Stanfield v. Wigger et al
Filing
29
ORDER denying 7 Motion for Preliminary Injunction; denying 7 Motion for TRO; finding as moot 10 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim; affirming 14 Report and Recommendation.; denying 21 Motion to Amend/Correct Signed by Honorable Patrick Michael Duffy on January 5, 2015.(tlim, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
David D. Stanfield,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
Jarrel Wigger; Angelica Hattaway; Gina
)
Reeves; Thomas L. Hughston, Jr.; and
)
Kristi L. Harrington,
)
)
Defendants.
)
____________________________________)
C.A. No.: 2:14-cv-00839-PMD
ORDER
This matter is before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of the
Magistrate Judge (ECF No. 14). Following pre-service review pursuant to the provisions of 28
U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civ. Rule 73.02(B)(2)(e) (D.S.C.), the Magistrate Judge issued
the R&R, recommending that this Court summarily dismiss, without prejudice, Plaintiff David
D. Stanfield’s (“Plaintiff”) Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6) and deny Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction and Emergency TRO (ECF No. 7). Plaintiff timely filed Objections to
the R&R (ECF No. 19). The Court has carefully reviewed and considered the entire record,
including Plaintiff’s Objections, and finds that the Magistrate Judge fairly and accurately
summarized the relevant facts and applied the correct principles of law. Accordingly, the Court
hereby adopts the Magistrate Judge’s R&R and incorporates it into this Order.1 Further, for the
reasons detailed below, the Court declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his Amended
Complaint.
______________________________________________________________________________
1. On May 12, 2014, the same day that the Magistrate Judge issued the R&R, Defendants Kristi L. Harrington and
Thomas L. Hughston, Jr. (collectively “Judicial Defendants”) filed a Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 10) pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Because the Court hereby adopts the R&R and dismisses
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint, the Court need not separately address the Judicial Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation
has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with
the Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). Parties are allowed to make a
written objection to the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and recommendations within
fourteen days after being served a copy of the R&R. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This Court is
charged with conducting a de novo review of any portion of the R&R to which a specific
objection is registered, and the Court may accept, reject, or modify the R&R’s findings and
recommendations in whole or in part. Id. Additionally, the Court may receive additional
evidence or recommit the matter to the Magistrate Judge with instructions. Id. A party’s failure
to object is accepted as an agreement with the conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). In the absence of a timely filed, specific objection—or as to those
portions of the R&R to which no specific objection is made—this Court “must ‘only satisfy itself
that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.’”
Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.
R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee note).
DISCUSSION2
I.
R&R
As an initial matter, the Court notes that it has taken great strides to liberally construe the
often-contradictory, if not incomprehensible, arguments and assertions both in Plaintiff’s
Amended Complaint and in his Objections to the Magistrate Judge’s R&R. Compare, e.g., Pl.’s
______________________________________________________________________________
2. The Magistrate Judge’s R&R sets forth in sufficient detail the relevant facts of this case, including citations to
the record. Because Plaintiff did not object to the Magistrate Judge’s factual recitation and because the Court finds
that the Magistrate Judge’s factual recitation accurately reflects the record, the Court adopts the Magistrate Judge’s
proposed findings and summary of the relevant facts for purposes of this Order. Thus, the Court sees no need to
repeat or restate the relevant facts and procedural history of this case.
2
Objections 1, ¶ 1 (“THIS IS AN INDEPENDENT ACTION attacking the validity of a prior
judg[]ment, an equitable proceeding.” (emphasis added)), with id. at 3, ¶ 12 (“In this
Independent action the Plaintiff is not contesting the validity of the State judg[]ments . . . .”
(emphasis added)). Nevertheless, the Court cannot ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set
forth a claim cognizable in a federal district court. See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d
387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990). Stated simply, after conducting a de novo review of those portions of
the Magistrate Judge’s R&R to which Plaintiff lodged specific objections, the Court finds no
basis to reject, modify, or set aside the R&R’s findings and recommendations either in whole or
in part. In his Objections, aside from referencing, restating, and relying upon the allegations in
his Original and Amended Complaints, Plaintiff primarily attempts to emphasize the independent
and equitable nature of the present action. However, for the various reasons set forth in the
R&R, and explained in great detail by the Magistrate Judge, Plaintiff’s arguments in this regard
are unavailing. Therefore, having reviewed the record, including Plaintiff’s Objections, de novo,
the Court concludes that the Magistrate Judge fairly summarized the relevant facts, extensively
outlined the corresponding principles of law, and correctly applied those principles to the facts at
hand. Accordingly, the Court accepts and adopts the Magistrate Judge’s thorough and wellreasoned R&R and fully incorporates it into this Order.
II.
Motion to Amend
On May 22, 2014, the day after he filed his Objections to the R&R, Plaintiff filed a
document styled as “Plaintiff’s Second Amendment to Complaint.” (ECF No. 21). Plaintiff has
already amended his Original Complaint and all Parties have responded, either by way of an
Answer or Motion to Dismiss. Thus, Plaintiff may file his Second Amendment to Complaint
only with Defendants’ written consent or the Court’s leave. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1), (2).
