Pinckney v. United States of America, The

Filing 30

ORDER AND OPINION This order relates to all consolidated cases Despite clear evidence of system failures in the federal background check system, it is manifest that under the well-established standards of the FTCA and t he specific immunity provisions contained in Brady Act provide the victims of this tragedy no remedy at law. In exceptional circumstances, Congress may authorize a private bill to provide for compensation to victims where there is no remedy at law. < i>See, e.g., Act for the relief of sixteen employees of the Charleston Naval Shipyard, Private L. No. 98-12, 98 Stat. 3419 (1984) (private bill sponsored by Sen. Strom Thurmond). This is ultimately a determination of Congress. This Court has set forth detailed factual findings that may be of some assistance to Plaintiffs if they wish to petition their Government for a private relief bill. The Government's motion to dismiss is granted. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. (granting (43) Motion to Dismiss in case 2:16-cv-02356-RMG) Signed by Honorable Richard M Gergel on 6/18/2018. Associated Cases: 2:16-cv-02356-RMG et al.(sshe, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
Felicia Sanders, individually and as legal
custodian/or K.M , a minor,

)
)

Civil Action No. 2: 16-2356-RMG

)

Plaintiff,

)
)

v.

ORDER AND OPINION

)
)

United States of America,

This order relates to all consolidated
cases

)
)

Defendant.

)

This action and fifteen other related actions 1 were filed by surviving victims and the
estates of deceased victims who suffered injury or death at the hands of Dylann Roof when he
entered a bible study group at Emanuel A.M.E. Church on June 17, 2015, and murdered nine
persons with a Glock Model 41 pistol. Under federal law, Roofs narcotics arrest on February
28, 2015, disqualified him from receiving a firearm. Nevertheless, he was able to purchase the
Glock pistol from a federally licensed firearms dealer on April 11, 2015 because the FBI' s
National Instant Criminal Background Check System ("NICS") failed to discover Roofs
disqualifying arrest record. Plaintiffs have brought this present action against the United States
of America under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"), 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-80, for alleged acts
and omissions of federal employees associated with the NICS.
The United States moved to dismiss these actions for lack of jurisdiction and failure to
state a claim, asserting that these claims are barred under the discretionary function exception of
the FTCA, 28 U.S .C. § 2680(a), the immunity granted federal employees responsible for
1

The Court consolidated this case with following related cases: Civ. Nos. 2: 16-2351-RMG,
2:16-2352-RMG, 2:16-2350-RMG, 2:16-2354-RMG, 2:16-2355-RMG, 2:16-2746-RMG, 2:162357-RMG, 2:16-2358-RMG, 2:16-2359-RMG, 2:16-2360-RMG, 2:16-2378-RMG, 2:16-2405RMG, 2:16-2406-RMG, 2:16-2407-RMG, and 2:16-2409-RMG. (Dkt. No. 23.)

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providing information to the NICS, 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(6)(A), and that Plaintiffs fail to state a
claim under South Carolina tort law. Plaintiffs opposed the motion and moved for jurisdictional
discovery, arguing the Court required a more complete factual record before addressing the
Government's jurisdictional claims.

The Court agreed and granted Plaintiffs' motions,

authorizing extensive jurisdictional discovery. This was apparently the first instance where any
party has had the opportunity to obtain discovery regarding NICS procedures and operations.
The Government thereafter renewed its motions to dismiss and the parties briefed the issues.
The Court held an evidentiary hearing on March 20, 2018, and the parties were allowed to file
additional supplemental materials in the weeks following the hearing. With the completion of
jurisdictional discovery and the full briefing of the legal issues involved, the Court now rules on
the pending motion to dismiss.

I.

Legal Standards

A.

The Federal Tort Claims Act
The FTCA authorizes lawsuits against the United States for wrongful acts or omissions of

federal employees acting within the scope of their duties in circumstances where a private person
would be liable for similar claims in the jurisdiction where the claim arose. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
The FTCA's authorization of actions against the United States constitutes a limited waiver of
sovereign immunity, the common law doctrine that prohibited claims against the Government.
There are, however, significant exceptions to the Government's waiver of sovereign immunity
under the FTCA, the most relevant here being the provision that the Government cannot be held
liable "based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a
discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government,
whether or not the discretion involved be abused. " 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a). The discretionary
function exception is grounded on the premise that the judiciary should not "second guess"
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policy choices of the Executive Branch through private litigation.

