White v. Iseman et al
Filing
37
ORDER: For the foregoing reasons, the Court ADOPTS the R & R of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No. 36) as the order of the Court. Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 36) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The m otion is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiffs § 1983 claim is DISMISSED. The motion is DENIED to the extent that Plaintiffs remaining state law claims are REMANDED to state court for disposition. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Honorable Richard M Gergel on 5/5/20.(ltap, )
2:18-cv-01043-RMG
Date Filed 05/05/20
Entry Number 37
Page 1 of 8
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
Alfred T. White,
)
)
Plaintiff,
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)
v.
)
)
Jonathan Chase Isemen, Brandon T. Braxton,
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and Clarendon County Sheriff’s Office,
)
)
Defendants.
)
__________________________________________)
Civil Action No. 2:18-1043-RMG
ORDER AND OPINION
Before the Court is the Report and Recommendation (“R & R”) of the Magistrate Judge
(Dkt. No. 36) recommending the Court grant in part and deny in part Defendants Jonathan Chase
Iseman, Brandon T. Braxton, and Clarendon County Sheriff’s Office’s (collectively “Defendants”)
Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 31). For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts
the R & R as the order of the Court, grants Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff Alfred T. White’s
42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, denies summary judgement without prejudice as to Plaintiff’s remaining
state law claims, and remands said state law claims to Clarendon County.
I.
Background1
On October 13, 2016, Plaintiff was driving southbound on Interstate 95 in Clarendon
County, South Carolina. (Dkt. No. 31-2 at 1).2 Deputy Iseman pulled Plaintiff over for speeding
and driving close to the white fog line. (Id.). After Plaintiff pulled over, Isemen approached the
1
All facts are viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, the non-moving party.
Both parties submit and rely on Defendant Iseman’s October 13, 2016 Incident Report, the
contents of which the Court finds are generally undisputed. Both parties also submit and rely on
the Dash Cam Video of the traffic stop at issue.
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passenger side of Plaintiff’s vehicle, requested Plaintiff’s license and registration, and requested
Plaintiff meet Iseman at the front of his patrol vehicle. (Id.). While next to Plaintiff’s car, Iseman
observed multiple cell phones throughout the vehicle, an open bible on the passenger seat, and a
bookbag, a dog crate, and a bag of dog food in the back of the car. (Id.).3 Once both individuals
were in front of the patrol car, Iseman explained to Plaintiff he conducted the traffic stop because
Plaintiff was speeding and driving too close to the fog line. Plaintiff told Iseman he was a Florida
resident and had been visiting family in Virginia. Plaintiff explained a cousin had rented the car
for a period of seven days so that Plaintiff could drive to Florida, pack his belongings, and move
to Virginia. (Id. at 2).
At this point, Iseman asked Plaintiff about prior arrests. According to the Incident Report,
Plaintiff “hesitated and then stated he had been arrested for drugs in the past.” Iseman “could see
that [Plaintiff] was beginning to become increasingly nervous as Deputy Iseman could see his
breathing increase.” Plaintiff’s “pulse in [his] neck” was visible. Plaintiff told Iseman that
“everything in the vehicle belonged to” Plaintiff and asserted there were no illegal items in the car.
When Iseman asked Plaintiff if he was carrying currency over $10,000, Plaintiff “looked away and
changed his response.” (Id.).
At this point, roughly six minutes into the traffic stop, Iseman asked to search Plaintiff’s
car. Plaintiff refused. Within roughly a minute Deputy Braxton arrived on the scene with a K-9
unit. The K-9 returned a positive alert. Iseman searched the car and opened the bag of dog food.
Iseman found a duct taped package consistent with “drugs or money.” Braxton and Iseman, neither
of whom had searched Plaintiff’s person, pulled out their weapons, pointed them at Plaintiff, and
3
In opposition, and without citation to the factual record, Plaintiff contends he only had “his own
cell phone, an extra cell phone he found at a rest area and promptly returned, and an iPod.” (Dkt.
No. 32 at 8). Plaintiff admits, however, this his iPod looks like a cellphone. (Id.).
