Brown v. Georgetown et al
Filing
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ORDER Granting 19 Motion for Summary Judgment and Remanding to the Court of Common Pleas for Georgetown County. Signed by Honorable David C Norton on 8/23/16.(vtra, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
MARLIN R. BROWN,
Plaintiff,
v.
CITY OF GEORGETOWN, RICKI
MARTIN, and JACK SCOVILLE, as
the Mayor of Georgetown,
Defendants.
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No. 2:15-cv-02353-DCN
ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendants City of Georgetown (“the City”),
Ricki Martin (“Martin”), and Jack Scoville’s (“the Mayor”) (collectively, “defendants”)
motion for summary judgment. For the reasons set forth below, the court grants
defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim and remands
the case to state court.
I. BACKGROUND
At issue in this case are defendants’ actions with regard to 312 E Street (“the
Property”), a piece of property plaintiff Marlin R. Brown (“Brown”) owns in
Georgetown, South Carolina. Compl. at 2. Brown’s grandfather, Charlie Banks
(“Banks”), originally purchased the Property in 1942. Id. ¶ 15. Banks later died intestate
on July 13, 1988, and Clara May Banks Brown (“Clara”)—Banks’s daughter and
Brown’s mother—inherited the Property as his sole heir. Id. ¶ 20. Clara then deeded the
Property to Brown on August 21, 1989. Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 4, Brown Deed.
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Sometime prior to 1981, the City had a 48-inch corrugated metal storm water
drainage pipe installed on the back portion of the Property. Id. at Ex. 2, 1981 Plat.
Defendants have been unable to locate records of when and by whom the pipe was
installed. Id. at Ex. 13, Cook Dep. at 15, ll. 17–22. Brown’s expert, Joe McCray,
testified that he spoke with several property owners in the area, and they believed the
pipe was installed between 1970 and 1975. Id. at Ex. 10, McCray Dep. at 30, ll. 12–15.
In June 1981, Moore, Gardner & Associates, Inc. prepared a survey or plat for the
Property that showed the “existing 48’ storm sewer” and referenced a “proposed 20’
permanent drainage easement.” 1981 Plat. The plat was filed with the Georgetown
County Clerk of Court on August 25, 1981, and recorded in page 155 of Deed Book 1.
Compl. ¶ 21. On September 2, 1981, the City obtained an easement on the Property from
Clara for the drainage line and recorded it at page 795 of Deed Book 194 on October 5,
1981. Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 3, Easement.
In 1990, Brown applied for and received a building permit to construct a garage
on the rear portion of the Property. Id. at Ex. 5, 1990 Building Permit. Brown applied
for and received another building permit in 1994 that allowed him to convert the upstairs
of the garage into an apartment. Id. at Ex. 6, 1994 Building Permit. Thereafter, Brown
began to notice flooding in his yard and contacted the City in 2012 regarding the ongoing
flooding problems. Pl.’s Resp., Ex. 1, Brown Aff. at 3; Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 9, Brown Dep. at
36. The City sent an engineer to the Property on three or four occasions “to find out how
to get the water out of the yard.” Brown Aff. at 3. On March 1, 2013, Brown filed a
complaint with the City regarding his garage apartment because it began to crack from
the flooding. Defs.’ Mot., Ex. 8, Brown Dep. at 17.
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After contacting employees of the City several times, Brown attended a City
Council meeting to discuss his problems on May 7, 2013. Brown Aff. ¶¶ 21–30. At this
meeting, the City notified Brown of the drainage easement on his property and informed
him that he needed to tear down the back one-third of his garage and apartment for the
City to replace the pipe. Id.; Pl.’s Resp. at 11. Brown spoke with Martin, as well as the
Mayor, about the building permits and easement numerous times leading up to and
following the May 7, 2013 City Council meeting. Brown Aff. ¶¶ 29–41.
Brown filed the instant action in the Court of Common Pleas for Georgetown
County on May 14, 2015, asserting a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against the Mayor and
Martin and alleging inverse condemnation, negligence, and fraud claims against the City.
Compl. 1–2, 7–11. On June 10, 2015, defendants filed a notice of removal of the action
to this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441. ECF No. 1. Following the
completion of discovery, defendants filed the present motion for summary judgment as to
all causes of action on May 9, 2016. ECF No. 19. After receiving multiple extensions,
see ECF Nos. 21, 23, 25, plaintiff filed his response in opposition to the motion for
summary judgment on June 13, 2016. ECF No. 26. The motion has been fully briefed
and is ripe for the court’s review.