28 U.S.C. § 2680(a);

Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531 , 536-37 (1988).
A claim falls within the discretionary function exception if two elements are satisfied.
First, the challenged conduct must be the product of a discretionary decision in which the
governmental conduct was a matter of judgment or choice. However, if law or policy mandated
a particular course of action, the discretionary function exception does not apply. Berkovits, 486
U.S. at 536 (" [T]he discretionary function exception will not apply when a federal statute,
regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a course of action for an employee to follow. In this
event, the employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive."). Second, the decision
must be "based on considerations of public policy." This second prong limits the discretionary
function exception to the kinds of judgments the exception "was designed to shield." Id. at 53637.
In this matter, the Court must determine whether the specific alleged negligent acts or
omissions of the federal employees or the federal agency, here relating to the processing of the
Roof background check, violated a controlling, mandated legal standard in which the federal
employees had no choice but to follow. If the alleged acts or omissions violated controlling law
or policy, the discretionary function exception would not apply.

On the other hand, if the

challenged acts or omissions were the product of a policy judgment or discretionary decision by
the agency, the claim is subject to being barred. Further, even if the acts or omissions were the
product of a discretionary decision of the agency, such acts or omissions must be related to
agency policy. For instance, a federal employee may be said to be exercising discretion in
operating a motor vehicle, but a dispute over negligent driving resulting in an accident is not

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barred by the discretionary function exception because the act in question does not relate to
agency policy.
When the Government asserts that a claim is barred by the discretionary function
exception, the burden is on the Plaintiff to demonstrate that the Court has subject matter
jurisdiction because the discretionary function exception does not apply.

All waivers of

sovereign immunity should be "strictly construed" in favor of the Government. Welch v. United

States, 409 F.3d 646, 651 (4th Cir. 2005). "The federal courts have held consistently that they
lack subject matter jurisdiction if the discretionary function exception bars the suit." Williams v.

United States, 50 F.3d 299, 305 (4th Cir. 1995).
B.

Immunity for claims arising under the NICS

The Government asserts that a specific federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(6), grants
immunity to the Government arising out of the failure to prevent the sale of a firearm to an
ineligible person through the processing of background checks in the NICS. The statute reads as
follows:
(6) Neither a local government nor an employee of the Federal Government or of
any State or local government, responsible for providing information to the
national instant criminal background check system shall be liable in an action at
law for damages(A) for failure to prevent the sale or transfer of a firearm to a
person whose receipt or possession of the firearm is unlawful
under this section; or
(B) for preventing such a sale or transfer to a person who may
lawfully receive or possess a firearm.
18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(6).
When Congress debated creation of the NICS as part of the Brady Act, there was

significant concern that making government actors responsible for vetting gun purchasers would
result in voluminous lawsuits when that vetting failed . See generally Brady Handgun Violence

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Prevention Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the H Comm.
on the Judiciary, l03d Cong. (1993). Congress' s clear intent in enacting § 922(t)(6) was to
prevent any assumption of monetary liability for the operation of the background check system.
E.g., 139 Cong. Rec. 28,529-30 (Nov. 10, 1993) (rejection of amendment offered to deny

immunity where the NICS search was not diligent). It is well settled that the United States may
assert any defense of immunity "which otherwise would have been available to the employee of
the United States whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, as well as any other defenses to
which the United States is entitled." 28 U.S.C. § 2674; Lomando v. United States, 667 F.3d 363 ,
375- 76 (3d Cir. 2011); Medina v. United States, 259 F.3d 220, 226 n.2 (4th Cir. 2001). These
immunity provisions appear to have had the effect Congress intended because this Court can find
no other case where a party has attempted to sue the United States for the alleged failure to
prevent the sale of a firearm under the NICS system to an ineligible person.
B.

Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6)

The Government has moved to dismiss these actions pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule
12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(l)
represents a challenge to the Court' s subject matter jurisdiction. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546
U.S. 500, 514 (2006). A challenge to subject-matter jurisdiction may contend either 1) that the
complaint fails to allege facts sufficient to establish subject matter jurisdiction or 2) "that the
jurisdictional allegations of the complaint [are] not true. " Adams v. Bain, 697 F.2d 1213, 1219
(4th Cir. 1982).

Where the sufficiency of the jurisdictional allegations in the complaint is

challenged facially, "the facts alleged in the complaint are taken as true, and the motion must be
denied if the complaint alleges sufficient facts to invoke subject matter jurisdiction." Kerns v.

United States, 585 F.3d 187, 192 (2009).

If, however the defendant contends "that the

jurisdictional allegations of the complaint [are] not true," the plaintiff bears the burden to prove

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facts establishing jurisdiction and the district court may "decide disputed issues of fact." Id. In
that case, because the plaintiffs allegations are not presumed true, "the court should resolve the
relevant factual disputes only after appropriate discovery." 24th Senatorial Dist. Republican

Comm. v. Alcorn, 820 F .3d 624, 629 (4th Cir. 2016). And where "the jurisdictional facts and the
facts central to a tort claim are inextricably intertwined," so that a challenge to the truth of the
jurisdictional facts indirectly challenges the plaintiffs claims on the merits, "the trial court
should ordinarily assume jurisdiction and proceed to the intertwined merits issues." Kerns, 585
F.3 at 193.
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the dismissal of an action if
the complaint fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Such a motion tests the
legal sufficiency of the complaint and "does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits
of the claim, or the applicability of defenses. . . . Our inquiry then is limited to whether the
allegations constitute ' a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is
entitled to relief. "' Republican Party of N. C. v. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir. 1992)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). In a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the Court is obligated to
"assume the truth of all facts alleged in the complaint and the existence of any fact that can be
proved, consistent with the complaint's allegations." E. Shore Mkts., Inc. v. JD. Assocs. Ltd.

