Mother Doe 203 v. Berkeley County School District et al

Filing 21

ORDER granting 9 Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. Signed by Honorable Patrick Michael Duffy on 10/14/2015.(adeh, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
Mother Doe 203, on her own behalf
and on behalf of her minor child, Jane
Doe 203,

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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Berkeley County School District and
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James Spencer,
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Defendants.
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____________________________________)

C.A. No.: 2:14-cv-3575-PMD
ORDER

This matter is before the Court on Defendant James Spencer’s Motion for Judgment on
the Pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (ECF No. 9). For
the reasons set forth herein, the Court grants Spencer’s motion and dismisses the claim that
Plaintiff Mother Doe 203 (“Mother”) has asserted against Spencer.
BACKGROUND/PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Mother’s daughter, Jane Doe, attended Marrington Middle School in Goose Creek, South
Carolina from 2012 to 2014. During that time, Spencer was Marrington’s principal.
In February 2013, one of Jane Doe’s male classmates began sexually molesting her.
Later that month, Mother met with Spencer and other employees of Defendant Berkeley County
School District (“District”). In the meeting, Mother told them that the classmate was abusing
Jane Doe and had also abused other female students. Mother demanded that Jane Doe be
protected from her classmate.
After that meeting, “Spencer took no action to protect Jane Doe” from her abusive
classmate. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1, at ¶ 19.) Instead of investigating Mother’s complaint or

protecting Jane Doe from further abuse, he “made a conscious decision to not restrict the male
student’s contact with Jane Doe.” (Id. at ¶ 48.) Spencer left Jane Doe in class with her abuser
for the rest of the 2012–2013 school year. During that time, the male student abused Jane Doe
again on multiple occasions.
For the 2013–2014 school year, Spencer “permitted Jane Doe to be assigned to be in the
same class as” the male student. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1, at ¶ 49.) The classmate continued to
abuse Jane Doe until he was eventually removed from the school in 2014.
Mother contends Spencer’s “inaction . . . created opportunity for the male student to
sexually exploit Jane Doe.” (Compl., ECF No. 1-1, at ¶ 52.) Because Spencer and other District
employees took “no action to effectively restrain” the abusive classmate, (id. at ¶ 24), Mother
sued the District and Spencer in state court. She asserted a claim against the District for
violation of Title IX, 20 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq., and two state-law claims for gross negligence and
loss of services. She also asserted one claim against Spencer for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
Defendants removed the case to this Court and then filed an answer. On June 12, 2015,
Spencer moved for judgment on the pleadings. Mother filed a Response in opposition on July 2.
Spencer filed a Reply on July 20. This matter is now ripe for consideration.
JURISDICTION
The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over Mother’s two federal-law claims pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a), the Court exercises jurisdiction over Mother’s
two related state-law claims because they are so related to the federal-law claims that they form
part of the same case and controversy.

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STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion for judgment on the pleadings is designed to “dispos[e] of cases in which there
is no substantive dispute that warrants the litigants and the court proceeding further.” 5C Charles
A. Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 1368 (3d ed. 2004). A district court
reviewing a Rule 12(c) motion applies the same standard that it applies to motions made under
Rule 12(b)(6). Drager v. PLIVA USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 470, 474 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Butler v.
United States, 702 F.3d 749, 751–52 (4th Cir. 2012)). Therefore, a motion for judgment on the
pleadings should be granted only “‘if, after accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the
plaintiff’s complaint as true and drawing all reasonable factual inferences from those facts in the
plaintiff’s favor, it appears certain that the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of his
claim entitling him to relief.’” Id. (quoting Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 244
(4th Cir. 1999)).
DISCUSSION
Spencer argues the Court should dismiss Mother’s § 1983 claim because he is entitled to
qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is “an entitlement not to stand trial or face the other
burdens of litigation.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Analyzing an assertion of
qualified immunity involves two steps. First, the court must “determine whether the plaintiff has
alleged the deprivation of an actual constitutional right at all.” Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286,
290 (1999). If she has not, the analysis ends there because her § 1983 claim fails. See id.
However, if she has, the court then “determine[s] whether that right was clearly established at the
time of the alleged violation.” Id. The answer to that question determines whether the defendant
has to defend against the § 1983 claim. See id. As explained below, Mother’s claim cannot
survive the first step of the Conn analysis.

