). This motion for summary judgment has been spread across Wellin II,
Wellin I, and McDevitt. However, the validity of the 2013–14 amendments only relate to
claims made in Wellin II.
3

II. STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the pleadings, the discovery and
disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine dispute as to
any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). “By its very terms, this standard provides that the mere existence of some
alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly
supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine
issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986).
“Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing
law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.” Id. at 248. “[S]ummary
judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the
evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.”
Id. “[A]t the summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the
evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 249. The court should view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the non–moving party and draw all inferences in its favor. Id. at 255.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Amendments to the 2001 Revocable Trust 2
The Wellin children argue the court should grant summary judgment declaring the
2013–14 amendments invalid because the Estate failed to adhere to the terms of the 2001

2

Unless otherwise stated, all references to the 2001 Revocable Trust will be as based on
the 2001 Revocable Trust as amended on August 30th, 2011 (“Tenth Amended Trust”).
The court shall perform its interpretation of the 2001 Revocable Trust based on the Tenth
Amended Trust because that is last effective version of the 2001 Revocable Trust prior to
any of the 2013–14 amendments.
4

Revocable Trust by not delivering the 2013–14 amendments to the successor Trustee
until after the Keith’s death. 3,4 ECF No. 472-1 at 2. The Estate and Hamilton College
contend the court should deny summary judgment as to the invalidity of the 2013–14
amendments because delivery to the successor Trustee was not a requirement to make an
amendment to the 2001 Revocable Trust effective. ECF No. 491 at 13; ECF 492 at 2. If
the court finds that delivery to the successor Trustee is required for an amendment to be
valid, the Estate argues that there is no time requirement for when such delivery must be
made, and the court should deny summary judgment as to the invalidity of the 2013–14
amendments because delivery of the 2013–14 amendments was eventually made. ECF
No. 491 at 21. The Estate and Hamilton College also reason the court should deny
summary judgment as to the invalidity of the 2013–14 amendments because the 2001
Revocable Trust did not specifically define Peter as successor Trustee and since
successor trustee is a term of art, delivery to Peter is irrelevant to determining the 2013–
14 amendments’ effectiveness. ECF No. 518 at 2; ECF No. 524 at 2.
All parties agree that the 2013–14 amendments are governed by Florida law
because of the 2001 Revocable Trust’s governing law provision. ECF No. 472-1 at 5;
ECF No. 491 at 3; ECF No. 492 at 8. “A federal court exercising diversity jurisdiction is
obliged to apply the substantive law of the state in which it sits, including the state’s

3

Terms that are capitalized and not defined within this Section III have the meaning
ascribed to them as defined in the 2001 Revocable Trust.

4

The Wellin children have also argued that the 2013–14 amendments are invalid based
on Keiths’ lack of capacity and undue influence, breaches of fiduciary duty, and
intentional inference by Wendy. ECF No 472-1 at 3. However, the Wellin children have
asked the court not to consider those arguments in this motion. The court abides by their
request.
5

choice-of-law rules.” Volvo Constr. Equip. N. Am., Inc. v. CLM Equip. Co., Inc., 386
F.3d 581, 599–600 (4th Cir. 2004) (citing Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79
(1938). Under South Carolina choice of law rules, “if the parties to a contract specify the
law under which the contract shall be governed, the court will honor this choice of law.”
Russell v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 578 S.E.2d 329, 336 (S.C. 2003). Because the validity
of the 2013–14 amendments must be determined by the court performing an
interpretation of the 2001 Revocable Trust agreement and all parties agree such an
interpretation falls within the scope of the 2001 Revocable Trust’s governing law
provision, the court shall perform its analysis under Florida law.
The interpretation of a trust is normally a matter of law that is determined by the
court. See In re Standard Jury Instructions--Contract & Bus. Cases, 116 So. 3d 284, 315
(Fla. 2013) (citing Smith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 231 So.2d 193, 194 (Fla.
1970)) (“The interpretation of a contract is normally a matter of law that is determined by
the court.”); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 736.0201(4)(a) (“A judicial proceeding involving a trust
may relate to the validity a trust, including [d]etermin[ing] the validity of all or part of a
trust.”). “Under certain circumstances, however, such as when the terms of a [trust] are
ambiguous or susceptible to different interpretations, an issue of fact is presented which
should be submitted to the jury.” In re Standard Jury Instructions--Contract & Bus. Cases,
116 So. 3d 284 at 315; see also Harkless v. Laubhan, 219 So. 3d 900, 910 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2016) (“Contract interpretation is for the court as a matter of law, rather than the
trier of fact, only when the agreement is totally unambiguous, or when any ambiguity
may be resolved by applying the rules of construction to situations in which the parol
evidence of the parties’ intentions is undisputed or non-existent.”)