P 'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th Cir. 2000). However, while the Court must accept the facts in a
light most favorable to the non-moving party, it "need not accept as true unwarranted inferences,
unreasonable conclusions, or arguments." Id.

To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint

must set forth "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell At!. Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007).

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II.

Factual Background

A.

Roof's February 28, 2015 arrest for unlawful possession of a controlled substance
On Sunday, February 28, 2015 , at 8:45 p.m., Officer Brandon M. Fitzgerald of the City of

Columbia, South Carolina, Police Department received a complaint from the security department
at the Columbiana Centre Shopping Mall that a white male wearing all black clothing was
entering stores and asking suspicious questions, such as how many associates were then working
in the store, when the store closed, and when the employees leave the store. (Dkt. No. 43-5 .)
The shopping center lies within Lexington County, South Carolina and the city limits of
Columbia. The city limits of Columbia are situated predominantly within adjacent Richland
County, but a small portion of the city in and around the Columbiana Centre lies within
Lexington County. The Columbia Police Department has jurisdiction over the shopping mall as
does the Columbia Municipal Court, but the Solicitor for the 11th Circuit, which has jurisdiction
over Lexington County, prosecutes cases from arrests at the shopping mall in the Columbia
Municipal Court and those arrests are initially processed at the Lexington County Sheriffs
Office.
Officer Fitzgerald made contact with the reported suspect, Dylann Roof, who behaved
"very nervously. " (Id.) Roof said he was visiting stores to apply for jobs, but admitted he had
not asked any store for an employment application. (Id.) Officer Fitzgerald then conducted a
consent search of Roofs person, finding orange square strips in a small white bottle. (Id.) Roof
initially lied that the strips were breath fresheners , but soon admitted that they were Suboxone, a
Schedule III narcotic. (Id.) Roof admitted that he had no prescription for Suboxone. (Id.)
Suboxone is prescribed to treat opioid addiction, FDA, Buprenophrine Drug Label, NDA 20732, 20-733 , at 43 (2010), and is often used by heroin addicts to control withdrawal symptoms,
Deborah Sontag, Addition Treatment with a Dark Side, N.Y. Times, Nov. 16, 2013 , at Al.
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Officer Fitzgerald then arrested Roof for illegal possession of a controlled substance.
(Dkt. No. 43-5.) Roof was booked at the Lexington County Sheriffs Office. (Dkt. No. 12-3 at
3.) The following day, March 1, 2015, Officer Fitzgerald applied for an arrest warrant from the
City of Columbia Municipal Court. In the affidavit, Officer Fitzgerald averred that he received
complaints from store owners regarding Roof, that he responded by making contact with Roof
and searching his person, that his search discovered what appeared to be Suboxone, that Roof
admitted he did not have a prescription, and that poison control confirmed Suboxone is a
Schedule III controlled substance. (Dkt. No. 44-6 at 2.) Judge Russell T. Spencer issued the
warrant that same day. The warrant states that the offense occurred within the "Municipality of
City of Columbia." (Id.) The complicated jurisdictional issues arising out of arrests made at the
Columbiana Mall contributed to later confusion concerning the location of arrest-related records
when Roofs NICS background check was performed.
On March 2, 2015, Roof was served with the arrest warrant issued by the Columbia
Municipal Court, and the Columbia Police Department submitted the incident report regarding
Roofs arrest to the National Data Exchange ("N-DEx"), an FBI-managed database. (Dkt., No.
43-7);

see

also

FBI,

National

Data

Exchange

(N-DEx)

System,

http://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/ndex. A second copy of the incident report was submitted to ND Ex by the Lexington County Sheriffs Office on March 3, 2015.

(Dkt. No. 43-7.)

The

Lexington County Solicitor's Office filed a criminal complaint against Roof on March 16, 2015,
charging him with possession of a controlled substance in violation of S.C. Code§ 44-53-370(c).
(Dkt. No. 44-28.) A first offense is a misdemeanor. S.C. Code§ 44-53-370(d)(2). The FBI has
publicly stated that the information in the Roof incident report was sufficient to establish Roof

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was disqualified from possessing a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3) as a drug user. (See Dkt.
Nos. 44-2; 43-8 at 29.)

B.

