Hamilton v. Murray et al

Filing 15

ORDER adopting Report and Recommendations re 9 Report and Recommendation. Signed by Honorable Patrick Michael Duffy on October 14, 2015.(jmcg, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
Gertrude Coretta Fennell Hamilton,
Plaintiff,
v.
Susanna H. Murray; Eric C. Schweitzer;
Catherine B. Templeton (with); Ogletree
Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, PC;
and Deputy Clerk Melissa Newman,
Defendants.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

C.A. No.: 2:15-cv-2085-PMD-MGB

ORDER

Plaintiff Gertrude Coretta Fennell Hamilton, proceeding pro se, brought this civil action
pursuant to Rule 60(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff seeks to vacate an order
and judgment entered in a prior civil action. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local
Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), the action was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for pretrial proceedings and a report and recommendation (“R & R”). This matter comes before the
Court upon Plaintiff’s objections to United States Magistrate Judge Mary Gordon Baker’s
recommendation that the Court dismiss the petition without prejudice and without issuance and
service of process. (ECF Nos. 14 & 9.) For the reasons stated herein, the Court overrules
Plaintiff’s objections, adopts Magistrate Judge Baker’s R & R, and dismisses the action without
prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
BACKGROUND
This action arises out of Plaintiff’s prior claim of employment discrimination against
Dayco Products LLC (“Dayco”), Mark IV Industries (“Mark IV”), and Liberty Mutual Insurance
Company (“Liberty Mutual”). In that suit, Dayco and Mark IV filed a counterclaim against

Plaintiff for overpayment of benefits. That counterclaim is the primary basis of Plaintiff’s
complaint in this action. In 2007, this Court awarded summary judgment to Dayco, Mark IV,
and Liberty Mutual on Plaintiff’s employment discrimination claim. Additionally, Dayco and
Mark IV dismissed their counterclaim with prejudice. In their stipulation of dismissal, Dayco
and Mark IV stated that Plaintiff had consented to the dismissal. Deputy Clerk Melissa Newman
then prepared and filed a judgment on May 21, 2009, stating that the counterclaim was dismissed
by agreement of the parties. Plaintiff alleges that she did not agree to the dismissal of the
counterclaim against her, and that on June 8, 2009, Newman prepared an amended judgment that
dismissed the counterclaim with prejudice. The amended judgment removed the statement that
the counterclaim was dismissed with Plaintiff’s consent. On August 11, 2009, Plaintiff filed a
motion for reconsideration on the basis that she did not agree to dismiss the counterclaim. This
Court denied the motion, and the Fourth Circuit affirmed on appeal.
Plaintiff then filed the present action, in which she seeks to be relieved from the portion
of the judgment dismissing the counterclaim against her with prejudice. Plaintiff also seeks
damages because Defendants perpetrated fraud on the Court. As discussed above, Judge Baker
entered an R & R in the present action, to which Plaintiff filed objections. This matter is now
ripe for consideration.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court. The R & R has no
presumptive weight, and the responsibility for making a final determination remains with the
Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71 (1976). Parties may make written objections to
the Magistrate Judge’s proposed findings and recommendations within fourteen days after being
served with a copy of the R & R. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). This Court must conduct a de novo

2

review of any portion of the R & R to which a specific objection is made, and the Court may
accept, reject, or modify the Magistrate Judge’s findings and recommendations in whole or in
part. Id. Additionally, the Court may receive more evidence or recommit the matter to the
Magistrate Judge with instructions. Id. A party’s failure to object is taken as the party’s
agreement with the Magistrate Judge’s conclusions. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).
Absent a timely, specific objection—or as to those portions of the R & R to which no specific
objection is made—this Court “must ‘only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of
the record in order to accept the recommendation.’” Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins.
Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 advisory committee’s note).
Pro se filings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys, Gordon
v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978), and federal district courts must construe such
pleadings liberally to allow the development of potentially meritorious claims, see Hughes v.
Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980) (per curiam). The liberal construction requirement, however, does
not mean courts can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth claims cognizable in
federal district court. See Weller v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 391 (4th Cir. 1990).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff filed a document titled Amended Objections to Report and Recommendation.
However, Plaintiff failed to make a single objection, much less a specific one. Plaintiff’s
“objections” simply restate the arguments she raised in her complaint. See Cabbagestalk v.
Miller, No. 3:06-1125 SBJRM, 2007 WL 172507, at *3 (D.S.C. Jan. 17, 2007) (stating that the
Court is not required to ignore Plaintiff’s failure to make specific objections where, “Plaintiff’s
response to the R&R merely rehashes . . . many of the same allegations raised in [her]
complaint.”). After reviewing the record, the Court concludes that Magistrate Judge Baker’s R

3

& R accurately analyzes this case and the applicable law and that the R & R makes a proper
recommendation for the disposition of this case. Finding no errors in the R & R, the Court
adopts it and incorporates it by reference into this order.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that Plaintiff’s Objections to Judge Baker’s R
& R are OVERRULED.

The action is hereby dismissed without prejudice, and without

issuance or service of process.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

October 14, 2015
Charleston, South Carolina

4