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detained Plaintiff with handcuffs. (Id.); see also Dash Cam Video, (Dkt. No. 32-3). Iseman learned
the package was cash money. Initially, Plaintiff stated the money was his and “saved from doing
landscaping.” (Dkt. No. 32-2 at 3).4 According to Plaintiff, Braxton and Iseman “threatened
Plaintiff with arrest if he did not disavow the funds” and “forced” Plaintiff to return to return to
the Sheriff’s Office with them. There, allegedly because he “felt pressured . . . so he would not be
arrested,” Plaintiff signed a Department of Homeland Security abandonment form stating that he
disowned the $30,000 cash found in the dog food bag.
On March 7, 2018, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants alleging state law claims
for false imprisonment (First Cause of Action), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Second
Cause of Action), conversion (Third Cause of Action), negligence/gross negligence/recklessness
(Fourth Cause of Action), negligent supervision/training (Fifth Cause of Action), and a federal
claim under § 1983 for intentional violation of Plaintiff’s civil rights by excessive force and
unreasonable search and seizure (Sixth Cause of Action). (Dkt. No. 1-1). On September 11, 2019,
Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgement. (Dkt. No. 31). Plaintiff filed a response in
opposition on September 25, 2019. (Dkt. No. 32). Defendants filed a reply on October 2, 2019.
(Dkt. No. 33). Defendants’ motion has been fully briefed and is ripe for disposition.
II.
Legal Standard
a. Report and Recommendation
The Magistrate Judge makes only a recommendation to this Court that has no presumptive
weight. The responsibility to make a final determination remains with the Court. See Mathews v.
Weber, 423 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1976). The Court may “accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in
part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge.” 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1). This
4
At this point, each party’s narrative diverges slightly.
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Court must make a de novo determination of those portions of the R & R Plaintiff specifically
objects to. Fed. R. Civ. P. 72 (b)(2). Where Plaintiff fails to file any specific objections, “a district
court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must only satisfy itself that there is no clear
error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” Diamond v. Colonial Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 315 (4th Cir. 2005). (internal quotation omitted). “Moreover,
in the absence of specific objection to the R & R, the Court need not give any explanation for
adopting the recommendation.” Wilson v. S.C. Dept of Corr., No. 9:14-cv-4365-RMG, 2015 WL
1124701, at *1 (D.S.C. Mar. 12, 2015). Neither party filed objections in this case, and the R & R
is reviewed for clear error.
b. Motion for Summary Judgment
To prevail on a motion for summary judgment, the movant must demonstrate that there is
no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The Court interprets all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and
in favor of the non-moving party. U.S. v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962). Where the
moving party has met its burden, the non-moving party must come forth with “specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (citing Rule 56(e)), though the “mere existence of a scintilla of
evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient” to create a genuine dispute,
Lilly v. Crum, No. 2:19-CV-00189, 2020 WL 1879469, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Apr. 15, 2020) (citing
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986)).
III.
Discussion
After a thorough review of the R & R, the Court finds that the Magistrate Judge ably
addressed the issues and correctly concluded Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on
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Plaintiff’s § 1983 claim for excessive force and unreasonable search and seizure. The Magistrate
Judge also correctly determined that Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims should be remanded to
Clarendon County.
a. Unlawful Search and Seizure
Upon a review of the parties’ arguments and the R & R, the Court finds the Magistrate
Judge ably addressed the issues and correctly determined that Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants unlawfully seized Plaintiff by deploying the K-9
around Plaintiff’s car, prolonging the instant traffic stop.
The Magistrate Judge correctly found Iseman’s initial “seizure” of Plaintiff was justified
because, as Plaintiff admits, Plaintiff was committing a traffic violation by speeding. White
Deposition, (Dkt. No. 31-6 at 2) (admitting Plaintiff was exceeding the posted speed limit when
Iseman pulled him over); United States v. Williams, 740 F.3d 308, 312 (4th Cir. 2014) (“When an
officer observes a traffic offense—however minor—he has probable cause to stop the driver of the
vehicle.”).