3
Because Defendants oppose Plaintiff’s proffered amendment, the Court will construe Plaintiff’s
Second Amendment to Complaint as a Motion to Amend his Amended Complaint (“Motion to
Amend”).
The amendment of pleadings is governed by Rule 15 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Where, as here, a party seeks to amend his complaint more than once as a matter of
course, Rule 15(a)(2) permits amendment only with the defendant’s written consent or the
court’s leave. However, Rule 15(a)’s “permissive standard” provides that such leave should be
freely given by the court “when justice so requires.” Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Hernshaw
Partners, LLC, 984 F. Supp. 2d 589, 592 (S.D.W. Va. 2013) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2)).
“This liberal rule gives effect to the federal policy in favor of resolving cases on their merits
instead of disposing of them on technicalities.” Laber v. Harvey, 438 F.3d 404, 426 (4th Cir.
2006) (en banc); see Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 48 (1957). Upholding the letter and the
spirit of this rule, “leave to amend a pleading should be denied only when the amendment would
be prejudicial to the opposing party, there has been bad faith on the part of the moving party, or
the amendment would be futile.” Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 242 (4th Cir.
1999) (quoting Johnson v. Oroweat Foods Co., 785 F.2d 503, 509 (4th Cir. 1986)); see Equal
Rights Ctr. v. Niles Bolton Assocs., 602 F.3d 597, 603 (4th Cir. 2010). The grant or denial of a
motion for leave to amend a pleading is committed to the sound discretion of the trial court. See
Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Equal Rights Ctr., 602 F.3d at 603.
Notwithstanding Rule 15(a)’s permissive standard, as well as the liberal-construction
requirement for pro se pleadings, the Court concludes that granting Plaintiff leave to amend his
Amended Complaint is not appropriate under the circumstances. Having carefully reviewed
Plaintiff’s proffered amendment, the Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend on the basis of
4
futility. For leave to amend to be denied for futility, the amendment must be “clearly insufficient
or frivolous on its face.” Johnson, 785 F.2d at 510. “Futility is apparent if the proposed
amended complaint fails to state a claim under the applicable rules and accompanying standards:
‘[A] district court may deny leave if amending the complaint would be futile—that is, if the
proposed amended complaint fails to satisfy the requirements of the federal rules.’” Katyle v.
Penn Nat’l Gaming, Inc., 637 F.3d 462, 471 (4th Cir. 2011) (alteration in original) (quoting
United States ex rel. Wilson v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 525 F.3d 370, 376 (4th Cir. 2008)).
Therefore, the futility analysis under Rule 15(a) necessarily requires a preliminary assessment of
the allegations of the proposed amendment in light of the substantive law on which the additional
claim is based. Rambus, Inc. v. Infineon Techs., AG, 304 F. Supp. 2d 812, 819 (E.D. Va. 2004).
Based on a review of Plaintiff’s filing, which this Court has construed as a Motion to
Amend, it appears that Plaintiff’s proffered amendment is effectively the same as his Amended
Complaint and nearly identical to his Objections to the R&R. Thus, in the present case, both the
undersigned and the Magistrate Judge have had the occasion to perform the requisite preliminary
assessment of the allegations of Plaintiff’s proposed amendment. In his Motion to Amend,
Plaintiff primarily attempts to “clarify[] the intent of this action for the [C]ourt[’]s evaluation of
[s]tanding purposes,” by narrowing his requested remedies, omitting his previous prayer for
injunctive relief and seeking only declaratory relief with regard to the Judicial Defendants.3
(Pl.’s Mot. to Amend 1). However, the Magistrate Judge’s R&R, which this Court adopts,
expressly states that “summary dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against [the Judicial Defendants]
for declaratory relief is appropriate in this case.” (R&R 12). Accordingly, even under the less
______________________________________________________________________________
3. Although Plaintiff asks the Court to “find Defendants guilty under the 14th amendment due process regulation
as well as 18 U.S.C. § 371 and render Judg[]ments to Plaintiff from Defendants Wigger, Hattaway[,] and Reeves
equal to those granted by the State court to create an equitable balance,” (Pl.’s Mot. to Amend 3), this too is
substantially similar to the relief requested in Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint and addressed by the Magistrate Judge
in the R&R.
5
stringent standard governing pro se parties and their pleadings, Plaintiff’s proposed amendment
is “clearly insufficient [and] frivolous on its face.” Johnson, 785 F.2d at 510.4 Therefore, the
Court denies Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge’s R&R.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint is DISMISSED.
It is
THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Emergency
TRO is DENIED. It is FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend is DENIED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
January 5, 2015
Charleston, South Carolina
______________________________________________________________________________
4. Because the Court concludes that Plaintiff’s Motion to Amend should be, and is, denied on the basis of futility,
the Court need not discuss whether the requested amendment would be prejudicial to Defendants or whether there
has been bad faith on the part of Plaintiff. However, the Court nevertheless notes that granting leave to amend
would severely prejudice Defendants.
6
Disclaimer: Justia Dockets & Filings provides public litigation records from the federal appellate and district courts. These filings and docket sheets should not be considered findings of fact or liability, nor do they necessarily reflect the view of Justia.
Why Is My Information Online?