6

Under Florida law, “the polestar of trust interpretation is the settlor[‘s] intent.”
Vigliani v. Bank of Am., N.A., 189 So. 3d 214, 219 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (citing
Roberts v. Sarros, 920 So.2d 193, 195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2006)). A court determines
“the settlor's intent from the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms set forth in the Trust
instrument.” Horgan v. Cosden, 249 So. 3d 683, 686 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018), reh’g
denied (June 29, 2018), review denied, 2018 WL 3650268 (Fla. July 30, 2018) (citing
Nelson v. Nelson, 206 So.3d 818, 819 (Fla. Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016)). “If the language
in the trust is unambiguous, the settlor’s intent as expressed therein controls and the court
cannot rely on extrinsic evidence.” Vigliani v. Bank of Am., N.A., 189 So. 3d 214 at
219. To determine the settlor’s intent, “the court should construe ‘the instrument as a
whole, taking into account the general dispositional scheme.” Id. (quoting Pounds v.
Pounds, 703 So.2d 487, 488 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997)). The determination of the
settlor’s intent based on the terms of the trust “should not ‘resort to isolated words and
phrases.’” Id. (quoting Pounds, 703 So.2d at 488). “This is true whether the court is
interpreting the entire trust or only a specific clause.” Id.
1. Validity of the 2013–14 Amendments
According to Florida law, “the settlor may revoke or amend a revocable trust . . .
by substantial compliance with a method provided in the terms of the trust.” Fla. Stat.
Ann. § 736.0602(3)(a). All parties concede that the 2001 Revocable Trust has a
provision that provides the method for making an amendment to it (“Amendment
provision”) and that the Amendment provision is not ambiguous. ECF No. 491 at 12;
ECF No. 492 at 10, ECF 500 at 5. The court agrees that the Amendment provision is

7

unambiguous, and therefore, the interpretation of the Amendment provision is a matter of
law to be resolved by the court. The Amendment provision is as follows:
XVI. AMENDMENT AND REVOCATION. I reserve the right at any
time to amend or revoke this Agreement by an instrument in writing, duly
acknowledged and delivered to the then acting Trustee and the successor
Trustee. The duties and liabilities of Trustee shall under no circumstance
be substantially increased or its compensation decreased except with its
written consent. Any amendment shall be effective immediately upon my
delivery or mailing thereof to Trustee, my attorney or other agent for
delivery to Trustee, if thereafter delivered to Trustee, and if accepted or
consented to by Trustee, if such acceptance or consent is required for
effective amendment.
ECF No. 472-4 at 18. The Wellin children argue that the settlor’s intent based on the
plain language of the first sentence of the Amendment provision shows that each
requirement listed within that first sentence must be complied with in order to have a
valid amendment. ECF No. 472-1 at 5. The Estate and Hamilton College counter that
argument by asserting that the plain and clear language of the third sentence of the
Amendment provision shows it is the settlor’s intent to make an amendment effective
upon compliance with the methods contained within that third sentence and the first
sentence of the Amendment provision is merely the procedure for providing notice of an
effective amendment. ECF No. 491 at 12; ECF No. 492 at 8–9. According to Florida
law, the court must determine the settlor’s intent not by “resort[ing] to isolated words and
phrases” but instead by “taking into account the general dispositional scheme” of the
trust. Vigliani, 189 So. 3d at 219. Therefore, the court cannot deduce the settlor’s intent
by focusing on the parties’ arguments alone and will make its determination of the
settlor’s intent in context of the entire 2001 Revocable Trust.
Throughout the 2001 Revocable Trust, the method for what must be done to
execute the purpose of provision is drafted in the beginning of the provision followed by
8

what must be done after execution for it to be effective. ECF 472-4 at 5–8, 10–12, 17. In
the 2001 Revocable Trust, the following provisions — the provision that gifts paintings
to Hamilton College, the provision that gifts items described in a written list, the
provision that distributes money to the grandchildren, and the provision that describes
how a Trustee may resign (“Resignation provision”) — each state what must be done to
execute the purpose of the provision at the beginning of the provision followed by what
must be done after execution of it to be effective. Id. In other words, the act in the 2001
Revocable Trust must be executed before it becomes effective. Because the court finds
that the general dispositional scheme of the 2001 Revocable Trust is to provide the
method for what must be done to execute the purpose of provision and then provides the
method for what must be done after execution of the act for it to be effective, the court
finds that an action in the 2001 Revocable Trust must be executed before it becomes
effective.
The Resignation provision is particularly informative to the court in its
determination of the settlor’s intent because this provision, like the Amendment
provision, describes a process by which a change to the 2001 Revocable Trust may be
made. The Resignation provision is as follows:
C.
Resignation of Trustee. Any Trustee serving hereunder may resign
by giving written notice of such resignation to me, if I am then living, or if
I am not then living to the then adult income beneficiary of a following
trust hereunder or a majority of adult income beneficiaries if more than
one. Such resignation shall take effect upon the date specified in such
notice, but not less than thirty (30) days after such mailing or delivery.
Upon the date specified, all duties of Trustee shall cease except the duty to
account.
ECF No. 472-4 at 17. The first sentence of the Resignation provision clearly instructs
what a Trustee must do to execute his or her resignation and the second sentence clearly
9