II. STANDARD
Summary judgment shall be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of
the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment.”
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). “[S]ummary judgment will
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not lie if the dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that
a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. “[A]t the summary
judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine
the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at
249. The court should view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party and draw all justifiable inferences in its favor. Id. at 255.
“The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of
demonstrating to the district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Major
v. Greenville Hous. Auth., No. 6:12-cv-183, 2012 WL 3000680, at *1 (D.S.C. Apr. 11,
2012). Nevertheless, “when a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made,
the adverse party ‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial.’” Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The plain language of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(c) “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for
discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that
party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322
(1986). “[C]onclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude
the granting of the summary judgment motion.” Major, 2012 WL 2000680, at *1.
III. DISCUSSION
Defendants argue no genuine issue of material fact exists as to any of Brown’s
claims and, therefore, defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Brown, on
the other hand, argues he has submitted sufficient evidence as to each cause of action to
submit this case to a jury.
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A.
Section 1983 Claim Against Martin and the Mayor
Martin and the Mayor argue they are entitled to summary judgment on Brown’s
§ 1983 claim against them because he has failed to allege a constitutional right upon
which they infringed. Def.’s Mot. 7. Brown contends Martin and the Mayor violated his
“constitutional right to property and should be held liable for the treatment of . . . [him]
based on his race.” Pl.’s Resp. 23.
“42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides a civil remedy in federal court for deprivation of
federal rights under color of state law.” Coastland Corp. v. Currituck Cty., 734 F.3d 175,
177 (4th Cir. 1984). Brown appears to bring his § 1983 claim against Martin and the
Mayor in their personal capacities because “[e]ach of the individuals named committed
an act against [him].”1 Pl.’s Resp. 22. “Personal-capacity suits seek to impose liability
upon a governmental official for actions he takes under color of state law.” Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1985). “Official capacity suits, in contrast, ‘generally
represent only another way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is
an agent.’” Id. at 165–66 (quoting Monell v. New York City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436
U.S. 658, 690 n.5 (1978)). “On the merits, to establish personal liability in a § 1983
action, it is enough to show that the official, acting under color of state law, caused the
deprivation of a federal right.” Id. at 166 (emphasis omitted). “A victory in a personal-
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But Brown then goes on to discuss the immunities available to a defendant in an
official-capacity suit. This is a recurring problem throughout the brief: the arguments
are largely conclusory and the precise theory under which he is bringing certain claims is
unclear. In any event, when reviewing his argument as a whole, Brown appears to bring
his § 1983 action against Martin and the Mayor in their personal capacities. Therefore,
the court will analyze this claim accordingly.
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capacity action is a victory against the individual defendant, rather than against the entity
that employs him.” Id. at 167–68.
“When it comes to defenses to liability, an official in a personal-capacity action
may, depending on his position, be able to assert personal immunity defenses, such as an
objectively reasonable reliance on existing law.” Id. at 166–67. Indeed, “government
officials performing discretionary functions generally are granted qualified immunity and
are ‘shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.” Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). “Qualified immunity balances two important interests—the
need to hold public officials accountable when they exercise power irresponsibly and the
need to shield officials from harassment, distraction, and liability when they perform their
duties reasonably.” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009). “The protection of
qualified immunity applies regardless of whether the government official’s error is ‘a
mistake of law, a mistake of fact, or a mistake based on mixed questions of law and
fact.’” Id. (quoting Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 567 (2004) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting)).
In deciding a qualified immunity claim, the court should “first determine whether
the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed
to determine whether that right was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation.” Conn v. Gabbert, 526 U.S. 286, 290 (1999). Although the Supreme Court
mandated this procedure “for resolving government officials’ qualified immunity claims”
in Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Court reconsidered the two-step sequence
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announced in Pearson and determined the order of the analysis was not mandatory. In
any event, although the district courts now have discretion as to which prong to analyze
first, the two-prong test remains the same. See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236 (“On
reconsidering the procedure required in Saucier, we conclude that, while the sequence set
forth there is often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as mandatory. The judges
of the district courts and the courts of appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound
discretion in deciding which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should
be addressed first in light of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.”).
Given the underlying facts and allegations in the instant case, the court begins
with the first prong, i.e., whether Brown “has alleged the deprivation of a constitutional
right at all.” Brown alleges that Martin and the Mayor “violated [his] constitutional right
to property and should be held liable for the treatment of [him] based on his race,” Pl.’s
Resp. 22, but he does not cite a single provision of the U.S. Constitution or the U.S. Code
to support this argument. Nor does Brown cite any specific conduct attributable to
Martin or the Mayor that violated his rights. Brown only indicates that his “causes of
action are related to the actions that occurred on and after May 7, 2013[,] not related to
things that happened in 1970.” Id. at 23. Further, when pressed to do so by defendants in
their motion for summary judgment, Brown simply responded “that is not the standard.”
