Langston v. Georgetown City Police Department et al

Filing 62

ORDER adopting 54 Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Mary Gordon Baker; denying 40 Motion for Summary Judgment. Signed by Honorable Richard M Gergel on 3/25/2016.(ssam, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT C6BR:~'fD CLeRK'S OFFICE
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

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Johnny Wayne Langston,
Plaintiff,

v.

Ofc. Bert Adams,
Defendant.

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ORDER

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This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation ("R & R") of the
Magistrate Judge recommending that the Court deny Defendant's motion for summary judgment.
(Dkt. No. 54 at 1). Defendant has filed objections to the Magistrate Judge's recommendation.
(Dkt. No. 40). For the reasons set forth below, the Court ADOPTS the R & R as the order of the
Court. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied.
Legal Standard

The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The recommendation
has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with
this Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261,270-71 (1976). This Court is charged with making
a de novo determination of those portions of the R&R to which specific objection is made.
Additionally, the Court may "accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or
recommendations made by the magistrate judge." 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This Court may also
"receive further evidence or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions." Id.
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is
appropriate if a party "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact" and that the
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). In other words,
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summary judgment should be granted "only when it is clear that there is no dispute concerning
either the facts of the controversy or the inferences to be drawn from those facts." Pulliam Inv.
Co. v. Cameo Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4 th Cir. 1987). "In determining whether a genuine

issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities in favor of the
nonmoving party." HealthSouth Rehab. Hosp. v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 101 F.3d 1005, 108 (4 th
Cir. 1996). The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating
to the court that there is no issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 u.s. 317,323
(1986).
Once the moving party has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to
survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his
pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate that specific, material
facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, "[c]onc1usory or speculative
allegations do not suffice, nor does a 'mere scintilla of evidence'" in support of the non-moving
party's case. Thompson v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 312 F.3d 645, 649 (4 th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Phillips v. CSX Transp., Inc., 190 F.3d 285,287 (4th Cir. 1999».

Background

Plaintiff is an inmate at Georgetown County Detention Center. He brings a claim
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that Defendant used excessive force against him while
Plaintiff was handcuffed in the back of a police car. (Dkt. No.1 at 3-4). He specifically alleges
that Defendant "grabbed [him] by the throat with excessive force and choked [him] for several
seconds until [he] almost passed out." (Id. at 3). Plaintiff reported the incident to the
Georgetown Police Department and the State Law Enforcement Division. (Dkt. No. 46-2 at 3).

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Because he alleges he had difficulty talking and breathing after the incident, he was examined by
a physician. (Dkt. No. 46-2 at 2).
Defendant subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that Plaintiff had
recanted the allegations in his complaint in a letter to Defendant. (Dkt. No. 40). Plaintiff filed a
response, denying that the letter recanted his allegations and instead maintained the allegations in
the Complaint are true. (Dkt. No. 46).
The Magistrate Judge issued an R & R recommending that the Court deny Defendant's
motion for summary judgment. (Dkt. No. 54 at 5). Defendant timely filed objections. (Dkt. No.
59).
Discussion

For the reasons stated in the R & R, the Court agrees with the Magistrate Judge that
Plaintiff has produced sufficient evidence such that a reasonable jury could find his allegations
credible. (Dkt. No. 54 at 3-5). The facts alleged in the complaint, the videos, and the audio from
the incident, when taken together, create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether
Defendant used excessive force. In the light most favorable to Plaintiff, the facts could support a
finding of excessive force. Accordingly, summary judgment is not appropriate at this juncture.
(Dkt. No. 54 at 4-5). Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (in ruling on
summary judgment, "the nonmoving party's evidence is to be believed, and all justifiable
inferences are to be drawn in that party's favor.")
Defendant has filed two objections to the R & R. (Dkt. No. 59). Defendant's first
objection asserts that Plaintiff has not provided credible evidence of any injury as a result of
Defendant's actions. (Dkt. No. 59 at 4-5). The Court is satisfied that Plaintiff has alleged, at a
minimum, a de minimis claim for injury based on the alleged choking. De minimis injury does

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not bar a plaintiff from asserting a Fourth Amendment excessive force claim because "the
severity of injury resulting from the force used has always been but one consideration in
determining whether force was excessive." Smith v. Murphy, No. 14-1918,2015 WL 7351758,
at *3 (4th Cir. Nov. 20, 2015) (quoting Jones v. Buchanan, 325 F.3d 520,530 (4th Cir. 2003)
(internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, Defendant's objection does not change the
Count's conclusion that there is sufficient evidence that a reasonable jury could find Plaintiff s
allegations credible.
Defendant's second objection to the R & R asserts that Defendant is entitled to qualified
immunity. (Dkt. No. 59 at 5-7). The Court disagrees. The most PlaintifI-friendly version of
events is that Defendant needlessly choked Plaintiff for several seconds while Plaintiff was
already in handcuffs and sitting in the back of a police car. And the question for the factfinder to
answer is "whether a reasonable officer would have determined that the degree of force used was
justified by the threat presented." Smith, 2015 WL 7351758, at *2. Ifajury were to find
Defendant's use of force to be unreasonable, qualified immunity would not apply because an
excessive use of force such as this falls squarely within the ambit of clearly established law.
Saucier v. Katz, 533

u.s. 194,202 (2001) ("The relevant, dispositive inquiry in determining

whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his
conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted."). Accordingly, Defendant's qualified
immunity objection is without merit.
Conclusion

The Court ADOPTS the Magistrate Judge's R & R, (Dkt. No. 54), as the Order of the
Court. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt. No. 40) is denied.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED

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Ri~.~

United States District Court Judge

March.2S,2016
Charleston, South Carolina

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