instructs how to make an executed resignation effective. The structure and scheme of the
Resignation provision and the Amendment provision are nearly identical. Each provision
begins with the method for what must be done to execute the act, resign as Trustee in the
Resignation provision and amend the 2001 Revocable Trust in the Amendment provision.
ECF No. 472-4 at 17–18. Each provision uses the verb of the act, “resign” in the
Resignation provision and “amend” in 2001 Revocable Trust, followed by the word “by”
meaning “the means of achieving something” in the first sentence. Id. The court finds
this indicates the first sentence in the Amendment provision is the method for executing
the act.
Each provision uses the noun for the act, “resignation” in the Resignation
provision and “amendment” in 2001 Revocable Trust, in the sentence providing what
must be done for the act to be effective. ECF No. 472-4 at 17–18. The court finds this
indicates that the action has been executed before it can become effective. In addition to
specifically aligning with the Resignation provision dispositional scheme, the
Amendment provision structure aligns with the general dispositional scheme of executing
the terms of 2001 Revocable Trust, which provides the method for what must be done to
execute the purpose of provision and then provides the method for what must be done
after execution of the act for it to be effective. Therefore, the court finds that it was the
settlor’s intent that an amendment to the 2001 Revocable Trust be executed according to
the Amendment provision prior to an amendment being effective.
2. Successor Trustee
Having found that it was the settlor’s intent that an amendment to the 2001
Revocable Trust be executed according to the Amendment provision prior to an

10

amendment being effective, the court must now determine if Keith substantially complied
with the method for executing an amendment in the 2013–14 amendments. The Estate
and Hamilton College argue that the 2001 Revocable Trust never actually defined Peter
as the Successor Trustee, only that he should become the Trustee in the event Keith
ceased being Trustee or upon Keith’s death, and therefore was not entitled to delivery of
the 2013–14 amendments. ECF No. 518 at 2; ECF No. 524 at 2. The Wellin children
contend that Peter was the successor Trustee and therefore was entitled to the delivery of
the 2013–14 amendments for the 2013–14 amendments to be executed. ECF No. 472-1
at 2.
The Florida Trust Code does not specifically define successor trustee; however, it
does require that when filling a vacancy in a trusteeship of a noncharitable trust, first
priority is given to the “person named or designated pursuant to the terms of the trust to
act as a successor trustee.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 736.0704(3)(a). The Florida Trust Code also
lists as one of the circumstances in which “a vacancy in a trusteeship occurs” is “if . . . [a]
trustee is disqualified or removed.” Fla. Stat. Ann. § 736.0704(1)(c). Article XV of the
2001 Revocable Trust is entitled “Successor Trustees” and each paragraph in Article XV
taken together describes the person designated to replace Keith as Trustee upon his
vacating that position. ECF No. 472-4 at 16–18. Paragraph A of Article XV of the 2001
Revocable Trust provides a specific situation and what must occur in that situation for the
Trustee to “cease to serve as [Trustee].” Id. at 16. If the events occur as described in
paragraph A of Article XV such that the Trustee ceases to serve in that role, the Trustee
authorizes all individuals and entities to release and disclose any and all health
information to “the Trustee named in ‘B.’ of this Article.” Id. at 16–17. Paragraph B of

11

Article XV of the 2001 Revocable Trust names Peter as the person to serve as Trustee in
Keith’s place should Keith cease to serve as Trustee. Id. at 17. In other words, Article
XV of the 2001 Revocable Trust describes both a specific circumstance in which Keith
would be removed as Trustee and generally any situation in which Keith ceases to serve
as Trustee and, in both instances, identifies Peter as the person who will succeed Keith as
Trustee.
The Estate and Hamilton College’s contention that the 2001 Revocable Trust’s
failure to specifically define Peter as the “Successor Trustee” and the 2001 Revocable
Trust reference to Peter only as “nominated to serve as successor Trustee” should lead the
court to interpret that it was the settlor’s intent not to have a successor trustee is
misguided. It is the court’s responsibility under Florida law to interpret the trust based on
“the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms set forth in the Trust instrument.” Horgan
v. Cosden, 249 So. 3d 683 at 686. It is clear to that court that the plain and ordinary
meaning of Article XV of the 2001 Revocable Trust demonstrates that it was the settlor’s
intent was to name Peter the successor Trustee. For the court to accept the Estate and
Hamilton College’s argument, it would have to determine the settlor’s intent by
“resort[ing] to isolated words and phrases” which is in direct contrast with Florida law.
Vigliani, 189 So. 3d 214 at 219. Therefore, the court finds that Peter was the successor
Trustee under the 2001 Revocable Trust.
3. Delivery to Successor Trustee
The Wellin children argue that failure to deliver the 2013–14 amendments to
Peter, as successor Trustee, until after the Keith’s death, the 2013–14 amendments are not
valid. ECF No. 472-1 at 7. The Estate and Hamilton College argue that there is no time