Procedures under the NICS
The FBI administers the NICS, which is charged with performing background checks on

persons seeking to purchase a firearm from a federall y licensed gun dealer. Federal law provides
that upon receipt of a request from a gun dealer for approval of a firearm sale, the NICS must
respond with "Proceed," meaning the sale may proceed, "Denied," meaning the sale may not
proceed, or "Delayed," meaning the sale may not proceed while further inquiries are made. 28
C.F.R. § 25.6(c)(iv)(A)-(C). 2 The NICS however is authorized to place a request in a delayed
status for only three business days, and the gun dealer may proceed with the sale after three
business days if a denial has not been issued. Id. § 25.6(c)(iv)(B). This tight time window is
imposed on a system incredibly stressed by the huge volume of daily inquiries received by NICS ,
which totaled on average 22,000 per day and 8.2 million per year in 2014. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 11.)
The initial inquiry from the gun dealer is delivered by telephone or electronically and is
assigned to an NICS examiner.

The examiners are governed by highly structured Standard

Operating Procedures ("SOPs"), which mandate the standards for approval or denial of the
firearm sale, what databases the examiners can access and who they may contact for background
information. Federal law identifies disqualifying factors for firearm purchases, including a prior
felony conviction, a history of domestic abuse, and unlawful use of controlled substances. 28
U.S.C. 922(g). After receipt of an inquiry from a gun dealer, the examiner is directed by the
NICS SOPs to three designated databases: the National Crime Information Center ("NCIC")
database, the NICS Index, and the Interstate Identification Index ("III"). The NCIC database
2

Thirty states rely on the NICS to perform their background checks, including South Carolina.
The other states have established their own background check systems. (Dkt. No. 44-2.)

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contains twenty-one "files" of various classes of persons, such as individuals on supervised
release, sex offenders, persons subject to protective orders, fugitives, suspected terrorists, and
persons

who

have had prior gun purchase attempts

http://www.fbi .gov/services/cjis/ncic.

denied.

FBI, About NCIC,

The NICS Index contains an-FBI maintained list of

persons prohibited from possessing firearms, with most of these records submitted by the Bureau
of Immigration and Customs Enforcement regarding removable aliens. (Dkt. No. 43-2 at 7.)
The III System is an index of persons arrested for felonies or misdemeanors, but the information
is very abbreviated and provides little substantive information. (Dkt. No. 43-2 at 6; 43-1 at 11
n.2.)
Notably the NICS examiners are denied access to the FBI-administered N-DEx system, a
comprehensive federal database created after 9/11 that contains over 500 million criminal justice
records.

This database includes incident and arrest records, booking reports, pretrial

investigations, supervised release reports, photos and identification records.

A vast array of

agencies have access to N-DEx, including local law enforcement agencies, campus police,
railroad security, probation officers, and prisons. See FBI, N-DEx Policy and Operating Manual
1.3.3.

If an examiner obtains sufficient information from initial database inquiries to bring into
question a purchaser's right to own a firearm but not enough to deny the purchase, the examiner
is then instructed to contact local law enforcement agencies to obtain additional information.
This commonly involves a request for incident reports, court disposition records and other
standard criminal justice information.

The examiners are directed to reach out to law

enforcement agencies by fax transmissions. (Dkt. No. 44-1 at 10.) The local law enforcement
agencies, which in most instances already have provided the very same information to the FBI

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via N-DEx, have no legal obligation to respond to the NCIS faxes, and the NICS in 2006
abolished the requirement that a second fax be sent out if no response was received. (Dkt. No.
64-1 at 4.) It is hardly surprising that under such a set of procedures, receipt of timely responses
from local law enforcement agencies within the three-day window is not perfect, thereby
allowing persons to acquire firearms without NICS examiners accessing potentially critical and
disqualifying law enforcement records. Ironically, most of these records vainly requested by
NICS examiners from local law enforcement agencies by fax are already in the possession of the
FBI in the N-DEx system, which is physically located in the same facility as the NICS in
Clarksburg, West Virginia.

See FBI, Criminal Justice Information Services (CJJS),

http://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis.
C.

Roof's unlawful acquisition of a firearm

On April 11, 2015, Roof went to Shooter's Choice, a federally licensed firearms dealer in
West Columbia, South Carolina and sought to purchase a Glock Model 41 semi-automatic pistol.
Trial Tr. Vol. IV at 659-74, United States v. Roof, Crim. No. 15-472-RMG (D.S.C. Dec. 12,
2016); (Dkt. No. 50-1at12). As part of the purchase process, Roof completed ATF Form 4473
and Shooter's Choice contacted NICS by telephone to obtain approval of the purchase. (Dkt.
No. 50-1 at 12.)
The telephone call from Shooter's Choice was directed to NICS's Dallas-Fort Worth Call
Center. (Id.) The call was received by a Customer Service Representative ("CSR"), who entered
the information from Roofs ATF Form 4473 into a NICS automated system, which
automatically queried three databases regarding Roof: the NCIC database, the NICS Index, and
the III database. (Id. ; Dkt. No. 43-8.) The NCIC database and the NICS Index returned no
information on Roof, but the III database provided the following limited information:

