Battle et al v. South Carolina Department of Corrections et al

Filing 139

ORDER RULING ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION 120 of Magistrate Judge Mary Gordon Baker (130 in 2:19-cv-00574-TMC-MGB, 129 in 2:19-cv-00575-TMC-MGB, 136 in 2:18-cv-00719-TMC-MGB, 130 in 2:19-cv-00572-TMC-MGB, 131 in 2:19-cv-005 76-TMC-MGB). The court ADOPTS the Report of the magistrate judge and incorporates it herein by reference. The court finds that Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment 106 is MOOT to the extent it seeks summary judgment as to Plaintif fs' § 1983 claims against SCDC. In light of Plaintiffs' notice of withdrawal of all § 1983 claims against SCDC, the court hereby DISMISSES those claims. The court DENIES Defendants' motion for partial summary judgment 106 to the extent Defendants request that the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims against SCDC. Signed by Honorable Timothy M Cain on 12/20/2019. Associated Cases: 2:18-cv-00719-TMC-MGB, 2:19-cv-00572-TMC-MGB, 2:19-cv-00574-TMC-MGB, 2:19-cv-00575-TMC-MGB, 2:19-cv-00576-TMC-MGB(rshu, )

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
Korell Battle,
Plaintiff,
v.
South Carolina Department of
Corrections; Warden Cecilia
Reynolds, individually and in her
official capacity as Warden of Lee
Correctional Institution; and Warden
Aaron Joyner, individually and in his
official capacity as Warden of Lee
Correctional Institution,
Defendants.
Darnell Brown,
Plaintiff,
v.
South Carolina Department of
Corrections; Warden Cecilia
Reynolds, individually and in her
official capacity as Warden of Lee
Correctional Institution; and Warden
Aaron Joyner, individually and in his
official capacity as Warden of Lee
Correctional Institution,
Defendants.
Ronnie Drake,
Plaintiff,
v.
South Carolina Department of

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C/A No. 2:18-cv-719-TMC
ORDER

C/A No. 2:19-cv-572-TMC
ORDER

C/A No. 2:19-cv-574-TMC
ORDER

Corrections; Warden Cecilia
Reynolds, individually and in her
official capacity as Warden of Lee
Correctional Institution; and Warden
Aaron Joyner, individually and in his
official capacity as Warden of Lee
Correctional Institution,
Defendants.
Lance Lyles,
Plaintiff,
v.
South Carolina Department of
Corrections; Warden Cecilia
Reynolds, individually and in her
official capacity as Warden of Lee
Correctional Institution; and Warden
Aaron Joyner, individually and in his
official capacity as Warden of Lee
Correctional Institution,
Defendants.
John Mack,
Plaintiff,
v.
South Carolina Department of
Corrections; Warden Cecilia
Reynolds, individually and in her
official capacity as Warden of Lee
Correctional Institution; and Warden
Aaron Joyner, individually and in his
official capacity as Warden of Lee
Correctional Institution,
Defendants.

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C/A No. 2:19-cv-575-TMC
ORDER

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C/A No. 2:19-cv-576-TMC
ORDER

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The above-captioned cases arise from alleged incidents of prison violence occurring in
2016 and 2017 at Lee Correctional Institution (“LCI”) in Bishopville, South Carolina. Originally,
the plaintiffs in each of these actions were co-plaintiffs in a single action filed in South Carolina
state court alleging federal and state law claims against Defendants South Carolina Department of
Corrections (“SCDC”); Warden Cecilia Reynolds, individually and in her official capacity as
Warden of LCI (“Warden Reynolds”); and Warden Aaron Joyner, individually and in his official
capacity as Warden of LCI (“Warden Joyner”). (ECF No. 1-1). The original action was removed
to federal court, (ECF No. 1), and the court subsequently severed it into separate actions. (ECF
No. 81).1 In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Local Civil Rule 73.02, D.S.C., this matter
was referred to a magistrate judge for pretrial handling. Defendants filed identical motions for
partial summary judgment in each of the above-captioned cases. (ECF No. 106). Plaintiffs filed a
joint response in opposition to partial summary judgment, (ECF No. 110), and the magistrate judge
conducted a hearing, (ECF No. 112).
This matter is now before the court on the magistrate judge’s Report and Recommendation
(“Report”), recommending that the court dismiss Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against SCDC and that