12

requirement for when such delivery must be made, and that because delivery was
eventually made, the 2013-14 amendments were in “substantial compliance” with the
Amendment provision. ECF No. 491 at 15; ECF No. 492 at 14 n.5. The Wellin children
concede that Florida law has not addressed whether delivery after the death of the sole
settlor can be in “substantial compliance” with an amendment provision of a trust. ECF
No. 472-1 at 7. “Substantial compliance is ‘that performance of a contract which, while
not full performance, is so nearly equivalent to what was bargained for that it would be
unreasonable to deny the [party] the [benefit].’” Ortiz v. PNC Bank, Nat. Ass’n, 188 So.
3d 923, 925 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2016) (quoting Casa Linda Tile & Marble Installers, Inc.
v. Highlands Place 1981, Ltd., 642 So.2d 766, 768 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994)).
In its research, the court found that Florida law has only made a determination
about the substantial compliance with the method for effecting an amendment to a trust
after the settlor’s death in the context of multiple settlors. See generally Littell v. Law
Firm of Trinkle, 2009 WL 10706315 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 13, 2009), aff’d sub nom. Littell v.
Law Firm of Trinkle, Moody, Swanson, Byrd & Colton, 345 F. App’x 415 (11th Cir.
2009); Roberts v. Sarros, 920 So.2d 193; L’Argent v. Barnett Bank. N.A., 730 So.2d 395
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999). Those cases are not analogous because the 2001 Revocable
Trust has only one settlor. Furthermore, these cases are not useful precedents for the
court in this instance because those cases do not address the substantial compliance with
the method for effecting an amendment to a trust after the death of the sole settler when
delivery to a third party was the only outstanding obligation remaining to be in
substantial compliance with the terms of the trust’s amendment provision. Therefore, the
court must again look to determine if it was the settlor’s intent for there to be a temporal

13

limitation on the delivery of an amendment in order to be in “substantial compliance”
with the Amendment provision. The court will again make this determination based on
“the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms set forth in the Trust instrument” and
“taking into account the general dispositional scheme” of the 2001 Revocable Trust.
Horgan v. Cosden, 249 So. 3d at 686; Vigliani, 189 So. 3d at 219.
Throughout the 2001 Revocable Trust, there are temporal limits placed on
provisions. ECF 472-4 at 3, 7–8, 10–12, 17. In the 2001 Revocable Trust, the following
provisions — the provision that instructs the Trustee to make payments to the 2001
Revocable Trust, the provision that gifts items described in a written list, the provision
that requires purchase of the martial home in Vero Beach, the provision that distributes
money to the grandchildren, and the Resignation provision — each state a temporal limit
on when each action must be taken to be valid. Id. Furthermore, throughout the 2001
Revocable Trust there are actions that must occur during Keith’s lifetime and other
actions that must occur upon Keith’s death. ECF 472-4 at 3–14, 16. Therefore, the court
finds that the general dispositional scheme of the 2001 Revocable Trust is that when it
was the settlor’s intent for something to be done during Keith’s lifetime, upon his death,
or within a certain time frame, the 2001 Revocable Trust specifically enumerates such
temporal limitations. The Amendment provision does not enumerate a temporal limit on
when a delivery to the successor Trustee must be made for an amendment to be valid.
Therefore, the court finds it was not the settler’s intent to place a temporal limit on when
a delivery to the successor Trustee must be made for an amendment to be valid.
Because Florida law is silent on the timing requirement for the delivery of an
amendment to a trust for the amendment to be in substantial compliance with the method

14

for effecting an amendment, and since it was the settlor’s intent in drafting the 2001
Revocable Trust to not place a temporal limit on the delivery of an amendment to a trust
for the amendment to be valid, the court finds that the delivery of the 2013–14
amendments to the successor Trustee, Peter, is in substantial compliance with the
Amendment provision.
Therefore, the court denies the Wellin Children’s motion for summary judgment
as to the invalidity of the 2013–14 amendments.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the court denies the Wellin Children’s motion for
summary judgment as to the invalidity of the 2013–14.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
December 19, 2019
Charleston, South Carolina

15