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Charge Literal

MDP, SCH I B,C,D LSD AND SCH II, COCAINE 3RD/SUB

Statute

(44-53-370(B)(l) SC)

Severity

Felony

(Dkt. No. 43-8 at 8.) The Lexington County Sheriffs Office was listed as the arresting agency.
The III database results contained a number of inaccuracies. First, Roof was arrested for
a first offense of simple possession of a controlled substance, Suboxone, a misdemeanor, not a
felony . Second, Roof was not arrested for a third or subsequent offense of distributing or
manufacturing a Schedule I or II narcotic in violation of S.C. Code 44-53-370(b)(l), a felony
punishable by up to thirty years imprisonment. Third, he was arrested by the Columbia Police
Department, not the Lexington County Sheriffs Office. These were all clerical errors made by
the Lexington County Sheriffs Office when Roof was booked into the Lexington County
Detention Center on February 28, 2015. See Lexington Cty. Sheriffs Office, Lexington County
statement on Dylann Roof gun purchase, http://www.lex-co.com/sheriff/media.aspx?mid=2330.
Because of the result reported from the III database, the CSR transferred the telephone
call from Shooter's Choice to an NICS legal instrument examiner in Clarksburg, West Virginia
for additional processing. (Dkt. No. 50-1 at 12.) The examiner received the call at 4:01 p.m. on
April 11 , 2015. (Id.) The examiner confirmed the III database result matched Roofs name, date
of birth, height, and weight "and tried to make a quick determination to Proceed, Deny, or Delay
the transaction." (Dkt. No. 50-2 at 1.) At 4:04 p.m.-only three minutes after receiving the
call-the examiner placed the transaction in a "delayed" status and notified Shooter' s Choice
that Roof could receive a firearm on April 16, 2015 unless told otherwise by NICS before then.
(Id. ) The transaction was placed in the NICS Delay Queue for further research. (Dkt. No. 50-2

at 1.)

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On the next business day, April 13, 2015, another NICS exammer pulled Roofs
transaction from the Delay Queue for further research. (Dkt. Nos. 43-8 at 22; 50-2 at 1.) Per
standard operating procedures, the examiner first checked internal NICS databases for
information about Roofs arrest but found no information beyond what was reported in the III
database. (Id. )3 The examiner, continuing to follow the standard operating procedures, then
checked the Lexington County Court's website and discovered State v. Dylann Storm Roof, Case
No. 2015A4021600503. (See Dkt. Nos. 43-11; 43-12.) The website accurately identified the
pending charge against Roof as "Drugs I Poss. of other controlled sub. in Sched. I to V - 1st
offense," a misdemeanor. (Dkt. No. 43-14 at 3.) The website did not name the arresting agency
explicitly, but it did name Officer Fitzgerald as the arresting officer with an address of "#1
Justice Square Columbia 29201," which is the headquarters of the Columbia Police Department.
(Id. at4.)
The online records available through the court webpage indicated that Roof might be
disqualified from a firearm purchase as a drug user, but, per NICS procedures, they were
insufficient to establish disqualification. To establish disqualification where there is a recent
drug arrest without a conviction, the SOPs require proof that the substance possessed was tested
and confirmed to be a controlled substance, or that the arrestee admitted that the substance was a
controlled substance. (Dkt. No. 44-29 at 3.) This required the examiner to obtain further details
3

One of the internal NICS databases the examiner checked on April 13, 2015 was the
Disposition Document File ("DDF"). The DDF is an internal NICS repository for offense
disposition documents obtained from prior NICS background checks. (Dkt. Nos. 44-1 at 8; 4414 at 17.) Plaintiffs have repeatedly asserted that the incident report for Roofs arrest was
available in the DDF. (E.g., Dkt. Nos. 44 at 19; 62 at 27-28; 63 at 1-2.) That assertion is
incorrect. The DDF could not contain documents relating to a prior attempt by Roof to purchase
a firearm because Roof had never before attempted to purchase a firearm from an FFL. Thus, it
is unsurprising that the record produced by the Government at the Court's request conclusively
shows that the incident report for Roofs arrest was not in the DDF in April 2015. (See Dkt. Nos.
43-8 at 22; 65-1~~7, 8; 68-1~7.)

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about the Roof arrest, which were contained in the arresting officer's incident report that the
Lexington County Sheriffs Office and the Columbia Police Department each had previously
submitted to the FBI via N-DEx.