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In the original action, there were seven plaintiffs. (ECF No. 1-1). After dismissing Plaintiff
Jabari Moore’s § 1983 claims and remanding his remaining claims to state court, the court severed
the action into six separate actions. (ECF No. 81). For ease of reference, the court refers to docket
entries in this order using the civil action number of the original case, Battle et al. v. South Carolina
Department of Corrections et al., 2:18-cv-719-TMC.
Additionally, the court has addressed Defendants’ motion for summary judgment in one of these
actions—Brown v. South Carolina Department of Corrections et al., 2:19-cv-573-TMC—by
separate order because Defendants’ seek summary judgment as to Jeffrey Brown’s claims against
all Defendants, not merely the § 1983 claims against SCDC as they do in the other five actions.
This order addresses Defendants’ identical motions for summary judgment only as to the Plaintiffs
in the other five actions—Korell Battle, Darnell Brown, Ronnie Drake, Lance Lyles and John
Mack.

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the court deny Defendants’ request that the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
Plaintiffs’ remaining state law claims against SCDC. (ECF No. 120). Defendants filed objections
to the Report (ECF No. 123), and Plaintiffs filed a reply (ECF No. 125) .
I. Background
Plaintiffs allege that while they were incarcerated at LCI in 2016 and 2017, they were
subjected to similar attacks by other inmates as a result of Defendants’ “system-wide failures” to
ensure inmate safety and, in particular, their failure to control “the use of illegal contraband
weapons” at LCI. (ECF No. 21 at 6). Plaintiffs allege that in each case, the attacks occurred when
correctional officers “abandoned their posts,” left “cell or wing doors unlocked,” or otherwise
acted in violation of SCDC’s policies and procedures. Id. at 7. Moreover, Plaintiffs allege that
Defendants “were aware of these deficiencies and substandard patterns and practices within
SCDC” but failed to correct them even though they knew “their failure[] to correct these
substandard patterns or practices would lead to serious bodily injury [to] the Plaintiffs.” Id. at 6.
Plaintiffs further allege that these failures, including the substandard performance of LCI’s
correctional officers, resulted from Defendants’ “gross[ly] negligen[t]” failure “to employ
sufficient correctional officers, . . . to enforce its policies and procedures, [or] . . . to train or retrain
its correctional officer[s] to comply with the existing policies and procedures,” as well as their
“grossly negligent, reckless, willful, wanton, and/or deliberate[ly] indifferent actions.” Id. at 8.
Plaintiffs assert identical claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that all three
Defendants abridged their rights under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. (ECF No.
21 at 9-13). Plaintiffs also assert claims against SCDC under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act.
See S.C. Code. Ann. § 15-78-10 et seq. (ECF No. 21 at 13-15). Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief;
actual, consequential and punitive damages; and attorney fees and costs. Id. at 15-16.

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Defendants filed this motion for partial summary judgment, seeking dismissal of Plaintiffs’
§ 1983 claims only as to Defendant SCDC. (ECF No. 106-1 at 7-9). Defendants argue that because
SCDC, a state agency, has not waived its immunity under the Eleventh Amendment, Plaintiffs
cannot maintain claims against it under § 1983. Id. Additionally, Defendants argue that if the
court dismisses Plaintiffs’ § 1983 claims against SCDC, the court should decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims against SCDC that remain. Id. at 9-10. After
initially opposing Defendants’ argument that SCDC was entitled to summary judgment on
Eleventh Amendment Immunity grounds, Plaintiffs all subsequently withdrew their § 1983 claims
against SCDC. (ECF No. 113 at 4). Plaintiffs, however, urged the court to retain jurisdiction over
the state law claims against SCDC. (ECF No. 110 at 18).
The magistrate judge, after a hearing on the motion, issued a Report finding that
Defendants’ motion as to the § 1983 claims against SCDC was moot but recommending that the
court maintain jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims against SCDC. (ECF No. 120 at 12).
The magistrate judge noted that “even if the Court grants the motion for Partial Summary Judgment
in its entirety, federal causes of action will remain against Defendants Warden Reynolds and
Warden Joyner” and concluded that “defendants have failed to present any compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction over the state law claims against SCDC.” Id. at 9.
Defendants filed objections to the Report, arguing that if the court exercises supplemental
jurisdiction, Defendants will suffer prejudice from the differing standards of proof that apply to §
1983 claims and claims under the Tort Claims Act. (ECF No. 123 at 4). Specifically, Defendants
argue that jurors are likely to be confused by the fact that a mere negligence standard applies to
the state law claims against SCDC while a deliberate indifference standard applies to the federal
claims against the individual Defendants. Id. at 5. In response, Plaintiffs urge the court to adopt

