Petrosyan v. Delfin Group USA LLC

Filing 37

ORDER granting in part and denying in part 21 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; adopting Report and Recommendations re 31 Report and Recommendation. Signed by Honorable Patrick Michael Duffy on February 18, 2015.(lgra, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
Levon Petrosyan,

)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
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Delfin Group USA, LLC,
)
)
Defendant.
)
____________________________________)

C.A. No.: 2:13-cv-2990-PMD
ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Objections to the Report and
Recommendation (“R&R”) (ECF No. 31) of the United States Magistrate Judge recommending
that the Court grant Defendant Delfin Group USA LLC’s (“Defendant”) Motion to Dismiss
(“Motion”) (ECF No. 21) as to Plaintiff’s claims for hostile work environment, disparate
treatment, and breach of contract, and deny Defendant’s Motion with respect to Plaintiff’s
retaliation claim. Plaintiff timely filed Objections to the R&R as to the disparate treatment claim
only. (ECF No. 33). Having reviewed the entire record, including Plaintiff’s Objections and
Defendant’s Reply to Plaintiff’s Objections (ECF No. 34), the Court finds the Magistrate Judge
fairly and accurately summarized the facts and applied the correct principles of law.
Accordingly, the Court adopts the R&R and fully incorporates it into this Order.
BACKGROUND
This action is one of nine separate employment-discrimination cases against Defendant,
all of which were assigned to United States Magistrate Judge Bristow Marchant. Plaintiff, a
former employee of Defendant, is of Armenian nationality and asserts federal civil rights claims
pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., and 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, as well as a state law breach of contract claim. Defendant is a producer of synthetic

motor oils. Plaintiff was employed as an operator in Defendant’s blow-molding unit until his
termination on March 5, 2012. The basis for Plaintiff’s Title VII and § 1981 claims are that John
Gordon, Defendant’s President, demonstrated a “pattern of discriminatory treatment towards
Armenians” and made a “number of [demeaning] racial comments” towards Plaintiff. (Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 24–25). Plaintiff further alleges that Gordon reassigned Armenian workers to menial
tasks and terminated them in disproportionate numbers.

Plaintiff also claims that he was

“wrongfully” terminated. (Id. ¶ 33).
On November 1, 2013, Plaintiff filed the original Complaint in this Court. On February
3, 2014, the Defendant filed its first Motion to Dismiss. On February 6, 2014, this case was
reassigned to the undersigned United States District Judge. On March 21, 2014, Plaintiff filed an
Amended Complaint. On April 7, 2014, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended
Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Plaintiff filed a Response on April
28, 2014. Defendant filed a Reply on May 7, 2014. On October 8, 2014, the Magistrate Judge
recommended that the Defendant’s Motion be granted in part and denied in part. Plaintiff timely
filed Objections to the R&R and Defendant timely filed its Reply to Plaintiff’s Objections. The
R&R is ripe for consideration.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
I. Magistrate Judge’s R&R
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation
has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with
the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). Parties are allowed to make a
written objection to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and recommendations within
fourteen days after being served a copy of the R&R. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). This Court is

charged with conducting a de novo review of any portion of the R&R to which a specific
objection is registered, and the Court may accept, reject, or modify the R&R’s findings and
recommendations in whole or in part. Id. Additionally, the Court may receive additional
evidence or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. Id. A party’s failure
to object is accepted as an agreement with the conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). In the absence of a timely filed, specific objection—or as to those
portions of the R&R to which no specific objection is made—this Court “must ‘only satisfy itself
that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’”
Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee note). Moreover, in the absence of specific objections to the
R&R, the Court need not provide any explanation for adopting the Magistrate Judge’s analysis
and recommendation. See Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198, 199–200 (4th Cir. 1983).
II. Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted “challenges the legal sufficiency of a complaint.” Francis v. Giacomelli,
588 F.3d 186, 192 (4th Cir. 2009) (citations omitted); see also Republican Party of N.C. v.
Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (“A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) . . . does
not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of
defenses.”). To be legally sufficient a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
In Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), the Supreme Court “articulated a
‘two-pronged approach’ to assessing the sufficiency of a complaint.” Robertson v. Sea Pines
Real Estate Cos., 679 F.3d 278, 288 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662,

679 (2009)).