Since the NICS examiners are denied access to the most

comprehensive federal criminal justice database, the examiner was unable to obtain the incident
report by a simple click of a mouse. Instead, the examiner was compelled to send out faxes in
the hope that she could obtain another copy of the previously submitted incident report from the
local law enforcement agencies. As the examiner sought to obtain a copy of the Roof incident
report, she was initially led astray by the inaccurate information the NICS had obtained from the
III database.
The examiner sent an automated fax to the Lexington County Sheriffs Office at 1:58
p.m. on April 13, 2015, requesting a copy of the Roof incident report for March 1, 2015. (Dkt.
No. 43-17.) She also sent an automated fax to the 11th Circuit Solicitor' s Office 2:00 p.m.,
requesting the same report.

(Id.)

The Lexington County Sheriffs Office responded to Ms.

Conley' s fax in approximately two hours, at 4:05 p.m. on April 13, 2015. (Id.) The response
stated, "No arrest or report for this date. The last arrest was on 2-28-15. Columbia PD will have
the report. " (Dkt. No. 43-22.)4 The 11th Circuit Solicitor's Office never responded to the NICS
fax. (Dkt. No. 43-17).
Rather than follow the information provided by the Lexington County Sheriffs Office
concerning the location of the Roof incident report, the examiner, following the literal
requirements of the NICS standard operating procedures, reviewed a list in the NICS database of
all law enforcement agencies operating in Lexington County.
4

The City of Columbia was

The discrepancy in dates appears to be the date of the incident at Columbiana Mall versus the
date of the arrest warrant. The III database reported an incident date of February 28, 2015 and an
arrest date of March 1, 2015. (Dkt. No. 43-8 at 28.) The difference in dates does not appear to
have caused any confusion as to what incident report was being sought.

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erroneously omitted from the list. Reviewing her list of Lexington County law enforcement
agencies, she noticed the City of West Columbia and contacted that city in an effort to locate the
Roof incident report. (Dkt. Nos. 44-4; 43-3 at 8; 43-6.) The examiner sent an automated fax
requesting the incident report to the West Columbia Police Department at 4:07 p.m., April 13,
2015. (See Dkt. Nos. 43-17; 44-1 at 13 .). At 8:46 a.m., April 14, 2015, the West Columbia
Police Department responded, "Not WCPD warrant. This is not a WCPD arrest." (Dkt. Nos. 4317; 43-23.)
After receiving the negative report from West Columbia, the examiner made no effort to
contact the Columbia Police Department, an agency with provides law enforcement services for
South Carolina' s capital city, because that option was not explicitly provided for in the NICS
SOPs.

Further, the examiner did not call the Lexington County Sheriffs Office for further

details about its earlier fax response, apparently following the NICS practice of not "promot[ing]
directly contacting [agencies] in an affirmative manner." (Dkt. No. 50-2 at 12.) Instead, the
examiner did nothing more. At 7:15 p.m., on April 16, 2015 , Roof returned to Shooter' s Choice
and obtained the semi-automatic pistol which he would use two months later to murder the
pastor and eight parishioners at a Bible study class at Mother Emanuel A.M.E. Church in
downtown Charleston.
The examiner made no further effort to follow up about the missing Roof incident report,
either before or after the three-day period. This is hardly surprising because, as revealed in the
jurisdictional discovery, the NICS practice was to make a single fax inquiry to a law enforcement
agency and to attempt no further follow up of any type. (Dkt. Nos. 64-1 ; 43-1 at 18-19.) This
"one and done" practice directly contradicts FBI statements to the public and Congress in NICS
operations reports that the NICS "continues to actively seek the missing record information

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beyond the three-business-day time frame" and "remains proactive in efforts to enhance criminal
history record and disposition reporting." FBI, National Instant Criminal Background Check
System, 2007 Operations 12 (2007); Id. 2015 Operations 14 (2015).

III.

Discussion

A.

Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the discretionary function exception
The record reveals that the FBI's background check system is disturbingly superficial,

excessively micromanaged by rigid standard operating procedures, and obstructed by policies
that deny the overworked and overburdened examiners access to the most comprehensive law
enforcement federal database.

Reports by the FBI's Inspection Division and the then FBI

Director, James Corney, make much of the fact that the examiners adhered to every policy and
procedure of the agency. (Dkt. Nos. 50-1 at 5; 44-2.) The Court finds that is literally correct
because the SOPs require the examiners only to send a single automated fax to a law
enforcement agency with no expectation or requirement that follow up work be done if the
necessary records are not obtained. Since little is required, it was hardly difficult for examiners
to complete the modest requirements of the NICS SOPs.
When the Roof examiner was told by the Lexington County Sheriffs Office that the
requested record was in possession of the Columbia Police Department, the NICS SOPs
instructed her to look at a contact list of all law enforcement agencies in Lexington County,
which she did. When Columbia was not listed, she sent an inquiry to a similarly named City of
West Columbia. When West Columbia promptly responded it was not the arresting agency, a
reasonable and logical procedure would have been to follow the lead already given that the City
of Columbia had the arrest record. A simple Google search would have produced the contact
information for the Columbia Police Department. But the NICS SOPs did not address this
potential situation and NICS practice prohibited any general internet search. (See Dkt. No. 43-3
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at 8.) Consequently, the examiner elected to do nothing. This may not have met the most
minimal standards of common sense or due care, but the examiner did not violate her agency's
policy.
The fault here lies in some abysmally poor policy choices made regarding the operation
of the NICS.