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the Report “in full.” (ECF No. 125 at 3). Highlighting the fact that their federal and state claims
arise from closely-related factual bases, Plaintiffs argue that no compelling circumstances exist for
the court to decline jurisdiction and that any potential confusion can be alleviated by appropriate
jury instructions. Id. at 5.
II. Standard of Review for Report and Recommendation
“The magistrate makes only a recommendation to this court. The recommendation has no
presumptive weight, and the responsibility to make a final determination remains with this court.”
Estrada v. Witkowski, 816 F. Supp. 408, 410 (D.S.C. 1993) (citing Mathews v. Weber, 423 U.S.
261, 270–71 (1976)). This Court “shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the
report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b)(1). “The filing of objections to a magistrate’s report enables the district judge to focus
attention on those issues—factual and legal—that are at the heart of the parties’ dispute.” Thomas
v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147 (1985). “[W]hen a party makes general and conclusory objections that
do not direct the court to a specific error in the magistrate’s proposed findings and
recommendations,” de novo review is unnecessary. Orpiano v. Johnson, 687 F.2d 44, 47 (4th Cir.
1982) (citations omitted). As recounted above, Defendants filed a specific objection as to the
magistrate judge’s recommendation that the court continue to exercise jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’
state law claims against SCDC. Accordingly, the court will consider that portion of the Report de
novo and review the remainder of the Report for clear error.
III. Discussion
Section 1367 of Title 28 of the United States Code provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so
related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part
of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution.
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28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Claims are part of the same “case or controversy” when they “derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact . . . such that [the plaintiff] would ordinarily be expected to try
them all in one judicial proceeding.” United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966).
Plaintiffs’ federal and state law claims in this case share a common set of operative facts and are
thus part of the same case or controversy. Nonetheless, a district court “may decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over a claim” if the “court has dismissed all claims over which it has
original jurisdiction.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). “[T]rial courts enjoy wide latitude in determining
whether or not to retain jurisdiction over state claims when federal claims have been extinguished.”
Shanaghan v. Cahill, 58 F.3d 106, 110 (4th Cir. 1995). “Among the factors that inform this
discretionary determination are convenience and fairness to the parties, the existence of any
underlying issues of federal policy, comity, and considerations of judicial economy.” Id.
In their objections, Defendants make only one argument—that the differing standards of
proof for § 1983 claims and state law claims brought under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act
could potentially confuse the jury and render the proceedings unfair for the Defendants. (ECF No.
123 at 5-6). Defendants do not suggest that convenience, policy concerns or judicial economy
require the court to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction.
The court agrees with the magistrate judge that the applicable factors support the continued
exercise of jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ state law claims against SCDC. These state law claims,
which have been pending for nearly two years, share the same core of operative facts with the
federal claims against the individual Defendants that are still before this court. The court finds
that judicial economy, convenience and fairness to the parties are better served by the court’s
continued exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims. While the court recognizes
that the differing standards applicable to the federal and state claims in this case could potentially
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create confusion, “the risk of jury confusion can be reduced by judicious use of special verdict
[forms] and carefully drawn instructions.” Roget v. Lucas, No. Civ. B-90-335(WWE), 1990 WL
253071, at *1 (D. Conn. Nov. 28, 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted) (concluding that
potential juror confusion did not justify declining pendant jurisdiction over state claims that were
related to civil rights claims under § 1983). Defendants’ objections to the Report are overruled.
IV. Conclusion
As set forth above, the court ADOPTS the Report of the magistrate judge (ECF No. 120)
and incorporates it herein by reference. The court finds that Defendants’ motion for partial
summary judgment (ECF No. 106) is MOOT to the extent it seeks summary judgment as to
Plaintiffs § 1983 claims against SCDC. In light of Plaintiffs’ notice of withdrawal of all § 1983
claims against SCDC, the court hereby DISMISSES those claims.

The court DENIES

Defendants’ motion for partial summary judgment (ECF No. 106) to the extent Defendants request
that the court decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims against
SCDC.2
IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/Timothy M. Cain
United States District Judge

Anderson, South Carolina
December 20, 2019

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To the extent Defendants’ motion seeks summary judgment as to all claims of Plaintiff Jeffery
Brown, the court granted the motion by separate order entered in that action. See Brown v. South
Carolina Department of Corrections et al., 2:19-cv-573-TMC.
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