The Magistrate Judge then correctly concluded that no reasonable jury could find that
Defendants’ prolongation of the instant traffic stop by roughly 1-2 minutes for a dog sniff was
unreasonable. Dash Cam Video, (Dkt. No. 32-3 at 16:41:01) (initiating K-9 free air sniff roughly
seven minutes into traffic stop); United States v. Bernard, 927 F.3d 799,805 (4th Cir. 2019) (“A
police officer can extend the duration of a routine traffic stop . . . if there is reasonable suspicion
that an illegal activity is occurring”). As fully described in the R & R, which this Court adopts in
whole, and as per the Incident Report cited by both parties, Iseman had reasonable suspicion
criminal activity was afoot. While speaking to Plaintiff from the passenger side door, Iseman
observed Plaintiff had multiple cellphones and a bible open on his front seat. For Iseman, based
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on his experience and training, these signs were indicative of drug trafficking—the first to avoid
detection and wiretaps by law enforcement and the second as a means of making law enforcement
believe the individual is not involved in illegal activity. (Dkt. No. 32-2 at 3). When viewed in
combination with the fact Plaintiff became visibly nervous when questioned about past arrests,
Iseman’s decision to prolong Plaintiff’s traffic stop with Braxton’s K-9 was objectively reasonable.
See United States v. Branch, 537 F.3d 328, 336 (4th Cir. 2008) (“If a police officer wants to detain
a driver beyond the scope of a routine traffic stop, [ ] he must possess a justification for doing so
other than the initial traffic violation . . . [and] a prolonged automobile stop requires either the
driver’s consent or a reasonable suspicion that illegal activity is afoot.”). And because the K-9
returned a positive alert, Defendants’ search of Plaintiff’s car was lawful. Branch, 537 F.3d at 340
n. 2 (“[I]t is well settled that a “positive alert” from a drug detection dog, in and of itself, provides
probable cause to search a vehicle.”).
Defendants are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s unlawful search and seizure
claim.
b. Excessive Force
Upon a review of the parties’ arguments and the R & R, the Court finds the Magistrate
Judge ably addressed the issues and correctly determined that Defendants are entitled to summary
judgment on Plaintiff’s claim that Defendants used excessive force against Plaintiff.
Plaintiff argues that Braxton and Iseman’s pointing their weapons at him and forcibly
handcuffing him upon their finding a “brick” of an unknown substance in a bag of dog food was
unreasonable. The Magistrate Judge correctly determined, however, that the amount of force used
by Braxton and Iseman was objectively reasonable under the circumstances. E.g. Henry v. Purnell,
652 F.3d 524, 531 (4th Cir. 2011) (Fourth Amendment claims of excessive use of force during an
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arrest or seizure are considered under an “objective reasonableness” standard). Plaintiff’s own
evidence shows that, when Defendants located the “brick” of an undetermined substance in
Plaintiff’s car (later determined to be cash), Plaintiff was standing at the back of his vehicle,
unrestrained, and having never been searched. (Dkt. No. 32-2). For the reasons noted above,
Iseman had a reasonable suspicion Plaintiff was transporting drug contraband. Thus, there was
nothing unreasonable about either Braxton or Iseman drawing their weapons and handcuffing
Plaintiff. See Braxton Deposition, (Dkt. No. 31-11 at 1-5) (explaining why securing a driver under
such circumstances is warranted and necessary); see also Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396
(1989) (discussing factors to consider in assessing a police officer’s actions under the “objective
reasonableness” standard).
Defendants are therefore entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff’s excessive force
claim.
c. Plaintiff’s Remaining State Law Claims
Having granted summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s sole federal law claim, the
Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Plaintiff’s remaining state law claims should be
remanded to state court. The Magistrate Judge correctly applied Carnegie-Mellon v. Cohill, 484
U.S. 343 (1988) and found that judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity to state courts
dictate that this action be remanded. See, e.g., Mills v. Leath, 709 F. Supp. 671, 676 (D.S.C. 1988)
(noting federal courts should decline to exercise pendant jurisdiction where the sole federal claim
is dismissed and only state-law claims remain).
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court ADOPTS the R & R of the Magistrate Judge (Dkt.
No. 36) as the order of the Court. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. No. 36) is
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GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The motion is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiff’s
§ 1983 claim is DISMISSED. The motion is DENIED to the extent that Plaintiff’s remaining
state law claims are REMANDED to state court for disposition.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
s/ Richard Mark Gergel
United States District Court Judge
May 5, 2020
Charleston, South Carolina
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