The most obvious of these poor policy choices was the decision to deny the

examiners access to the most comprehensive federal criminal justice database, N-DEx. The
Roof incident report was provided to the FBI via N-DEx by two separate local law enforcement
agencies, and Roof would not have obtained approval to purchase the murder weapon if the
examiner could have accessed the report.

This would have also saved the examiner in this

transaction, and likely many other examiners in thousands of other transactions, a great deal of
time and effort in a system that is already tremendously overburdened.
The Court fully understands that the decision to deny the NICS examiners access to the
most comprehensive federal database is a policy choice and the FTCA provides the Government
immunity for policy choices (even really bad policy choices) under the discretionary function
exception.

The Government, nonetheless, argues endlessly and unpersuasively that it was

somehow correct in denying its examiners access to this important repository of information.
Having carefully reviewed and considered the Government's arguments, the Court finds the
offered explanations to be simple nonsense.
The Government argues that access to N-DEx is restricted to law enforcement agencies
and the NCIS system is not a criminal justice agency. (Dkt. No. 44-25 at 20). Denial of access
to NCIS examiners on this basis makes little sense. The N-DEx Policy and Operating Manual
allows the information to be use for criminal investigations, pretrial release investigations,
presentence investigations, prison intake, supervised release investigations, and employment

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background checks. FBI, N-DEx Policy and Operating Manual 1.3.4. Performing a background
check by a branch of the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services Division to prevent the

unlawful acquisition of a firearm by a convicted felon, a person under a court protective order, or
a user of illegal drugs constitutes quintessential law enforcement activity. This is every bit or
more core a law enforcement activity than an employment background check, which is an
allowable use ofN-DEx.
Further, the Government has repeatedly asserted a "law enforcement privilege" over
portions of internal NICS documents that set forth NICS operating procedures, claiming
disclosure "would impede or impair the effectiveness of an investigative technique, method or
procedure of the FBI." (E.g. , Dkt. Nos. 44-4; 64-1.) Those assertions are irreconcilable with the
Government' s argument that NICS is not a "criminal justice entity."

The Court finds the

Government' s assertion of a law enforcement privilege over NICS operating procedures
constitutes an admission that NICS is a criminal justice agency.
The Government further contends that the Code of Federal Regulations prohibits NICS
access to N-DEx by providing an exclusive list of databases to be used by NICS. (Dkt. No. 4414 at 9.) The regulation referenced provides that NICS will, upon receipt of a background check
request, "Search the relevant databases (i.e. , NICS Index, NCIC, III) for any matching records."
28 C.F.R. § 25.6(c)(iii); (see also Dkt. No. 44-14 at 13 (confirming that is the regulation he
referenced)). That regulation was written before N-DEx existed. Compare National Instant
Criminal Background Check System Regulation, 63 FR 58303-01 , 1998 WL 754140 (Oct. 30,
1998) with (Dkt. No. 44-14 at 9 (N-DEx was created in response to 9/1 1)). The Government' s
construction of the regulation ignores the plain meaning of "relevant databases" to construe a list
of databases in a parenthetical, preceded by "i.e." and written almost twenty years ago, as

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prohibiting access to a subsequently created, highly relevant database. The Court finds that
argument wholly without legal merit.
A Department of Justice Inspector General's audit report, conducted to investigate the
shortcomings of the FBI in Dylan Roofs unlawful acquisition of a firearm, states:
[A] check of the National Data Exchange (N-DEX), an FBI-developed repository
of unclassified criminal justice records, would have revealed a prohibiting
incident report for the alleged shooter [Dylann Roof] , leading INSD [FBI
Inspection Division] to recommend the FBI seek to identify and review additional
database resources or stakeholders both internal and external to the FBI. FBI
officials told us that its NICS Section would need law enforcement approval (by
way of the Advisory Policy Board) and a regulation change (28 CFR Part 25) in
order to access N-DEX to conduct firearm background checks.
Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Audit of the Handling of Firearms
Purchase Denials Through the National Instant Criminal Background Check System ii (2016).
The purported need for a regulatory change is not credible for the reasons set forth above. The
purported need for approval by the CJIS Advisory Policy Board (Dkt. Nos. 44-14 at 51 ; 44-25 at
35), likewise is not credible. The CJIS Advisory Policy Board was created by the FBI Director
in 1994. FBI, The CJJS Advisory Process, http://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/the-cjis-advisoryprocess. The Advisory Board makes recommendations to the Director of the FBI regarding "the
philosophy, concept, and operational principles of various criminal justice information systems
managed by the FBI's CJIS Division." 28 C.F.R. § 20.35(a). It does not have authority to deny
an FBI division access to an FBI-managed criminal information database.
§ 20.35(d).

