Adams v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration
Filing
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ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION the Court adopts the Report, reverses the decision of the Commissioner, and remands pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for further evaluation of Plaintiffs claim. Signed by Honorable Donald C Coggins, Jr on 03/20/2019. (cpeg, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
Nokomis Adams,
)
)
Plaintiff,
)
)
v.
)
)
Nancy A. Berryhill, Acting Commissioner )
of Social Security Administration,
)
)
Defendant. )
________________________________ )
C/A No. 2:17-cv-3271-DCC
OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) seeking judicial review of
the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security (“Commissioner”) denying her
claim for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) and Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”).
In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 (D.S.C.), this matter
was referred to a United States Magistrate Judge for pre-trial handling. On January 29,
2019, Magistrate Judge Mary Gordon Baker issued a Report and Recommendation
(“Report”), recommending that the decision of the Commissioner be reversed and
remanded. ECF No. 13. On February 11, 2019, the Commissioner filed objections to the
Report. ECF No. 15. On February 14, 2019, Plaintiff filed a Reply. ECF No. 16. For the
reasons stated below, the Court adopts the Report and incorporates it herein by
reference.
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court.
The
recommendation has no presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final
determination remains with this Court. Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270–71. The
Court is charged with making a de novo determination of only those portions of the Report
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that have been specifically objected to, and the Court may accept, reject, or modify the
Report, in whole or in part. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).
The role of the federal judiciary in the administrative scheme established by the
Social Security Act (“the Act”) is a limited one. Section 205(g) of the Act provides, “[t]he
findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be
conclusive . . . .”
42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
“Substantial evidence has been defined
innumerable times as more than a scintilla, but less than preponderance.” Thomas v.
Celebreeze, 331 F.2d 541, 543 (4th Cir. 1964). This standard precludes a de novo review
of the factual circumstances that substitutes the court’s findings for those of the
Commissioner. Vitek v. Finch, 438 F.2d 1157 (4th Cir. 1971). The court must uphold the
Commissioner’s decision as long as it was supported by substantial evidence and
reached through the application of the correct legal standard. Johnson v. Barnhart, 434
F.3d 650 (4th Cir. 2005). “From this it does not follow, however, that the findings of the
administrative agency are to be mechanically accepted. The statutorily granted right of
review contemplates more than an uncritical rubber stamping of the administrative
action.” Flack v. Cohen, 413 F.2d 278, 279 (4th Cir. 1969). “[T]he courts must not
abdicate their responsibility to give careful scrutiny to the whole record to assure that
there is a sound foundation for the [Commissioner’s] findings, and that his conclusion is
rational.” Vitek, 438 F.2d at 1157–58.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff applied for DIB and SSI in July 2014, alleging that she has been disabled
since January 29, 2012, due to diabetes, hypertension, depression, anxiety and PTSD.
Plaintiff’s claims were denied initially, and Plaintiff requested a hearing before
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Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”). The ALJ denied Plaintiff's claims in a written decision.
Plaintiff asked the Appeals Council to review the ALJ's decision; however, the Appeals
Council denied Plaintiff's request, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the
Commissioner for purposes of judicial review.
In her request for judicial review, Plaintiff raises four claims. First, Plaintiff alleges
the ALJ improperly discounted her treating psychologist's opinions. Second, Plaintiff
contends the ALJ improperly assessed her mental RFC. Third, Plaintiff claims the ALJ
improperly evaluated her testimony's consistency with other evidence. Finally, Plaintiff
contends the ALJ provided the vocational expert flawed hypothetical questions.
The Magistrate Judge provides a thorough recitation of the facts of this case and
the applicable legal standards in her Report, which the Court incorporates by reference.
The Magistrate Judge evaluated the merits of Plaintiff’s arguments and found Plaintiff's
third claim meritorious.
In that regard, the Magistrate Judge found that the ALJ’s
evaluation of Plaintiff's subjective complaints was insufficient to allow judicial review.
Therefore, the Magistrate Judge recommended remanding the case so that the ALJ may
provide the requisite analysis.1
The Commissioner filed Objections, claiming the
Commissioner properly evaluated Plaintiff's subjective complaints.
DISCUSSION
The Commissioner contends the ALJ issued a well-reasoned opinion with a
credibility determination that is supported by substantial evidence. In Reply, Plaintiff
contends that the "ALJ made no more than a boilerplate finding on [Plaintiff's] statements
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The Magistrate Judge did not address Plaintiff's remaining allegations of error, but noted
the ALJ should consider Plaintiff's remaining allegations of error on remand.
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by finding they were inconsistent with the evidence without specifying what statements
were found inconsistent with other[s] nor what other evidence those statements allegedly
conflicted with." ECF No. 16 at 2. The Court agrees with Plaintiff and overrules the
Commissioner's objections.
The Report thoroughly outlines the regulations applicable to evaluating subjective
complaints, including the two-step that the ALJ must use. See ECF No. 13 at 5–6. The
Court has reviewed the ALJ's decision, which merely summarily concludes Plaintiff's
subjective complaints are unsupported by the medical evidence. See ECF No. 7-2 at 17
("At the February 10, 2017, hearing, the claimant appeared and gave testimony that was
inconsistent and unsupported by her medical evidence of record.").
Yet, the ALJ's
decision does not identify what parts of Plaintiff's testimony about her symptoms were
inconstant with other evidence. As the Report correctly notes, SSR 16-3p requires such
specificity. See ECF No. 13 at 6–7 (discussing the regulation's requirements for specific
discussion of inconsistencies). Moreover, the ALJ did not discuss the relevant factors for
evaluating symptoms at all, much less demonstrate that he actually considered the
factors. To that end, this Court rejects Commissioner's argument that reviewing courts
must rubber stamp an ALJ's decision that contains merely a blanket statement that the
ALJ has considered the relevant regulations. See ECF No. 15 at 4.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, the Court adopts the Report, reverses the decision
of the Commissioner, and remands pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) for
further evaluation of Plaintiff’s claim as indicated above.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
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s/ Donald C. Coggins, Jr.
United States District Judge
March 20, 2019
Spartanburg, South Carolina
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