Williams v. Reynolds

Filing 14

OPINION AND ORDER declining to adopt 9 Report and Recommendation. The case will proceed. This action is re-referred to the Magistrate Judge for pretrial matters. Signed by Honorable Cameron McGowan Currie on 11/9/2016. (ssam, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
C/A No. 2:16-2835-CMC

Darrell Williams, #219730,
Plaintiff
v.

Opinion and Order
Cecelia Reynolds, Warden,
Defendant.

This matter is before the court on Petitioner’s pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus,
filed in this court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(c), DSC, this
matter was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Mary Gordon Baker for pre-trial
proceedings and a Report and Recommendation. On September 15, 2016, the Magistrate Judge
issued a Report recommending that Petitioner’s motion be summarily dismissed as time-barred.
ECF No. 9. The Magistrate Judge advised the parties of the procedures and requirements for
filing objections to the Report and Recommendation and the serious consequences if they failed
to do so. Petitioner filed objections to the Report on September 30, 2016. ECF No. 12.
Standard
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation
has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with the
court. See Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976). The court is charged with making a de novo
determination of any portion of the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge to
which a specific objection is made. The court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part,

the recommendation made by the Magistrate Judge or recommit the matter to the Magistrate
Judge with instructions. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b).
Discussion
The court has conducted a de novo review of the record and has considered Petitioner’s
objections, the entire record, the applicable law, and the Report and Recommendation of the
Magistrate Judge. After review, the court declines to adopt the Report’s assessment of the
timeliness of the petition and whether equitable tolling applies to this matter. For the reasons
discussed below, the court finds the petition is timely filed, and that tolling has extended the
filing period in this matter.
As noted by the Magistrate Judge, this matter is controlled by the Anti-Terrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). Under the AEDPA, the limitation period for §
2254 petitions runs from the latest of:
(d)(1)(A) the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final by the conclusion
of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from making a motion by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the
Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have
been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(d)(2)The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or
other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall
not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.
28 U.S.C. § 2244.

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The claims and assorted filings in this case are difficult to follow. While the conviction
Petitioner is challenging in the instant petition was unclear from his petition, he confirmed in his
objections that this petition seeks to challenge a 2008 conviction. ECF No. 12. Therefore, as the
Magistrate Judge explained in the Report, this is not a successive filing.1 ECF No. 9 at 6.
The timeliness of the instant petition, however, is not as easily determined. Petitioner
was sentenced for his 2008 burglary conviction on September 24, 2008.

State v. Darrell

Williams, No. 2008GS4013175 (S.C. Gen. Sessions Sept. 24, 2008).2 His motion for a new trial
was denied on March 26, 2010. Id. He filed an appeal in 2010 (exact filing date is unknown)
which was denied by unpublished per curiam opinion of the South Carolina Court of Appeals on
November 13, 2013. State v. Williams, No. 2010-157626, 2013 WL 8541561 (S.C. Ct. App.
Nov. 13, 2013).
In addition to motions and appeals in his criminal case, Petitioner filed two applications
for Post-Conviction Relief (“PCR”) with the South Carolina courts. His first was filed on
January 11, 2010 and denied on July 1, 2010. Darrell Williams v. State of South Carolina, No.

1

As explained below, Defendant’s first filed habeas petition challenged his 1995 convictions, and
was dismissed with prejudice. Williams v Catoe, et al., C/A No. 4:00-cr-265 (D.S.C. Jan. 8,
2003). To the extent his second habeas petition (Williams v. Padula, C/A No. 8:10-cr-2688
(D.S.C. Jan. 27, 2011)) challenged his 2008 conviction and sentence, it was dismissed for failure
to exhaust state remedies, which is not a dismissal “on the merits.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S.
473, 485-89 (2000) (holding that a dismissal for failure to exhaust state remedies was not
adjudicated on the merits and therefore a subsequent habeas petition is not second or successive);
see also Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 379-80 (4th Cir. 2002) (abrogated on other grounds by
Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S.Ct. 1289 (2011).
2

See Richland County Public Index, available at
http://www5.rcgov.us/SCJDWEB/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx.

3

2010CP3400008 (S.C. Common Pleas July 1, 2010).3 His second PCR, challenging the 2008
conviction, was filed on November 22, 2013 and dismissed on January 2, 2015.

Darrell

Williams v. State of South Carolina, No. 2013CP4007117 (S.C. Common Pleas Jan. 2, 2015).4
Defendant filed a notice of appeal from the order denying the 2013 PCR application on January
14, 2015 and certiorari was denied by the South Carolina Supreme Court on August 10, 2016.
Id.
As for federal filings, Petitioner has filed three habeas petitions. Defendant’s first filed
habeas petition challenged his 1995 convictions, was filed on January 24, 2000, and was
dismissed with prejudice on January 8, 2003. Williams v Catoe, et al., C/A No. 4:00-cr-265
(D.S.C. Jan. 8, 2003). His second habeas petition, filed on October 20, 2010, appeared to
challenge both his 1995 and 2008 convictions, but was dismissed as successive (to the extent the
1995 convictions were challenged) and for failure to exhaust state remedies (as to the 2008
conviction) on January 27, 2011. Williams v. Padula, C/A No. 8:10-cr-2688 (D.S.C. Jan. 27,
2011). The instant petition was filed on August 11, 2016. ECF No. 1.
Based on these filings, it appears that Petitioner has not exhausted the AEDPA statute of
limitations. His 2008 burglary conviction was final, after post-judgment motions and appeal, on
November 13, 2013. Petitioner thereafter filed a PCR application regarding the 2008 conviction
on November 22, 2013, which tolled the AEDPA statute of limitations. See § 2244(d)(2) (“The
time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review

3

See Marlboro County Public Index, available at
http://publicindex.sccourts.org/Marlboro/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx.

4

See Richland County Public Index, available at
http://www5.rcgov.us/SCJDWEB/PublicIndex/PISearch.aspx.
4

with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.”). That PCR proceeding was not
complete until the South Carolina Supreme Court denied certiorari on August 10, 2016. Since
the AEDPA statute of limitations was tolled starting on November 22, 2013 and ending on
August 10, 2016, Petitioner had nearly a year (minus nine days for the gap between the appeal
denial for the 2008 conviction and the filing of the PCR) within which to file his § 2254 petition.
Having filed on August 11, 2016, he is within the statute of limitations after tolling.
As Petitioner did not provide any information regarding the timing of his direct appeal
until he filed objections, the Magistrate Judge was unable to determine the date on which the
2008 burglary conviction was final. However, the timeline of the appeal shows that Petitioner’s
2008 conviction was not final until November of 2013, and the subsequent PCR filing tolled the
AEDPA statute of limitations until August 2016.
Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, Petitioner’s § 2254 is neither successive nor untimely.
Therefore, the court declines to adopt the Report and the case will proceed. This action is rereferred to the Magistrate Judge for pretrial matters.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Cameron McGowan Currie
CAMERON MCGOWAN CURRIE
Senior United States District Judge
Columbia, South Carolina
November 9, 2016

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