The court respectfully disagrees.
After defendants filed a well-supported motion for summary judgment, the burden
shifted back to Brown to demonstrate a genuine issue for trial. See Major, 2012 WL
3000680, at *1 (“The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of
demonstrating to the district court that there is no genuine issue of material fact,” but
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“when a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party
‘must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.’” (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e))). Nevertheless, even when given the opportunity to present a
genuine issue for trial, Brown failed to—and, indeed, refused to—“make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to” his § 1983 claim. See
Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322 (stating the plain language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
56(c) “mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and
upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the
existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial”); Major, 2012 WL 2000680, at *1 (“[C]onclusory allegations
or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude the granting of the summary
judgment motion.”).2
Because Brown is unable to identify any constitutional right of which Martin and
the Mayor deprived him, or articulate which actions constituted the deprivation, his claim
necessarily fails on the other prong of the qualified immunity analysis as well. See
Gabbert, 526 U.S. at 290 (stating that, in deciding a qualified immunity claim, the court
should “first determine whether the plaintiff has alleged the deprivation of a
constitutional right at all, and if so, proceed to determine whether that right was clearly
established at the time of the alleged violation”). If he cannot articulate which right is at
stake, then the court certainly cannot determine whether it was “clearly established” in
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And while a few constitutional provisions certainly come to mind, it is not the
court’s job to make Brown’s arguments for him. See Builders Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wingard
Props., Inc., No. 4:07-cv-3183, 2010 WL 4393270, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 29, 2010) (“It is
not this [c]ourt’s duty to scour the record in order to locate potential arguments on a
party’s behalf.”).
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2013. See id. To the extent Brown argues “[i]t is the [d]uty of the City based on [its]
obligation in issuing permits to be aware of [its] own easements,” this does not implicate
a constitutional right or any federal statutory rights.
Based on the foregoing, the court finds Martin and the Mayor are entitled to
summary judgment as to Brown’s § 1983 claim against them in their personal capacities.
Simply put, Brown failed to set forth any facts or cognizable arguments to establish a
genuine issue for trial.
B.
Remaining State Law Claims
Upon finding that Brown’s § 1983 claim fails as a matter of law, the court must
now determine whether it should exercise supplemental jurisdiction over his state law
claims under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). “A district court’s decision whether to exercise
[supplemental] jurisdiction after dismissing every other claim over which it had original
jurisdiction is purely discretionary.” Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635,
640 (2009); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (“The district courts may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . if . . . the district court has dismissed all claims
over which it has original jurisdiction.”); Yashenko v. Harrah’s NC Casino Co., 446 F.3d
541, 553 n.4 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Once a district court has dismissed the federal claims in an
action, it maintains ‘wide discretion’ to dismiss the supplemental state law claims over
which it properly has supplemental jurisdiction.” (quoting Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v.
Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 353–54 (1988))). In exercising this discretion, the court must
consider “convenience and fairness to the parties, the existence of any underlying issues
of federal policy, comity, and considerations of judicial economy.” Shanaghan v. Cahill,
58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995).
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Given that the court granted summary judgment in favor of Martin and the Mayor
as to Brown’s § 1983 claim arising under federal law, Brown’s remaining claims against
the City for inverse condemnation, gross negligence, and fraud all arise under South
Carolina law. The court finds that the parties would not be inconvenienced or unfairly
prejudiced by its decision not to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Brown’s
remaining claims, nor does the court find any underlying issues of federal policy involved
in his state law claims. See id. The comity factor, of course, weighs in favor of declining
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, and considerations of judicial economy demand the
same result. See id. Accordingly, the court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over Brown’s state law claims for inverse condemnation, gross negligence, and fraud.
See Carlsbad Tech., 556 U.S. at 640 (providing that the “district court’s decision whether
to exercise [supplemental] jurisdiction after dismissing every other claim over which it
had original jurisdiction is purely discretionary”).
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IV. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court GRANTS defendants’ motion for summary
judgment as to Brown’s § 1983 claim against Martin and the Mayor, and the court
REMANDS the remaining state law claims against the City for inverse condemnation,
gross negligence, and fraud to the Court of Common Pleas for Georgetown County.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
DAVID C. NORTON
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
August 23, 2016
Charleston, South Carolina
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