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“Section 1983 imposes liability on state actors who cause the ‘deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution.’” Doe v. Rosa, 795 F.3d 429, 436 (4th
Cir. 2015) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1983). “[T]hese constitutional rights include a Fourteenth
Amendment substantive due process right against state actor conduct that deprives an individual
of bodily integrity. Accordingly, state actions that result in sexual abuse of children can be
actionable under § 1983.” Id. at 436–37 (internal citation omitted).
However, when a private actor perpetrates the sexual abuse, state actor liability for such
harm “is significantly limited.” Rosa, 795 F.3d at 437. The Due Process Clause, on which
Mother’s § 1983 claim is based, does not “impose an affirmative obligation on the State” to
“protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion by private actors.”
DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 195 (1989). “As a general
matter, then, . . . a State’s failure to protect an individual against private violence simply does not
constitute a violation of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 197; see also id.at 196–97 (stating that
because “the Due Process Clause does not require the State to provide its citizens with particular
protective services, it follows that the State cannot be held liable under the Clause for injuries
that could have been averted had it chosen to provide them”); H.B. ex rel. C.B. v. State Bd. of
Educ., No. 4:14-cv-204-BO, 2015 WL 2193778, at *3 (E.D.N.C. May 11, 2015) (“The Due
Process Clause does not transform every tort committed by a state actor into a constitutional
violation.” (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202)).
DeShaney left open “two narrow circumstances” in which a state actor can be liable
under § 1983 for privately caused harm. Rosa, 795 F.3d at 437. One of those circumstances
arises in what is called the “state-created danger” doctrine. See id. at 438. Under the doctrine, a
state actor is liable for actively creating or contributing to a dangerous situation that resulted in a

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private person harming the plaintiff. See Pinder v. Johnson, 54 F.3d 1169, 1177 (4th Cir. 1995)
(en banc).

Under such circumstances, the state actor is liable because his creation of, or

contribution to, the danger is “akin to . . . directly causing harm to the injured party.” Id. Mother
bases her § 1983 claim on this doctrine.
“[T]o establish § 1983 liability based on a state-created danger theory, a plaintiff must
show that the state actor created or increased the risk of private danger, and did so directly
through affirmative acts, not merely through inaction or omission.” Rosa, 795 F.3d at 439.
Affirmative conduct by the state actor is a key requirement of the doctrine. Id. at 440 (citing
Butera v. District of Columbia, 235 F.3d 637, 650 (D.C. Cir. 2001)); see also DeShaney, 489
U.S. at 200 (observing “it is the State’s affirmative act” that “trigger[s] the protections of the Due
Process Clause”). Failing to defuse a preexisting danger is not an affirmative act under the
doctrine. See Rosa, 795 F.2d at 440 (holding college president was not liable for state-created
danger where, “at worst, he failed to take actions that might have removed [the victims] from an
ongoing danger that had been present for a long time”); Butera, 235 F.3d at 650 (“No
constitutional liability exists where the State actors ‘had no hand in creating the danger but
[simply] stood by and did nothing when suspicious circumstances dictated a more active role for
them.’” (quoting Reed v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1122, 1125 (7th Cir. 1993)) (alteration in Butera));
Sargi v. Kent City Bd. of Educ., 70 F.3d 907, 913 (6th Cir. 1995) (affirming summary judgment
where there was “no evidence that the Board took any affirmative action that exposed decedent
to any danger to which she was not already exposed”). Moreover, affirmative conduct alone
does not necessarily translate to liability. The conduct must either create the risk of private harm
or increase that risk. Rosa, 795 F.3d at 439. Accordingly, an act that does not increase the risk
of harm from a preexisting danger cannot trigger liability under the doctrine. See id. (“As

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DeShaney makes clear, allowing continued exposure to an existing danger by failing to intervene
is not the equivalent of creating or increasing the risk of that danger.”); Armijo ex rel. Chavez v.
Wagon Mound Pub. Sch., 159 F.3d 1253, 1263 (10th Cir. 1998) (“[I]f the danger to the plaintiff
existed prior to the state’s intervention, then even if the state put the plaintiff back in that same
danger, the state would not be liable because it could not have created a danger that already
existed.”).
These narrow contours of the state-created danger doctrine create a “demanding standard
for constitutional liability.” Sargi, 70 F.3d at 913; see also Rosa, 795 F.3d at 439 (stating that
DeShaney and Pinder set “narrow limits” on the doctrine). Mother’s allegations against Spencer
do not meet that standard.
The Complaint makes clear that Mother’s § 1983 claim is premised on Spencer’s inaction
after the February 2013 meeting.

Allegations of “inaction” and “failure to act” appear

throughout the Complaint. For example, Mother alleges that “Spencer took no action to protect
Jane Doe” from her classmate; that Spencer “left the abusive male student in the class where the
abuse had occurred”; that Spencer’s “inaction . . . created opportunity for the male student to
sexually exploit Jane Doe”; and that Spencer failed to investigate Mother’s complaints and take
appropriate action. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1, at ¶¶ 19, 49, 52.)

She also alleges that by “failing to

act,” Spencer gave the male student additional opportunities to harm Jane Doe and that “by his
inaction,” Spencer “assisted” the student in harming Jane Doe.

(Id. at ¶¶ 56, 62, 65.)

Essentially, Mother’s claim is that Spencer maintained the status quo for the rest of one school
year and into the next one. None of this alleged inaction constitutes an affirmative act, and it
neither created nor increased Jane Doe’s preexisting risk of being harmed by her classmate.