First, the complaint must “contain factual allegations in addition to legal

conclusions.” Id. Under Rule 8’s pleading standard, “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a
cause of action will not do,” id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555) (internal quotation marks
omitted), and “‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further factual enhancement’” will not suffice,
Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Second, the complaint must “contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”
Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff
pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is
liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). More specifically, the
complaint must demonstrate that the plaintiff’s right to relief is more than a mere possibility, but
it need not rise to the level of evincing a probability of success. Id. Accordingly, “[d]etermining
whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief will . . . be a context-specific task that
requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at 679.
When ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the trial judge must accept as true all
of the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of
the plaintiff. E.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th
Cir. 2011). The court must determine whether the allegations give rise to a plausible right to
relief, Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; however, it should “not accept ‘legal conclusions couched as facts
or unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or arguments.’” United States ex rel.
Nathan v. Takeda Pharm. N. Am., Inc., 707 F.3d 451, 455 (4th Cir. 2013) (quoting Wag More
Dogs, LLC v. Cozart, 680 F.3d 359, 365 (4th Cir. 2012)); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[T]he
tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is
inapplicable to legal conclusions.”). Thus, although the court must accept a plaintiff’s well-

pleaded factual allegations as true for purposes of ruling on the motion, the complaint must
nevertheless satisfy the “two-pronged” test articulated by the Supreme Court. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at
679.
ANALYSIS
Plaintiff alleges three claims under both Title VII and § 1981 in his first two causes of
action: retaliation, hostile work environment, and disparate treatment. Plaintiff also alleges a
breach of contract claim. Plaintiff filed Objections as to the disparate treatment claim only.
Plaintiff’s claim for disparate treatment is based on his allegation that Defendant’s
President John Gordon: (1) displayed a pattern of discriminatory treatment towards Armenians,
including making disparaging comments, reassigning Armenians to menial positions, and
discharging them in disproportionate numbers; (2) made demeaning racial comments to Plaintiff;
and (3) wrongfully terminated Plaintiff. The Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff failed to set
forth sufficient factual allegations to state a claim for disparate treatment. Specifically, the
Magistrate Judge found that Plaintiff’s allegations were conclusory, generalized, and lacking in
specifics. On this basis, the Magistrate Judge recommended that Defendant’s Motion be granted
with respect to this claim.

In his Objections, Plaintiff’s sole argument that his disparate

treatment claim should not be dismissed is that the plaintiffs in seven other related cases have
stated a claim for disparate treatment and that fact evinces a “clear pattern of disparate
treatment,” making dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim “inconsistent with the other cases.” (Pl.’s
Objections 2).
In point of fact, in three of the seven cases to which Plaintiff alludes in his Objections,
this Court found that the plaintiffs had not stated a claim for disparate treatment and dismissed

their claims.1

However, whether plaintiffs in other cases have stated claims for disparate

treatment, based on the specific allegations of their respective complaints, is wholly irrelevant to
whether Plaintiff has stated a claim. Ultimately, after a comprehensive review of the record and
of the applicable law, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge fairly and accurately summarized
the facts and applied the correct principles of law and that Plaintiff’s Objections are without
merit. Accordingly, the Court adopts this portion of the R&R and hereby grants Defendant’s
Motion as to Plaintiff’s claim for disparate treatment.
CONCLUSION
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s R&R.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Defendant’s Motion is DENIED with respect to Plaintiff’s
retaliation claim under Title VII and § 1981. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant’s
Motion is GRANTED with respect to Plaintiff’s claims for disparate treatment, hostile work
environment, and breach of contract.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

February 18, 2015
Charleston, South Carolina

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1.

2:13-cv-02421-PMD-BM; 2:13-cv-02991-PMD-BM; 2:13-cv-03013-PMD-BM.