Williams v. International House of Pancakes LLC et al
Filing
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ORDER granting in part and denying in part 34 Motion to Dismiss; adopting Report and Recommendations re 41 Report and Recommendation. Signed by Honorable David C Norton on 1/25/16.(elim, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
AMY WILLIAMS,
)
)
Plaintiff,
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vs.
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MKKM, INC., EAGLE’S LANDING
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RESTAURANTS, LLC (IHOP), EAGLE’S )
LANDING RESTAURANTS, INC.,
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EAGLE’S LANDING INTERNATIONAL, )
LLC, IHOP #3141 MKKM, INC., and,
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IHOP #3141 MKKM INC. 200602183,
)
)
Defendants.
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____________________________________)
No. 2:14-cv-04509-DCN
ORDER
This matter comes before the court on United States Magistrate Judge Bristow
Marchant’s Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) that this court grant in part and deny
in part defendants MKKM, Inc., Eagle’s Landing Restaurants, LLC (IHOP), Eagle’s
Landing Restaurants, Inc., Eagle’s Landing International, LLC, IHOP #3141 MKKM,
Inc., and IHOP #3141 MKKM Inc. 200602183’s (collectively “defendants”) partial
motion to dismiss plaintiff Amy Williams’s (“Williams”) second, third, and fourth causes
of action pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b). Specifically, the magistrate
judge recommends that this court grant defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Williams’s
third and fourth causes of action for violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act and for
negligent supervision/retention, but deny defendants’ motion to dismiss as to Williams’s
second cause of action under the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act. For the reasons
set forth below, the court adopts the R&R in full and grants defendants’ motion to
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dismiss Williams’s third and fourth causes of action, but denies defendants’ motion to
dismiss Williams’s second cause of action.
I. BACKGROUND
Williams alleges that on or about November 2013, she began working for
defendants at the IHOP location on Center Point Drive in North Charleston, South
Carolina. Am Compl. ¶ 10. Williams alleges that immediately upon her employment,
her supervisor, Assistant Manager Lamont (“Lamont”), subjected her to inappropriate
sexual advances, comments, and gestures. Id. ¶ 11. Williams alleges that Lamont
continued to sexually harass her, verbally and physically, despite her asking him to stop,
pushing his hands off of her, and threatening to report him. Id. ¶ 12.
Williams alleges that on numerous occasions in November 2013, she reported
Lamont’s behavior to Supervisor Angela Smith (“Smith”), the corporate office, a shift
manager, and a district manager. Id. ¶ 13. Williams claims that defendants “began
treating [her] harshly in retaliation for reporting the lewd and inappropriate behavior” and
immediately placed her on suspension. Id. Williams alleges that when she “showed
during her regular [sic] schedules hours to work . . . [she] would not be allowed to clock
in until there was a table available to serve.” Id. Williams further alleges that she was
forced to continue to work with Lamont even though his harassment and inappropriate
behavior continued. Id. ¶ 15. In February 2013, Williams alleges that defendants
retaliated against her after she notified another co-worker of the continuing sexual
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harassment. Id. According to Williams, she was constructively discharged on February
22, 2013.1
Williams filed the present action on November 24, 2014 and filed an amended
complaint on April 9, 2015. Williams brings the following causes of action: (1) sexual
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964; (2) violation of
the South Carolina Payment of Wages Act (“SCPWA”); (3) violation of the Fair Labor
Standards Act (“FLSA”); and (4) negligent retention. On May 5, 2015, defendants filed a
partial motion to dismiss Williams’s second, third, and fourth causes of action.
Defendants argue that: (1) Williams’s SCPWA claim must be dismissed because
Williams does not allege that defendants violated a policy or employment agreement
provision; (2) Williams’s FLSA claim must be dismissed because she fails to allege that
she worked more than 40 hours in a week or that defendants reduced her wages below the
federal minimum requirement; and (3) Williams’s negligent retention claim must be
dismissed because it is barred by the South Carolina Workers’ Compensation Act, which
provides the exclusive remedy for personal injuries arising in the course and scope of
employment. Defs.’ Mot. 2. Williams filed a response in opposition to defendants’
motion to dismiss on May 22, 2015. The magistrate judge issued an R&R on September
24, 2015. Defendants filed objections to the R&R on October 13, 2015, specifically
objecting to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the court deny defendants’
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Although the amended complaint alleges that Williams was constructively
discharged in February 2013, it also alleges that Williams did not begin work until
November 2013. Resolution of this issue is not dispositive to the present motion, and the
court will assume that the inconsistency is the result of a clerical error.
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motion to dismiss Williams’s SCPWA claim. Williams did not file objections to the
R&R.2 The motion has been fully briefed and is now ripe for the court’s review.
II. STANDARDS
This court is charged with conducting a de novo review of any portion of the
magistrate judge’s R&R to which specific, written objections are made. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). A party’s failure to object is accepted as agreement with the conclusions of
the magistrate judge. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 149–50 (1985). In absence of a
timely filed objection to a magistrate judge’s R&R, this court need not conduct a de novo
review, but instead must “only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the
record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins.
Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s
note). The recommendation of the magistrate judge carries no presumptive weight, and
the responsibility to make a final determination rests with this court. Mathews v. Weber,
423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). The court may adopt the portions of the R&R to which the
plaintiff did not object, as a party’s failure to object is accepted as agreement with the
conclusions of the magistrate judge. Thomas, 474 U.S. at 149–50. This court may
accept, reject, or modify the report of the magistrate judge, in whole or in part, or may
recommit the matter to him with instructions for further consideration. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1).
