Flowers v. Premier VTL LLC et al
Filing
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ORDER AND OPINION granting in part and denying in part 4 Defendant Preferred Service's Motion to Dismiss, or, in the alternative, for a more definite statement. Plaintiff is ORDERED to file a more definite statement as described herein. Plaintiff's conversion claim is DISMISSED. The motion is otherwise DENIED. AND IT IS SO ORDERED. Signed by Honorable Richard M Gergel on 6/15/2018.(sshe, )
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION
Civil Action No. 2:18-1279-RMG
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Plaintiff,
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v.
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Premier V.T.L., LLC and Preferred Service,)
LLC,
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Defendants.
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Patrick Flowers,
ORDER AND OPINION
This matter is before the Court on Defendant Preferred Service's motion to dismiss, or, in
the alternative, for a more definite statement. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in
part and denies in part the motion.
I.
Background
Plaintiff alleges he was employed by Defendant Premier V.T.L and Defendant Pre(erred
Service in 2016. Plaintiff alleges Defendants never paid him for mileage or overtime and that they
made improper deductions from his paychecks. He filed the present action in Charleston County
Court of Common Pleas, asserting claims for violation of the South Carolina Payment of Wages
Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), conversion, and unjust enrichment on April 4, 2018.
Preferred removed on May 9, 2018.
When filing the notice of removal, Preferred included
Premier' s pro se "Consent to Removal." That consent is ineffective because an LLC may not
appear pro se, but the lack of consent does not appear to effect removal jurisdiction because it does
not appear that Premier has been served. See 28 U.S.C. ยง 1446(b)(2)(A).
II.
Legal Standard
Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits the dismissal of an action if
the complaint fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Such a motion tests the
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legal sufficiency of the complaint and "does not resolve contests surrounding the facts, the merits
of the claim, or the applicability of defenses. . . . Our inquiry then is limited to whether the
allegations constitute ' a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled
to relief. "' Republican Party ofN C. v. Martin , 980 F.2d 943 , 952 (4th Cir. 1992) (quotation marks
and citation omitted). In a Rule 12(b)( 6) motion, the Court is obligated to "assume the truth of all
facts alleged in the complaint and the existence of any fact that can be proved, consistent with the
complaint's allegations." E. Shore Mias., Inc. v. JD. Assocs. Ltd. P 'ship, 213 F.3d 175, 180 (4th
Cir. 2000). However, while the Court must accept the facts in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, it "need not accept as true unwarranted inferences, unreasonable conclusions, or
arguments." Id.
To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must state "enough facts to state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face. " Bell At!. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). Although
the requirement of plausibility does not impose a probability requirement at this stage, the
complaint must show more than a "sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully. "
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A complaint has "facial plausibility" where the
pleading "allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged." Id.
Under Rule 12(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
A party may move for a more definite statement of a pleading to which a responsive
pleading is allowed but which is so vague or ambiguous that the party cannot
reasonably prepare a response . . .. If the court orders a more definite statement
and the order is not obeyed within 14 days after notice of the order or within the
time the court sets, the court may strike the pleading or issue any other appropriate
order.
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e). Whether a motion for a more definite statement should be granted is
"generally left to the district court's discretion." Hodgson v. Va. Baptist Hosp., 482 F.2d 821, 824
(4th Cir. 1973).
III.
Discussion
Preferred makes three arguments in favor of dismissal.
First, Preferred argues the
complaint fails to allege a sufficient employment relationship between Plaintiff and Preferred
because it alleges both Defendants employed Plaintiff without explaining the relationship between
the two Defendants or their respective relationships with Plaintiff. While the Court does not expect
Plaintiff to have detailed knowledge of Defendants' business arrangements before discovery,
Plaintiff must have had some reason for naming two different companies as Defendants, and
Defendants are entitled to know what that reason is. Plaintiff provides a reason in its opposition
to the motion to dismiss: "Although Plaintiffs payment documents indicate Plaintiff was
employed by Premier, agents of his employer company identified themselves to Plaintiff as
Preferred employees." (Dkt. No. 5.) But factual allegations may not be made in an opposition to
a motion to dismiss. Frederico v. Home Depot, 507 F.3d 188, 201-02 (3d Cir. 2007) ("It is
axiomatic that a complaint may not be amended by the briefs in opposition to a motion to
dismiss."). The Court therefore grants the alternative relief of a more definite statement regarding
what allegations are made regarding which Defendant.
Preferred also argues the FLSA preempts conversion and unjust enrichment claims. The
Fourth Circuit has held that common law claims cannot be used to enforce the FLSA. Anderson
v. Sara Lee Corp., 508 F .3d 181 , 194 (4th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff responds that his conversion and
unjust enrichment claims seek only enforcement ofrights not created by the FLSA, while his FLSA
claim seeks recovery of overtime pay. Cf Manning v. Boston Med. Ctr. Corp. , 725 F.3d 34, 55
(1st Cir. 2013) (" [I]nsofar as these common law claims sought to recover overtime pay, they were
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preempted because they conflicted with the FLSA' s comprehensive remedial scheme" and so the
"state law claims are accordingly limited to the recovery of ' straight-time' pay, i.e. , unpaid wages
for non-overtime hours at her regular hourly rate."). But that is not at all clear from the complaint.
(See, e. g. , Dkt. No. 1-1
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29, 31 .) The Court therefore orders a more definite statement regarding
what exactly Plaintiff seeks to recover under each asserted cause of action.
Finally, Preferred argues failure to pay wages cannot support a claim for conversion under
South Carolina law. That is correct. Owens v. Zippy Mart of S.C. , Inc., 234 S.E.2d 217, 218
( 1977). Plaintiff concedes that "if Defendants were to initially owe and fail to pay funds but
nothing more, the law in this state would not support a cause of action for conversion," but argues
conversion applies here because Plaintiff was terminated in retaliation for seeking unpaid wages.
(Dkt. No. 5 at 5-6.) That argument is unavailing. The termination did not change the fact that
" [t]he relationship between the parties was one of creditor and debtor," which is insufficient to
support a conversion claim. Owens, 234 S.E.2d at 219; see also Anderson, 508 F.3d at 190 (same
result under North Carolina' s similar law of conversion). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiffs
conversion claim.
IV.
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the
motion to dismiss, or in the alternative for a more definitive statement (Dkt. No. 4.) Plaintiff is
ORDERED to file a more definite statement as described herein. Plaintiffs conversion claim is
DISMISSED. The motion is otherwise DENIED.
AND IT IS SO ORDERED.
Richard Mark Gergel
United States District Court Judge
June J~-: 2018
Charleston, South Carolina
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