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Mother also contends Spencer “made a conscious decision to not restrict the male
student’s contact with Jane Doe” and that in the 2013–2014 school year, Spencer “permitted” 1
Jane Doe and her abuser to be in class together again. (Compl., ECF No. 1-1, at ¶¶ 48, 49.)
Those decisions, however, do not constitute state-created danger because they neither created
Jane Doe’s danger nor increased the risk of that danger. At most, Mother has alleged that at the
beginning of the 2013–2014 school year, Spencer participated in a student assignment decision
that put Jane Doe back into the same danger she faced the prior academic year. As mentioned
above, returning someone to a preexisting danger does not create § 1983 liability. See Armijo,
159 F.3d at 1263; see also Rosa, 795 F.3d at 440 (citing Armijo). Mother does not allege
anything about the classmate’s post-meeting abuse of Jane Doe that had not already been
occurring before the February 2003 meeting. See Rosa, 795 F.3d at 440 (“There was simply
nothing new about ReVille’s perverted abuse of the Does in the summer of 2007 that had not
already been occurring . . . .”). As such, Spencer’s alleged conduct placed Jane Doe in “‘no
worse position than that in which [she] would have been had [Spencer] not acted at all.’” Id.
(quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201).
Finally, Mother makes several direct allegations that Spencer created the danger for Jane
Doe or increased its risk. Specifically, Mother alleges Spencer “created . . . the danger of
enabling the male student’s continuing access to Jane Doe.” (Compl., ECF No. 1-1, at ¶ 54.) As
discussed above, allowing the status quo to continue is not a state-created danger. She also
alleges that “by taking no effective action to limit the male student’s conduct” after the February
2013 meeting, Spencer increased Jane Doe’s risk of harm. (Id. at ¶ 66.) Again, however,
______________________________________________________________________________
1. Mother’s use of “permitted” in the Complaint creates an ambiguity. She could be alleging that Spencer actively
made the final decision for Jane Doe to spend the 2013–2014 school year in a classroom with the male student.
Alternatively, Mother may be alleging that Spencer passively failed to intervene in someone else’s class assignment
decision. However, because neither of those meanings would result in a sufficiently pled claim, the Court need not
decide which of them is more favorable to Mother.

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Spencer’s failure to separate Jane Doe and her abuser does not create § 1983 liability. See
Stevenson ex rel. Stevenson v. Martin Cty. Bd. of Educ., 3 F. App’x 25, 31 (4th Cir. 2001) (per
curiam) (“Liability does not arise when the state stands by and does nothing in the face of
danger.”). Using the words “create” and “increase” does not transform Spencer’s omissions into
state-created danger. See Pinder, 54 F.3d at 1175 (“No amount of semantics can disguise the
fact that the real ‘affirmative act’ here was committed by [a private actor], not by [the
defendant]. . . . [T]he state did not ‘create’ the danger, it simply failed to provide adequate
protection from it.”).
Based on the above, the Court holds that Mother has not alleged facts sufficient to
support her § 1983 claim against Spencer. In so holding, the Court has taken into account H.B.
ex rel. C.B. v. State Board of Education, a recent district court opinion on which Mother relies.
H.B. involved one student at a school for the deaf abusing another. 2015 WL 2193778, at *1.
The abuse began with C.B., a day student at the school, being bullied by another student. Id.
C.B.’s parents later considered enrolling C.B. as a residential student, which would involve him
living in a school dormitory five nights per week. Id. However, they expressed to school
officials their concerns that the other student would bully C.B. Id. The officials assured C.B.’s
parents that if they enrolled C.B., he and the other student would be separated whenever
possible, and so C.B.’s parents enrolled him in the residential program. Id. On C.B.’s first night
in the dorm, a school employee assigned him to the same room as his bully. Id. C.B. asked to be
moved to a different room, but his request was denied. Id. The next night, his bully raped him
repeatedly and threatened to kill him if he tried to get help. Id. C.B.’s father sued, asserting a
state-created danger § 1983 claim. Id. at *3. The defendants moved to dismiss under Rule
12(b)(6), but the district court denied the motion. Id. at *1, *3–4. Taking the complaint’s facts

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to be true, the court held the defendants created an “increased opportunity of contact” by placing
C.B. and the bully in a room without any supervision “for an extended period overnight.” Id. at
*4.
The allegations in H.B. differ significantly from what Mother alleges. In H.B., the
defendants promised to protect the victim and then turned daytime schoolmates into
unsupervised roommates, thereby increasing the one student’s opportunities to brutalize the
other. No such transformation occurred here. Spencer is accused of letting classmates stay
classmates. That neither created the danger of Jane Doe’s abuse nor increased the risk of it. At
most, Spencer twice put Jane Doe “back in that same danger,” Armijo, 159 F.3d at 1263, that she
faced before the February 2013 meeting. Thus, H.B. does not support Mother’s claim.
The Court does not condone Spencer’s alleged course of inaction. However, because
Mother has failed to allege that Spencer committed a Due Process violation, the Court grants
Spencer’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The Court declines to address the second part
of Spencer’s qualified immunity argument. See Rosa, 795 F.3d at 442 n.10 (declining to address
remainder of defendant’s qualified immunity argument because plaintiffs failed to establish a
violation of their constitutional rights).
CONCLUSION
Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Defendant James Spencer’s
Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings is GRANTED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

October 14, 2015
Charleston, South Carolina

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