See 28 C.F.R.

The Court finds that the Director of the FBI has full authority to allow NICS

examiners to access N-DEx. He could do this today.
The NICS SOPs contain many other limitations and restrictions that merit further review
by the FBI Director in light of this tragedy. The NICS "one and done" approach to the request of
information is not defensible, and there must be a mechanism to follow up if no response is

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provided to an initial inquiry. Further, if the background check cannot be completed within three
days, the NICS should do as it has promised the public and Congress but failed to do-continue
its efforts to locate potentially critical information after the three day period. The system's
continued reliance on faxes is also dubious and outdated, and its prohibition of its examiners
accessing general internet search engines seems hopelessly stuck in 1995. If more financial
resources and staff are needed to complete the important task of performing background checks,
and keeping firearms out of the hands of illegible people, the Director should be candid with
Congress regarding the system's needs and flaws.
The glaring weaknesses revealed in the background check system, however, are the
function of distinct policy choices made by the FBI, not violations of specific legal standards.
The United States is immune from Plaintiffs' claims because such policy choices fall squarely
within the discretionary function exception. The Government's motion to dismiss based on the
discretionary function exception is granted.
B.

The Plaintiffs' claims are barred by the immunity provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(6)

The Court must note from the outset that the Government has blown hot and cold on the
issue of whether the specific immunity provisions in the Brady Act, 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(6), bars
the claims of Plaintiffs. The issue was first raised by the Government in its reply brief, then
abandoned at oral argument, and asserted again in post-trial briefs. (Dkt. Nos. 50-9; 69 at 63-64;
69 at 27-30).

This change of positions is "a distasteful occurrence" and is "not to be

encouraged," United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 423 (4th Cir. 2018), but the Court is
disinclined to find a waiver of congressionally mandated immunity. Plaintiffs fully briefed this
issue and addressed it at the evidentiary hearing, and it is obvious to the Court that a claim of
negligence in the operation of the NICS system resulting in a prohibited person obtaining a
firearm falls plainly within the scope of the Government's immunity.
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Plaintiffs seek to avoid the immunity provision by arguing that this action is more like an
attack on the operations of the agency, rather than the negligence of individual federal
employees. This argument cannot survive minimal scrutiny. The Government cannot act other
than through its employees. Their conduct gives rise to any negligence claim. Moreover, if this
is actually an attack on the policies of the agency, rather than the conduct of individual
employees, the claims necessarily are barred by the discretionary function exception.

The

Government's motion to dismiss based on immunity under 18 U.S.C. § 922(t)(6) provides a
second and independent ground to support the Government's motion.

C.

South Carolina Tort Law
Because the Court concludes it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case, it does not

reach the Government's arguments under Rule 12(b)(6) for dismissal on the merits based on
South Carolina' s public duty rule and other issues of South Carolina tort law.
IV.

Conclusion
The jurisdictional discovery conducted in this matter provided important information

concerning how this tragic failure of the FBI's background check system occurred.

The

examiner's failure to obtain access to Roof's February 28, 2015 drug arrest incident report was
critical. Important contributing factors to this failure includes the denial of access to NCIS
examiners to the N-DEx database, the NCIS policy of making a single request for records with
no follow up to local law enforcement agencies, and the prohibition against examiners using
internet search engines to follow leads. Human error also contributed to this failure, including
erroneous entries by the Lexington County Sheriff's Office into federal databases and the
omission of the City of Columbia from the NCIS list of Lexington County law enforcement
agencies. Perhaps the FBI, learning fully the details of the failure of its system in this tragic

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series of events, will promptly take corrective steps to prevent a similar' failure of the system in
the future.
Despite clear evidence of system failures in the federal background check system, it is
manifest that under the well-established standards of the FTCA and the specific immunity
provisions contained in Brady Act provide the victims of this tragedy no remedy at law. In
exceptional circumstances, Congress may authorize a private bill to provide for compensation to
victims where there is no remedy at law. See, e.g., Act for the relief of sixteen employees of the
Charleston Naval Shipyard, Private L. No. 98-12, 98 Stat. 3419 (1984) (private bill sponsored by
Sen. Strom Thurmond). This is ultimately a determination of Congress. This Court has set forth
detailed factual findings that may be of some assistance to Plaintiffs if they wish to petition their
Government for a private relief bill. The Government's motion to dismiss is granted.

AND IT IS SO ORDERED.

Junef8 , 2018
Charleston, South Carolina

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