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Williams did not object to the magistrate judge’s recommendation that the court
dismiss her third and fourth causes of action. After reviewing the record for clear error
and finding none, the court adopts the R&R as it pertains to Williams’s third and fourth
causes of action for negligent retention/supervision and violation of the FLSA.
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Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss for
“failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” When considering a Rule
12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court must accept the plaintiff’s factual allegations as true
and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours
& Co. v. Kolon Indus., 637 F.3d 435, 440 (4th Cir. 2011). But “the tenet that a court
must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal
conclusions.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
On a motion to dismiss, the court’s task is limited to determining whether the
complaint states a “plausible claim for relief.” Id. at 679. A complaint must contain
sufficient factual allegations in addition to legal conclusions. Although Rule 8(a)(2)
requires only a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief,” “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). The “complaint must contain
sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “Facts pled that are
‘merely consistent with’ liability are not sufficient.” A Soc’y Without a Name v.
Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 346 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678).
III. DISCUSSION
Williams alleges that when she “showed during her regular [sic] scheduled work
hours to work[, she] would not be allowed to clock in until there was a table available to
serve.” Am. Compl. ¶ 13. Williams further alleges that she “was scheduled to come into
work and made to sit and not work with any pay until there was a table available to
serve.” Id. ¶ 18; see also id. ¶¶ 38–40.
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“The SCPWA prohibits employers from unilaterally withholding an employee’s
wages unless the employer has given written notification to the employee of the amount
and terms of the deductions.” Visco v. Aiken Cty., S.C., 974 F. Supp. 2d 908, 920
(D.S.C. 2013) (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 41–10–40(C) (Supp. 2011)). “‘Wages’ means all
amounts at which labor rendered is recompensed, whether the amount is fixed or
ascertained on a time, task, piece, or commission basis, or other method of calculating the
amount and includes vacation, holiday, and sick leave payments which are due to an
employee under any employer policy or employment contract.” Id. (citing S.C. Code
Ann. § 41–10–10)). Therefore, the SCPWA provides relief for an employer’s failure to
pay wages in accordance with its own policies. See id. (granting the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment as it pertained to a SCPWA claim because “the SCPWA only
required that it pay [p]laintiffs benefit days in accordance with or as set forth in its
ordinances”).
The magistrate judge found Williams’s allegations that defendants retaliated
against her by making her sit and wait for a table without paying her sufficient to state a
claim for violation of the SCPWA. R&R 4–6 (citing Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 18, 38–40). The
magistrate judge stated the following: While [defendants] may or may not be able to
ultimately prevail on this claim at summary judgment or trial, when evidence has been
presented with respect to this claim, the undersigned does not find that this claim is
subject to dismissal on a Rule 12 motion at this time.” Id. at 5 (emphasis in original).
Defendants argue that “an employee’s failure to allege a violation of an employer pay
policy or an employment contract is not a defense to a SCPWA cause of action” but
rather is a necessary element that the employee must allege in order to state a claim
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against an employer. Defs.’ Obj. 5. Defendants argue that Williams’s SCPWA claim
must be dismissed because she failed to make such an allegation.
The court agrees with the magistrate judge and finds that Williams has alleged
sufficient facts to state a plausible claim for relief. Defendants do not cite a single case in
which a court dismissed a SCPWA claim because the plaintiff failed to state that the
defendants conduct violated a specific policy or employment contract provision. Further,
the court’s research did not reveal such a case. In support of their objections, defendants
cite Visco, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 920, in which the court granted summary judgment on a
SCPWA claim because there was no evidence to support a finding that the defendant
unjustifiably retained the plaintiff’s wages as required under its own ordinances.3
However, unlike the procedural posture of this case, Visco involved a motion for
summary judgment and not a motion to dismiss. Unlike the court in Visco, this court is
only required to determine—viewing the allegations as true and drawing all reasonable
inferences in Williams’s favor—whether the allegations contained in the complaint state
a plausible claim for relief.
Williams alleges that her employer forced her to sit and wait for a table to serve
before she could clock in and was thereby deprived of wages due in violation of S.C.
Code Ann. § 41-10-10. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 13, 18, 38–40. Therefore, Williams alleges
that she was an employee as defined under the SCPWA, that defendants are an employer
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Defendants also cite Rice v. Multimedia, Inc., 456 S.E.2d 381, 384 (S.C. 1995), in
support of their objections. Defs.’ Obj. 6. The court in Rice simply recognized that an
employer may establish policies that determine what wages are “due” under the SCPWA.
Id. Rice does not, however, stand for the proposition that a plaintiff’s failure to
specifically allege that the defendant’s conduct violated a policy or contract provision
warrants dismissal.
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as defined under the SCPWA, and that defendants failed to pay her all of the wages she
was due in violation of the SCPWA. Construing all allegations and inferences in the light
most favorable to Williams, the court finds that the allegations state a plausible claim
under the SCPWA sufficient to withstand defendants’ motion to dismiss.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the court ADOPTS the R&R and GRANTS
defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s third and fourth causes of action, but DENIES
defendants’ motion to dismiss plaintiff’s second cause of action
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
January 25, 2016
Charleston, South Carolina
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